l^quf  a%5  bg  t?tm  to 

tl|0  ICItbrarg  of 

prinrrton  StjMlogtral  S^^mtnarg 


.0-7:^" 


BASAL    COjSTCEPTS    IN 
PHILOSOPHY 


BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN 
PHILOSOPHY 


AN  INQUIRY  INTO  BEING,  NON-BEING,   AND  BECOMING 


ALEXANDER  T.  ORMOND,  Ph.D. 

PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN  PRINCETON  UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YORK 

CHARLES   SCRIBNER'S   SONS 

1894 


Copyright,  1894,  by 
CHARLES  SCRIBNERS  SONS 


TROW   DIRECTORY 

PniNTING  AND   BOOKBINDING  COMPANY 

NEW  YORK 


PREFACE 

The  motive  of  this  volume  is  a  desire  to  restore 
tlie  primacy  of  certain  conceptions  which  are  in 
danger  of  disappearing  from  our  modern  thinking, 
and  to  reform  others  which,  as  I  think,  have  been 
wrongly  or  inadequately  conceived.  Reflection  has 
led  me  to  dissent  from  monistic  pantheism  on  the 
one  hand,  and  from  agnosticism  on  the  other,  two  of 
the  leading  tendencies  in  the  thought  of  our  cen- 
tury, and  to  seek  a  metaphysical  basis  for  philos- 
ophy that  may  adequately  ground  a  rational  theory 
of  knowledge  and  being.  With  this  end  in  view,  I 
have  sought  to  reconstruct  philosophy  upon  the 
trinal  categories  of  being,  non-being,  and  becoming, 
and  also  to  reform  the  current  methods  of  meta- 
physics by  showing  that  a  completely  rational  idea 
of  being  can  be  achieved  only  when  we  represent  it 
under  our  highest  and  most  concrete  categories  and 
translate  it  into  self-conscious  personal  spirit.  The 
result  is  a  siDiritualistic  metaphysic  which  leads  us 
to  ground  the  world  of  reality  in  an  Absolute  pos- 
sessed of  supreme  intelligence,  goodness,  and  love. 

The  order  in  which  the  basal  concepts  emerged  in 
my  own  thinking,  is  substantially  as  follows :  Hav- 
ing, by  historic  study  and  reflection,  become  con- 


Vl  PREFACE 

vincecl  of  the  identity  of  the  logos  with  the  principle 
of  conscious  personality,  I  began  to  see  its  value  as 
a  means  of  j)enetrating  the  opaque  absolute  of  the 
agnostic  creed,  and  obtaining  an  intelligible  concep- 
tion of  its  inner  nature  and  connection  with  the  rela- 
tive. The  application  of  the  logos-category  led  di- 
rectly to  the  i^ersonal  construction  of  being  and  to 
the  idea  of  the  Absolute  as  personal,  self-conscious 
spint.  It  was  at  this  point  that  the  dualistic  light 
came  to  me  in  an  intuition  of  the  immanent  move- 
ment or  dialectic  of  si3irit.  For  it  became  clear  that 
the  activity  of  a  self-conscious  spirit  must  be  first  of 
all  intellectual,  and  that  its  primal  intellection  would 
be  dual  in  its  nature,  including  a  positive  intuition  of 
being's  self  or  the  logos,  and  a  negative  intuition  of 
its  not-self  or  the  a-logos.  And  reflection  made  it 
clear  also  that  the  logos  and,  a-logos  are  primal  and 
mutually  exclusive  opi^osites,  and  that  while  spirit- 
ual being  is  to  be  conceived  as  exercising  internally 
the  activity  which  intuites  the  i^ositive  and  negative 
terms,  yet  the  object  of  the  negative  intuition,  the 
a-logos,  must  be  excluded  from  being  as  its  oppo- 
site ;  that  is,  as  non-being. 

The  exclusion  of  non-being  from  being  as  its  op- 
posite, never  to  be  identified  with  it,  laid  the  foun- 
dations of  a  dualistic  creed,  and  through  it  of  a 
reform  of  spiritual  dialectic  in  the  direction  of  a 
non-pantheistic  theory  of  creation  and  the  connection 
of  the  Absolute  with  the  sphere  of  relativity.  For  it 
became  clear  that  the  primal  intuition  of  non-being 
would  motive  an  outgo  of  volitional  energy  into  the 


PREFACE  Vll 

negative  sphere  for  its  suppression  and  annulment 
and  that  the  nature  generated  out  of  it  would  not  be 
pure  being  but  becoming,  a  creature  including  in  its 
constitution  opposite  moments  of  being  and  non-be- 
ing. Thus,  through  the  conception  of  the  negative 
datum,  I  began  to  see  that  an  answer  might  be  forth- 
coming to  the  hitherto  unresolved  problem,  why  the 
creative  energy  of  the  Absolute  falls  short  of  an  ab- 
solute result  and  only  produces  the  finite  and  imper- 
fect. The  book  itself  must  answer  the  question  how 
far  the  solution  is  to  be  regarded  as  satisfactory. 
For  the  last,  but  not  least  important,  insight  I  have 
to  thank  the  great  master  of  thinking,  Aristotle. 
The  identification  of  his  category  of  self  -  activity 
with  the  nature  of  absolute  and  self-existent  being, 
was  the  "holding  turn"  that  reduced  all  the  ele- 
ments to  final  unity  and  coherence. 

In  the  unfolding  of  these  basal  concepts  a  certain 
use  of  symbolism  has  become  necessary.  But  the 
discerning  reader  will  penetrate  the  shell  to  the 
kernel  that  it  conceals.  In  conclusion,  I  wish  to  dis- 
claim any  purpose  to  add  another  to  existing  sys- 
tems of  philosophy,  of  which  the  world  is  already 
over-full.  My  ambition  is  rather,  through  the  em- 
phasising of  certain  fundamental  ideas,  to  impart  a 
new  spiritual  vitalitj^  to  the  body  philosophic.  It  is 
possible  for  philosophy  to  be  spiritually  dead  Avhile 
it  is  intellectually  alive.  But  it  is  only  through  its 
spiritual  energy  that  it  is  able  to  become  an  impor- 
tant organ  of  truth  and  to  minister  to  the  highest 
needs  of  humanity. 


Vm  PREFACE 

I  wish  to  acknowledge  the  great  debt  I  owe  to  my 
honored  teacher,  the  venerable  McCosh,  to  the  spirit 
of  whose  realistic  philosophy  I  hope  my  own  work 
will  be  found  to  be  loyal.  My  acknowledgments 
are  due  to  Mr.  A.  L.  Frothingham,  Sr.,  of  Princeton, 
for  imioortant  suggestions  regarding  the  principle  of 
dualism  and  for  kindness  in  reading  and  criticising 
my  manuscript ;  also  to  my  colleague,  Professor  A. 
F.  West,  for  painstaking  and  appreciative  interest 
in  my  work  and  for  many  helpful  criticisms  and 
suggestions,  and  to  my  pupil,  Mr.  G.  A.  Tawney,  for 
valuable  assistance  in  reading  proof-sheets.  There 
are  other  obligations  which  cannot  be  acknowledged 
in  detail.  My  indebtedness  to  the  masters,  Plato, 
Aristotle,  Plotinus,  Augustine,  Kant,  Hegel,  and 
Lotze,  is  too  obvious  to  require  special  mention. 

Alexander  T.  Ormond. 

Princeton,  January  20,  1894. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 
1 


Introductory, 

I.  The  Norm, ^ 

11.  Being  and  Non-being, 24 

III.  Becoming, 44 

IV.  Space  and  Time, 59 

V.  Cosmic  Nature, "^^ 

VI.  Organic  Nature, 83 

VII.  Psychic  Nature, 96 

VIII.  Consciousness, 115 

IX.  Morality, 125 

X.  Non-being  and  Evil, 138 

XI.  Communal  Nature, 155 

Xn.  History, I'^'l 

XIII.  Religion, 194 

XIV.  Art, 218 

XV.  Knowledge, '^^5 

XVI.  Logos, 255 

XVIL  God, 266 

XVIII.  Spiritual  Activity, 292 

Conclusion, ^^^ 


BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN 
PHILOSOPHY 


INTKODUCTOEY 

One  of  the  most  striking  features  of  contemporary- 
thought  is  its  weakness  in  resiiect  to  fundamental 
philosophical  concei^tions.  The  masses  of  the  in- 
telligent are  espousing  agnosticism,  not  as  the  re- 
sult of  any  reasoned  conviction,  but  out  of  sheer 
inability  to  rise  above  the  middle  axioms  of  human 
thinking.  To  this  weakness  is  due  in  great  measure 
the  prevalence  of  sensationalism  in  Psychology  and 
phenomenism  in  Philosophy  ;  the  former  springing 
out  of  a  kind  of  blindness  of  the  soul  to  its  own 
spiritual  nature ;  the  latter  from  the  inability  of 
the  reason  of  the  time  to  conceive  any  categories  of 
reality  transcending  the  mechanical  and  sensible. 

It  is  the  merit  of  the  transcendental  movement,  in 
the  thinking  of  this  century,  that  it  possesses  an  in- 
sight which  leads  it  to  refuse  to  respect  the  limits 
of  phenomenism  and  to  insist  not  only  on  the  exist- 
ence of  realities  beyond  the  sensible  horizon  but 
also  on  the  power  of  human  intelligence  to  embrace 
these  within  the  circle  of  knowledge.      But  tran- 


2  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

scendentalism,  altlioug-li  it  has  the  root  of  the  matter 
in  it,  has  not  been  able  to  wage  on  the  whole  a  suc- 
cessful warfare  against  suiierficial  tendencies.  Kant- 
ism  has  failed  on  account  of  its  only  partial  grasp 
of  the  conditions  of  its  problem  and  its  consequent 
aloofness  from  the  processes  of  experience,  while 
Hegelism,  a  much  more  competent  theory,  and  one 
that  has  in  it  the  true  antidote  of  phenomenism, 
fails  in  part,  because  of  its  misconception  of  the 
true  dialectic  of  spirit,  a  misconception  that  leaves 
the  system  prisoned  in  a  closed  sphere  of  absolut- 
ism. The  clash  of  philosophical  systems  is  thus 
reducible  to  a  conflict  between  speculative  blind- 
ness on  one  side,  and  a  kind  of  speculative  aberration 
on  the  other,  with  no  competent  mediator  in  sight 
to  heal  the  breach. 

Again,  the  trend  of  the  ^scientific  thinking  of  the 
century  has  been  so  strong  in  the  direction  of  evolu- 
tion that  faith  in  it  has  come  to  be  a  recognized  test 
of  scientific  orthodoxy  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
religious  orthodoxy  of  the  time  has  felt  constrained 
to  take  toward  the  evolution  theory,  if  not  an  atti- 
tude of  hostility,  at  least  one  of  distrust,  on  account 
of  its  tendency  to  unsettle  religious  convictions  and 
its  apparent  hostility  to  supernaturalism  and  the 
doctrine  of  final  causes.  A  painful  breach  has  thus 
arisen  between  the  convictions  of  science  and  those 
of  religion,  and  this  breach  has  contributed  still  fur- 
ther to  cloud  the  vision  and  to  trouble  the  spirit  of 
the  time. 

The  following  inquiry  is  an  attempt  to  deal  with 


INTRODUCTORY  3 

these  and  other  scarcely  less  grave  issues  in  a  way 
that  will  not  be  oiDen  to  the  charge  of  superficial- 
ity. We  are  convinced  that  the  only  radical  cure 
for  the  limitations  of  our  thinking  is  to  be  found 
in  the  discovery  of  profounder  and  more  adequate 
categories.  Knowledge  is  founded  in  categories, 
and  its  successive  stages  arise  not  i3rimarily,  out 
of  the  generalization  of  facts,  but  rather  out  of 
the  emergence  of  new  categories  under  which  our 
generalizations  are  to  proceed.  We  not  only  gen- 
eralize facts,  but  our  reflection  rises  from  categories 
of  space  and  time  to  those  of  substance  and  cause, 
and  only  rests  finally  in  the  supreme  ideas  of  unity 
and  ground. 

Now  when  we  seek  to  construe  the  ground  of 
things  adequately  we  are  led  by  a  necessary  trend 
of  reflection  to  translate  it  into  the  self- existent,  and 
this  again  into  the  self-active  energy  of  Aristotle. 
But  self -activity  in  itself  does  not  afford  a  final  rest- 
ing-place for  thought.  Consciousness  is  either  a 
mere  by-product  and  spectator  in  the  universe,  or 
it  is  inherent  in  the  primal  essence  of  things.  But 
self-consciousness  is  a  form  of  self-activity  and  can- 
not be  conceived  as  a  by-product.  And  all  conscious- 
ness is  going  on  to  be  self-conscious.  The  final  rest- 
ing-place of  thought  is  found  when  self-activity  and 
self-conscious  activity  are  identified,  and  primal  be- 
ing is  translated  into  conscious  self-activity. 

When  primal  being  is  conceived  as  conscious 
self-activity  its  highest  category  can  no  longer  be  the 
logos  construed  as  abstract  intelligence.      The  re- 


4  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

flection  of  Anaxag-oras  and  Aristotle  is  not  adequate 
on  this  point,  but  we  must  learn  the  lesson  of  the 
subsequent  historic  movement  which  culminated  in 
the  idea  of  the  logos  as  a  xDrinciple  of  immanent 
personal  activity.  And  if  the  objection  be  raised 
that  such  a  conception  of  the  logos  could  not  be 
completely  attained  without  reference  to  religious 
history  and  literature,  we  would  meet  the  objection 
with  a  plea  of  confession  and  avoidance.  Philos- 
ophy must  recognize  its  indebtedness  to  history,  and 
especially  to  religious  history.  The  highest  spir- 
itual intuitions  of  the  race  have  been  achieved 
through  channels  of  religious  experience.  We  claim 
for  philosophy  the  right  to  seek  light  wherever  it 
can  be  found.  If  this  light  should  come  through 
the  channels  of  sacred  literature,  that  is  no  reason 
why  philosophy  should  ngt  avail  herself  of  it,  pro- 
vided she  do  not  receive  it  on  mere  authority,  but  is 
able  to  translate  it  into  rational  terms  and  deal  with 
it  according*  to  her  own  legitimate  methods. 

The  logos  is  the  highest  category  of  rational  in- 
sight, and  when  applied  to  the  primal  self-activity 
renders  a  conception  of  its  nature  possible.  In  short, 
the  cure  of  the  agnostic  blindness  is  to  be  found  in 
the  logos-category.  This  renders  the  immanent 
nature  and  activity  of  absolute  being  intelligible. 
In  its  light  we  are  able  to  conceive  a  spiritual  move- 
ment of  internal  conscious  distinction  and  unity, 
which  translates  the  Absolute  into  living  spiritual 
energy  and  personal  being.  And  this  achievement 
not  only  intelligizes  the  ground  of  reality  but  sup- 


INTRODUCTORY  5 

plies  the  clew  to  its  productive  and  generative  re- 
lations to  tlie  world. 

For  it  enables  us  to  achieve  an  intuition  of  that 
primal  dialectic  of  spirit  out  of  which  the  whole  gen- 
erative movement  of  things  proceeds.  Here,  as  we 
see,  one  of  the  primal  difficulties  of  reflection  has 
arisen.  The  Hegelian  insight  has  seized  upon  the 
dialectic,  but  has  misconstrued  it  at  a  vital  point. 
We  must  not  only  apprehend  that  the  primal  ac- 
tivity of  being  contains  the  dual  moments  of  affir- 
mation and  negation,  but  we  must  also  realize,  as 
Plato  did,  that  primal  opposites  can  never  pass  into 
each  other.  Being,  therefore,  affirms  itself,  but  it 
does  not  deny  itself,  but  rather  its  opposite. 

The  problem  of  the  negative  becomes  thus  the 
last  and  most  erudite  issue  in  philosophy.  If  we 
yield  the  point  that  primal  opposites  may  pass  into 
one  another,  then  the  whole  dialectic  of  reality  be- 
comes a  process  of  the  self-affirmation  and  self-de- 
nial of  being,  and  the  distinction  between  being 
and  non- being  vanishes.  In  that  case,  however,  the 
dialectic  is  shorn  of  its  power  as  an  explanatory 
principle,  for  it  can  never  render  conceivable  the 
generation  of  a  relative  order  from  the  Absolute. 
Pantheism  is  thus  its  logical  outcome. 

If  we  maintain  the  position  that  primal  opposites 
do  not  pass  into  one  another,  we  then  have  the  prob- 
lem of  non-being  on  our  hands.  For  then  s^jirit 
must  be  conceived  as  affirming  itself,  but  as  denying, 
not  itself  but  its  oi3posite.  Non-being  thus  becomes 
a  transcendent  opposite  to  being,  that  which  it  ne- 


6  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

gates,  opposes,  and  seeks  to  suppress  and  annul. 
The  value  of  this  conception  as  an  explanatory  prin- 
ciple, as  we  find  in  the  following"  inquiry,  consists  in 
the  fact  that  it  renders  the  genesis  of  a  relative  and 
imperfect  order  from  the  Absolute  conceivable.  That 
modification  which  differentiates  the  relative  from 
its  absolute  ground  becomes  intelligible  when  we 
are  able  to  supply  a  motive  for  creative  energy  and 
thus  conceive  a  distinction  between  the  immanent 
movement  of  spirit  and  its  volitional  outgo  in  crea- 
tive and  generative  activity.  This  motive  arises  in 
spirit's  intuition  of  its  opposite,  and  its  impulse  to 
go  out  into  what  may  be  symbolically  represented 
as  the  sphere  of  non-being,  in  order  to  annul  the 
negative  and  generate  positive  reality  in  its  place. 

We  admit  that  the  doctrine  of  non-being  thus 
arrived  at  is  not  free  h'om  difficulties.  One  of 
these  arises  from  the  necessity  of  conceiving  non- 
being  in  a  purely  negative  sense,  and  yet  ascribing 
to  it  some  of  the  functions  of  causation.  This  seems 
to  involve  a  contradiction.  We  think,  however,  that 
the  difficulty  is  greater  in  appearance  than  in  real- 
ity. For  it  is  conceded  that  effects  in  being  may 
arise  from  the  non-existence  of  positive  conditions. 
Now,  as  the  inquiry  shows,  the  essential  negative 
characteristic  of  the  opposite  of  primal  being 
is  the  absence  from  it  of  a  ground  or  principle  of 
self-existence.  In  view  of  this  it  maj^  be  symbol- 
ized as  an  abyss  in  which  being  has  no  support. 
A  reality  generated  in  such  a  sphere  would  partici- 
pate in  non-being  in  the  sense  that  it  would  have 


INTRODUCTORY  7 

no  immanent  principle  or  ground  of  self-existence. 
In  this  sense  non-being-  is  a  cause  in  a  purely  nega- 
tive sense  and  contradiction  does  not  arise. 

This  absence  of  self-existence  and  this  depend- 
ence on  that  which  transcends  it  is,  as  St.  Augustine 
profoundly  shows,  the  differentia  of  relative  and  gen- 
erated being.  It  is  that  modification  which  panthe- 
istic principles  are  never  able  to  explain,  and  upon 
which  naturalism  is  ever  stumbling  into  agnosti- 
cism. 

The  same  principle,  as  the  inquiry  shows,  enables 
us  to  attain  a  rational  conception  of  the  ground  pro- 
cess of  relativity,  which  is  that  of  a  passage  from 
immanent  potentiality  to  realized  actuality,  an  evolu- 
tion whose  presui^position  is  a  spiritual  absolute, 
and  whose  stages  are  mechanism,  life,  and  spirit.  In 
the  conception  of  the  world-process  thus  achieved, 
there  is  a  ground,  we  think,  for  the  harmonizing  of 
scientific  and  religious  convictions.  For  if  evolu- 
tion be  real  and  proceed  according  to  the  categories 
of  mechanism  and  the  law  of  natural  causation,  the 
basis  of  science  is  established  and  her  intuition  is 
vindicated ;  whereas,  if  mechanism  and  causality 
themselves  have  as  their  presupposition  a  spiritual 
absolute,  and  as  their  finality  the  evolution  of  spirit, 
the  substantial  requirements  of  the  intuition  of  re- 
ligion have  been  met  and  satisfied. 

And  this  satisfaction  will  be  the  more  complete  if 
it  is  seen  that  out  of  the  same  grounds  on  which  the 
whole  historic  ^Drocess  arises,  springs  also  that  prin- 
ciple of  spiritual  mediation  which  is  one  of  the  essen- 


8  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

tial  elements  in  religion.  The  whole  spiritual  his- 
tory of  nature  and  humanity  finds  its  rationale  in  the 
postulate  of  a  transcendent  and  self-existent  being- 
whose  creative  energ-y  functions  in  the  world  as  the 
immanent  spiritual  principle  of  its  existence  and  de- 
velopment. This  postulate  grounds  and  rationalizes 
the  whole  realm  of  science  and  its  categories,  while 
in  the  sphere  of  the  ultimate  issues  it  provides,  in 
the  synthesis  of  immanence  and  transcendence  which 
it  implies,  an  adequate  foundation  for  a  Philosoi3hy 
of  Religion. 

The  spirit  of  the  time  is  not  lacking  in  scholar- 
ship or  zeal  for  the  truth.  What  it  needs  most  is  a 
fresh  baptism  in  the  fountain  of  insight.  Philos- 
ophy needs  to  become  more  truly  historical  by  escap- 
ing from  the  form  and  entering  more  into  the  spirit 
of  the  world's  thinking.  SJie  must  also  use  her  own 
eyes  to  look  up  into  the  heavens  and  down  into  the 
heart  of  humanity.  The  organ  of  philosophy  is  re- 
flection, but  her  highest  gift  is  spiritual  intuition. 
Through  this  she  achieves  the  primal  insight  she 
needs  to  qualify  her  for  her  highest  mission,  which 
is  to  unify  knowledge  and  heal  the  breaches  of  the 
human  spirit. 


THE  NORM 

Meditation  on  the  history  of  thought  leads  to  the 
conviction  that  Philosophy  has  a  distinctive  and  in- 
dividual norm,  and  that  this  norm  contains  in  it  the 
secret  of  the  highest  wisdom.  But  when  we  essay 
to  search  the  annals  of  jDhilosophy  for  the  idea  that 
will  express  its  essence,  we  find  ourselves  launched 
on  a  perilous  voyage  over  an  uncertain  sea.  The 
highest  point  of  ancient  thinking  was  that  reached 
in  the  speculation  of  Socrates,  Plato,  and  Aristotle. 
At  the  heart  of  this  reflection  there  functions  an  idea 
as  the  inner  motive  of  its  activity  and  develop- 
ment. The  thought  of  Socrates  is  psychologic,  and 
he  conceives  the  idea  as  a  principle  of  generic  activ- 
ity in  the  human  consciousness.  To  stimulate  this 
principle  and  develop  from  its  activity  a  rational 
system  of  truth  is  the  aim  of  all  his  teaching.  Pla- 
to's thought  transcends  the  psychologic  sphere,  and 
becomes  ontologic.  To  his  intuition  the  idea  be- 
comes transformed  into  an  ontologic  archetype, 
standing  objective  to  conscious  reason  and  energiz- 
ing as  the  absolute  formative  principle  in  things. 
Aristotle's  thinking  is  analytic  and  individual,  and 


10  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

reacts  from  the  transcendent  imiversalism  of  Plato. 
The  Stagirite  attempts,  and  in  a  measure  achieves, 
a  reconciliation  of  the  j)sycholog'ic  and  ontologic 
l^oints  of  view  in  his  conception  of  the  individual 
real  as  including-,  in  one  asxDCct,  a  synthesis  of  the 
universal  and  particular ;  in  another,  a  union  of 
self-activity  and  iDotence. 

It  is  this  latter  aspect  which  is  of  interest  here. 
Socrates  had  represented  the  idea  as  a  self-active 
universal  energizing-  in  the  consciousness  of  man, 
while  Plato  elevated  it  into  a  transcendent  ontologic 
self-activity.  Now  Aristotle,  in  his  distinction  be- 
tween self-activity  and  potence,  achieves,  what  Socra- 
tes and  Plato  were  not  able  to  do,  namely,  a  rational 
basis  for  a  distinction  between  the  primal  ground  of 
things  and  the  nature  of  things  themselves.  The 
primal  ground  is  pure  self  -  activity,  iniriis  actus, 
while  things  are  a  dual  synthesis  of  self-activity 
and  potence.  While,  therefore,  the  primal  ground 
is  complete  in  itself,  and  is  not  moved,  things  have 
a  history  in  space  and  time  ;  they  are  not  completely 
self-active  but  have  a  movement  that  de^Dends  upon 
conditions  outside  of  themselves.  Their  history 
thus  falls  into  a  conditioned  series,  and  evolution  is 
tlieir  law. 

The  world's  thought  presents  no  deeper  insight 
than  this.  Aristotle  barely  misses  a  final  and  ade- 
quate solution  of  the  profoundest  issue  of  philoso- 
phy. But  the  Aristotelian  chain  is  not  complete. 
The  question  still  presses.  If  the  primal  ground  of 
things  be  a  pure  self -active  lorinciple,  why  should 


THE   NORM  11 

not  all  tlie  iDroducts  of  its  energizing  be  the  same  ? 
Why  should  potence  and  its  fruit,  imperfection,  exist 
in  a  system  whose  creative  springs  are  self-sufficient 
and  perfect  ?  To  these  questions  this  ancient  si^ec- 
ulation  has  no  coherent  answer.  The  modification 
of  self-activity,  which  constitutes  the  differentia  of 
produced  things,  is  brought  in  by  what  Hegel  would 
call  an  *'  external  reflection,"  and  is  left  without  ra- 
tional ground  or  explanation. 

The  scene  of  our  meditation  changes  to  the  oi3en- 
ing  of  modern  speculation,  and  the  vision  of  three 
epoch-making  thinkers  rises  before  our  eyes.  Des 
Cartes'  thinking,  like  that  of  Socrates,  finds  its  start- 
ing-point in  the  human  consciousness,  and  the  idea  it 
develops  is  that  of  the  psyche  itself  as  thinking  sub- 
stance. But  Des  Cartes  does  not  identify  his  sub- 
stance with  self-activity,  conceiving  it  as  relatively 
inert  and  motionless.  His  notion  of  the  psyche 
turns  out,  therefore,  to  be  speculatively  barren, 
providing  no  adequate  principle  for  rationally 
apprehending  either  God  or  nature,  whose  ideas 
are,  nevertheless,  inseparable  from  the  human  con- 
sciousness. The  result  is  a  practical  failure  of  his 
enterprise  and  the  breaking  up  of  his  system  into  a 
number  of  intractable  and  incommunicable  spheres. 

Spinoza  is  the  Platonizing  thinker  of  this  group, 
who  transforms  Cartesianism  into  ontology  by  rais- 
ing the  uncreated  substance  of  Des  Cartes  to  the 
plane  of  absolute  being,  while  he  reduces  the  rela- 
tive substances,  mind  and  matter,  to  the  ranks  as 
the   attributes  through   which  it   manifests  itself. 


12  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

But  this  ontologic  transformation  does  not  fully 
meet  expectations.  It  yindicates  the  Absolute  by 
swallowing  up  the  relative,  and  with  it  the  individual. 
Spinoza  follows  Des  Cartes  in  his  failure  to  identify 
substance  with  self-active  principle.  His  absolute 
does  not  move,  but  stands  there  forever  in  the  same 
place.  Natura  naturans  is  not  a  self-active  being-, 
apurus  actus,  nor  is  the  natura  naturata  a  manifes- 
tation of  this  self -activity  in  the  forms  of  relativity. 
The  relation  is  static,  not  dynamic.  The  primal 
substance  is  simply  a  substrate  of  attributes  and 
modes  which  rest  upon  it,  but  are  not  rationally 
grounded  in  its  nature.  In  Platonism  we  find  a 
lower  and  a  higher  insight.  When  thinking  in  the 
lesser  light  Plato  conceives  the  archetypes  as  mere 
models  and  patterns  which  an  external  demiurge 
dips  into  the  material,  so  to  speak,  and  forms  created 
things.  Under  the  influence  of  the  larger  insight, 
he  rises  to  higher  views  and  identifies  the  arche- 
types with  self-active  principles  which  operate  as 
the  formative  energies  of  creation.  Spinoza  does 
not  rise  to  this  higher  insight  of  the  master.  His 
system  is  Platonism  on  the  lower  plane  of  the 
archetypes,  conceived  after  the  analogy  of  the  Car- 
tesian substance  and  reduced  to  absolute  unity. 
The  pit  of  Spinozism  is  not  pan-theism,  but  pan- 
substantialism.  Its  bane  is  its  bondage  to  a  false 
idea  of  substance,  and  its  cure  is  to  be  found,  not  so 
much  in  the  breaking  up  of  its  all-devouring  unity 
as  in  the  reform  of  its  idea  of  substance. 

In  Leibnitz  we  find  a  reincarnation  of  the  individ- 


THE  NOKM  13 

ualizing  tliouglit  of  Aristotle.  Leibnitz  has  learned 
the  fear  of  the  all-devouring-  One  of  Spinoza,  and  the 
cure,  he  conceives,  must  be  brought  about  by  a  re- 
assertion  of  individualism.  In  his  insight  Leibnitz 
is  a  true  child  of  Aristotle.  He  sees  that  philoso- 
phy has  been  bound  and  i)aralyzed  by  a  false  idea 
of  substance,  and  he  seeks  to  free  her  from  her  bond- 
age by  going  back  to  Aristotle  and  restoring  his 
doctrine  of  substance  as  a  self-active  principle.  Un- 
der the  double  insight  his  reflection  breaks  up  the 
ontologic  unity  of  Spinoza  into  a  xDlurality  of  self- 
energizing  individual  monads,  potential  or  active 
spiritual  psyches,  each  an  independent  substance  in 
itself,  because  it  contains  in  it  the  principle  and 
motive  of  its  own  evolution.  Leibnitz  is  also  a  true 
child  of  Aristotle  in  recognizing  the  limitations  of 
pure  individualism  and  in  seeking  to  ground  the 
finite,  developing  individualities  in  a  "  monad  of  mo- 
nads," the  equivalent  of  Aristotle's  purus  actus.  In 
other  words,  Leibnitz's  reform  of  the  idea  of  sub- 
stance is  a  revolution ;  it  roots  out  the  static  con- 
ceptions which  had  dominated,  and  in  a  sense  per- 
verted, the  early  period  of  our  modern  thinking,  and 
reintroduces  into  i3hilosophy  those  dynamic  catego- 
ries under  which  the  highest  fruits  of  ancient  spec- 
ulation were  achieved. 

But  in  face  of  the  highest  problems  of  philosophy 
we  do  not  find  that  Leibnitz  is  more  successful  than 
his  master.  To  the  question  how  the  existence  of 
the  imperfect  and  undeveloped  is  consistent  with 
the  existence  of  a  perfect  self -active  ground,  Leibnitz 


14  BASAL    CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

has  no  rational  answer.  "VVe  look  in  vain  in  this 
modern  cycle,  as  we  looked  in  vain  in  the  reflection 
of  the  ancient  triumvirate,  for  a  datum  from  which 
an  intellig-ible  reason  for  this  emergence  of  imper- 
fection from  x3erfection  can  be  deduced. 

It  is  clear  that  our  meditation  must  still  g-o  for- 
ward. For  philosophy,  as  distinguished  from  psy- 
chology, the  development  from  Locke  to  Hume  has 
chiefly  a  negative  value.  It  furnishes  a  natural  his- 
tory of  the  decline  and  death  of  speculation,  smoth- 
ered in  a  mass  of  empiric  details.  In  Kant,  how- 
ever, the  genius  of  philosophy  again  reappears. 
The  Socratic  thinking,  modified  by  the  Cartesian 
cycle,  is  again  incarnated.  Kant  applies  his  ana- 
lytic to  human  consciousness  in  order  to  rediscover 
in  it  those  universals  the  loss  of  which  had  plunged 
British  thought  into  scepticism.  The  result  is  the 
categories,  the  most  imiDortant  single  outcome  of 
modern  philosophy.  These  categories  are  in  the 
Kantian  system  the  self-active  universals  which 
translate  ordinary  experience  into  rational  knowl- 
edge and  thus  lay  the  foundations  of  science.  But 
Kant,  like  Socrates,  puts  a  psychologic  limit  on  his 
categories  ;  they  are  valid  only  for  human  cogni- 
tion, but  in  the  transcendent  ontologic  sphere  are 
without  authority.  The  result  is  that  philosophy 
stands  like  a  house  divided  against  itself.  Knowl- 
edge is  only  of  subjective  value  while  the  shadow 
of  an  objective  and  transcendent  Eeal  forever  haunts 
the  consciousness  of  man  and  destroys  his  rest. 
Philosophy  stands  thus  as  a  propounder  of  a  sphinx's 


THE   NORM  15 

riddles  and  swallows  up  all  her  own  children  because 
they  are  unable  to  solve  them. 

Kant's  failure  was  the  motive  of  subsequent  spec- 
ulation. With  a  backward  Dionysian  sweep  his 
negations  fostered  the  agnostic  tendencies  of  British 
thought.  The  forward  impulse  is  toward  transcen- 
dentalism. The  transformation  of  the  psychologic 
principle  of  Kant  into  ontology  takes  place  in 
Ficlite  and  Schelling.  Fichte's  reflection  seizes  on 
the  shadowy  noumenal  self  of  Kant,  which  Kant 
had  endeavored  to  secure  in  a  moral  postulate,  and 
translates  it  into  the  idea  of  an  absolute  ego  ;  while 
Schelling,  rightly  denying  that  Fichte  ever  com- 
pletely succeeds  in  reducing  the  recalcitrant  object 
or  Aiistoss  to  subjection  to  his  absolute,  conceives 
the  project  of  enlarging  the  continent  of  being  so  as 
to  embrace  both  subject  and  object  in  the  notion  of 
the  Absolute.  Schelling  then  completes  the  onto- 
logic  transformation  of  Kant  in  his  dual  conception 
of  a  transcendent  absolute,  in  which  subject  and  ob- 
ject, ideal  and  real,  stand  as  parallels  with  a  medial 
relation  of  indifference  between  them.  But  further 
reflection  taught  him  at  length  that  such  a  concep- 
tion of  the  Absolute  is  self-contradictory,  and  that 
the  real  absolute  in  his  system  is  the  point  of  indif- 
ference itself ;  the  evolution  of  which  leads  again 
into  the  closed  circle  of  Spinoza,  a  fate  from  which 
he  escapes  only  by  losing  himself  in  the  clouds  of 
theosophic  mysticism. 

In  Hegel  we  have  again  a  return  from  ontologic 
universalism  to  individualism.     But  the  Heg-elian 


16  BASAL  CONCEPTS  IN   PHILOSOPHY 

return  is  on  a  higher  plane  than  that  of  Leibnitz. 
To  Hegel  the  individual  is  a  category  which  con- 
tains in  solution  the  universal  and  the  particular, 
and  from  another  point  of  view,  the  subject  and 
object.  Hegel's  conception  of  absolute  being  is 
that  of  a  self-active  principle  which  includes  the 
distinction  of  subject  and  object,  and  everywhere 
leads  to  individual  manifestations.  The  self-activ- 
ity of  the  Absolute  expresses  itself  in  a  dialectical 
movement  which  passes  through  three  stages  in  its 
return  upon  itself  and  functions  everywhere  as  the 
inner  reality  of  things.  Now  Hegel  has  two  modes 
of  conceiving  the  movement  of  this  dialectic  energy, 
(1)  the  logical,  which  starts  with  the  most  abstract 
notion  of  being  and  represents  the  dialectical  pro- 
cession of  thought  as  a  perpetual  concretion  which 
culminates  in  the  highest  and  richest  idea,  that  of 
absolute  spirit ;  (2)  the  ontologic,  which  reversing 
the  logical  order  starts  from  the  idea  of  absolute 
spirit,  and  represents  creation  as  the  going  out  of 
absolute  spirit  into  objective  self -alienation,  through 
nature  and  finite  siDirit  back  into  itself.  The  pro- 
cess of  relativity  is  thus  conceived  as  a  drama  of 
self-evolution  and  self-reconciliation  of  the  Abso- 
lute Spirit  in  which  it  is  begun,  continued,  and 
ended. 

Overawed  by  the  magnitude  of  Hegel's  idea  our 
reflection  might  end  here ;  but  the  old  questions 
come  up  and  clamor  for  an  answer.  We  admit  that 
Hegel  has  touched  the  highest  point  of  modern 
speculation,   but  we  are  unable  to   conceive  how 


THE   NORM  17 

logically  a  notion  which  is,  ex  hypothesi,  the  thinnest 
of  abstractions  (in  Heg-el  being-  is  the  last  abstrac- 
tion) can  be  the  bearer  of  a  dialectic  that  presses  on 
through  self-affirmation  and  self  -  negation,  never 
staying  its  footsteps  until  it  has  reached  the  bosom 
of  absolute  spirit.  The  truth  is,  the  logical  move- 
ment is  a  superinduction.  The  true  dialectic  is  an 
external  reflection  ;  it  is  the  movement  of  the  spirit 
itself  refusing  to  be  satisfied  until  it  has  reached  its 
own  highest  category. 

The  normal  movement  of  Hegelism  is  the  on- 
tologic,  the  self-uttering  of  absolute  spirit  in  the 
sphere  of  its  manifestations.  But  here  we  meet  a 
difficulty.  How  is  it  conceivable  that  absolute 
spirit  can  evolve  or  utter  from  itself  anything  less 
IDerfect  than  itself  %  We  cannot  conceive  how  abso- 
lute being,  simply  by  an  immanental  dialectic,  can 
generate  from  itself  a  sphere  of  relative  and  im- 
perfect nature.  There  is  no  datum  in  Hegelism,  as 
we  found  none  in  Aristotle,  which  makes  it  possible 
to  ground  rationally  the  distinctive  character  of  the 
relative,  or  to  justify  the  Absolute  in  resting  satisfied 
with  a  relative  and  imperfect  result  of  its  energizing. 
And  since  this  ontologic  aspect  of  Hegelism  is  its 
side  of  chief  philosophic  value,  we  conclude  that 
Hegel  fails,  as  Aristotle  failed  and  as  Leibnitz  failed, 
to  discover  a  rational  7iexus  between  the  relative  and 
its  absolute  ground.  The  chasm  still  yawns  before 
us,  therefore,  so  that  if  we  start  from  the  relative 
we  fail  to  reach  the  absolute  ground ;  whereas,  if 
we  proceed  from  the  Absolute,  we  are  unable  to 


18  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

find  any  real  passage  across  to  the  sphere  of  rela- 
tivity. 

In  the  foregoing  historical  survey  we  have  touched 
only  the  mountain-peaks  of  speculation,  ancient  and 
modern.  The  great  lesson  the  masters  have  to 
teach  is  that  philosophy  reaches  its  highest  category 
in  the  notion  of  being  as,  in  its  essence,  self-activitj^ 
The  intuition  of  this  is  as  old  as  Socrates  and  Plato. 
In  modern  philosophy  Hegel  is  the  one  thinker 
whose  system  has  embodied  the  insight  most  clearly 
and  adequately  ;  and  for  this  reason,  in  spite  of  all 
its  shortcomings,  Hegelism  reaches  the  high-water 
mark  of  modern  speculation.  Its  failure,  therefore, 
to  ground  rationally  the  sphere  of  relativity  in  the 
Absolute  has  thrown  modern  thought  back  upon  it- 
self in  a  wave  of  philosophic  despair.  If  the  highest 
thinking  fails  to  ground  knowledge  in  an  absolute 
princiiDle,  the  logical  inference  seems  to  be  that  the 
attempt  is  vain  and  that  agnosticism  is  the  final  out- 
come of  philosophy. 

Before  accepting  this  conclusion  as  final,  how- 
ever, some  further  reflection  is  necessary.  Let  us 
assume  that  in  the  idea  of  self-activity  philosophy 
has  achieved  its  highest  category.  It  is  still  possi- 
ble for  it  to  fall  short  in  two  distinct  directions.  It 
may  either  fail  to  conceive  adequately  the  nature 
and  implications  of  self -activity,  or  it  may  overlook 
some  datum  that  is  essential  to  the  solution  of  its 
problem.  The  first  of  these  considerations  will  oc- 
cupy the  remainder  of  this  chapter.  It  will  be  con- 
ceded, we  think,  that  a  cardinal  fault  of  old  Platonism 


THE  NORM  19 

is  its  tendency  to  represent  the  self-active  ideas  or 
archetypes  as  independent  entities,  transcendent 
and  objective  to  the  mind  of  the  Creator.  And  since 
these  archetypes  constituted  the  whole  form  and 
structure  of  rational  conception  and  knowledge,  a 
tendency  inevitably  arose  in  later  Platonic  thinking- 
to  separate  the  Creator  from  the  world  of  forms  and 
to  regard  him  as  only  negatively  conceivable,  and 
therefore  unintelligible.  This  tendency  was  stimu- 
lated by  the  contact  of  Hellenism  with  the  panthe- 
istic thought  of  the  Orient,  which  forever  oscillates 
between  two  poles  ;  the  negative  unity  of  the  abso- 
lute ground  of  the  world  and  the  nothingness  of  the 
sphere  of  plurality  and  change.  An  absolute  cleft 
was  thus  threatened  between  the  world  and  its  cre- 
ative ground.  And  for  this  difl&culty  there  was  no 
cure  in  the  reflection  of  Aristotle.  For  while  Aris- 
totle espoused  the  doctrine  of  Anaxagoras  and  trans- 
lated his  purus  actus  into  vov%  or  reason,  this  was 
conceived  as  abstract  intelligence  to  which  no  defi- 
nable internal  character  could  be  ascribed.  This  was 
but  logical,  since  the  Platonic  ideas  had  been  reduced 
to  forms  of  relative  existence,  and  no  categories 
remained  for  the  inner  characterization  of  the  Ab- 
solute. 

Now,  it  was  a  consciousness  of  this  widening 
breach,  coalescing  with  a  feeling  of  spiritual  distance 
and  alienation  from  God,  that  motived  those  media- 
tional  features  which  characterize  the  last  efforts  of 
ancient  speculation.  To  this  must  be  ascribed  Phi- 
lo's  hierarchy  of  beings  between  God  and  matter,  as 


20  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN  PHILOSOPHY 

well  as  that  catena  of  emanations  from  the  unthink- 
able One  down  to  the  plurality  of  the  phenomenal 
world,  which  appears  in  the  New  Platonism  of 
Plotinus  and  Proclus.  The  true  speculative  signifi- 
cance of  these  movements  can  be  understood  only 
when  we  connect  them  with  old  Platonism  and  the 
issue  which  it  left  open.  For  to  this  later  reflection 
the  self-active  ideas  to  which  the  term  reason,  or 
logos,  came  to  be  applied,  could  not  be  left  in  their 
alienation,  but  they  were  seized  upon  and  introduced 
as  mediators  between  the  Creative  One  and  the 
created  many.  And  in  putting  upon  them  this 
function  they  were  also  hypostatized  and  clothed 
with  the  attributes  of  quasi-personality.  The  inter- 
mediate natures  in  these  later  forms  of  Platonism 
are  not  abstractions  or  mere  essences,  but  they  are 
beings  possessing  some  of  the  properties  of  x)ersonal 
agents. 

The  speculative  genius  of  Christianity  responding 
to  a  motive  which  was  also  active  in  these  pagan 
systems,  was  able  to  take  a  great  step  in  advance  of 
their  solutions.  For  while  this  pagan  and  semi- 
pagan  thinking  is  able  only  to  subordinate  the  logos 
to  the  Absolute  One,  and  thus  to  heal  the  breach 
between  it  and  the  world  in  a  merely  external  and 
mechanical  way,  Christian  intuition  takes  a  different 
road,  and,  denying  the  subordination  and  externality 
of  the  logos,  conceives  it  as  an  immanent  personal 
principle  in  the  nature  of  the  Absolute  One.  Thus 
understood,  it  becomes  a  medium  in  a  double  sense, 
(1)  of  the  union  and  interaction  between  the  Creator 


THE   NORM  21 

and  the  world,  and  (2)  of  the  conceivability  of  the 
creative  nature.  For  the  gist  of  the  Christian 
reflection  is  that  reason  cannot  exist  apart  from 
personality,  and  that  i^ersonality  is  an  immanent 
category  of  the  jDrimal  being.  Personality  is,  there- 
fore, the  category  that  opens  the  nature  of  this  be- 
ing and  translates  into  intelligible  terms  its  rela- 
tions to  the  world. 

Modern  philosophy  has  been  largely  blind  to  this 
result  of  early  thinking,  and  the  consequence  has 
been  general  powerlessness  in  dealing  with  the 
ontologic  side  of  the  philosophic  problem.  But  it 
has  been  reaching  parallel  results  in  the  i^sj^cho- 
logic  sphere.  The  almost  irresistible  trend  of  iDhi- 
losophy,  since  Kant,  has  been  toward  the  recognition 
of  self-activity  as  the  highest  XDsychological  category. 
Kant's  doctrine  of  the  categories  is  gradually  con- 
quering the  world.  For  we  have  only  to  construe 
these  categories  as  self-active  functions  in  order  to 
recognize  them  as  the  analogues  in  the  psychologic 
sphere,  of  the  Platonic  ideas.  For  just  as  in  Pla- 
tonism  the  ontologic  elements  were  conceived  as 
impersonal  and  external  to  the  creative  nature,  so 
in  Kantism  the  categories  are  regarded  as  imper- 
sonal functions  external  to  the  real  personality  of 
man.  The  trend  of  post-Kantian  thought  has  been 
toward  the  reduction  of  these  categories  from  their 
isolated  position  and  the  immanating  of  them  in  the 
constitution  of  a  personal  subject  of  experience. 

If  to  the  conception  of  self-activity  which  is  de- 
veloped in  the  movements  sketched  above  we  apply 


22  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

the  historic  designation  logos,  a  term  which  the 
Stoics  applied  pantheistically  to  the  divine  world- 
energy,  it  may  then  be  truly  said  that  the  pro- 
foundest  activity  of  human  thinking  has  devoted 
itself  to  the  definition  of  the  logos  as  the  central 
category  of  reality.  Early  thinking,  concerning 
itself  chiefly  with  the  ontologic  problem,  has  in  its 
efforts  to  reach  an  intelligible  conception  of  the 
nature  of  primal  being  achieved  the  Christian  idea 
of  the  Divine  Logos,  while  modern  thought,  track- 
ing up  the  same  function  of  self-activity  on  the 
psychological  side,  has  been  gradually  attaining 
to  an  adequate  conception  of  the  psychic  logos  or 
category  of  human  personality.  In  both  lines  of 
reflection,  the  ontologic  as  well  as  the  psychologic, 
the  true  progress  of  thinking  has  been  in  the  direc- 
tion of  more  adequate  philosophic  conceptions  in 
the  light  of  which  self-active  energy  can  be  ration- 
ally conceived  only  under  the  category  of  the  logos 
and  as  the  nature  of  self-conscious  and  personal 
being. 

In  tending  toward  this  result  history  only  con- 
firms the  verdict  of  direct  reflection.  True  psycho- 
logic insight  shows  that  the  primal  root  of  per- 
sonality is  not  to  seek  in  the  empirical  stream  of 
conscious  states,  but  rather  in  that  ego-principle 
which  unifies  the  conscious  life  and  gathers  up  the 
stream  into  the  personal  knot.  Metaphysical  re- 
flection confirms  the  psychologic  verdict,  with  its 
own  insight  into  primal  being  as  self-activity.  It 
sees  that  self-consciousness  cannot  be  denied  to  self- 


THE   NOEM  23 

active  being"  without  contradiction,  and  that  self- 
conscious  self-activity  is  personal  activity.  The 
root  of  personal  consciousness  is  thus  to  be  traced 
to  the  self-active  intelligence,  and  not  primarily,  as 
the  Aristotelians  have  supposed,  to  the  passive  or 
purely  empirical  element  in  man's  psychic  nature. 

Logos  is  construed  here  as  the  category  of  con- 
scious personal  self-activity.*  The  Stoics  applied 
the  term  to  the  energizing  principle  of  the  world, 
which  they  conceived  to  be  rational  but  impersonal. 
Here  it  is  conceived  to  be  the  very  principle  and 
energy  of  personal  consciousness.  Being*  cannot 
render  itself  completely  intelligible  under  the  cate- 
gories of  substance  or  cause.  It  will  not  yield  up 
its  secrets  if  approached  as  abstract  and  impersonal 
intelligence.  Neither  is  the  Aristotelian  insight, 
which  saw  in  being  a  synthesis  of  self-activity  and 
intelligence,  altogether  adequate.  Being  only  be- 
comes intelligible  when  we  translate  self -active  in- 
telligence into  the  energy  of  self-conscious  person- 
ality. 

*In  the  following  discussions  the  term  Logos  is  employed  in 
two  senses — (1),  as  above  indicated,  for  the  principle  of  personal 
self-activity ;  (2),  for  the  personal  manifestation  itself.  The  con- 
text will  indicate  clearly  enough  in  which  sense  the  term  is  used. 


n 

BEING  AND   NON-BEING 

1.  Primal  being"  is  self-activity,  and  when  viewed 
under  the  category  of  the  log-os  it  becomes  self-con- 
scious and  personal.  If  we  ask  why  it  is  neces- 
sary to  conceive  primal  being  as  self-activity,  the 
answer  is  that  no  other  category  is  self-explanatory. 
Causality,  for  example,  simply  evades  the  philo- 
sophic demand  by  perpetually  shifting  the  burden 
of  explanation  back  upon  a  vanishing  antecedent, 
unless,  indeed,  we  translate  causality  itself  into 
some  form  of  self -activity.  What  is  true  of  causality, 
holds  of  every  other  category.  If,  further,  we  ask 
why,  having  identified  primal  being  with  self-ac- 
tivity, it  is  necessary  to  conceive  self-activity  under 
the  category  of  the  logos,  the  answer  is  very  much 
the  same.  Every  idea  of  self-activity  short  of  one 
which  represents  it  as  self-conscious,  will  be  found 
to  involve  a  subtle  contradiction. 

This  is  a  hard  saying.  But  self-activity  is,  in  the 
last  analysis,  self-affirmation.  We  have  also  found 
it  to  be  identical  with  purus  actus,  or  being  in  which 
the  highest  loossibilities  are  actual.  Now  self-con- 
scious activity  is  to  us  the  highest  conceivable  cate- 


BEING  AND   NON-BEING  25 

gory.  To  suppose,  then,  that  self-consciousness  is 
not  actual  in  the  pur  us  actus,  is  contradictory. 

Moreover,  if  self-conscious,  then  personal,  for  per- 
sonality springs  necessarily  out  of  being's  self -recog- 
nition of  self. 

The  logos  is  to  be  conceived  as  the  principle  of 
personality,  and  personality  is  self-realization.  In 
order  to  grasp  this  clearly  a  distinction  must  be 
made  between  two  things  that  are  commonly  con- 
fused—personality and  individuality.  If  personality 
be  definable  as  self-realization  of  self,  then  person- 
ality is  internal  to  being  and  being  may  include  a 
plurality  of  personal  manifestations.  But  individu- 
ality is  not  internal  to  being.  It  is  a  comprehend- 
ing unitary  category  which  characterizes  being  as  a 
whole.  We  moderns  have  to  a  degree  confounded 
personality  and  individuality  and  have  made  the 
former  do  duty  for  the  latter.  This  has  worked  to 
the  detriment  of  clear  thinking  both  in  philosophy 
and  theology.  We  broach  no  novelty  in  the  concept 
of  personality  here  advocated,  but  simply  revive  the 
dominating  idea  of  the  early  thinkers  of  our  era. 
These  thinkers  distinguished  personality  from  indi- 
viduality, and  conceiving  personality  to  be  an  imma- 
nent self-conscious  process  in  being,  saw  no  incon- 
sistency in  coupling  the  doctrine  of  the  multiperson- 
ality  of  the  absolute  nature  with  that  of  its  unitary 
individuality.  If  this  early  insight  could  be  restored 
it  would  soon  prove  its  value  both  for  theology  and 
philosophy. 

The  importance  of  the  logos  principle  for  philos- 


26  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

opliy  arises  partly  from  the  fact  that  it  breaks  our 
bondage  to  external  reflection,  and  giving*  us  an  in- 
sight into  being  enables  us  to  identify  our  reflection 
with  its  own  immanent  movement. 

From  this  internal  stand-point  we  are  able  to  con- 
ceive primal  being,  or  the  absolute  ground  of  things, 
as  a  self-energizing  nature,  the  form  of  whose  activ- 
ity is  a  circle  of  self-affirmation  in  which  is  eternally 
realized  distinctive  spheres  of  self-conscious  and 
j)ersonal  life.  This  internal  activity  of  being  re- 
ceived a  notable  representation  in  the  reflection  of 
the  early  Christian  Fathers.  Their  motive  was  the 
desire  to  achieve  a  philosophical  statement  of  the 
Christian  idea  of  God,  and  in  order  to  realize  this 
they  were  led  to  seize  upon  the  notion  of  immanent 
conscious  self -activity  as  the  germ  out  of  which  their 
doctrine  of  the  Divine  nature  was  gradually  evolved. 
According  to  this  mode  of  thinking  God  is  not 
to  be  conceived  as  a  motionless  unity  like  the 
Oriental  one,  but  rather  as  self -active  being,  the 
ceaseless  pulsations  of  whose  energy  generate  dis- 
tinctive spheres  of  self-realization.  Thus  the  pri- 
mal or  Father-nature  is  represented  as  generating 
a  second  nature,  an  alter  ego  or  eternal  Son.  This 
is  the  Divine  Logos  which  stands  as  the  utterance 
or  Word  of  the  Father,  and  is  thus  a  necessary  me- 
dium for  the  going  out  of  the  Divine  energy  in  the 
creation  of  the  world. 

But  this  creative  logos  does  not  complete  the 
circle  of  the  Divine  energy.  The  creation  is  not 
at  fiirst  an  orderly  and  developed  system,  but  rath- 


BEING   AND   NON-BEING  27 

er  a  mass  of  imorg-anized  and  disorderly  elements. 
Between  this  formless  world  and  its  author  there 
is  a  chasm,  and  this  dualism  supplies  the  motive  of 
a  further  impulse  toward  unification.  Thus  arises  a 
third  sphere  of  self-realization,  that  of  the  Holy 
Spirit,  which  is  the  necessary  medium  of  the  outgo 
of  the  Divine  love  into  the  world  in  order  to  bring- 
the  creature  through  a  process  of  evolution  into 
union  with  the  Creator. 

The  full  significance  of  this  conception  of  the  abso- 
lute nature  does  not  reveal  itself  until  we  connect 
it  with  its  presupposition ;  namely,  that  this  nature 
can  only  be  represented  adequately  under  the  cat- 
egory of  self-active,  self-conscious  energy ;  that  is, 
under  the  category  of  spirit.  God  is  a  sioirit,  and 
therefore  he  is  eternally  active,  and  his  activity  is 
perpetually  realizing  itself  in  spheres  of  personal 
self  -  manifestation  in  and  through  which  it  also 
comes  into  creative  and  organizing  relations  with 
the  world. 

There  is,  however,  in  this  early  thinking,  an  un- 
reflected  point,  namely,  the  nexus  or  mode  of  con- 
nection between  the  Divine  nature  proper  and  the 
world.  The  immanent  movement  which  this  early 
intuition  seized  upon  is  a  principle  of  absolute  and 
perfect  manifestation,  but  in  itself  it  does  not  ac- 
count for  the  rise  of  the  relative  and  imperfect.  This 
issue  was  partially  obscured  for  Christian  thought 
by  the  concrete  solution  of  the  problem  which  was 
embodied  in  the  Christ  as  God  manifest  in  the  flesh. 
It  did  come  up  in  the   development   of  Christian 


28  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN  PHILOSOPHY 

dogrnatics  in  the  problem  of  the  double  nature  of 
the  Christ,  which,  while  asserted,  could  not  be  con- 
ceived, and  was,  therefore,  authoritatively  affirmed 
as  a  mystery  that  transcends  reason  and  can  be  re- 
ceived only  by  an  act  of  faith.  Now,  outside  of  the 
early  Christian  reflection,  the  only  thought  of  mod- 
ern times  that  has  reached  this  jDlane  of  speculation 
and  the  problems,  which  it  presents,  is  that  of  Hegel 
and  his  school.  The  central  idea  of  Heg'el,  as  we 
have  seen,  is  that  of  a  self-active  dialectic  which 
constitutes  the  inner  core  and  essence  of  being-, 
and  expresses  itself  in  a  self-realizing  process,  a 
g-oing  out  and  return  upon  self.  Heg-el  is  led,  like 
the  earlier  thinkers,  to  conceive  the  primal  nature 
as  absolute  spirit,  and  he  represents  the  dialectic 
as  passing  through  three  corresponding  stages,  giv- 
ing rise  to  a  procession, of  Father,  Son,  and  Holy 
Ghost.  To  Hegel's  intuition  the  Father-nature  as 
subject-spirit  goes  out  and  embodies  itself  in  an  ob- 
ject which,  as  such,  is  its  negation  or  not  self.  In 
this  stage  of  alienation  and  distinction  it  is  the 
world,  but  in  the  moment  of  return  into  the  bosom 
of  the  Father  it  is  the  eternal  Son.  Hegel  thus, 
as  Dr.  Harris  says,  identifies  the  world  with  the 
second  person  of  the  Trinity.  In  the  Hegelian  as 
in  the  Christian  intuition  the  mediation  and  unifi- 
cation of  the  world  with  God  is  the  motive  of  a 
third  sphere  of  i^ersonal  manifestation,  that  of  the 
Holy  Ghost,  the  immanent  spirit  in  the  Divine  evo- 
lution of  the  world. 

Now,  the  unreflected  point  of  the  early  thinking 


BEIXG   AND   NON-BEING  29 

has  been  reflected  in  Hegel,  but  not,  we  think,  in  a 
satisfactoiy  manner.  Hegel's  solution  of  the  knot 
consists  in  a  restoration  of  tlie  negcdive  as  a  necessary 
philosopliic  datmn.  The  world  is  the  other  of  ab- 
solute spirit,  and  the  other  is  realized  through  self- 
negation.  That  dialectic  by  which  absolute  spirit 
traverses  the  circle  of  jDersonal  manifestations  con- 
tains in  it  the  moment  of  negation.  In  going  out 
from  itself  it  others  itself,  and  this  other  is  its  neg- 
ative or  not-self.  The  not-self  is  the  world,  and 
thus  the  world  and  its  process  are  mediated  by  ne- 
gation. 

Philosophy  made  a  great  stride  in  this  thought  of 
Hegel.  But  it  has  not,  we  think,  reached  a  final  so- 
lution of  the  issue  involved.  For  the  immanent  ne- 
gation by  which  being  is  translated  into  its  other  does 
not  break  the  link  of  its  self-identity.  The  other  is, 
therefore,  the  same  as  being,  only  in  an  objective 
form,  and  must,  therefore,  be  as  absolute  and  as  ]3er- 
feet  as  being.  Being  cannot  by  self -negation  reduce 
itself  from  the  plane  of  perfection  to  that  of  the  rela- 
tive and  imperfect.  Hegelism  sui3plies  no  rational 
grounds  for  the  modification  which  takes  place  in 
the  character  of  being  in  its  translation  from  the  ab- 
solute ground,  to  the  world,  and  for  this  reason  it  has 
not  achieved  a  final  solution  of  its  problem. 

In  the  preceding  chapter  we  pointed  out  that  phil- 
osophy might  fail  either  through  an  inadequate  con- 
ception of  its  categories  or  by  neglecting  to  take  into 
account  some  necessary  datum.  The  failure  above 
indicated  seems  to  arise  from  the  latter  cause.    Both 


30  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN    PHILOSOPHY 

the  early  and  the  later  thinking  break  down  at  the 
same  point.  They  fail  to  make  it  conceivable  how  the 
immanent  activity  of  an  absolute  nature  can  give  rise 
to  a  sphere  of  relative  and  imjDerfect  manifestation. 
The  first  stej)  toward  the  solution  of  the  difficulty 
must  be  sought,  we  think,  in  a  denial  that  the  dialectic 
of  being  has  been  adequately  conceived.  In  order  to 
make  this  denial  good  it  will  be  necessary  to  retrace 
the  steps  of  the  dialectic  through  which  the  personal 
distinctions  in  the  absolute  nature  are  conceived 
to  arise.  Following  the  line  of  Hegel's  reflection 
we  see  how  the  self-manifestation  called  the  Son  or 
logos  arises.  But  the  logos  does  not  present  it- 
self as  the  objective  other  of  the  manifesting  nature, 
but  rather,  to  take  an  analogy  from  the  ego  in  the 
human  consciousness,  it  stands  forth  as  the  uniting 
idea  or  self-conscious  manifestation  of  the  primal 
self.  This  ego  is  not  the  object  of  the  primal  self  in 
the  sense  that  it  is  its  not-self,  but  rather  in  the  sense 
that  it  is  its  alter  ego.  Now  there  is  a  negative 
movement  which  arises  at  this  point.  The  ego  con- 
sciousness arouses,  by  a  necessary  reaction,  the  anti- 
thetic consciousness  of  its  opposite  or  not-self.  The 
consciousness  of  the  not-self  is,  thus,  a  function  of 
the  primal  self,  but  the  not-self  which  it  intuits  can- 
not in  any  sense  he  conceived  as  identical  either  imth 
the  primal  self  or  its  realized  other.  It  is  excluded 
from  both,  and  is  their  object  in  the  sense  of  being 
their  qualitative  opposite.  In  like  manner,  in  con- 
nection Avith  the  logos-consciousness  of  the  absolute, 
we  must  conceive  that  there  springs  up  by  a  neces- 


BEING   AND   NON-BEING  31 

sary  negative  movement,  the  consciousness  of  the 
a-logos  as  its  antithetic  opposite,  and,  therefore,  ex- 
ckided  from  it.  The  object  which  thus  arises  can- 
not be  in  any  sense  identified  with  either  the  Father 
nature  or  the  logos,  but  is  to  be  conceived  as  an 
outer  sphere  of  antithetic  negation.  The  mistake 
that  reduces  Hegelism  to  ilhision  at  this  point  may 
be  stated  as  follows :  Hegel,  following  the  train  of 
Plato's  reflection  in  the  Sophist,  conceives  that  the 
distinction  between  opposites  is  only  relative  and 
that  they  may  pass  into  each  other.  But  Plato 
plainly  indicates  that  in  his  whole  discussion  of  be- 
ing and  non-being  he  has  the  problem  of  classifica- 
tion or  the  basis  of  genera  and  species  in  view,  while 
to  the  question  whether  there  be  an  absolute  opposite 
of  being  he  has  long  since  said  good-by.*  Now  it  is 
precisely  this  question  of  the  opposite  of  absolute 
being  on  which  Hegel  is  engaged.  But  it  is  clear 
that  while  the  opposite  of  any  species  of  being  may 
be  a  species  of  being,  the  opposite  of  absolute  being 
cannot  be  any  species  of  being.  The  opposite  of 
absolute  being  must  be  the  negative  of  its  being 
and  must,  therefore,  be  non-being,  and  it  is  contra- 
dictory to  conceive  that  being  and  non-being  can 
pass  into  each  other.  Our  intuition  will  be  rectus  in 
curia  only  when  we  see  clearly  and  cling  to  it,  that 
there  can  be  no  passage  of  primal  opposites  into 
each  other.  The  primal  negative  of  being  is  non- 
being,  and  this  non-being  must  be  conceived  as  a 

♦  The  Sophist,  Jowett's  Translation,  Ed.  3,  vol.  iv.,  p.  394. 


82  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

datum  til  at  ever  confronts  the  intuition  of  being", 
and  which  being  ever  strives  to  cancel  and  annul. 
Only  so  does  the  negative  become  a  real  datum  in 
philosophy,  supplying  a  negative  ground  of  the  dif- 
ferentia of  relativity  as  well  as  a  motive  for  the  out- 
go of  the  energy  of  creation. 

We  have,  then,  the  intuition  of  an  absolute  nat- 
ure which  by  its  inner  dialectic  activity,  not  only 
develops  a  conscious  embodiment  of  the  logos  or 
alter  ego,  but  through  it  also  a  consciousness  of  an 
antithetic  otlier  which  negates  its  whole  sphere  of  be- 
ing. To  this  antithetic  other  the  term  non-being  may 
be  applied,  and  we  thus  arrive  at  the  notion  of  the 
Absolute  as  becoming  conscious  through  its  logos- 
consciousness,  by  a  negative  movement,  of  an  a-lo- 
gos,  or  outer  sphere  of  non-being. 

In  the  idea  of  non-being  we  find  a  key  to  a  prob- 
lem that  has  hitherto  bailed  solution.  That  prob- 
lem is  the  genesis  of  an  imperfect  and  relative  order 
from  an  absolute  ground.  To  the  question  why  the 
world  should  not  be  perfect,  if  it  be  grounded  in 
absolute  being,  philosoiDhy  has  had  no  answer.  The 
answer  here  given  is  that  the  world  is  not  to  be  con- 
ceived as  the  immediate  product  of  the  immanent 
energy  of  the  Divine,  but  rather  as  its  mediated 
product.  The  mediating  term  is  non-being.  The 
world  can  be  produced  only  by  the  outgoing  en- 
ergy of  the  logos  and  only  in  the  sphere  of  non- 
being  and  not  in  God.  There  is  thus  an  element 
of  nothingness  constitutional  to  things,  and  this  ac- 
counts for  that  modification  which  in  the  process 


BEING  AND   NON-BEING  33 

of  being  created,  renders  things  mutable  and  im- 
perfect. 

That  non-being  is  a  real  datum,  is  a  conception 
which  philosophy  finds  great  difficulty  in  realizing. 
Plato  in  the  "  Timaeus  "  has  an  intuition  of  it  in  his 
idea  of  vkt]  or  matter.  But  his  insight  halts,  and  he 
conceives  the  negative  sometimes  as  the  mere  re- 
cej)tacle  of  being  and  again  as  the  mother  of  gener- 
ation. In  the  first  point  of  view  he  represents  it 
under  the  analogies  of  space  ;  under  the  second  he 
conceives  it  to  be  a  kind  of  material  matrix  in  which 
the  elemental  forces,  fire,  air,  water,  and  earth  are 
generated  and  enter  into  the  constitution  of  the  soul 
as  disturbing  elements,  of  temperament  and  passion. 
Alexandrian  Platonism  identified  non  -  being  with 
the  corporeal  and  the  coriioreal  with  evil.  Hence 
arose  its  determined  hostility  to  the  Christian  doc- 
trine of  the  Incarnation  and  its  decided  trend  to- 
ward asceticism.  Christianity  avoids  this  extreme 
while  recognizing  the  dualism  between  good  and 
evil  in  the  spiritual  world,  and  identifying  evil  with 
negation.  St.  John  has  an  intuition  of  the  cosmic 
significance  of  non-being  in  the  glimpse  he  gives  of 
the  drama  of  creation,  and  the  darkness  and  chaos 
standing  over  against  the  light-giving  Logos.  But 
in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  post-Apostolic  move- 
ment, the  speculative  genius  of  Christianity  was 
largely  absorbed  in  the  develoi^ment  and  formula- 
tion of  its  conception  of  the  Divine  nature,  in  the 
course  of  which  the  gnosis  of  the  negative  was,  for 
the  time,  left  relatively  in  the  background. 
3 


34  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

The  speculative  motive  for  again  bringing  it  for- 
ward  was  introduced  largely  from  the  outside.  Man- 
icheism,  which  was  an  offshoot  of  Parseeism,  and 
supposed  to  have  been  founded  by  Manes,  one  of  the 
Persian  Magi,  had  spread  extensively  over  the  East 
and  ultimately  came  into  contact  with  Christianity, 
upon  which  an  effort  was  made  to  graft  its  leading 
tenets.  The  central  idea  of  the  system  is  that  of  an 
absolute  spiritual  dualism  between  two  indepen- 
dent, coordinate,  and  antithetic  deities,  the  Prince  of 
Darkness  and  the  Prince  of  Light,  who  engage  in 
an  eternal  struggle  for  supremacy.  Around  this  cen- 
tral core  was  aggregated  a  body  of  doctrines  which 
were  for  the  most  part  irrational  if  not  immoral. 

The  historic  importance  of  Manicheism  for  mod- 
ern philosophy  arises  almost  wholly  from  St.  Augus- 
tine's connection  with  it,  who  for  a  time  an  adherent 
of  the  system,  at  length  rejected  it  and  reacted  vio- 
lently against  it.  But  Augustine,  although  he  threw 
off  Manicheism,  was  unable  to  throw  off  the  problem 
which  it  propounded,  the  relation  of  negation  and 
evil  to  God  or  the  Absolute.  We  find  in  Augus- 
tine the  fruitful  beginning  of  a  real  gnosis  of  non- 
being.  Running  through  his  refutation  of  the  Man- 
icheans,  and  his  great  work  Be  Clvitate  Dei,  is  a 
current  of  rich  speculation  which  culminates  in  that 
consummate  flower  of  early  Christian  reflection,  "  The 
Confessions."  The  "high  argument"  reaches  its 
climax  in  Book  XII  of  De  Clvitate  Dei  and  in  Books 
XI  and  XII  of  "  The  Confessions." 

Augustine  rejects  the  Manichean  doctrine  of  the 


BEmG   AND   NON-BEING  35 

positive  nature  and  eternity  of  evil.  It  lias  its  ac- 
tual origin  in  the  will  of  the  creature.  All  wills 
are  primarily  good.  Evil  originates  when  the 
creature  turns  from  God  and  chooses  some  lower 
good.  Augustine  distinguishes  between  positive 
and  negative  causes  and  conditions,  and  contends 
that  it  is  folly  to  ask  for  a  positive  cause  of  an  evil 
will.  The  positive  antecedent  of  a  bad  will  is 
a  good  will.  The  good  will  is  not  the  cause  of 
the  evil  will.  Evil  is  the  turning  of  the  will  from 
the  supreme  Good  ;  it  has  no  jDositive  cause  outside 
the  will  that  thus  turns.  The  evil  will  has,  how- 
ever, a  negative  condition,  and  that  is  the  mutahility 
of  the  creature.  This  mutability  is  the  differentia  of 
creature  existence  and  it  has  its  ground  in  the  noth- 
in(/?iess  out  of  which  the  creature  is  made.  Augus- 
tine, in  his  doctrine  of  creation,  opposes  both  old 
Platonism,  which  ijosited  a  primary  matter,  and  Neo- 
Platonism,  which  taught  the  emanation  of  the  world 
from  God.  Against  these  he  develops  his  theory 
of  creation  out  of  nothing.  Now  in  his  whole  re- 
flection it  is  plain  that  Augustine's  mind  oscillates 
between  two  inconsistent  conceptions  of  this  noth- 
ing. The  view  which  he  verbally  espouses  is  that 
which  perpetuated  itself  in  later  theology,  and  which 
takes  nothing  as  absolutely  identical  with  unreality. 
But  the  assertions  which  he  makes  about  the  noth- 
ing are  consistent  only  with  its  negative  reality. 
God  did  not  make  things  out  of  himself  or  out  of 
eternal  matter,  but  out  of  nothing.  The  assertion 
*'  out  of  nothing  "  would  be  wholly  inane  if  nothing 


36  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

were  not  conceived  as  entering-  in  some  way  into  the 
nature  of  the  creature.  Again,  in  connection  with 
his  theory  of  creation  the  problem  of  evil  and  its 
relation  to  God  comes  up.  God  is  not  the  author  of 
evil.  The  creature  is  mataUe  because  he  is  made 
out  of  notliing,  but  things  maybe  mutable  and  good. 
Mutability  is  not  evil,  but  it  introduces  into  a  nature 
the  liability  to  evil,  since  through  it  contingency 
aifects  the  will,  in  that  the  creature  having  the  op- 
tion of  the  supreme  Good  or  the  nothing,  before  it, 
may  choose  the  nothing  for  its  good  and  thus  be- 
come evil.  The  trend  of  Augustine's  real  thought  is 
toward  the  conception  of  evil  as  real  though  neg- 
ative, and,  in  like  manner,  toward  the  conception  of 
the  nothing  which  is  its  negative  condition  as  a  neg- 
ative reality.  In  other  words,  to  the  thought  of 
Augustine  the  nothing  is  a  datum  which  explains 
something,  whereas  the  conception  of  it  that  got 
lodged  in  subsequent  theological  thinking  is  not  a 
datum  and  is  powerless  to  explain  anything. 

The  survival  of  Augustine's  verbal  doctrine  of  the 
nothing  which  identifies  it  Avith  the  unreal  was  fol- 
lowed logically  by  two  unfortunate  results.  The 
first  was  the  giving  up  of  the  whole  problem  of  cre- 
ation as  an  unthinkable  mystery.  If  the  nothing  is 
to  be  identified  with  mere  unreality,  then  the  i^ropo- 
sition  that  God  made  the  world  out  of  nothing,  can 
only  mean  that  there  existed  no  external  motive  or 
datum  for  the  creation,  and  that  the  motive  and  da- 
ta of  the  world  must  be  sought  wholly  within  the 
Divine  nature.     The  difiiculty  is  not  escaped  by  as- 


BEING   AND   NON-BEING  37 

cribing"  the  origin  of  the  world  to  a  fiat  of  a  Di- 
vine will.  A  fiat  of  will  accomiolishes  nothing  un- 
less it  be  accompanied  by  energy.  Even  on  the  fiat 
theory  it  is  the  Divine  energy  that  is  the  producing 
cause.  Why,  then,  should  we  not  say  that  God  cre- 
ated the  world  out  of  himself  ?  This  question  is 
unanswerable  unless  we  acknowledge  the  reality  of 
the  nothing.  Eationally  the  only  alternatives  are 
the  recognition  of  the  reality  of  non-being  or  the 
surrender  of  the  whole  problem  of  the  origin  of  the 
relative  to  the  agnostic. 

The  second  unfortunate  result  has  been  the  giving 
up  of  the  problem  of  evil  as  an  unsolvable  riddle. 
We  must  regard  evil  as  either  positive  or  negative. 
If  we  conceive  it  to  be  positive,  then  we  are  driven 
either  to  the  Parsee  dualism,  if  we  regard  good  as 
also  positive ;  or  to  pessimism,  if  we  conceive  good 
to  be  negative.  If,  on  the  contrary,  we  conceive  evil 
to  be  negative  and  identify  negation  with  unreality, 
we  cannot  but  regard  evil  as  unreal.  This  is  the 
metaphysical  assumption  underlying  all  optimistic 
or  other  theories  which  conceive  evil  to  be  the  mere 
privation  of  good,  or  good  in  the  making.  No 
theory  of  evil  can  be  adequate  that  does  not  regard 
it  as  both  negative  and  real.  But  unless  negation 
is  real  this  cannot  be. 

We  may  try  to  escape  these  subtleties  by  seeking 
the  source  of  evil  in  free  will,  and  for  this  we  have 
the  example  of  Augustine.  But  unless  Ave  recog- 
nize the  reality  of  non-being  or  the  nothing,  we 
can  find  no  refuge  in  free  will,  for  the  question  con- 


38  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

fronts  us,  why  should  free  will  be  contingent  if  the 
freedom  of  the  Absolute  does  not  constitute  liability 
to  evil  I  Augustine  was  able  to  i3oint  to  the  noth- 
ing out  of  which  the  creature  is  made  as  constitut- 
ing the  ground  of  his  mutability  and  the  consequent 
contingency  of  his  free  will ;  and  so  must  we  if  our 
explanation  is  to  have  any  rational  force.  But  we 
then  raise  non-being  into  a  real  datum  which  ex- 
plains something.  There  is  no  escape  ;  either  real- 
ity of  non- being  or  a  choice  between  a  one-sided 
pessimism  or  optimism,  or  else  the  surrender  of 
the  whole  problem  as  an  unsolvable  riddle. 

A  philosophy  that  goes  to  the  root-problems  must 
face  the  negative.  It  will  have  not  simply  the  prob- 
lem of  being  but  also  that  of  non-being  on  its  hands. 
The  crucial  questions  regarding  the  negative  will 
be  how  its  reality  and  its  primal  relation  to  absolute 
being  are  to  be  conceived.  Now,  as  we  have  main- 
tained, the  reality  of  non-being  does  not  carry  with 
it  the  supposition  that  it  is  any  sort  of  a  iDOsitive 
nature.  This  has  been  the  mistake  of  Platonism, 
which  identifies  the  negative  with  matter,  or  at  least, 
with  space  ;  also,  of  those  modern  systems  which 
either  conceive  an  abyss  out  of  which  both  being 
and  the  negative  arise,  or,  represent  the  negative  as 
a  hostile  potency  in  the  absolute  nature  which  has 
only  to  be  liberated  from  the  bond  of  the  absolute 
will  in  order  to  develoi^  actual  disorder  and  evil. 
Non-being  cannot  be  conceived  as  any  kind  of  ac- 
tivity, or  as  a  i3otency  out  of  which  anything  de- 
velops.   It  has  no  type  and  can  be  represented  by 


BEING   AND   NON-BEING  39 

no  positive,  constructive  categories.  It  negates  all 
positive  predication.  The  only  gniding-  clew  we  can 
have  to  its  characterization  is  that  of  antithesis  and 
opposition.  It  is  what  being  excludes  from  its  nat- 
ure as  contradictory.  Shall  we  call  it  energy,  or 
cause,  or  substance  ?  By  no  means.  It  is  the  nega- 
tion of  all  these.  It  is  the  negation  of  energy  in 
that  so  far  as  it  enters  as  a  datum  there  is  a  failure 
of  energy  to  do  work.  It  is  the  negative  of  cause  in 
the  same  sense  as  Augustine  conceives  mutability 
to  be  the  negative  cause  of  evil ;  not  a  generator  of 
evil  but  the  root  of  that  contingency  which  makes 
a  will  liable  to  evil.  It  is  the  negative  of  substance 
in  that  it  has  no  positive  principle  of  existence  in 
itself.  It  lacks  the  spring  of  self-evolution  and  self- 
perpetuation,  and  being  the  negation  of  these,  it  is 
the  root  of  that  mutability,  that  lack  of  self-sub- 
sisting activity,  which  constitutes  the  differentia  of 
all  creature  existence. 

That  the  assertion  of  the  reality  of  non-being  is 
not  open  to  the  charge  of  absolute  dualism,  and  that 
it  is  a  very  important  and  necessary  philosophical 
datum,  the  following  statement  will  serve  to  show. 
Absolute  dualism  is  a  theory  of  the  Parsee  type 
which  splits  being  into  two  antithetic  halves,  thus 
breaking  its  unity  and  perpetrating  the  same  kind 
of  an  error  in  philosophy  that  polytheism  is  in  the 
sphere  of  religion.  But  absolute  dualism  arises 
only  w^hen  being  is  cleft,  and  positive,  active,  and 
co-ordinate  principles  are  arrayed  in  antagonism  to 
each  other.    It  is  needless  to  say  that  no  such  dual- 


40  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

ism  is  involved  in  the  theory  of  non-being  set  forth 
above.  In  the  first  phice,  the  whole  conception  is 
arrived  at  by  the  use  of  a  unitary  principle,  the  logos, 
for  the  interpretation  of  absolute  being.  The  re- 
sult of  this  stei3  is  the  conception  of  absolute  being 
as  spirit  which  expresses  itself  in  self-conscious  per- 
sonal self-manifestation.  Absolute  being  is  thus  a 
necessary  i3resupposition  of  non-being,  and  being 
itself  is  one.     Its  unity  is  not  broken. 

Thus  the  first  presupposition  of  the  real  is  ])eing. 
Now  the  intuition  of  non-being  arises  out  of  the 
spiritual  dialectic.  That  same  movement  of  intel- 
lection which  reveals  being  to  itself,  also  confronts 
it  with  the  intuition  of  the  not-self,  an  object  which 
in  the  absolute  sphere  must  be  the  negative  oppo- 
site of  being.  The  root  of  the  dual  intuition  is  thus 
found  in  the  heart  of  being  itself.  The  negative 
intuition  which  arises  is  simply  the  negative  aspect 
of  reality,  which  is  qualitatively  op^DOsed  to  being 
and  excluded  by  its  positive  nature. 

Now,  that  this  negative  is  not  to  be  conceived  as 
internal  and  immanent  to  being  is  evident  from  the 
fact  that  it  is  being's  opposite,  i.e.,  that  which  be- 
ing denies  and  excludes  from  itself.  The  relation  is 
one  of  primal  opposites  which,  as  we  maintain,  can 
never  be  conceived  as  passing  into  one  another 
without  gross  confusion  of  thought.  Negation  as 
an  activity  is  ahvays  being's  denial  of  its  opposite, 
and  negation  as  the  object  of  denial  is  always  be- 
ing's opposite.  There  is  no  self -negation  of  being, 
but  what  being  negates  is  its  opposite  or  non-being. 


BEING   AND   NON-BEING  41 

This  is  absolutely  true  in  the  sphere  of  the  Abso- 
lute. Qualification  is  only  necessary  for  the  rela- 
tive. 

Confusion  on  this  cardinal  point  leads  to  the  one- 
sided ItUntitats  Philosophies  as  the  Germans  call  it, 
which  sacrifices  distinction  and  difference  to  unity, 
and  having-  in  the  ground  of  the  system  eliminated 
the  distinction  between  being"  and  non-being",  is 
driven  by  an  irresistible  trend  of  logical  necessity 
to  its  goal  in  a  species  of  monistic  i3antlieism  in 
which  the  Absolute  completely  swallows  up  the 
relative. 

Non-being  as  an  objective  and  antithetic  term  in 
reality  thus  arises  as  a  necessary  consequence  of 
being-  itself  when  conceived  as  spirit  and  construed 
in  the  light  of  the  logos-princiiDle.  How,  then,  can 
the  category  of  non-being-  be  shown  to  be  philo- 
sophically necessary  ?  Its  value  arises  chiefly  as  a 
principle  of  disjunction  and  discrimination.  So  ap- 
plied it  brings  some  vital  x)hilosophical  conceptions 
to  the  birth  which  it  would  otherwise  be  very  diffi- 
cult to  realize.  In  the  first  place  it  makes  a  disjunc- 
tion between  the  immanent  and  the  exeunt  energiz- 
ing of  the  Absolute  not  only  conceivable  but  also 
rational,  in  the  motive  it  supplies  for  it  in  spirit's  in- 
tuition of  its  own  negative  and  opposite.  The  very 
self-assertion  of  being  which  is  its  essence  will  lead 
it  to  assert  itself  against  and  upon  its  opposite  for 
its  suppression  and  annulment.  In  the  second  place, 
as  we  have  seen  above,  a  true  conception  of  non-be- 
ing renders  the  origin  of  the  world-series  and  its 


42  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN  PHILOSOPHY 

relative  character  intelligible.  The  self-assertion 
of  being  against  its  opposite  not  only  explains  the 
exeunt  energy  but  also  the  origin  of  the  world-proc- 
ess, as  not  in  the  absolute  but  in  the  negative  sphere. 
The  negative  sphere  is  being's  opposite,  and  is  nega- 
tive in  the  sense  that  it  lacks  the  ground-principle  of 
self-existence  which  is  the  essence  of  being.  Logi- 
cally then,  a  creature  originating  in  this  sphere  will 
be  relative  and  mutable,  its  ground  and  rationale 
being  not  in  itself  but  in  another.  In  the  idea  of 
the  negative  we  thus  find  the  key  to  a  problem  over 
which  all  philosophy  has  puzzled ;  namely,  how  an 
absolute  energy  could  produce  a  creature  that  is 
only  relative.  The  outgoing  energy  can  produce  no 
other  than  a  relative  result. 

The  negative  also  renders  intelligible  the  law  of 
the  relative  sphere,  which  is  upward  development. 
If  the  world  arises  out  of  non-being  and  progresses 
toward  being  it  follows  that  its  process  will  be 
from  the  lowest  categories,  those  which  lie  nearest 
to  the  nothing,  through  more  advanced  stages  until 
it  reaches  its  full  development  under  the  categories 
of  spirit.  From  the  material  to  the  spiritual,  from 
mechanism  to  teleology,  is  therefore  the  natural 
order  of  relative  growth. 

The  nature  and  necessity  of  non-being  thus  be- 
come apparent.  It  is  incumbent  on  iDhilosophy 
then  to  assert  the  reality  of  both  being  and  non- 
being  ;  being  as  positive,  self-subsistent,  and  self- 
active  ;  non-being  as  being's  qualitative  op])osite. 
The  category  of  being  is   the  logos  ;  that  of  non- 


BEING   AND   NON-BEING  43 

being-  the  a-log-os.  Each  is  a  necessary  datum  of 
reality  ;  being,  of  its  self-existent  ground,  its  origin, 
positive  nature,  and  development ;  non-being,  of  its 
mutability,  its  dependence  on  other,  its  tendency  to 
disorder,  dissolution,  and  death. 


ni 

BECOMING 

We  think  that  a  rational  doctrine  of  Becoming*  is 
possible  only  in  the  light  of  the  dual  categories  of 
being-  and  non-being*.  In  the  preceding-  chapters 
we  have  investigated  these,  and  have  been  led  to  the 
discovery  of  a  necessary  connection  between  them. 
We  have  seen  that  a  true  conception  of  being-  leads 
to  the  assertion  of  its  negative  and  antithetic  corre- 
late, non-being- ;  and  that  non-being-  cannot  be  con- 
ceived as  an  immanent  movement  merely,  in  the 
evolution  of  being-.  We  have  seen  that  if  we  con- 
ceive being-  as  spirit,  then  non-being-  can  be  re- 
garded only  as  its  primal  and  excluded  opposite, 
as  that  which  it  iierpetually  denies  and  annuls  but 
never  becomes  identical  with. 

The  category  of  reality  is  broader  than  that  of 
being-.  The  whole  of  reality  has  its  negative  side, 
and  it  is  this  negative  side  which  being  denies. 
The  whole  of  reality  cannot  be  being,  for  being  is 
perfect  and  com^Dlete  and  could  of  itself  supply  no 
motive  for  the  generation  of  the  relative.  Nor  can 
non-being  be  conceived  as  internal  to  being,  since 
non-being  is  negation  and  want  and  being  cannot 


BECOMING  45 

be  affected  internally  by  these.  The  activity  of  be- 
ing- is,  as  we  have  seen,  a  dialectic  in  which  spirit 
affirms  itself,  and  denies  and  negates  its  opposite. 
Being  never  denies  itself,  but  it  denies  and  seeks  to 
annul  the  whole  negative  aspect  of  reality.  The 
processes  through  which  this  annulment  is  realized 
will,  therefore,  not  be  immanent,  but  will  have  their 
existence  in  the  negative  sphere  of  reality.  Non- 
being  is  thus  the  negative  side  of  reality  and  is  it- 
self real.  It  is  the  primal  opposite  of  being,  that 
which  being  denies  and  annuls.  In  this  qualitative 
sense  it  is  external  and  alien  to  being,  a  term  Avhich 
must  be  overcome  and  suppressed  in  order  that  be- 
ing may  be  realized. 

How,  then,  shall  the  category  of  non-being  be  con- 
ceived and  made  available  for  philosophic  reflec- 
tion ?  It  cannot  be  conceived  literally  as  antago- 
nizing the  energy  of  being,  for  it  would  then  be 
transformed  into  a  kind  of  being.  Nor  can  we  con- 
ceive it  simply  as  the  non-existent,  since  the  non- 
existent is  also  supposed  to  be  unreal.  Non-being 
has  no  categories  of  its  own,  since  all  categories 
primally  belong  to  being,  and  in  the  strictest  sense 
it  is,  therefore,  unrepresentable. 

We  have  seen,  however,  that  non-being  is  a  nec- 
essary datum,  and  in  order  that  philosophic  think- 
ing may  get  on,  it  is  necessary  that  there  should  be 
some  mode  of  representing  it.  Now,  the  negative  is 
to  be  conceived  as  the  opposite  of  being  in  the  sense 
that  it  is  what  being  denies  and  annuls.  This  rela- 
tion will  enable  us  to  represent  non-being  symboli- 


46  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

cally  by  simply  applying  to  it  the  negatives  of  the 
categories  of  being.  If,  then,  we  conceive  being  to  be 
a  sphere  of  reason,  consciousness,  light,  order,  per- 
sonality, and  individuality  ;  non-being  will  be  rep- 
resentable  as  the  opposites  of  these,  unreason,  un- 
consciousness, darkness,  cajprice,  impersonality,  and 
dividuality.  If  we  conceive  being  to  be  creative, 
generative,  formative,  and  constructive  ;  non-being 
will  be  representable  as  decreative,  degenerative, 
deformative,  and  destructive.  If  we  conceive  being 
as  energy  that  makes  for  ideal  truth,  beauty,  and 
good,  non-being  will  be  representable  as  the  nega- 
tive ground  of  falsehood,  deformity,  and  evil.  It  is 
only  necessary  thus  to  unfold  completely  the  idea 
and  categories  of  being  in  order  to  reach  an  ade- 
quate negative  conception  of  non-being.  Non-being 
is  irrational,  unconscious,  dark,  chaotic,  imperson- 
al, and  dividual.  It  is  decreative,  degenerative,  de- 
formative, and  dissolutive.  It  is  the  negative  prin- 
ciple of  falsehood,  deformity,  and  evil.  Exercising 
the  philosophic  imagination  we  may  represent  it  as 
an  abyssmal  gulf  of  darkness  and  caprice  eternally 
confronting  the  Absolute  intuition  in  opposition  to 
his  creative  energies. 

We  must  not,  however,  in  thus  characterizing  the 
negative  allow  our  terms  to  mislead  us.  Non-being 
is  a  necessary  datum  of  reason  and  an  element  in 
reality,  but  it  is  not  representable  to  the  imagina- 
tion except  symbolically.  Nor  can  we  apply  to  it 
any  category  in  the  positive,  that  is,  in  the  active 
sense.    If  we  conceive  it  under  the  category  of  cause, 


BECOMING  47 

as  we  must,  our  term  cause  must  be  used  in  the 
negative  sense.  It  is  not  the  active  generator  of  the 
properties  of  things  which  it  is  necessary  to  exi^lain, 
but  rather  their  negative  condition.  Want  and  ne- 
gation are  negative  but  not  positive  causes,  and 
non- being  is  a  cause  in  that  it  is  a  metaphysical 
want  in  the  nature  of  relativity.  For  since  the  rela- 
tive arises  in  the  negative  sphere,  its  self-existent 
ground  will  not  be  in  it  but  in  another.  In  this 
sense,  non-being  is  a  negative  cause. 

We  think  it  important  that  philosophy  should 
achieve  this  idea  of  negative  causation,  for  it  rep- 
resents the  only  practicable  mode  of  characterizing 
the  negative  element  in  reality.  It  is  only  when 
non-being  is  conceived  as  negative  cause,  that  the 
mutability  of  generated  things  and  their  dependence 
on  other  can  be  understood,  and  it  is  only  when  we 
become  able  to  apply  this  mode  of  characterization 
with  insight  and  discrimination  that  we  can  avail 
ourselves  of  the  true  riches  of  the  negative. 

The  question  then  arises,  how  are  we  to  employ 
the  dual  categories,  being  and  non-being,  as  data 
for  a  theory  of  becoming.  The  first  three  catego- 
ries of  Hegel's  Logic  are  being,  nothing,  and  be- 
coming. But  Hegel  identifies  being  with  the 
thinnest  abstraction  ;  i.e.,  the  real  disrobed  of  every 
definite  and  positive  attribute.  This  renders  being 
indistinguishable  from  nothing,  since  both  are  repre- 
sented under  negative  conceptions.  Hegel  is  only 
logical,  therefore,  when  he  translates  the  negative 
movement  of   the  dialectic  into  being's  denial  of 


48  BASAL  CONCEPTS  IN  PHILOSOPHY 

itself  and  the  wliole  activity  of  being  is  thus  con- 
ceived monistically  as  immanent  self-evolution.  The 
reform  which  we  think  necessary  is  that  the  dialectic 
be  dualistically  interpreted  and  that  non-being  be 
conceived  not  as  being  in  the  form  of  negation,  but 
rather  as  the  primal  opposite  of  being,  which  being 
denies  and  annuls.  The  dialectic  of  being  and  non- 
being,  in  so  far  as  it  is  real,  must  be  construed  as  an 
outgo  of  being's  energy  into  the  negative  sphere  of 
reality,  and  its  activity  will  be  an  activity  of  opposi- 
tion. 

This  substitution  of  a  dualistic  for  a  monal  con- 
ception of  the  dialectic  of  being  works  a  complete 
revolution  in  it  while  preserving  and  in  fact  increas- 
ing its  unique  suggestiveness  and  power.  So  con- 
ceived, it  becomes  an  activity  in  which  being  as  self- 
active  spirit,  realizes  intellectually  in  its  first  motion, 
a  dual  intuition  of  itself  and  its  negative  opposite. 
This  intuition  motives  a  volitional  movement  which 
is  to  be  conceived  as  the  creative  impulse  of  being, 
embodying  itself  in  the  outgoing  of  energy  into  the 
negative  sphere.  The  result  of  this  volitional  on- 
slaught upon  non-being  is  creation,  the  generation  of 
a  positive  nature  in  the  sphere  of  want  and  negation. 
In  this  generated  nature  we  have  the  origin  of  the 
species  of  reality  we  call  becoming.  How  then  shall 
the  nature  of  becoming  be  conceived.  In  seeking 
an  answer  to  this  question,  we  must  again  revert  to 
the  antithetic  data  out  of  which  it  has  arisen.  Fol- 
lowing the  line  of  reflection  opened  by  the  early 
thinkers  and  developed  by  Hegel,  we  have  conceived 


BECOMING  49 

tlie  world  as  the  product  of  the  volitional  energy  of 
the  creative  logos,  while  its  evolution  is  the  func- 
tion of  absolute  energy  conceived  as  Holy  Spirit. 

The  question  arises  why  this  distinction  is  to  be 
made  between  the  energies  of  creation  and  evolu- 
tion. The  answer  will  be  found  in  two  considera- 
tions. In  the  first  ]3lace,  while  the  Absolute  is  to  be 
conceived  as  spirit,  its  primal  activity  must  be  in- 
tellectual, and  thus  will  arise  the  dual  intuition  of 
self  or  being  and  of  the  negative  or  non-being.  This 
will  lead  by  close  sequence  to  the  second  moment  of 
activity,  which  is  volitional  and  presupposes  the  in- 
tellectual intuition  as  its  motive.  The  volitional 
activity,  as  we  have  seen,  asserts  itself  transitively 
in  the  energy  of  creation.  The  Absolute  conceived 
as  thus  energizing  and  motived  by  the  intellectual 
intuition  is  the  creative  logos.  We  see  then  that 
the  same  reflection  which  leads  to  the  idea  of  the 
volitional  activity  also  assigns  to  it  the  function  of 
creation. 

In  the  second  place  we  have  seen  how  the  creat- 
ure which  arises  from  the  creative  energy  is  gen- 
erated, not  in  being,  but  in  the  negative  sphere.  A 
form  of  being  thus  arises  out  of  non-being.  This  de- 
termines the  generation  as  beginning  with  the  lowest 
categories  and  the  creation  will  be,  in  its  initial  stage, 
next  to  nothing,  and  thus  removed  as  far  as  possible 
from  the  Absolute.  This  distance  between  the 
creature  and  the  Creator  will  motive  a  third  activity 
of  spirit  in  which  it  goes  out  into  the  created 
sphere  in  an  energy  of  unification  and  love.     The 


50  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

process  which  results  from  this  unifying  activity  is 
development  or  evolution.  It  is  a  deep  insight  that 
applies  the  name  Holy  Spirit  to  the  primal  being 
in  the  exercise  of  this  activity  of  development.  The 
inner  core  of  holiness  is  an  activity  of  unification 
leading  to  the  realization  of  wholeness  or  unity  of 
being  and  the  beauty  of  its  manifestation.  Thus 
arises  what  in  theological  language  is  called  the 
procession  of  the  Spirit,  or  in  Scriptural  lohrase  the 
moving  of  the  Spirit  upon  the  face  of  the  deep.  And 
this  moving  of  the  spirit  is  the  immanent  principle 
of  the  world-process,  including  both  nature  and  hu- 
manity. It  is  true  that  nothing  is  made  without 
the  logos.  It  is  also  true  that  the  unifying  spirit 
is  the  immanent  agency  in  the  historic  evolution  of 
the  world. 

To  the  generated  sphere  conceived  as  the  product 
of  the  logos  and  as  motived  by  the  spirit,  we  apply 
the  name  becoming.  The  term  is  suggestive  of  the 
flux  of  Heraclitus,  and  it  may  be  conceived  under 
the  figure  of  a  flowing  and  ebbing  stream.  Becom- 
ing is  not  pure  being,  nor  is  it  pure  non-being,  but 
it  participates  in  both,  and  thus  its  nature  repre- 
sents a  dualistic  synthesis.  The  idea  of  becoming 
involves  dual  and  opposite  tendencies  to  being  and 
to  non-being.  The  Heraclitean  intuition  had  the 
keener  sense  for  the  negative  side.  The  flux  thus 
became  a  species  of  non -being  and  sceptical  despair 
was  the  logical  result.  But  becoming  is  as  truly  a 
tendency  to  being  as  to  non-being.  The  energy 
that  generated  it  continues,  as  we  have  seen,  as  con- 


BECOMING  51 

serving  and  developing-  force,  and  thus  determines 
the  positive  moment  of  becoming  not  only  as  real, 
but  also  as  dominant,  so  that  negation  becomes  a 
subordinate  and  not  a  ruling  feature  in  the  system 
of  things.  While,  therefore,  becoming  in  its  ground- 
constitution  is  dualistic  and  its  activity  expresses 
itself  in  a  perpetual  oscillation  between  the  posi- 
tive and  negative  poles  of  reality,  the  immanent 
energy  of  the  Absolute  conserves  the  positive  forces 
and  translates  the  flux  into  a  movement  of  develop- 
ment from  lower  to  higher  stages  of  reality. 

It  is  only  in  the  light  of  this  metaphysical  dual- 
ity that  we  can  arrive  at  a  completely  rational  con- 
ception of  the  nature  of  becoming.  This  major 
dualism  is  necessary  to  explain  (1)  the  form  of  rela- 
tive being ;  (2)  what  may  be  called  the  comple- 
mental  duality  of  its  constitution.  Becoming  is,  as 
we  have  seen,  dual  in  its  constitution ;  it  is  a  per- 
petual flux  which  is  determined  by  opposite  moments 
of  generation  and  decay.  Now,  what  is  the  meaning 
of  this  duality  of  form  ?  It  signifies  that  the  rela- 
tive is  not  a  pure  creature  of  absolute  energy,  that 
it  cannot  be  monistically  explained.  The  secret  of 
its  dual  character  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  it 
is  the  generated  product  of  energy  that  works  in  the 
negative  sphere,  and  produces  being  out  of  it  by 
the  suppression  and  annulment  of  the  negative. 
But  this  war  against  non-being  is  endless,  and  the 
negative  enters  as  a  moment  into  generated  being, 
rendering  it  mutable,  dependent,  and  contingent  to 
decay. 


52  BASAL   CONCEPTS  IN   PHILOSOPHY 

We  find  here  also  the  key  to  another  feature  of 
the  relative ;  namely,  the  complemental  duality  of 
its  constitution.  In  a  self-conserving,  self-subsist- 
ing- medium  a  dual  balance  of  forces  would  not  be 
needed.  But  in  the  negative  sphere  from  which  the 
self-existenfc  ground  is  absent,  a  generated  force 
cannot  be  self-conserving,  but  must  be  conserved  by 
its  other  or  fall  into  the  abyss.  The  only  mode  in 
which  a  relative  nature  can  be  conceived  as  obtain- 
ing a  TTov  o-Tcu  is  that  of  a  complemental  dualism 
of  positive  forces.  This  complemental  dualism  of 
forces,  which,  as  we  see,  is  not  ultimate,  but  pre- 
supposes the  Absolute,  is  the  ground  of  a  universal 
law  of  relativity  ;  namely,  that  of  relatim  self -i mainte- 
nance, which  has  an  application  to  both  matter  and 
mind. 

Limiting  our  view  to  the  former,  the  most  philo- 
sophical conception  of  matter  is  that  which  regards 
it  as  reducible  in  its  ultimate  analysis  to  dual  centres 
of  force.  The  conception  of  a  material  monad  as 
the  unit  of  material  constitution,  seems  to  be  irra- 
tional and  nugatory.  It  can  only  be  asserted  in  a 
postulate  that  can  give  no  rational  account  of  itself, 
and  it  holds  in  it  no  principle  that  can  help  us  to 
rationally  conceive  its  own  persistence,  or  that  can 
explain  any  of  the  characteristic  material  phenomena. 
If  we  posit  the  monad,  it  is  necessary  for  us  imme- 
diately to  give  it  a  fellow,  held  in  the  grip  of  a  co- 
hesive and  repellant  synthesis,  before  we  can  take  a 
single  step  forward.  This  indicates  that  the  rational 
unit  of  matter  is  the  duad  and  not  the  monad.     It  is 


BECOMING  53 

upon  tLo  duacl  only  that  mechanical  science  can  rise, 
and  a  metaphysic  of  matter  lay  its  foundations. 

Assuming-  the  material  duad  and  the  law  of  self- 
maintenance  involved  in  it,  let  us  consider  the  basal 
category  of  the  relative  process  ;  namely,  the  Series. 
Heflection  here  will  lead  to  analogous  conclusions. 
The  meta^Dhysical  dualism  of  being  and  non-being 
out  of  which  the  relative  arises,  can  give  rise  to  no 
series  unless  we  conceive  the  comple mental  duad  as 
the  type  of  relative  being.  For  we  have  seen  that 
the  mere  notion  of  a  dialectic  of  being  and  non-being 
leads  to  the  intuition  of  a  flux,  a  mere  succession  of 
sparks,  an  alternation  of  origination  and  cessation. 
Decay,  dissolution,  and  death  are  as  real  as  their  op- 
X^osites  ;  they  are  ever  X3resent  moments  in  the  rela- 
tive, constituting  the  negative  ground  of  its  muta- 
bility and  dependence.  But  the  moments  of  origi- 
nation and  cessation  do  not  constitute  the  series. 
The  principle  of  conservation  in  the  Absolute  is 
self-subsistence,  self-identity,  while  its  opposite  in 
non-being  is  absolute  discontinuity,  and  dividual- 
ity.  In  such  a  sphere  the  relative  analogue  of 
absolute  self-subsistence  can  only  be  a  succession 
of  pulsations  in  which  the  energizing  centre  of  the 
exfjiring  i)ulsation  persists  and  passes  into  its  suc- 
cessor. This  persistent  core  is  to  be  identified 
with  the  spiritual  potence  in  the  form  of  which  the 
immanence  of  the  absolute  energy  in  the  world  is  to 
be  conceived.  Thus  the  series  arises,  a  synthesis  of 
of)posite  moments.  The  series  may  be  conceived 
either  as  discontinuity  ever  striving  to  make  a  breach 


54  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

in  continuity,  or  as  continuity  striving-  to  heal  the 
breaches  of  the  discontinuous.  The  series  express- 
ing- itself  in  the  category  of  change  is  a  dual  alterna- 
tion of  cessation  and  origination  in  which  a  dialectic 
core  of  being  persists. 

The  series  thus  realizes  the  law  of  self-mainte- 
nance, and  this  law,  conceived  as  the  inner  principle 
of  the  series,  is  Causality.  Here  the  same  funda- 
mental moments  appear.  The  profoundest  science 
of  the  time  reduces  the  category  of  cause,  on  one 
side  to  the  universal  law  of  conditions ;  that  is,  the 
principle  by  which  all  phenomena  are  connected  in 
an  order  of  dependence ;  and  on  the  other,  to  the 
law  of  dynamic  continuity  ;  that  is,  the  principle  by 
which  the  change  from  cause  to  effect  is  conceived 
to  be  only  a  change  of  form,  in  which  the  substance 
continues  the  same.  Both  these  lines  of  conceiving 
state  the  same  ultimate  fact,  the  dualistic  nature  of 
the  principle  of  causation.  The  first  point  of  view, 
confining  itself  more  rigorously  to  the  sphere  of 
manifestation,  simply  embodies  in  its  concei3t  of 
causation  the  inner  nature  of  the  series ;  whereas 
the  latter  more  profoundly  transcends  serial  limits 
of  manifestation,  and  connects  the  changing-  series 
with  its  ultimate  dialectic  core.  But  this  profun- 
dity, instead  of  transcending  the  sphere  of  dualism, 
simply  leads  to  the  "hidings  of  its  power,"  for  analy- 
sis of  the  elements  of  the  material  continuity  which 
is  presupposed,  only  reveals  to  our  intuition  that 
ultimate  dialectical  opposition  of  being  and  non- 
being  which  underlies  all  relative  nature. 


BECOMIXG  55 

We  conceive  that  the  idea  of  relativity  unfolded 
above,  supplies  the  only  completely  rational  basis 
for  a  x^hilosophy  of  nature.  In  the  first  place,  it 
enables  us  to  see  that  the  real  clash  of  thought  in 
regard  to  the  origin  and  history  of  the  relative  and 
finite  is  not  between  the  concepts  of  creation  and 
evolution,  but  rather  between  those  of  creative  dual- 
ism and  monistic  self-evolution.  All  theories  of  the 
self-evolution  of  the  world  are  monistic,  and  may  be 
classed  under  two  categories  :  self-evolution  from 
either  absolute  being,  or  absolute  non-being.  Now, 
from  the  standpoint  we  have  reached  here  we  are 
able  to  see,  as  by  intuition,  that  self-evolution  from 
absolute  being  can  never  rationally  explain  the 
origin  of  relative  and  finite  nature,  nor  can  it  give 
any  intelligible  account  of  its  universally  dualistic 
character.  If  the  Avorld  is  simply  a  self-evolution 
of  absolute  being,  then  the  product  ought  to  be 
absolute  and  no  relative  category  ought  to  show  its 
head.  If  nature  is  a  self-evolution  of  absolute  be- 
ing, then  nature  ought  to  be  a  sphere  of  perfect  free- 
dom, and  necessity  could  have  no  rational  right  to 
appear.  The  categories  of  relativity  are  wholly  in- 
explicable from  the  idea  of  the  world  as  a  jDure 
phenomenon  of  absolute  being. 

Even  more  powerless  is  the  idea  of  self-evolution 
from  non-being.  This  is  the  basis  of  the  negative 
Dionysian  theories  and  the  theories  of  purely  nat- 
uralistic evolution.  To  these  the  primal  datum  is 
some  sphere  of  negative  reality,  the  Dionysian 
theories  conceiving  the  evolution  of  the  logos  out 


5Q  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  a-log-os  and  relative  nature  out  of  the  logos, 
while  the  naturalistic  theories  of  evolution  conceive 
the  same  process  in  materialistic  terms.  Naturalis- 
tic evolution  i30stulates  some  primordial  world-stuff 
transcending-  the  categories  of  organization,  and, 
therefore,  a  species  of  negative  absolute  out  of 
which  organized  nature  gradually  emerges.  Now, 
in  order  that  this  absolute  world-stuff  may  supply 
a  fruitful  starting-point  for  development,  it  must  be 
conceived  as  containing  principles  of  organization 
in  its  bosom.  But  in  that  case  the  organizing  lorin- 
ciples  become  absolute,  and  the  dual  categories  of 
being  and  non-being  are  acknowledged.  Natural- 
istic evolution  is  thus  forced,  by  the  simple  logic 
that  order  and  form  cannot  be  conceived  as  arising 
out  of  the  orderless  and  formless,  to  the  positing 
of  absolute  being  as  one  of  its  necessary  condi- 
tions. 

The  only  species  of  monism  that  has  any  philo- 
sophic value  is  a  monism  that  starts  from  the  pos- 
tulate of  absolute  being,  and  conceives  the  universe 
as  being  the  product  or  manifestation  of  an  absolute 
self-subsistent  principle.  The  world  is  then  repre- 
sented as  having  the  springs  of  its  own  being  and 
evolution  within  itself,  and  its  movements  are  all  to 
be  construed  under  the  categories  of  self-manifesta- 
tion and  self-development.  We  are  able  thus  to  de- 
velop a  concept  of  the  evolution  of  absolute  being, 
but  we  find  our  logic  powerless  to  ground  a  real 
relative  order,  or  to  rationally  interpret  its  dualistic 
character  and  categories. 


BECOMING  57 

Pure  self-evolution  is  a  category  of  absolute  be- 
ing and  has  no  place  in  a  sphere  of  relativity.  Kor 
does  it  furnish  any  adequate  exjplanation  of  the  rel- 
ative. If  we  start  from  it  as  the  sole  metaphysical 
datum,  we  are  never  able  to  bridge  the  chasm  from 
absolute  to  relative,  and  if  we  seek  to  employ  it  as 
a  relative  principle,  we  then  either  elevate  the  rela- 
tive into  the  Absolute  by  positing  the  primal  springs 
of  nature's  subsistence  within  herself,  or  we  form  a 
closed  circle  of  relativity  which  excludes  the  Abso- 
lute and  has  no  rational  ground. 

We  conceive,  then,  that  the  category  of  becoming 
is  that  of  the  whole  relative  sphere.  Its  presuppo- 
sition is  a  metaphysical  dualism  of  being  and  non- 
being.  Out  of  this  dual  fountain  issues  the  flux, 
the  flowing  stream,  a  creature  that  is  ever  coming 
into  being  and  ever  ceasing  to  be.  This  creature 
acquires  relative  stability  through  the  complemental 
duality  of  positive  forces  which  forms  the  type  of 
a  relative  constitution,  and  stands  as  the  analogue 
of  self -existence  in  the  Absolute.  By  virtue  of  its 
persistence  it  forms  a  series.  The  series  is  the  form 
of  the  law  of  self -maintenance.  Its  inner  principle 
is  causality,  and  by  virtue  of  its  causal  connections 
the  dialectic  core  of  being  passes  from  moment  to 
moment  by  change  and  development,  and  the  sprout- 
ing of  consequents  out  of  antecedents  becomes  a 
law  of  the  world's  movement. 

If  now  we  apply  the  term  creation  to  the  genera- 
ting process  by  which  the  relative  is  grounded,  and 


58  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

the  term  evolution  to  the  process  of  g-rowth  from  an- 
tecedent to  consequent  which  constitutes  its  order, 
then  creation  and  evolution  become  complemental 
terms,  and  a  complete  theory  of  relativity  will  be 
seen  to  involve  both. 


IV 

SPACE  AND   TIME 

If  the  Absolute  is  a  necessary  postulate  of  the  ex- 
istence of  things,  non-being  is  a  necessary  postulate 
of  their  imperfection.  No  reason  can  be  found  in 
the  nature  of  the  Absolute  why  generated  existence 
should  be  less  complete  and  perfect  than  its  self- 
existent  ground.  But  a  reason  for  this  is  sux3plied 
by  the  postulate  of  that  which  is  qualitatively  oppo- 
site to  being.  AYe  have  seen  how  the  intuition  of 
non-being  arises  and  supplies  a  motive  for  the  out- 
go of  the  creative  energy  of  being  into  the  sphere  of 
its  qualitative  opposite.  This  determines  the  char- 
acter of  generated  being  in  two  w^ays :  (1)  the  rise  of 
things  in  the  negative  si^here  determines  them  as 
contingent  and  mutable ;  that  is,  as  lacking  a 
ground  or  principle  of  existence  in  themselves ;  (2) 
the  very  necessity  that  creative  energy  should  not 
remain  immanent,  but  that  it  should  go  out  or  utter 
itself,  is  the  reason  for  another  essential  character- 
istic of  generated  being. 

The  law  of  all  utterance  is  that  what  is  implicit 
in  the  uttering  agent  shall  become  explicit,  and 
that  what  is  explicit  shall  become  implicit.     To  the 


60  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

utterer  the  tlionglit  is  explicit  and  the  symbol  in 
which  it  expresses  itself  lies  coiled  up  in  its  bosom. 
When  it  goes  out  into  the  outer  sphere  this  order  is 
reversed.  The  form  uncoils  itself  and  swallows  up 
the  thought,  which  becomes  implicit  as  its  inner  en- 
ergy and  meaning.  Thus  the  word  is  necessary  to 
manifest  the  thought  just  as  in  Christian  thinking 
the  Divine  energy  utters  itself  in  the  eternal  Logos. 

This  law  is  universal,  and  it  involves  an  inversion 
of  the  categories  of  being  in  its  outgo  into  the 
negative  sphere.  It  is  the  operation  of  this  law  in 
connection  with  the  modifying  influence  of  the 
negative,  as  above  explained,  we  think,  rather  than 
any  labored  effort  to  trace  the  moments  of  logical 
reflection,  that  will  bring  to  light  the  real  forms  and 
energies  of  the  world. 

The  most  obtrusive  elements  of  the  world,  as  it 
presents  itself  to  our  cognitive  intuition,  are  space 
and  time  and  matter.  Having  treated  of  the  genesis 
of  matter  in  the  preceding  cha]3ter,  we  shall  devote 
this  reflection  to  space  and  time.  We  must  hold  to 
the  cardinal  doctrine  that  the  world  has  as  its  gen- 
erating ground  an  absolute  being  ;  that  this  being 
is  self-activity  ;  and  that  self-activity  is  to  be  con- 
strued in  the  light  of  the  logos,  as  spirit ;  that  is, 
as  self-conscious,  personal,  and  individual.  Self- 
activity  is  then  an  individualizing  energy.  It  is  an 
energy  that  is  formally  unitary,  comprehending  the 
whole  and  including  distinction  as  internal  and  im- 
plicit. 

The  inversion  of  such  an  energy  consequent  on  its 


SPACE  AND  TIME  61 

outg*o  or  external  utterance,  would  lead  to  a  trans- 
position of  relations  between  its  unitary  and  differ- 
encing activities.  The  latter,  the  category  of  divid- 
uality,  would  become  explicit  and  obtrusive,  and  the 
principle  of  its  operation  would  be  the  distinction 
and  expulsion  of  point  from  point,  a  process  which 
is  endless  and  to  which  no  assignable  limit  can  be 
fixed.  The  operation  of  such  a  principle  would  gen- 
erate the  relations  of  quantitative  self-exclusion  and 
externality.  But  the  force  of  this  dividual  prin- 
ciple would  be  checked  by  the  implicit  unitary  force 
of  individuality  which,  when  thus  energizing  in  sub- 
ordination to  its  opposite,  would  take  the  form  of 
continuity.  The  quantitative  points  would  thus 
fall  into  a  species  of  dialectic,  explicitly  expell- 
ing, but  implicitly  comprehending  all  other  points. 
Thus  would  arise  that  process  of  generation,  that 
flowing  out  from  points  into  lines,  planes,  and  solids, 
which  constitutes  the  central  movement  of  all  our 
space  conceptions. 

We  have  only  to  translate  this  supposition  into 
fact  in  order  to  obtain  a  rational  idea  of  the  genera- 
tion of  space.  For  space  is  explicitly  this  principle 
of  unchecked  dividuality,  this  breaking  up  into  an 
infinity  of  mutuallj^  expulsive  points ;  this  wholly 
outering  and  self-repelling  property  of  reality.  But 
space  is  imxjlicitly  individual  and  unitary,  so  that 
every  point  includes  and  comprehends  all  other 
points.  The  law  of  space  conception  is  thus  the 
evolution  of  point  from  point  in  the  process  which 
generates  lines,  planes,  and  solids. 


62  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

How,  then,  is  space  related  genetically  to  the  self- 
active  energy  of  the  creative  spirit  ?  We  answer, 
mediately,  through  the  modifying  influence  of  non- 
being.  Space  as  above  construed,  is  to  be  con- 
ceived as  a  first  resultant  in  the  negative  sphere,  of 
the  outgoing  creative  energy.  The  first  fruits  of 
the  outflow  of  the  creative  energy  into  the  negative 
sphere,  is  its  transformation  into  a  quantitative  im- 
age of  its  absolute  author. 

This  we  call  ontologic  space,  and  the  question 
arises,  what  is  the  relation  of  ontologic  space  to 
matter  ?  We  cannot  regard  it  as  a  phenomenon  of 
matter,  nor  yet  as  separable  from  matter.  In  the 
order  of  conception  it  is  the  ^^Hws  of  matter.  But 
on  the  other  hand,  we  cannot  conceive  its  existence 
apart  from  the  existence  of  matter.  We  cannot 
separate  what  the  Absolute  has  joined  together. 
The  true  relation  will,  we  think,  be  apprehended  if 
we  conceive  space  and  matter  as  arising  out  of  the 
same  generative  activity,  space  being  its  form 
while  matter  is  its  substance.  Form  and  substance 
are  inseparable,  while  in  the  order  of  conception, 
form  must  stand  as  the  priits  of  substance.  Matter 
and  space,  therefore,  though  not  to  be  identified, 
are  as  inseparable  as  substance  and  form. 

A  distinction  is  to  be  made  between  ontologic  and 
psychologic  space.  Ontologically  considered,  space 
is  the  form  of  matter.  It  is  the  iDrinciple  of  divisi- 
bility and  continuity  in  the  material  sphere  and  is, 
therefore,  objective  and  dependent  on  the  creative 
energy  that  underlies  the  world.     Psychologically 


SPACE   AND   TIME  63 

considered,  when  we  abstract  from  ontologj^  space 
seems  to  be  subjective,  a  phenomenon  of  our  percep- 
tion.    Kant  conceives  it  to  be  the  form  of  percep- 
tion, and  Berkeley  virtually  anticipated  the  Kantian 
view  by  reducing  it  to  a  perceptive  process.     The 
doctrine  of  the  subjectivity  of  space  contains  both  a 
truth  and  an  oversight.     The  truth  is  that  space  is 
not  to   be   conceived  as  a  motionless  thing  lying 
wholly  outside  of  the  activity  by  which  it  is  per- 
ceived.    Berkeley  and  Kant  are  the  authors  of  a  real 
psychological   discovery.      We   do   not   objectively 
contemplate  space;  rather,  we  spatialize  objective 
phenomena,  and  the  mode  of  this  spatialization  can 
only  be  adequately  conceived  when  w^e  regard  it  as 
analogous  to  the  generation  of  ontologic  space— that 
is,  when  we  conceive  our  perception  of  phenomena  in 
space  as  resulting  from  an  inversion  of  the  inner  ac- 
tivity of  the  perceiving  subject.     Berkeley  and  Kant 
are  following  a  deep  insight,  therefore,  when  they 
identify  space  with  the  form  of  external  perception. 
But  the  doctrine  of  these  thinkers  contains  an  im- 
portant oversight.     It  does  not  take  account  of  the 
objective   factor,  the  ontologic   conditions   of  per- 
ception.    If  we  eliminate  the  objective  factor,  the 
incoming  energy  that  meets  the  outgoing  activity, 
we   abolish   perception.      But   if  we  recognize   the 
objective  factor,  we  have  on  our  hands  the   whole 
ontological  problem,  and  we   cannot   foreclose  the 
case  in  favor  of  subjectivity,  as  these  thinkers  do, 
but  must  include  the  ontological  as  an  integral  part 
of  our  theory.    When  we  do  this,  the  intuition  gradu- 


64  BASAL   CONCEPTS  IN  PHILOSOPHY 

ally  claims  that,  primarily,  space  is  ontolog-ical  and 
objective,  and  that  in  our  psychological  process  we 
simply  retrace  the  steps  of  a  creative  energy  that 
has  gone  before. 

The  nature  of  time  is  to  be  analogously  appre- 
hended. The  root  of  time,  as  of  space,  will  be  to 
seek  in  the  nature  of  the  creative  activity.  This  ac- 
tivity, as  we  have  seen,  is  one  that  is  explicitly  uni- 
tary and  self -identical.  But  it  implicates  change  in 
the  form  of  immanent  movement  or  procession,  a 
movement  which  ever  returns  upon  itself.  Now,  we 
have  only  to  bear  in  mind  the  law  of  outer  expres- 
sion, to  be  able  to  conceive  the  expressed  activity 
which  goes  out  upon  and  in  the  negative  sphere,  as 
undergoing  a  transformation,  so  that  the  category  of 
change  has  become  explicit  and  obtrusive.  The  re- 
sult will  be  parallel  to  that  in  the  case  of  space. 
The  moments  of  the  inner  activity  which  were  all 
comprehended  in  an  eternal  consciousness  will, 
through  the  transformation,  have  become  explicit  as 
a  succession  of  moments  or  pulsations,  each  of  which 
expels  every  other  moment  from  itself.  This  will 
give  rise  to  an  indefinite  plurality  of  moments  which 
would  be  wholly  disparate  and  disconnected,  were  it 
not  for  the  fact  that  the  self -identical  activity,  which 
in  the  Absolute  holds  the  procession  immanent,  has 
now  become  implicit  and  functions  as  a  principle  of 
continuity.  We  have  then  a  result  analogous  to  that 
noted  above.  Explicitly,  the  moments  are  mutually 
exclusive  and  disparate,  but  implicitly  each  moment 
comprehends  every  other  moment.     The   opposite 


SPACE   AND   TIME  65 

cliaracteristics  of  time  thus  arise,  for  time  flows,  but 
time  is  also  continuous.  Time  is  tlie  principle  of 
separate  events,  but  it  is  time  that  binds  events  to- 
gether in  a  continuous  movement. 

Thus  arises  ontologic  time,  regarding-  which  we 
have  to  ask,  as  we  asked  regarding  space,  how  are 
we  to  conceive  its  relation  to  the  material  world? 
In  order  to  mark  the  distinction  between  matter, 
sx3ace,  and  time,  which  proceed  from  a  common  ac- 
tivity in  the  Absolute,  we  must  note  their  variant 
relations  to  the  sphere  of  non-being.  The  dual  con- 
stitution of  matter  arises,  as  we  saw,  from  the  want  of 
self-supporting  ground  in  the  negative  sphere.  The 
peculiar  constitution  of  s^Dace  arises  from  the  di- 
viduality  of  non-being,  the  absence  from  it  of  any 
principle  of  continuity ;  while  that  of  time  finds 
its  negative  condition  in  the  chaos  of  non-being,  the 
absence  from  it  of  any  principle  of  orderly  sequence. 
A  cardinal  point  to  be  emphasized  is  that  matter, 
space,  and  time  have  a  common  root  in  the  Abso- 
lute ;  they  spring  simultaneously  out  of  a  common 
activity,  and  their  differential  features  are  the  neg- 
ative results  of  the  medium  in  w^hich  they  are  en- 
gendered. 

Now,  we  have  seen  that  space  is  the  form  of  which 
matter  is  the  substance.  How  shall  time  be  related 
to  this  complex  phenomenon  ?  In  a  preceding  chap- 
ter we  saw  how  the  serial  form  of  becoming  origi- 
nates. But  the  idea  of  time  is  also  that  of  a  series. 
Time  bears  the  same  relation  to  the  series  of  becom- 
ing that  space  bears  to   matter.    It  is  the  form 


66  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  series,  while  its  substance  is  that  inner  dy- 
namic causal  connection  which,  as  we  saw,  consti- 
tutes the  principle  of  natural  evolution.  The  two 
ideas  are  inseparable,  and  when  we  say  that  the 
order  of  becoming  is  serial,  we  are  also  saying-  that 
it  is  temporal.  The  form  of  the  series,  time,  and  its 
substance,  causal  dependence,  are  thus  inseparable, 
though  not  the  same,  and  we  are  not  at  a  loss  to  un- 
derstand a  tendency  so  marked  in  certain  phases  of 
modern  thought,  to  identify  the  substance  with  the 
form,  and  to  conceive  causation  in  terms  of  pure  tem- 
poral succession. 

Time  thus  conceived,  we  call  ontologic,  because 
it  has  its  roots  in  the  creative  activities  which  pro- 
duce the  world.  This  is  to  be  distinguished  from 
psychologic  time,  which  arises  in  a  way  analogous 
to  the  rise  of  psycholo'gic  space,  and  regarding 
which  the  same  i^roblems  have  been  mooted  in  mod- 
ern thought.  The  solution  of  these  problems  need 
not  delay  us,  since  it  is  analogous  to  the  solution  of 
the  space  problems.  It  is  true  of  time,  that  while 
it  is  to  be  conceived  psychologically  as  the  formal 
activity  of  the  serial  consciousness  which  appre- 
hends events  in  succession,  yet  this  subjectivity 
must  be  qualified  by  the  recognition  of  time  as 
springing  from  ontologic  conditions,  and,  therefore, 
objective.  In  thinking  time  we  retrace  the  pathway 
of  the  creative  energy.  Of  the  modern  analyses  of 
time,  that  of  St.  Augustine  is  the  earliest  and  one  of 
the  most  interesting.  Augustine  declines  to  regard 
the  divisions  of  time  into  past,  present,  and  future, 


SPACE   AWD   TIME  67 

as  ultimate.  There  is  in  reality  only  the  present, 
and  there  are  three  times,  only  in  the  sense  of  "  a 
present  of  things  past,  a  present  of  things  present, 
and  a  present  of  things  future."  *  Translating  this 
into  psychological  terms,  we  have  a  memory-pres- 
ent, a  sight -present,  and  an  expectation -present. 
But  when  he  comes  to  the  analysis  of  this  present 
which  subserves  everything,  Augustine's  insight 
fails  and  he  confesses  himself  baffled. 

Contemporary  psychology  is  scarcely  more  suc- 
cessful in  meeting  the  Augustinian  difficulty.  It 
distinguishes  between  a  "  specious  present,"  which 
James  picturesquely  describes  as  "  a  sort  of  saddle- 
back with  a  certain  length  of  its  own,  on  which 
we  sit  perched  and  from  which  we  look  in  two  direc- 
tions into  time,"  and  the  real  present,  which  for- 
ever vanishes  to  a  point.  This  real  present  the 
psychologist  finds  inexiDlicable,  and  no  wonder,  for 
it  involves  a  datum,  we  think,  which  transcends  the 
temporal  series.  The  objective  life  of  man  moves  in 
a  series,  but  there  is  a  point  at  which  it  transcends 
the  flowing  stream  and  contemplates  it  forward  and 
backward  from  the  standpoint  of  eternity.  It  at- 
tains this  point  whenever  it  retreats  into  the  citadel 
of  the  I.  That  intangible  and  indivisible  present, 
which  the  keenest  analysis  of  empiric  consciousness 
never  traces  to  its  source,  is  the  voice  of  the  I,  whose 
function,  in  relation  to  the  temporal  series,  is  to  com- 
prehend its  plurality  and  change  under  its  own 
ideal  unity. 

*  Confessions,  Chap.  xi. 


68  BASAL   CONCEPTS  IN   PHILOSOPHY 

If  this  conception  be  true,  we  have  an  ontologic 
explanation  of  the  "  saddle-back  of  time  "  which, 
from  this  point  of  view,  is  to  be  conceived  as  rep- 
resenting the  mode  of  this  ideal  comprehension  and 
the  extent  to  which  it  has  been  developed  in  the 
human  soul.  The  mode  is  ideal  and  original,  but 
the  extent  is  a  function  of  experience  and  seems  to 
progress  in  a  direct  ratio  to  the  growing  wealth  of 
man's  consciousness.  To  the  child  the  grasp  is 
small  compared  with  that  of  the  adult  man ;  to  the 
adult  savage  it  is  small  compared  with  that  of  the 
adult  civilized  man ;  to  the  adult  civilized  rustic 
it  is  small  compared  with  the  comprehension  of  a 
Plato  or  a  Newton.  The  "  specious  present "  simjDly 
measures  the  triumph  of  individuality  over  plural- 
ity and  change ;  it  is  the  resultant  in  the  psychic 
sphere  of  the  perpetual  struggle  of  man's  ideal  self 
to  overcome  the  relative  formlessness  of  the  actual 
and  bring  it  into  harmony  with  its  own  law.  And 
in  proportion  as  man  succeeds  in  the  struggle,  the 
flight  of  the  temporal  becomes  more  rapid,  its  riches 
are  emptied  more  and  more  lavishly  into  the  basket 
of  the  present,  and  the  circle  of  his  individuality 
becoming  more  and  more  comprehensive,  he  feels 
the  shackles  which  have  bound  him  as  a  thrall  to 
the  mere  temporal  and  evanescent,  loosening  their 
grasp,  and  his  conscious  life  taking  on  more  and 
more  the  image  of  the  eternal. 

One  of  the  profoundest  of  recent  thinkers*  has 

*  S.  H.  Hodgson  :   Time  ami  Space. 


SPACE    AND    TIME  69 

an  intuition  of  the  ontologic  character  of  space  and 
time,  which,  with  matter  in  the  form  of  psychic  feel- 
ing-, he  represents  as  the  constituents  of  all  knowable 
being,  and  his  subtle  analytic  is  tasked  in  order  to 
show  how  the  constituents  may  be  conceived  as 
complicating  into  all  forms  of  organized  existence. 
But  they  are  represented  as  ultimates  floating  at 
large  m  a  universe  without  any  absolute  moorings, 
and  when  the  question  of  absolute  being  comes  up, 
as  it  must  to  all  speculative  minds,  this  thinker  can 
discover  no  exit  from  the  sphere  of  relativity,  and 
finds  himself  confronted  with  the  hopeless  problem 
of  developing  a  rational  theory  of  relative  nature 
out  of  purely  relative  data.  Time  and  space  and 
matter  are  ontological  elements  of  relative  being. 
But  they  are  not  self-explanatory.  They  only  sug- 
gest the  problem  to  be  solved,  and  the  principle  of 
the  solution  can  be  discovered  only  by  looking  be- 
yond these  relative  forms  to  the  absolute  springs 
from  which  they  have  emerged. 


COSMIC   NATURE 

Hitherto  we  seem  to  have  been  dealing-  with  the 
fragments  of  a  world-idea.  Now  the  whole  vision 
begins  to  dawn,  and  in  this  chapter  we  shall  seek  to 
trace  its  outlines.  The  vision  ]3resents  itself  as  the 
whole  idea  of  cosmic  nature,  of  the  world  as  a 
sphere  of  mechanical  activities.  And  just  as  in  the 
former  chapters  we  achieved  the  ideas  of  matter, 
space,  and  time,  by  applying  the  law  of  inversion 
to  the  outgo  of  the  creative  activities  into  the  sphere 
of  non-being,  so  here  we  must  apx3ly  the  same  prin- 
ciple in  order  to  reach  a  conception  of  the  whole 
mechanical  s^Dhere. 

If  we  make  a  synthesis  of  space,  and  time,  and 
matter,  we  have  a  concept  of  a  sphere  of  mechanical 
forces  and  energies,  and  if  we  realize  the  connection 
of  this  sphere  with  its  absolute  ground,  we  have 
the  concei3t  of  a  world-spirit  as  the  transcendent 
ground  of  the  world  manifesting  itself  immanently 
in  the  mechanical  categories  of  the  world-activities. 
Now,  the  inner  material  principle  of  this  sphere  of 
world-activity,  as  we  have  seen,  is  causality.  How 
then  is  this  principle  to  be  conceived?      We  have 


COSMIC   NATURE  71 

seen  that  it  is  the  inner  nerve  of  that  world-series  of 
which  time  is  the  form.  But  what  we  seek  here  is 
to  determine  the  mode  of  that  activity  which  we  call 
mechanical  causation.  And  in  order  to  reach  that 
determination,  we  must  seek  the  rationale  of  the 
modification  which  self-activity  suffers  in  the  ex- 
ternal sx)here.  Self -activity,  as  we  know,  moves 
ever  in  a  circle  of  return  upon  self.  It  is,  therefore, 
self-dependant  and  self-conservinof.  The  outgo  of 
self-activity  into  the  negative  sphere  simjoly  breaks 
this  circle  and  translates  it  into  a  series,  and  the 
nexus  which  holds  all  moments  in  the  grasp  of  self- 
dependence  is  straightened  out,  so  to  speak,  and 
becomes  a  link  of  dependence  upon  an  antecedent 
in  time. 

Causality  is  the  activity  in  which  this  dependence 
on  antecedents  is  realized.  It  has  a  double  aspect. 
In  the  first  place,  it  is  a  principle  of  external  de- 
pendence. If  the  link  of  self-return  be  broken,  then 
the  pulsations  of  activity  will  be  ever  going  out 
from  their  source  in  an  external  succession.  Each 
will  go  out  from  and  sejDarate  itself  from  each.  In 
this  aspect,  mechanical  causation  is  a  self-alienating, 
disparate  activity,  which  is  ever  breaking  up  unity 
into  isolated  moments  and  parts.  But  causality  has 
another  aspect  equally  essential,  but  not  so  overt 
and  explicit.  It  is  not  strictly  accurate  to  say  that 
the  movement  of  self-return  is  broken  bj'  the  outgo 
of  creative  activity  into  the  negative  si:>here.  It  is 
not  broken,  but  is  rather  translated  into  implicit 
potency.     In  this  form  it  enters  the  world-series  as 


72  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

a  principle  of  inner  continuity.  Let  us  endeavor  to 
construe  this.  We  say  that  a  is  the  cause  of  h,  and 
that  involves  the  distinction  and  separation  of  h  from 
a  in  the  series  ;  h  must  be  out  of  a  in  order  to  be  the 
effect  of  a.  But  if  h  be  simply  out  of  a,  it  is  cut  off 
from  «'s  influence  and  cannot  be  its  effect ;  h  must  al- 
so be  in  a  in  order  to  be  produced  by  it.  In  other 
words,  there  must  be  continuity  as  well  as  distinction, 
and  the  outer  procession  of  the  effect  must  be  con- 
ceived as  being  grounded  in  an  inner  procession  of 
cause. 

Modern  science  is  founded  on  this  intuition  of 
the  dual  nature  of  causation.  It  sees  that  the  world- 
series  and  the  principle  of  the  external  mechanical 
dependence  of  the  parts  of  this  series,  can  be  rational- 
ized only  by  conceiving  as  implied  in  it  a  continuity 
of  the  generative  activity' by  which  the  series  is 
produced.  The  basal  insight  of  science  thus  opens 
to  it  the  grounds  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  limits  of 
its  own  proper  categories  and  principles. 

Custom  sanctions  the  employment  of  causation  as 
a  regressive  princiiDle  for  the  connection  of  con- 
sequents with  their  antecedent  grounds.  The  look 
of  causation  is,  therefore,  backward,  and  its  presup- 
position is  always,  the  present  of  the  world  wliich  it 
seeks  to  ground  in  antecedent  conditions  that  have 
lapsed.  But  this  regressive  employment  of  causa- 
tion is  merely  a  convention  of  science,  and  it  is  just 
as  open  to  a  progressive  use.  It  then  becomes  a 
principle  of  forward  world-development  and  evolu- 
tion. 


COSMIC   NATURE  73 

The  question  then  arises,  how  is  woiid-deyelop- 
ment  or  evolution  to  be  conceived  ?  If  we  reflect  on 
the  world-series  we  will  be  led,  in  accordance  with  the 
previously  developed  view,  to  regard  it  as  the  real- 
ization of  a  modified  form  of  creative  self-activity. 
How  this  modification  arises  and  the  nature  of  it, 
we  have  already  considered.  The  fact  to  be  em- 
phasized here  is  that  the  life  of  the  series  depends 
on  its  connection  with  this  activity,  and  that  it  can 
be  conceived  as  possessing-  any  degree  of  relative 
independence  and  self-sufficiency,  only  when  the 
creative  springs  are  included  in  it.  But  the  in- 
clusion of  the  creative  sjDrings  in  the  series  binds  it 
fast  to  the  absolute  ground,  since  it  involves  the  pre- 
supposition of  the  creative  activity  of  the  Absolute  as 
the  immanent  source  of  the  world's  energy  and  move- 
ment. Now,  if  we  include  this  creative  activitj^  in 
our  idea  of  the  world-series,  we  are  enabled  to  reach 
the  conception  of  a  forward  world-movement  in 
which  each  antecedent  section  of  the  world  will  be 
regarded  as  the  matrix  or  spring  of  production  for 
each  section  that  follows,  and  in  which,  therefore, 
the  principle  of  continuous  development  reigns  su- 
preme. 

From  this  i3oint  of  view  we  see  that  the  category 
of  world-development  or  evolution  is  vital  to  the 
life  of  science.  For  science  is  the  intuition  of  the 
world-series  under  the  category  of  causation,  and 
while  causation  says  that  every  part  of  the  series 
must  have  an  antecedent  condition,  its  deeper  voice 
says  also  that  in  order  to  be  completeh'^  explanatory, 


74  BASAL   COTnTCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

this  condition  must  also  include  in  it  the  creative 
ground  of  its  being-.  The  idea  of  world-develop- 
ment or  evolution  rests  on  this  deep  intuition  and 
embodies,  therefore,  the  ideal  which  science  places 
before  her,  just  in  proportion  as  her  intellig-ence 
rises  out  of  the  mistiness  of  abstractions  into  the 
light  of  conceptions  that  are  concrete  and  adequate. 
The  presupposition  of  evolution  is  t-hat  in  the 
world-series,  at  any  conceivable  point,  will  be  found 
the  explanatory  conditions  of  what  follows.  This 
presupposition  is  valid,  as  we  have  seen,  only  when 
in  the  world-series,  at  any  given  point,  we  include 
the  creative  activity  out  of  which  the  series  springs. 
But  it  is  not  obligatory  on  science,  in  its  ordinary 
procedure,  to  make  a  constitutive  use  of  this  presup- 
position. Whether  dealing  with  nature  or  human- 
ity, science  may  treat  the  presupiDOsition  as  latent, 
and  may  construct  her  explanations  in  view  of  condi- 
tions which  appear  in  the  series.  And  this  proced- 
ure is  rendered  not  only  possible,  but  rational,  by 
the  fact  that  the  creative  energy  manifests  itself  im- 
manently  in  the  world-series,  and  thus  translates  all 
its  realized  activity  into  the  forces  and  agencies  of 
the  series  itself.  The  biologist  may,  therefore,  de- 
termine the  life-series  in  view  of  natural,  mechanical 
causes,  and  the  student  of  man  may  find  in  the  nat- 
ure of  humanity  the  data  of  historic  science.  Each 
becomes  a  charlatan  only  when  he  groAvs  negatively 
dogmatic  and  attempts  to  eliminate  from  his  prob- 
lem the  latent  assumption  of  the  creative  ground  on 
which  the  rationale  of  evolution  depends.     But  in 


COSMIC   NATURE  75 

science  as  in  religion,  it  is  not  as  a  rule  lie  who  keeps 
noisily  crying  Lord,  Lord,  that  enters  the  kingdom, 
but  rather  he  who,  having  caught  a  vision  of  the 
Creator  in  his  works,  follows  in  a  reverent  spirit 
those  mechanical  footsteps  which  symbolize  the 
"  hidings  of  his  power." 

How,  then,  are  we  to  construe  the  world-series 
when  conceived  under  the  category  of  evolution  ? 
The  starting-point  of  the  regressive  use  of  causation 
is  the  present  state  of  the  world.  But  when  science 
adopts  the  category  of  evolution  she  must  transport 
herself  back  to  the  beginning  of  the  series,  and  look 
forward  to  the  present  as  its  goal.  Eegressive  caus- 
ation is  analytic,  resolving  the  present  into  its  past 
conditions.  Progressive  evolution  is  synthetic,  con- 
structing from  the  conditions  of  the  past  the  vision 
of  the  future.  And  in  order  that  it  may  be  really 
explanatory  the  evolution  process  must  be  repre- 
sented as  beginning  with  a  datum  that  requires  no 
antecedent  for  its  own  explanation.  This  datum 
has  been  represented  under  the  category  of  absolute 
simi^licity  and  identified  with  a  point  in  the  world- 
series,  from  which  all  distinction  and  determination 
have  been  eliminated.  Thus  Herbert  Spencer  postu- 
lates a  condition  of  absolute  homogeneity  as  the 
first  datum  of  evolution,  and  the  process  of  develop- 
ment consists  in  the  rise  and  progressive  complica- 
tion of  distinction  and  integration  in  this  undif- 
ferentiated medium.  Such  a  conception  of  the 
world-process  is  open  to  a  criticism  similar  to  that 
which  has  already  been  made  on  Hegel's  '*  Logic."  It 


76  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

starts  with  the  thinnest  of  abstractions  and  professes 
to  show  how,  by  a  species  of  nature-dialectic,  the 
workl  passes  from  category  to  category  in  the  path- 
way of  concretion  and  complication,  until  it  reaches 
as  its  goal,  the  world  with  all  its  present  riches. 
But  as  in  Hegel's  "  Logic,"  it  is  the  rich  spirit  of 
the  reflector  himself  that  supplies  the  motive  and 
stages  of  the  dialectic,  so  here  we  must  seek,  not  in 
the  nndiiferentiated  homogeneous,  but  rather  in  the 
highly  organized  and  developed  intelligence  of  the 
Spencerian  thinker,  for  the  motives  and  categories 
of  the  process  he  describes. 

We  must  do  this  unless  we  are  prepared  to  admit 
that,  either  implicit  in  the  homogeneous  or  tran- 
scending it,  there  must  be  assumed  as  a  necessary 
datum  of  the  process,  an  activity  which  contains  cate- 
gories similar  to  those  Ave' have  read  into  the  proc- 
ess. In  other  words,  the  alternatives  open  to  us  are 
either  a  subjective  and  psychological  construction 
of  the  evolution-process  which  reduces  the  world  to 
an  ontologic  illusion,  or  an  objective  ontologic  con- 
struction which  seeks  the  rationale  of  the  world-^Dro- 
cess  in  its  connection  with  the  creative  springs. 

It  is  only  this  ontologic  conception  of  evolution 
that  is  completely  borne  out  by  the  investigations 
of  science.  Before  the  principle  of  evolution  could 
be  more  than  vaguely  apprehended,  science  had  to 
establish  her  great  generalizations  known  as  the 
laws  of  the  conservation  of  energy  and  the  correla- 
tion and  transformation  of  forces.  The  law  of  con- 
servation asserts  that,  given  a  certain  quantum  of 


COSMIC  naturp:  77 

energ-y,  that  quantum  will  remain  constant,  subject 
to  neither  increase  nor  diminution  by  the  processes 
of  nature.  The  empirical  proof  of  this  consists  in 
the  discovery  that  when  energy  disappears  its  equiv- 
alent is  always  found  to  reapiDear  in  some  other 
form.  This,  however,  is  no  complete  demonstration, 
and  cannot  account  for  the  assurance  of  science, 
which  rests  primarily  on  its  refusal  to  believe  in  the 
possibility  of  annihilation.  The  law  of  correlation 
and  transformation  contains  the  same  intuition,  but 
it  also  involves  an  additional  postulate,  that  of  the 
continuity  of  nature  through  all  its  stag"es  and  proc- 
esses. The  changes  of  nature,  therefore,  including 
the  apiDarent  superinduction  of  new  spheres  of  being 
and  new  species  of  force  and  energy,  can  be  con- 
ceived only  as  transformations  of  forces  that  already 
exist.  Science  sjDeaks  with  absolute  assurance  v»  hen 
she  says  that  nature's  continuity  is  unbroken,  and 
that  evolution  can  effect  transformations,  but  is  un- 
able to  create  any  new  species  or  increment  of  force. 
What  is  this  but  a  deep  intuition  of  a  necessi- 
ty that  apiDears  also  from  other  points  of  view  ; 
namely,  of  the  fact  that  evolution  can  be  rationalized 
only  by  a  presui^position  that  connects  its  process 
from  the  beginning  Avith  an  inexhaustible  reservoir 
of  creative  activity?  Evolution  is  absolutely  shut 
up  to  given  forces.  She  can  create  none,  destroy 
none.  She  can  only  work  transformations  in  the 
materials  put  into  her  hands.  She  can  have  no 
voice  as  to  how  the  forces  she  employs  shall  origi- 
nate, nor  how  their  existence  shall  be  conditioned. 


78  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

The  vision  of  evolution  is  limited  absolutely  to  her 
own  things  ;  of  the  things  of  the  creative  energy  she 
sees  not  so  much  as  a  glimmer  in  the  dark.  Beyond 
the  limits  of  her  vision  rest  the  whole  problem  of 
the  origination  of  natural  force  and  the  mode  of  its 
introduction  into  nature,  the  question  of  its  possible 
increase  or  diminution  in  the  ]3rimal  springs,  the 
whole  question  of  the  possible  teleologic  meaning 
of  nature,  and  the  relation  it  may  bear  to  larger  and 
correlated  spheres  of  being.  These  problems  are 
only  for  an  intelligence  which  is  able  to  comprehend 
evolution  as  an  element  in  a  larger  system  of  real- 
ity. 

No  philosopliy  is  complete,  however,  that  over- 
looks the  negative  side  of  the  world-problem.  We 
have  seen  how  non-being  determines  that  modifica- 
tion of  the  world-categories  which  distinguishes 
them  from  absolute  spiritual  activities.  Thus  arise 
the  relative  and  imperfect  forms  and  categories  of 
the  world-series  and  the  laws  under  which  it  pro- 
ceeds. We  may  say  that  in  the  positive  world-proc- 
ess, so  far  as  unfolded,  negation  is  held  in  solution 
but  not  suppressed.  And  that  this  is  true  will  be 
apparent  when  we  consider  that  the  categories  of 
evolution  have  their  correlative  negative  categories 
which  are  inseparable  from  them.  Dissolution,  de- 
cay, and  death  are  as  real  features  of  the  world  as 
evolution,  growth,  and  life,  and  although,  as  will  be 
seen  in  the  chapter  on  Organic  Nature,  these  are 
subsidized  in  a  measure  by  the  processes  of  higher 
organization,  yet  this  result  is  accomplished  only 


COSMIC   NATURE  79 

by  a  new  stride  on  the  part  of  the  positive  construc- 
tive forces  of  nature.     The  negative  tendencies  are 
only  overcome  and  held  in  check,  and  that   mod- 
ern intuition  which  gives  us   the   clearest  vision 
of  the  processes  and  laws  of  evolution,  also  gives 
the  clearest  presentation  of  the  dissolutive  process. 
Evolution  and  dissolution,  growth   and  decay,  are 
inseparable,  though   antithetic  categories.     In  the 
very  heart  of  the  developing  process  science  discerns 
the  seeds  of  decay  in  a  tendency  toward  an  equilib- 
rium of  forces,  the  principle  of  differentiation,  which 
is  a  negative  condition  of  life  in  a  growing  organism, 
becoming  a  minister  of  death  to  an  organism  in  which 
the  force   of  integration   has   ceased   to   dominate. 
Chaos  thus  confronts  nature,  dissolution  confronts 
evolution,  death  confronts  life,  as  an   omnipresent 
issue.     Everywhere  in  nature,  as  in  the  sphere  of 
humanity,   progress    is    achieved    only   through   a 
struggle  of  organizing  forces  to  overcome  and  neu- 
tralize negative  tendencies,   and    the    catastrophe 
threatened  by  the   equilibrium   of   forces    can   be 
averted  only  by  the  infusion  of  a  new  increment  of 
organizing  energy  and  the  transformation  of    the 
stagnant  mass  into  the  conditions  of  a  new  develop- 
ment. 

We  are  ready  now  to  perform  the  final  synthesis 
through  which  an  adequate  conception  of  cosmic 
nature  may  be  achieved.  The  ground  of  the  world 
is  both  transcendent  and  immanent.  Its  transcend- 
ent ground  is  that  primal  energy  which,  as  we  saw, 
must  be  presupposed  as  the  root  and  spring  of  all 


80  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

derivative  being.  On  grounds  which  need  not  be 
restated  here,  we  are  led  to  posit  the  outgo  of  this 
primal  self-activity  into  the  sphere  of  non-being, 
w^here,  in  accordance  with  the  law  of  external  self- 
expression,  it  is  translated  into  the  world-energy. 
The  immanent  ground  of  the  world  is  this  spring 
of  world-energy  or  potence  which  we  may  call  the 
world-spirit,  and  which  constitutes  the  unfailing 
spring  out  of  which  its  forces  and  movements 
emerge.  This  immanent  ground  is  related  to  the 
transcendent  ground  as  potence  to  actuality,  so  that 
the  ultimate  rationale  of  the  world  must  be  sought 
in  the  transcendent  activity  of  the  Absolute. 

Out  of  the  immanent  ground  of  the  world  arise  the 
forces  and  categories  of  the  world-series.  We  have 
seen  how  the  material  force  which  functions  in  cos- 
mic nature  must  be  conceived  as  dual  in  order  that 
it  may  be  relatively  self-maintaining.  The  rationale 
of  this  duality  may  be  found  in  the  same  charac- 
teristics which  determine  the  series,  namely,  the 
struggle  of  immanent  and  imi^licit  unity  to  over- 
come explicit  difference  and  dividuality.  This  dual 
opposition  is  conceived  as  constituting  in  the  atomic 
elements,  to  which  science  reduces  the  material  con- 
stitution of  things,  a  balance  of  forces  which  condi- 
tions the  stability  and  continuity  of  the  world.  The 
immanent  ground  of  the  world  is  also  the  immediate 
source  of  the  order  in  which  the  categories  of  de- 
velopment make  their  appearance.  The  primal 
category  is  self-activity.  But  in  the  sphere  of  non- 
being  this  is  inverted  and  translated  into  potence. 


COSMIC   NATURE  81 

The  order  in  which  this  potence  is  translated  again 
into  actuality  will  be  an  inversion  of  the  primal 
activity.  Its  first  manifestation  will  be  at  the  bottom 
of  the  scale,  as  far  from  self-activity  as  possible. 
Instead  of  self-activity  it  will  be,  explicitly,  activity 
that  is  ever  determined  by  the  other  than  self.  Such 
activity  we  call,  in  substance,  material  force,  and  in 
form,  mechanical. 

Cosmic  nature  is  the  sphere  of  material  force 
acting-  under  the  mechanical  form.  Its  proximate 
spring  is  the  potential  world-spirit,  which  actualizes 
itself  in  the  world-series  and  in  the  forces  and  cate- 
gories of  mechanical  evolution.  The  first  stage  of 
world-activity  is  that  sphere  of  energies  which  arises 
from  a  synthesis  of  space  and  time  and  matter.  We 
call  it  the  inorganic  because  here  mechanism  reigns 
supreme.  The  unitary  and  individualizing  force  of 
the  world  is  still  implicit  and,  in  a  sense,  transcend- 
ent, acting  as  a  restraint  on  the  externalizing  forces, 
but  not  entering  as  a  determinative  factor  into  the 
constitution  of  things.  In  this  sphere  the  world- 
series  is  mechanical,  each  part  being  conditioned 
and  determined  by  its  other.  The  inner  law  of  this 
series  is  causation  in  its  mechanical  form,  and  the 
principle  of  its  progress  is  mechanical  evolution, 
the  forwa-rd  march  of  differentiation  and  integration 
in  the  course  of  which  the  simple  homogeneity  is 
transformed  into  rich  and  varied  heterogeneity. 

But  it  has  already  been  made  apiDarent  that  the 
whole  sphere  of  mechanical  development,  if  ab- 
stracted from  its  ground,  becomes  irrational.  It  can 
6 


82  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

be  grounded  and  the  world  rationalized  only  by 
connecting  the  whole  world- series  with  the  creative 
fountains  out  of  which  it  arises,  and  this  leads  us,  as 
we  have  seen,  back  to  the  immanent  power  that  is 
the  immediate  source  of  the  world-energies,  and 
through  this  to  the  transcendent  source  of  all  things, 
the  self-active  energy  of  Absolute  Being. 


VI 

OEGANIC   NATURE 

In  the  preceding-  chapters  we  have  achieved  what 
may  be  called  a  deduction  of  the  idea  of  a  world- 
spirit  or  spiritual  potentiality  as  the  immediate  and 
immanent  ground  of  the  world's  being  and  develop- 
ment. This  idea  of  an  immanent  world-ground  de- 
pends, as  we  have  seen,  on  the  postulate  of  a  trans- 
cendent and  absolute  self-active  spirit  whose  energy 
g-oes  out  into  and  operates  upon  a  sphere  of  nega- 
tion and  non-being,  by  which  it  is  translated  into 
the  inner  potentiality  of  the  relative  and  depen- 
dent world. 

The  postulate  of  this  potential  world-spirit  not 
only  grounds  the  series,  but  also  the  order  of  its 
development.  We  have  seen  how  the  mechanical 
categories  of  the  cosmic  sphere  arise  as  the  first 
entelecJues  of  this  potential  ground.  In  these,  dis- 
tinction and  difference  become  overt  and  active, 
determining  the  mechanical  series  and  its  laws, 
while  the  unitary  individualizing  force  remains  im- 
plicit and  latent  as  a  regulative  and  conditioning- 
principle.  But  it  is  the  law  of  potency  to  gradually 
pass  into  actuality,  and  from  the  idea  of  the  world- 


84  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PJIILOSOPHY 

spirit,  already  achieved,  Ave  would  be  led  to  antici- 
pate that  the  next  stage  in  the  development  after 
the  purely  mechanical,  would  be  one  in  which  the 
latent  unitary  and  individualizing-  force  of  the  world- 
ground  begins  to  manifest  itself  in  the  series  as  an 
active  constitutive  principle.  In  other  words,  we 
would  expect  to  see  a  transformation  of  the  form  of 
the  series,  and  the  manifestation  of  a  force  that  pro- 
duces individual  wholes,  which  will  comprehend  and 
unify  distinctions  and  parts.  Thus  would  arise  Life 
or  organic  nature. 

What  life  is,  is  a  question  that  has  puzzled  both 
science  and  philosophy.  The  tendency  of  science 
is  to  regard  it  as  a  complex  product  of  mechan- 
ical forces,  but  how  mechanism  can  produce  an 
individual  organism  remains  a  mystery.  Defini- 
tions of  life  are,  as  a  rule,  mere  descriptions  of  its 
external  phenomena.  The  physicist  characterizes  a 
living  organism  as  a  machine  for  generating  heat 
and  doing  work ;  the  chemist,  as  a  body  composed 
of  highly  unstable  compounds  ;  the  biologist,  as  a 
plexus  of  organs  and  tissues  which  are  adapted  to 
the  performance  of  certain  functions,  or,  if  he  be 
speculatively  inclined,  as  an  inner  correspondence 
to  an  outer  environment.  Such  definitions,  though 
true  and  i^erhaps  adequate  to  their  purpose,  do  not 
reach  the  heart  of  the  subject,  and  fail  to  give  any 
rational  insight  into  the  nature  of  life  or  its  relation 
to  other  dei^artmonts  of  nature. 

The  cosmic  series  is  coextensive  with  time,  for,  as 
we  have  seen,  time  and  the  cosmic  series  originate 


ORGAIS^IC   T^ATURE  85 

together  out  of  a  common  ground.  But  life  is  not 
co-extensive  with  time.  Life  originates  hi  time,  and 
it  may  also  cease  to  exist  in  time.  The  origin  of 
life  thus  presupposes  a  section  of  the  world-series 
from  which  vital  phenomena  were  absent,  and  in 
which,  therefore,  only  mechanical  forces  energized. 
At  some  point  in  the  series  a  new  phenomenon,  which 
we  call  life,  originates,  and  this  new-comer  has  no 
other  antecedent  conditions  among  the  active  forces 
of  the  series  than  the  material  and  mechanical. 

Nature  presents,  not  a  straightforward  progress 
on  a  x^lane,  but  rather  a  hierarchy  of  graduated  steps 
in  an  upward  progress  from  plane  to  plane.  Let 
us  develop  this  conception  a  little  farther.  Josejjh 
Leconte  arranges  this  upward  progress  into  four 
planes  :  1,  Elements ;  2,  Chemical  Compounds  ;  3, 
Vegetables ;  4,  Animals  ;  also  into  the  four  planes 
of  corresponding  force,  Physical  force,  Chemical 
force,  Vitality,  and  Will.*  We  thus  reach  the  con- 
ception of  the  world-series  as  passing  through  three 
distinctive  stages  in  its  upward  career ;  namely, 
those  of  mechanical,  vital,  and  spiritual  force,  and 
their  manifestations. 

Now,  naturalistic  evolution  is  a  theory  which 
denies  the  necessity  of  grounding  nature  in  a  poten- 
tial spiritual  principle,  and  which,  therefore,  seeks  in 
the  mechanical  antecedents  of  life  the  conditions  of 
its  genesis  and  develo]3ment.  More  than  this,  being 
committed  to  the  postulate  of  material  and  mechani- 
cal force  as  primordial,  it  is  incumbent  on  the  theory 
*  Conservation  of  Energy.     Int.  Sc.  Series,  p.  194. 


86  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

to  maintain  that  all  other  forces,  vital  and  spiritual, 
are  mere  modifications  of  the  material  and  mechan- 
ical. Naturalistic  evolution  has  on  its  hands,  there- 
fore, two  main  problems  :  (1)  that  of  the  origin  of  the 
modification  which  is  called  vital  force  ;  and  (2)  the 
mechanical  explanation  of  all  vital  phenomena. 

In  order  to  solve  the  first  problem,  that  of  the 
origin  of  life,  it  puts  forward  the  hypothesis  of 
spontaneous  generation,  in  which  the  assumption  is 
made  that  at  some  point  in  the  world-series,  when 
all  the  conditions  are  supposed  to  have  been  most 
favorable,  life  was  generated  from  mechanical  con- 
ditions and  nature  stepped  into  a  new  and  higher 
sphere  of  manifestation.  Now,  if  the  fact,  or  even 
the  jDossibility,  of  spontaneous  generation  could  be 
established,  naturalistic  evolution  would  have  some 
ground  to  stand  on.  But  not  only  have  all  efforts 
failed  to  induce  spontaneous  generation  under  con- 
ditions which  are  a  real  test,  but  these  experi- 
mental efforts  tend  toward  the  establishment  of  a 
negative.  Not  only  is  this  the  case,  but  the  uni- 
versal mode,  so  far  as  observation  can  extend,  by 
which  nature  keeps  up  her  organic  supply,  is  dead 
against  the  hypothesis.  If  nature  is  callable  at  all 
of  generating  vital  out  of  mechanical  force,  by  an 
immediate  process,  this  ought  to  be  a  permanent 
possession  after  life  has  once  appeared.  But,  as 
Leconte  and  others  have  pointed  out,  while  physi- 
cal and  chemical  forces  are  being  constantly  trans- 
formed into  vital  force,  an  essential  condition  of  this 
change  is  the  presence  of  living  matter.     The  trans- 


ORGANIC   NATURE  87 

formatiou  of  force  to  a  higher  sphere  exemplifies, 
here  and  everywhere,  the  law  that  like  only  i)ro- 
cluces  like,  and  in  order  that  a  qualitative  difference 
may  arise,  its  analogue  must  be  presupjposed  in  the 
conditions  out  of  which  it  arises. 

The  truth  of  the  matter  seems  to  be  that  the  hy- 
pothesis of  spontaneous  generation  involves,  in  ad- 
dition to  its  other  difficulties,  a  subtle  violation  of 
the  logical  principle,  Ex  nihilo  nihil  ft,  which  ration- 
ally signifies  that  nothing  can  arise  as  an  effect  or 
manifestation,  which  has  not  something  akin  to  it 
in  its  conditions  and  grounds.  In  the  economy  of  nat- 
ure, life  itself  is  one  of  the  conditions  of  life.  This 
is  the  law  of  the  life-series,  and  it  is  therefore  regu- 
lative of  the  whole  sphere  of  biological  evolution. 

If  we  deny  to  naturalistic  evolution  its  right  to 
assert  spontaneous  generation,  we  take  away  from 
its  grasp  the  whole  sphere  of  origins.  For  in  that 
case  those  transformations  which  an  energy  under- 
goes in  passing  from  one  sphere  of  force  to  another 
would  necessarily  be  conceived  as  being  mediated  in 
some  way  by  the  higher  force  into  which  it  is  trans- 
formed. And  this  would  clearly  mark  the  limit  of 
the  principle  of  naturalistic  evolution.  Given  any 
species  of  force,  this  may  differentiate  and  distribute 
itself  indefinitely,  and  thus  give  rise  to  a  movement 
of  development  on  its  own  i^lane.  But  it  is  strictly 
limited  to  this  plane,  and  when  the  problem  is,  how 
nature  is  to  rise  to  another  plane  and  realize  another 
species  of  force,  here  the  naturalistic  i^rinciple  is 
powerless ;  for,  as  we  have  seen,  nature  only  makes 


88  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IT^   PHILOSOPHY 

this  step  tlirougli  the  mediation  of  the  higher  force 
itself,  and  in  order  that  the  first  step  may  be  taken 
into  this  higher  sphere,  we  must  presuppose  the 
archetype  of  tlie  higher  force  as  an  element  in  the 
erround  out  of  which  the  movement  arises.  And  if 
we  g-eneralize  this  condition,  we  reach  a  position 
from  which  we  can  assert  that  evolution,  in  order  to 
be  possible  without  limit,  must  be  grounded  in  a 
spiritual  x^rinciple  which  refers  ultimately  back  to 
an  absolute  first  cause  of  the  world ;  whereas,  if  this 
spiritual  principle  be  abstracted  from  or  denied, 
evolution  is  limited  strictly  to  the  movement  of  a 
given  force  along  a  single  plane.  Thus  if  i^hysical 
and  chemical  force  be  given,  the  conditions  of  me- 
chanical evolution  in  the  sphere  of  the  inorganic  are 
present.  Again,  if  we  suppose  that  vital  force  has 
been  somehow  achieved,  the  conditions  of  biologi- 
cal evolution  are  then  present.  But  for  the  genesis 
of  these  several  species  of  force  through  which 
nature  is  lifted  to  successively  higher  planes  of  ac- 
tivity, the  principle  of  naturalistic  evolution  sup- 
]Dlies  no  adequate  cause. 

The  second  problem  which  naturalistic  evolution 
has  on  its  hands  is  the  mechanical  explanation  of 
vital  phenomena.  To  naturalistic  evolution  mechan- 
ical force,  that  is,  physical  and  chemical,  is  ihefous 
et  origo  out  of  which  all  other  forms  of  force  arise. 
Every  other  force  must,  therefore,  be  reducible  to 
mechanical  elements,  and  every  form  of  manifesta- 
tion in  the  world-series  must  be  traceable  ultimately 
to   mechanical   antecedents  and   conditions.      This 


ORGANIC   NATURE  89 

necessitates  the  supposition  that  life  itself  is  a 
purely  mechanical  product ;  for,  inasmuch  as  living 
matter  is  one  of  the  conditions  of  the  genesis  of  liv- 
ing- matter,  it  follows,  if  the  mythical  hyi3othesis  of 
spontaneous  generation  be  given  u^d,  that  the  vital 
antecedent  itself  must  be  regarded  as  a  form  of 
mechanical  force  ;  for  if  any  portion  of  living  matter, 
however  small  and  insignificant,  can  be  successfully 
reduced  to  a  iDure  mechanical  phenomenon,  the 
battle  of  naturalistic  evolution  has  been  won,  and  it 
can  no  longer  be  conceived  as  imx)ossible  to  reach 
a  mechanical  explanation  of  the  most  complicated 
forms  and  manifestations  of  life. 

What,  then,  is  the  obstacle  in  the  way  of  the  me- 
chanical theory  ?  It  is  simply  this,  that  mechanical 
force  cannot  account  for  individuality.  We  mean 
by  individuality  here,  the  form  of  an  organized  prod- 
uct. A  living  organism  is  a  body  in  which  the 
mechanical  forces  are  held  in  subordination  to  some 
unitary  and  co-ordinating  lorinciple.  When  libera- 
ted from  the  grasp  of  this  princij)le,  each  goes  its 
own  way  and  the  organism  dissolves  ;  but  while  in 
its  grasp  and  under  its  sway,  they  subserve  some 
self-centred  power  which  controls  their  activities  and 
makes  them  builders  of  the  organism.  The  conten- 
tion of  the  mechanical  theory  is  that  this  so-called 
unitary  and  co-ordinating  principle  is  not  a  princi- 
ple or  a  non-mechanical  force,  but  merely  a  product 
of  the  conjunction  of  mechanical  forces.  But  this  is 
a  blind  assertion  which  fails  to  realize  any  of  the 
difficulties  in  its  way.     For  what  then  is  death  that 


90  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

breaks  up  the  conjunction  1  Has  some  mechanical 
agent  necessary  to  tlie  combination  departed,  or  have 
the  members  of  the  corporation  dissolved  jDartner- 
ship  by  mutual  consent  ? 

The  truth  is  that,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  me- 
chanical theory,  the  existence  of  a  living-  organism  is 
inconceivable.  Mechanical  forces  may  develop  con- 
tinuous series,  and  they  may  form  aggregates  and 
compounds,  but  the  production  of  self-centred  in- 
dividuality is  beyond  their  province.  Mechanical 
forces  have  no  sense  for  wholes  as  such.  They 
move  straight  forward  to  simple  ends,  or  flow  to- 
gether into  united  streams.  They  may  be  equal  to 
the  complexity  of  an  organism,  but  its  unity,  its  self- 
centred  individuality,  is  a  phenomenon  that  trans- 
cends their  power. 

If  naturalistic  evolution  thus  fails  to  answer  satis- 
factorily either  of  the  problems  that  confront  it,  it 
is  clear  that  the  origin  and  nature  of  life  must  be 
dealt  with  according  to  some  other  iDrinciple.  The 
weakness  of  naturalistic  evolution  as  a  theory  of  ori- 
gin, arises  from  the  fact  that  it  cuts  itself  off  from  the 
spiritual  principle  which  supplies  the  only  rational 
ground  of  the  world-movement ;  while  its  weakness 
as  a  theory  of  the  nature  of  life  is  to  be  found  in  the 
necessity  it  is  under  of  regarding  the  mechanical 
forces  as  alone  primordial,  and  all  other  forms  of 
energy  as  modifications  of  these.  In  view  of  both 
sources  of  weakness  the  theory  plainly  breaks  down 
in  its  unlimited  form,  and  must  be  limited  in  order  to 
possess  any  value.     We  have  already  seen  where  the 


ORGANIC   NATURE  91 

limitation  must  be  applied.  Naturalistic  evolution 
cannot  account  for  tlie  origin  of  any  new  form  of 
force,  nor  for  tlie  rise  of  nature  from  one  plane  of  ex- 
istence to  another.  The  problem  of  origins  must  be 
dealt  with  on  some  other  principle.  Nor  can  natu- 
ralistic evolution  give  any  rational  conception  of 
the  nature  of  life.  Her  mechanical  theory  commits 
her  to  a  principle  of  explanation  which  regards  ma- 
terial forces  as  the  only  primordial  forms,  and  seeks, 
therefore,  to  reduce  all  other  forms  to  the  material 
type.  The  limit  of  the  principle  of  naturalistic  evo- 
lution is  reached  when  the  limit  of  mechanical  forces 
and  laws  is  reached.  In  so  far  as  life  and  organic 
nature  transcend  the  scope  of  these,  just  in  so  far 
do  they  transcend  the  limits  of  naturalistic  evolu- 
tion. 

The  foregoing  strictures  on  naturalistic  evolu- 
tion as  a  theory  of  life,  are  not  directed  against  the 
principle  of  evolution.  Their  aim  is  simply  to  clear 
the  ground  for  a  more  adequate  conception  of  the 
idea  of  world-development.  As  indicated  in  the  be- 
ginning of  this  chapter,  no  theory  of  world-evolution 
is  adequate  that  does  not  include  in  it  a  recognition 
of  the  necessity  of  a  world-ground  out  of  which,  as 
from  a  fountain,  shall  emerge  its  forces  and  phe- 
nomena. Again,  no  theory  of  world-ground  is  ade- 
quate that  does  not  identify  that  ground  with  a  spir- 
itual principle.  Nor  is  any  theory  of  the  spiritual 
principle  adequate  that  does  not  connect  it  as  the 
immanent  potency  of  the  world-development,  with  its 
transcendent  source,  in  the  spiritual  self-activity  of 


92  BASAL    CONCEPTS    IN   PHILOSOPHY 

an  absolnte  nature.  The  world-evolution  is  thus 
grounded  immediately  in  an  immanent  spiritual 
jootency,  and  mediately  in  the  self-activity  of  a 
transcendent  Creator  and  First  Cause. 

Upon  this  foundation  we  are  able  to  conceive  a 
world-evolution  that  is  at  the  same  time  completely 
universal  and  completely  rational.  For  in  this  spir- 
itual ground,  as  we  have  shown,  is  contained  not 
only  the  rationale  of  the  existence  of  a  relative  and 
temporal  world-series,  but  also  the  rationale  of  its 
order  and  the  succession  of  its  categories.  From 
this  point  of  view  it  is  rationally  necessary  that  the 
mechanical  forces  and  categories  in  which  plurality 
and  self-exclusion  are  most  explicit,  and  the  forces 
of  unitary  individuality  most  latent  and  transcend- 
ent, should  first  emerge.  The  world-series  is  thus 
grounded  in  mechanism.  But  if  the  world  be 
grounded  in  a  spiritual  principle,  a  point  must  come 
in  its  develoiDment  when  the  latent  and  relatively 
transcendent  force  of  unitary  individuality  will  be- 
gin to  show  its  head  above  the  stream,  a  point  at 
which  it  will  cease  to  be  merely  regulative,  there- 
fore, and  will  enter  into  the  series  as  a  constitutive 
agent.  Now,  it  is  at  this  point  that  a  new  phenome- 
non will  make  its  appearance.  Just  as  soon  as  the 
unitary  force  begins  to  function  explicitly,  the  nu- 
cleus of  an  organism  will  be  formed,  for,  as  though 
a  vortical  movement  had  been  originated  in  some 
part  of  the  series,  the  particles  will  begin  to  whirl 
and  aggregate  around  some  invisible  centre,  the  or- 
dinary processes  of  physical  and  chemical  forces 


ORGANIC    NATURE  93 

will  become  tributary  to  this  new  movement,  and  the 
product  will  be  a  body  that  is  self-centred  and  that 
has  within  itself  the  princiiDle  of  its  own  unity  and 
conservation. 

AVe  have  been  representing  in  figure  what  would 
happen  to  the  world-series  when  the  spiritual  force 
of  unitary  individuality  begins  to  function  in  it  as  a 
constitutive  agent.  Dropping  figure,  we  may  say 
that  this  i)resupi30sition  of  a  si3iritual  world-prin- 
ciple is  the  only  basis  on  which  a  completely  ra- 
tional theory  of  organic  evolution  can  be  grounded. 
It  places  at  the  heart  of  the  world  a  principle  which, 
beginning  Avith  the  mechanical,  has  in  it  the  poten- 
tiality of  a  progressive  evolution  up  to  the  spiritual. 
The  continuity  of  the  world-movement  is  thus  se- 
cured. Not  only  so,  but  it  enables  us  to  understand 
rationally  why  there  should  be  a  movement  at  all, 
and  why  this  movement  should  be  upward.  And 
lastly,  it  enables  us  to  understand  rationally  why  the 
progress  of  the  world  should  lead  it  from  the  purely 
mechanical  into  the  biological  sphere. 

A  living  organism  realizes  the  form  of  individu- 
ality. It  is  unity  overcoming  and  comprehending 
diversity.  It  is  a  synthesis,  therefore,  of  mechanical 
and  extra  mechanical  forces.  On  the  side  of  its  uni- 
tary individuality  it  transcends  mechanism,  and  is 
the  first  overt  spiritual  manifestation  in  nature.  On 
the  side  of  its  diversity  it  is  a  plexus  of  mechanical 
forces  and  processes.  The  mode  by  which  a  living 
organism  develops  is  a  species  of  natural  dialectic,  a 
conflict  of  opposite  and  antagonistic  forces,  in  which 


94  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

the  principle  of  unitary  individuality  is  striving-  per- 
petually to  bring-  the  plexus  of  mechanical  forces 
into  subordination  to  itself.  The  life  of  the  organism 
is  the  progressive  achievement  of  this  subordina- 
tion. 

But  a  living-  organism  does  not  completely  realize 
the  essence  of  individuality.  There  is  no  return  of 
the  unitary  force  upon  itself,  and  consequently  the 
organism  arrives  at  no  consciousness  of  itself.  The 
reason  of  this  we  conceive  to  rest  in  the  fact  that  the 
unity  of  life  is  one  which  the  spiritual  principle 
achieves  by  going  out  of  itself.  It  is  a  unity,  in 
other  words,  which  is  superinduced  upon  a  plexus  or 
aggregation  of  mechanical  elements  which  in  them- 
selves, that  is,  in  their  atomic  constitution,  remain 
unmodified.  These  elements  persist,  therefore,  in 
obeying  purely  mechanical  laws,  and  simply,  while 
held  in  subordination  to  an  alien  force,  subserve  the 
life  of  the  organism.  When  this  alien  force  relaxes 
its  grasp  or  is  overcome,  the  mechanical  elements 
resume  their  autonomy  and  dissolution  of  the  organ- 
ism ensues. 

The  achievement  of  the  essence  of  individuality 
would  involve  an  additional  step  in  the  spiritual 
evolution ;  namely,  the  completion  of  the  circle  of 
return  upon  self,  and  the  consequent  iilanting  of  a 
germ  of  spiritual  self-activity  in  the  atomic  elements 
themselves.  This  would  transform  mechanism  in 
its  roots  and  ground  those  modified  spiritual  activi- 
ties and  categories  which  we  shall  come  upon  at  a 
later  stage  of  our  inquiry.     But  in  the  stage  of  liv- 


ORGANIC   NATURE  95 

ing"  organisms,  this  transformation  has  not  been 
achieved.  The  unitary  force  asserts  itself  in  an  ex- 
ternal manner  in  the  aggregation  and  organization 
of  unmodified  mechanical  elements.  The  life-strug- 
gle is,  therefore,  an  unequal  contest  between  the 
forces  of  mechanism  on  the  one  hand  and  an  undevel- 
oped spiritual  principle  on  the  other,  in  which  this 
principle,  for  a  time  triumphant,  at  length  succumbs 
to  the  mechanical  forces,  and  the  organism  which  has 
reached  the  climax  of  its  career  as  a  living  body, 
starts  on  the  downward  road  of  dissolution  and 
death.  The  continued  existence  and  evolution  of 
life  depends  not  on  the  individual  organism,  which 
IDcrishes,  but  on  the  biological  series,  which  is  self- 
periDetuating.  For  just  as  we  have  seen  that  the 
world  is  grounded  by  the  going  out  of  the  absolute 
spiritual  energy  into  potency,  so  we  find  that  wher- 
ever spiritual  force  manifests  itself  as  a  principle  of 
individual  organization,  it  carries  with  it  this  consti- 
tutional power  to  emit  its  own  potential  in  the  form 
of  a  germ  or  norm,  and  thus  establish  the  nucleus  of 
another  organism.  Through  this  going  out  of  self- 
activity  into  potency  the  biological  scale  is  made 
continuous,  and  the  basis  of  an  evolution  is  secured  ; 
an  evolution  which  depends  formally  on  the  spiritual 
ground-principle,  and  which  in  its  process  obej^s 
those  laws  and  categories  of  development  and  he- 
redity which  it  is  the  business  of  biological  science 
to  discover  and  formulate. 


VII 

PSYCHIC    T^ATURE 

We  have  followed  the  evolution  of  the  world- 
series  through  the  stages  of  mechanism  and  life, 
and  have  seen  how  this  progress  can  be  rationally 
understood  only  in  the  light  of  its  spiritual  ground. 
The  last  and  highest  stage  of  the  world-series  is 
that  of  Psychic  nature,  in  which  soul  becomes  the 
protagonist  of  the  drama.  In  the  soul  the  essence 
of  individuality  is  realized.  We  have  seen  how  in 
the  mechanical  sphere  the  effect  of  the  individualiz- 
ing force  of  the  world-ground  appeared  in  that  prin- 
ciple of  continuity  which  bound  the  separate  parts 
into  one  developing  series.  Individuality  proper, 
however,  transcends  mechanism  both  in  its  essence 
and  its  form.  In  the  organic  series  the  form  of  in- 
dividuality lifts  its  head  above  the  stream  and  em- 
bodies itself  externally  in  the  living  body.  But 
here  it  achieves  only  a  temporary  and  incomplete 
triumph  over  mechanism,  by  which  its  grasp  is  soon 
broken,  and  its  continuity  is  secured  only  in  a  suc- 
cession of  perishing  organisms. 

The  defect  of  individuality  as  it  embodies  itself  in 
the  life-series  consists  in  its  failure  to  realize  a  com- 


PSYCHIC   NATURE  97 

plete  circle  of  return  upon  self.  This,  as  we  have 
seen,  is  the  type  of  all  complete  spiritual  activity, 
and  it  is  the  essence  of  individuality.  Now,  at  the 
point  in  the  world-series  where  this  complete  circle 
of  activity  is  first  achieved,  and  the  world-energy  is 
able  to  complete  the  cycle  of  self-return  upon  self, 
soul  makes  its  first  overt  entrance  into  nature.  Soul 
is  that  complete  type  of  individuality  which  arises 
out  of  this  perfected  circle,  and  its  roots  are  to  be 
sought,  therefore,  not  in  any  form  of  organism,  but 
in  the  atomic  sphere.  The  category  of  soul-activity 
is  elemental,  and  must  be  conceived  as  arising  in 
that  sx)here  of  i^rimal  forces  which  antedates  all 
forms  of  organized  existence. 

Let  us  consider  the  modification  which  the  ap- 
XDcarance  of  this  category  would  introduce  into  the 
world-series.  If  we  posit  the  persistence  of  the 
material  atoms  or  centres  of  mechanical  force,  then 
this  psychic  force  will  be  conceived  as  arising  in 
conjunction  with  the  material  atoms  as  a  principle 
of  spiritual  activity.  We  will  thus  arrive  at  the 
conception  of  the  soul  as,  in  its  elemental  constitu- 
tion, consisting  of  a  duad  or  synthesis  of  material  and 
spiritual  forces  ;  and  this  synthesis  will  be  conceived 
as  the  x^rimal  centre  of  psychic  activity. 

We  adopt  this  form  of  psychic  dualism  as  a  proxi- 
mate conception.  Its  value  consists  loartly  in  the 
constitutional  basis  which  it  provides  for  the  recog- 
nized dualism  of  conscious  experience,*  and  partly 

*  James  :  rsycJiology,  vol.  i. ,  chaps,  ix.  and  x. 
7 


98  BASAL   CONCEPTS    IN   PHILOSOPHY 

also  in  the  profounder  view  it  opens  as  to  the  relation 
between  matter  and  spirit  in  the  sphere  of  the  sonl- 
life.  This  connection  is  so  close  and  interpenetrat- 
ing- as  to  preclude  the  common  idea  that  the  sonl  is 
a  pure  spiritual  activity  that  is  unmodified  by  mat- 
ter, and  that  it  comes  into  contact  with  the  material 
only  in  its  organized  corporeal  form.  Such  a  view 
reduces  the  psyche,  in  its  relation  to  matter,  to  the 
position  of  a  mere  deus  ex  'machina,  capable  of  influ- 
encing and  of  being  influenced  only  in  an  external 
and  artificial  way.  If  the  common  theory  were  the 
true  one,  then  the  way  in  which  the  categories  of  the 
material  penetrate  into  the  inner  circle  of  con- 
sciousness and  determine  the  forms  of  perception, 
would  be  inexplicable.  No  theory  of  the  connection 
of  the  material  and  spiritual  will  be  satisfactory,  we 
think,  that  does  not  trace  it  to  its  roots  in  the  con- 
stitution of  the  soul  itself. 

The  statement  of  i^sychic  dualism  above  given  is 
not  to  be  taken,  however,  as  final.  A  profounder 
view  may  be  achieved  by  reflection,  Aristotle  con- 
ceived the  soul  to  be  pure  actuality  ;  but  he  also  con- 
ceived matter  to  be  potence  —  Swa^uts  —  and  thus 
made  no  absolute  distinction  between  them.  He 
rather  conceived  a  continuity  of  development  from 
matter  up  to  the  purest  activity  of  spirit.  The  view 
advocated  here  is  in  its  main  features  almost  iden- 
tical with  that  of  Aristotle.  We  conceive  soul  in  its 
ideal  essence  to  be  pure  entelechy,  or  spiritual  self- 
activity,  but  in  the  form  of  its  real  existence  it  is 
modified  hy  lower  grades  of  activity.     By  this  we 


PSYCHIC   NATURE  99 

mean  to  say  that  its  ideal  essence  is  not  all  realized 
in  activity,  but  that  some  of  it  is  mere  potence. 
Now,  it  is  the  law  of  potence  to  be  perpetually  pass- 
ing- into  activity,  and  in  doing  so  it  passes  through 
g-rades,  each  of  which  has  its  distinctive  categories 
and  modes  of  action.  Matter  is  a  form  of  partially 
actualized  spiritual  potency,  and  there  can  be  no 
impropriety,  therefore,  in  conceiving  it  as  co-existing 
in  the  same  individual  being  with  higher  forms  of 
spiritual  activity. 

This  is  the  conception  of  soul  to  which  we  are 
gradually  approaching.  Nature  in  her  journey  up- 
ward to  soul  passes  through  the  stages  of  mechan- 
ism and  life.  Now,  just  as  the  living  organism  com- 
prehends the  mechanism  by  which  it  is  preceded,  so 
soul  is  to  be  conceived  not  alone  as  the  end  of  nat- 
ure's evolution,  but  also  as  its  epitome.  Soul  is  a 
microcosm,  and  when  we  sslj  that  it  is  a  synthesis 
of  the  material  and  spiritual,  or  that  it  unites  in  its 
constitution  both  actuality  and  potence,  we  mean  to 
say  that  nature  in  her  passage  up  to  soul  carries  all 
her  riches  with  her,  and  that  in  the  constitution  of 
the  soul  is  to  be  found,  therefore,  a  synthesis  of  the 
categories  and  activities  of  mechanism,  life,  and  spirit. 

Still,  the  conceptions  of  the  soul  as  a  duad,  and  as 
an  epitome  and  synthesis  of  nature's  evolution,  are 
not  completely  satisfactory.  We  will  only  reach  an 
adequate  idea  of  soul  by  connecting  it  with  the 
primal  ground  out  of  which  it  springs.  The  primal 
ground  of  the  world  is  the  self-activity  of  absolute 
Spirit.  This  self-activity  going  out  into  potentiality, 


100  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

constitutes  the  proximate  and  immanent  ground  of 
the  world.  Now,  if  we  call  this  outgo,  creation,  we 
cannot  regard  it  as  a  single  act  once  and  for  all 
accomplished  in  time,  for,  as  we  have  seen,  time  it- 
self originates  with  this  activity.  But  we  must 
rather  conceive  it  to  be  an  eternal  process,  which  has 
neither  beginning,  interruption,  nor  end  in  time. 
In  its  relation  to  the  time-series,  then,  we  must  re- 
gard creation  as  a  continuous  process  by  which  the 
world  and  its  activities  are  keiDt  in  being. 

In  the  light  of  this  we  are  able  to  jnit  a  new  con- 
struction on  the  idea  of  the  soul  reached  above.  It 
enables  us  to  translate  our  categories  of  duality  and 
synthesis  into  more  adequate  terms,  and  to  conceive 
soul  as  a  self -activity  whichrealizesitself  by  passing 
through  the  lower  stages  represented  by  mechanism 
and  life,  in  its  progress.  It  will  include  in  its  unity, 
therefore,  these  moments  of  potency  which  will  con- 
stitute a  modification  of  pure  self-activity  and  at 
the  same  time  make  it  rationally  intelligible  how 
the  activity  of  the  soul  may  also  include  in  it  the 
lower  categories  of  the  world-series. 

It  also  grounds  the  dualism  of  the  psychic  nature 
without  making  any  break  in  its  unity.  The  unitary 
individuality  of  the  soul  is  its  supreme  category. 
But  included  in  this  there  is  a  synthesis  of  actuality 
and  i:>otency.  Out  of  this  synthesis  springs  a  dia- 
lectic which  motives  the  progressive  life  of  the  soul. 
For,  if  we  conceive  the  inner  movement  of  the  soul 
to  be  a  ceaseless  evolution  of  self-activity,  in  the 
course  of  which  the  moments  of  lower  activity  are 


PSYCHIC   MATURE  101 

passed  through  and  both  comprehended  and  tran- 
scended, we  will  be  able  to  conceive  the  outer  move- 
ments of  experience  which  we  come  upon  in  empiri- 
cal processes,  as  a  dual  dialectic  between  a  spiritual 
principle  of  unitary  activity  and  the  lower  ma- 
terial and  mechanical  activities,  and  also  how  out  of 
this  arises  the  dual  form  of  the  soul's  life. 

In  order  to  realize  this  we  have  only  to  consider 
the  categories  which  belong*  to  the  different  species 
of  activity.  The  mechanical,  as  we  have  seen,  develo^D 
the  categories  of  a  series  which  is  spatio-tem^Doral 
in  its  form,  while  in  substance,  the  parts  are  bound 
together  into  a  continuous  chain  of  conditions  and 
consequents  by  the  mechanical  principle  of  causa- 
tion. The  spiritual  activity,  on  the  other  hand,  de- 
velops the  closed  circle  of  unitary  individuality. 
Now,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  if  the  soul  be  represented 
as  we  have  represented  it  above,  its  manifested  ac- 
tivity in  experience  will  be  a  dual  process.  The 
mechanical  activities  will  determine  its  life  in  the 
form  of  a  series,  each  part  of  which  will  be  condi- 
tioned on  what  j)recedes  it  in  time.  Thus  will  arise 
the  flowing  stream  of  which  James  speaks,  that  ob- 
jective empirical  self  which  flows  along  with  the 
world-series  and  is  held  fast  in  the  clutches  of  its  con- 
ditions. On  the  other  hand,  the  spiritual  activity 
will  be  ever  realizing  itself  in  a  self-centred  unitary 
ego  or  self,  the  unitary  I  of  the  conscious  life.  And 
this  unitary  I,  which  we  must  regard  as  the  form  of 
self-activity,  will  be  ever  reaching  out  and  compre- 
hending in  its  circle  the  flowing  stream  of  the  ob- 


102  BASAL    CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

« 

jective  empirical  sell  The  process  is  thus  dualistic, 
and  takes  the  form  of  a  strug-gle  of  the  unitary  self- 
activity  of  the  soul  to  overcome  and  comprehend  the 
empirical  in  its  cycle,  the  result  of  which  is  that  the 
soul-life  can  be  adequately  conceived  only  as  a  flow- 
ing temporal  stream  that  is  perpetually  being-  taken 
up  and  transformed  into  unitary  individuality  by  a 
principle  of  immanent  spiritual  self-activity. 

By  thus  immanating"  mechanism  in  the  soul's  con- 
stitution we  are  able  to  rationally  ground  the  dual 
process  of  its  experience.  Ordinarily  the  duality  of 
experience  is  traced  to  the  operation  of  the  primal 
tendency  of  spirit  to  distinguish  between  subject 
and  object.  The  objective  empirical  me  of  our  expe- 
rience is  thought  to  be  fully  explained  by  reference 
to  this  category.  But  a  serious  difiiculty  confronts 
this  view.  We  have  seen  in  earlier  chapters  that 
the  dialectic  of  absolute  spirit  which  proceeds  by 
means  of  this  distinction,  ex^Dresses  itself  in  an  im- 
manent self-contained  movement  of  distinction  and 
comprehension.  To  absolute  spirit  there  can  be  no 
flowing  stream  in  which  its  life  will  seem  to  be 
embraced,  but  the  flowing  stream  will  itself  be  com- 
pletely comprehended  and  made  inner  in  the  move- 
ment of  self-return  upon  self,  and  no  dual  process 
of  experience  analogous  to  that  of  the  soul  will 
arise.  The  idea  of  soul  as  pure  self-activity  is,  there- 
fore, inadequate,  and  we  must,  in  order  to  ground 
its  most  characteristic  manifestations,  take  into 
account  the  modification  of  self-activity  which  the 
presence  of  the  Aristotelian  category  of  potence  in 


PSYCHIC  T^ATUKE  103 

the  form  of  mechanism  and  its  categories,  introduces. 
The  ideal  movements  of  the  soul's  unitary  activity 
correspond  to  the  movement  of  absolute  spirit,  but 
these  are  never  completely  actualized.  The  ideal 
spiritual  self  is  ever  striving  to  comprehend  the  ob- 
jective empirical  self  within  its  completed  circle. 
But  its  efforts  are  perpetually  aborted  by  the  resist- 
ance of  the  stream  and  its  refusal  to  be  completely 
individualized.  The  resulting  movement  of  soul- 
activity  never  realizes  the  ideal,  therefore,  but  is 
simply  an  approximation  to  it  under  the  form  of  a 
dualistic  struggle  of  the  spiritual  self-activity  to 
overcome  the  empirical  stream  and  bring  it  into 
subordination  to  its  own  ideal. 

The  relation  of  the  soul-activity  to  that  of  life  is 
to  be  somewhat  differently  conceived.  There  is  a 
sense  in  which  the  elemental  forces  of  the  world 
may  be  included  under  two  categories,  mechanical 
and  spiritual.  These  embody  the  two  relatively  op- 
posing tendencies  toward  self -exclusion  and  the  serial 
form  of  activity,  and  self -inclusion  or  the  activity  of 
unitary  individuality.  The  activity  of  life  is  simply 
a  form  of  the  latter.  It  represents  the  first  attempt 
of  nature  to  qualify  mechanism  by  the  principle  of 
individuality.  Now,  the  self -activity  of  spirit,  as  it 
manifests  itself  in  soul,  is  simply  a  more  complete 
expression  of  the  individualizing  force.  There  can 
be  no  dualism,  then,  between  the  activity  of  life  and 
that  of  the  soul.  The  soul  represents  a  higher  and 
more  potent  embodiment  of  that  spiritual  energy 
which  is  also  embodied  in  life.    The  soul  thus,  in  one 


104  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN    PHILOSOPHY 

point  of  view  comprehends  the  life-energy  in  its  own 
activity,  while  in  another  sense  it  presupposes  it  as 
its  own  condition.  It  is  necessary  in  the  order  of 
evolution  that  living  organisms  should  appear,  and 
that  they  should  reach  their  climax  of  development 
before  soul  can  emerge.  And  inasmuch  as  life, 
apart  from  the  mechanical  forces  and  elements  which 
it  subordinates,  can  be  conceived  only  as  an  indi- 
vidualizing function  of  an  immanent  spiritual  prin- 
ciple, it  is  clear  that  soul  is  only  a  more  advanced 
and  perfect  function  of  this  same  principle.  Soul, 
then,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  later  comer  in  the  world- 
series  than  life,  must  depend  on  the  living  organ- 
ism as  a  necessary  condition  of  its  birth  and  devel- 
opment. But  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  higher  embodiment 
of  the  same  spiritual  force,  it  will  comprehend  life 
within  itself,  and  will  therefore  become  the  living 
principle  in  any  organism  in  which  it  emerges. 

Soul  is  thus  a  higher  manifestation  of  life.  It  is 
life  which  completes  its  own  circle  and  returns  upon 
itself.  It  is,  therefore,  identical  with  the  activity  of 
spirit.  It  becomes  the  indwelling  unitary  principle 
in  the  organism  by  which  it  is  transformed  into  a 
true  individual.  "We  do  not  conceive,  then,  that  there 
are  two  principles  of  unity  in  a  living  organism  that 
also  possesses  soul ;  but  we  conceive  that  the  living 
principle  has  developed  into  soul  and  thus  realized 
a  higher  form  of  life.  There  may  be,  and  doubtless 
are,  living  organisms  without  souls.  We  can 
scarcely  think  that  the  life  of  an  oak  or  a  tulip  is 
worthy  of  being  dignified  with  the  name  of  soul. 


PSYCHIC   NATURE  105 

But  we  can  see  no  reason  to  think  otherwise  than 
that  the  ground  of  that  unitary  force  which  deter- 
mines the  individual  existence  of  the  oak  or  tulip,  is 
the  same  spiritual  principle  or  potency  that  mani- 
fests itself  also  in  the  energ-y  we  call  soul.  The  uni- 
tary life-principle,  wherever  it  manifests  itself,  and 
in  its  lowest  as  well  as  its  highest  forms,  is  a  fore- 
runner of  soul,  and  contains  in  it  the  promise  and 
potency  of  soul-life.  We  do  not  identify  life  and 
soul,  therefore,  but  we  conceive  soul  to  be  a  species 
of  life,  the  highest  form  that  it  is  capable  of  achiev- 
ing in  a  relative  and  imperfect  sphere. 

How  then  shall  we  conceive  the  stages  and  develop- 
ment of  soul-life  ?  Soul  originates  in  an  organism, 
and  belongs,  therefore,  to  the  biological  scale.  AYe 
may  represent  it,  with  Aristotle,  as  passing  through 
the  stages  of  vegetable,  animal,  and  human.  The 
lowest  form  of  biological  individuality  is  represented 
in  the  life  of  the  plant.  Here  the  organism  is  wholly 
unconscious  of  the  unitary  force  that  is  working  in 
it,  and  the  life-principle  may  be  regarded  as  trans- 
cendent and  super-imposed  on  the  mechanical 
forces  and  elements.  In  the  animal  the  unitary 
principle  becomes  more  immanent.  The  organism 
begins  to  feel  its  unity  in  an  organ  we  call  sensation, 
and  upon  this  self -feeling  the  mental  life  of  the  ani- 
mal grows  up.  But  in  the  animal  soul  the  circle  of 
individuality  is  not  fully  achieved.  Although  the 
animal  lifts  its  head  above  the  natural  stream  in  the 
function  of  self-feeling,  yet  it  is  not  able  to  achieve 
its  complete  selfhood  through  self-distinction  from 


106  BASAL    CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

the  stream.  According-  to  tlie  figure  of  the  ancient 
thinker,  it  is  half  out  of  the  slime  and  half  im- 
prisoned in  it.  The  complete  deliverance  of  the 
psyche  is  effected  only  in  man,  through  an  additional 
function  ;  namely,  that  of  self-conce^Dtion  or  ideation. 
True  ]3sychic  individuality  is  achieved  when  in  ad- 
dition to  the  feeling  of  self  which  the  animal  has, 
the  soul  ideates  itself  and  distinguishes  itself  from 
the  stream  in  which  it  has  hitherto  been  merged. 
In  man,  therefore,  the  circle  of  spiritual  self-activity 
is  first  completed,  and  a  true  soul  having  the  basis 
of  a  rational  and  ideal  life,  begins  to  exist. 

Now,  as  the  history  of  the  soul  is  thus  bound  up 
in  the  history  of  the  biological  series,  it  is  reason- 
able to  suppose  that  the  laws  of  biological  evolution 
will  also  be  laws  of  psychic  evolution.  We  have 
seen  that,  apart  from  its  spiritual  ground,  life  is  in- 
conceivable, and  that  its  development  must  therefore 
rest  directly  on  the  presupposition  of  the  spiritual 
ground.  The  same  qualification  applies  to  the 
question  of  psychic  evolution.  That  the  soul  could 
be  evolved,  as  naturalistic  evolution  supposes  it  to 
have  been  evolved,  out  of  mechanical  and  unspirit- 
ualistic  conditions,  is  unthinkable.  Soul  is  a  real- 
ization of  spiritual  potency,  and  cannot  be  conceived 
as  having  any  other  ground.  Admitting  this  pre- 
supposition, however,  there  can  be  no  adequate 
grounds  for  excepting  the  soul  from  the  conditions 
and  laws  of  biological  evolution  in  general.  We 
have  seen  how  the  soul  is  to  be  conceived  as  coming 
into  being  at  the  end  of  a  series   of  progressive 


PSYCHIC   NATURE  107 

manifestations  of  tlie  life-principle,  inclnclino-  the 
vegetable  and  animal  kingdoms,  and  culminating 
in  the  man.  This  is  not  to  say  that  the  soul  of 
the  animal  develops  ont  of  that  of  the  vegetable, 
and  the  soul  of  man  out  of  that  of  the  animal ;  but 
rather  that,  presupposing  a  spiritual  principle  as 
the  ground  of  the  world,  the  life-principle  in  the 
vegetable,  and  the  souls  of  animals  and  man,  may  be 
regarded  as  its  successive  and  progressive  mani- 
festations. The  progress  will  thus  manifest  the 
phenomenon  of  continuous  development. 

The  rise  of  the  psyche  will,  therefore,  be  connected 
with  the  processes,  and  conditioned  by  the  laws,  of 
biological  evolution.     It  may  also  be  connected,  we 
think,  with  the  biological  modes  of  propagation  and 
inheritance.     We  have  represented  self-propagation 
as  primarily  a  spiritual  function,  although  it  may 
require  corporeal   organs  for  its  realization.      The 
living  principle   in  an  organism   projects  its  self- 
potential  or  germ  as  the  nucleus  of  another  organism 
of  the  same  species,  and  thus  the  succession  is  main- 
tained.   There  is  no  valid  reason  for  supposing  that, 
when  the  form  of  the  life-principle  which  we  call  soul 
appears,  this  function  will  not  continue.     Eather  we 
may  suppose  that  the  soul  has  the  power  to  project 
its  self-potential  or  germ,  and  that  thus  the  succes- 
sion of  psychic  individualities  is  maintained.     The 
germ  of  the  new  organism  will  contain  in  it,  there- 
fore, the  potency  of  the  new  soul  that  arises  in  con- 
nection with  it,  and  psyche  will  thus  be  connected 
with  psyche  as  closely  as  organism  with  organism. 


108  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

And  the  soul  will  thus  come  under  the  biolog-ical 
laws  of  inheritance.  Whatever  be  the  true  theory  of 
heredit}^,  souls  will  transmit  their  essential  charac- 
teristics to  their  psychic  successors,  and  in  the 
transmission  of  spiritual  as  well  as  corporeal  char- 
acter a  solid  foundation  for  race  exj)erience  and  race 
destiny  will  be  laid. 

If  it  be  objected  to  this  view  that  it  identifies  soul 
too  much  with  the  phenomenal  series,  and  makes  it 
too  completely  a  creature  of  evolution,  the  answer  is 
that  this  is  an  aspect  of  soul-life  to  which  full  justice 
must  be  done.  But  in  connection  with  the  theory, 
the  presuppositions  on  which  it  is  founded  must  be 
taken  into  account.  One  of  these  presuppositions 
is,  that  no  theory  of  evolution  can  be  rational  that 
does  not  trace  the  develoi3ing  world-series  to  a 
spiritual  principle  as  its  immanent  ground.  The 
theory  of  naturalistic  evolution  is  thus  ruled  out  of 
court.  Another  and  deeper  presupposition  is,  that 
the  immanent  spiritual  world-ground  itself  depends 
directly  on  a  transcendent  energy,  the  creative  ac- 
tivity of  an  absolute  spiritual  Being.  If  we  dis- 
tinguish, as  above  indicated,  between  the  historical 
conditions  out  of  which  anything  arises  and  its 
ontological  grounds,  which  supply  the  immediate 
basis  of  its  existence,  we  will  be  able  to  see  how  the 
historic  proposition  that  the  soul  belongs  to  an 
evolving  series,  and  the  ontological  proposition  that 
the  soul  is  the  creature  of  a  transcendent  creative 
Spirit,  may  co-exist  as  mutually  complementary 
truths. 


PSYCHIC    NATURE  109 

The  idea  of  the  psychic  nature  which  we  have 
unfokled  in  this  chapter  gives  rise  to  several  impor- 
tant considerations.  One  of  these  has  a  pedagogi- 
cal interest.  A  science  of  j^edagogy,  in  order  to  be 
adequate,  must  have  two  ideas  as  its  basis  ;  namely, 
first,  the  idea  of  self-activity  as  the  central  category 
of  the  soul's  life,  and,  secondly,  the  idea  of  a  devel- 
opment of  the  soul's  activities  and  powers.  The  first 
idea  conceives  the  soul  as  actuality,  the  second  as 
potence.  Now,  there  is  needed,  in  order  that  peda- 
gogy may  become  a  real  science,  such  a  conception  of 
the  soul  as  will  make  a  rational  synthesis  of  the  cate- 
gories of  self-activity  and  development  possible. 
This  need  we  conceive  to  be  supplied  by  the  theory 
of  the  soul's  constitution  unfolded  above,  and  by  the 
conception  of  the  dualistic  nature  of  experience 
which  it  was  shown  to  rationally  ground.  In  the 
light  of  this  theory,  it  is  made  clear  that  the  proc- 
ess of  soul-experience  is  a  perpetual  struggle  of  a 
thinking  principle  of  s^Diritual  individuality  to  over- 
come and  transform  an  empirical  nature  that  is 
dominated  by  mechanical  categories  and  laws.  It 
also  becomes  intelligible,  that  this  process  should 
give  rise  to  an  evolution  of  the  soul's  powers  which 
follows  the  order  of  the  development  of  actuality 
out  of  potence.  This  order,  as  the  process  of  nature 
indicates,  is  from  mechanism  up  to  spirit.  The 
stages  of  mental  and  moral  growth  will  correspond 
in  a  rough  way  to  the  stages  of  the  natural  evolu- 
tion, and  both  the  intellectual  and  moral  life  will  be 
dominated  by  corresponding  categories.     Thus  in 


110  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

the  sphere  of  moral  growth,  which  is  fundamentally 
the  development  of  freedom,  the  child  will  be  domi- 
nated at  first  by  pure  mechanical  impulses,  which 
determine  its  actions  as  the  mechanical  forces  de- 
termine the  movements  of  nature.  At  a  later  stage, 
the  mechanical  impulses  will  be  organized  under 
some  external  unitary  jDrinciple,  like  that  of  author- 
ity. The  command  or  wish  of  the  parent  or  teacher 
will  be  the  law  which  will  introduce  unity  into  the 
child's  life.  Later  still,  conscience,  which  is  a  prin- 
ciple of  internal  unity,  will  emerge,  and  with  the 
appearence  of  this  principle  the  child  will  begin  to 
acquire  a  free  standing-ground  of  its  own  as  a  self- 
determining  and,  therefore,  responsible  x^ersonal 
agent.  With  the  emergence  of  conscience  the  plane 
of  free  moral  self-activity  is  achieved,  and  the  sub- 
sequent education  of  the  child  Avill  conserve  the  de- 
velopment of  this  principle  out  of  potence  into 
realized  free  self-activity. 

Generalizing  the  above  illustration,  we  may  say 
that  all  education  is,  teleologically,  a  spiritual  func- 
tion, and  must  have  as  its  end  the  awakening  and 
development  of  the  free  self-activity  of  the  human 
spirit.  This  free  self-activity  exists  largely  at  first 
in  a  state  of  potency,  and  must  be  developed  by  a 
process  which  will  lead  it  from  the  mechanical  up 
to  the  spiritual.  In  the  stage  of  mechanism  the  life 
will  be  governed  by  corresponding  categories.  At 
first  isolated  facts  will  dominate  the  budding  con- 
sciousness, and  these  will  be  related  in  the  most 
naive  fashion  to  their  most  obvious  and  customary 


PSYCHIC   NATURE  111 

autecedents  in  time.  The  conceptions  of  tlie  child 
will  be  passively  determined  by  a  species  of  natural 
photography,  and  its  whole  mental  activity  will  be 
largely  a  reflex  of  the  nature  that  environs  it.  But 
through  the  mechanical  discipline  of  this  period  tlie 
spiritual  potence  is  gradually  struggling  into  activ- 
ity. The  next  important  step  in  its  development 
will  be  the  emergency  of  a  category  that  will  enable 
it  to  lift  itself  partially  out  of  the  stream  in  which  it 
has  been  engulfed  and  to  impose  upon  it  a  prin- 
ciple of  quasi-individuality.  This  category  is  that 
of  causation,  vvhich  constitutes  the  inner  bond  of  the 
series,  and  thus  functions  in  the  mechanical  sphere 
as  a  latent  individualizing  function,  binding  the 
parts  each  to  each  in  a  developing  chain.  Causation 
begins  to  dominate  the  growing  intelligence  of  the 
child  as  a  rational  norm,  which  develops  in  it  the 
historical  consciousness  and  sends  it  out  in  a  per- 
petual search  for  the  efficient  and  final  antecedents 
of  things.  In  this  stage  the  passive,  recipient  spirit 
is  subordinated  to  that  of  an  intellectual  curiosity, 
which  cannot  rest  in  the  presentations  of  its  experi- 
ence, but  prompts  the  child  everlastingly  to  look 
inquiringly  behind  the  presentation  for  the  condi- 
tions that  brought  it  forth.  This  period  of  naive 
rationality,  in  which  the  budding  spirit  begins  to 
assert  itself,  leads  us  perhaps  to  the  end  of  the 
period  of  primary  education. 

The  great  epoch  in  moral  development,  as  Ave  saw, 
is  that  in  which  conscience  lifts  its  head  above  the 
conscioiis  stream.     In  the  general  evolution  of  the 


112  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

child's  intelligence  there  is  a  corresponding  epoch, 
when  the  principle  of  reflection  makes  its  a^DiDear- 
ance.  In  reflection  the  spirit  completes  the  circle  of 
its  self-activity  in  the  return  upon  itself.  Reflection 
contains  in  it,  therefore,  the  germ  of  what  we  may 
call  the  ontological  consciousness,  a  consciousness 
that  has  apprehended  the  principle  of  reason  in  a 
higher  form  than  causation.  The  historical  con- 
sciousness seeks  the  serial  antecedents  of  things,  but 
the  consciousness  that  has  achieved  the  germ  of 
ontology  asks  for  the  grounds  or  reasons  of  the 
series  itself.  In  other  words,  it  only  rests  satisfied 
Avhen  it  has  apprehended  principles  in  the  light  of 
which  things  are  self-explanatory.  The  world  is 
self-explanatory  if  we  ground  it  in  a  spiritual  prin- 
ciple that  is  sufiicient  to  rationally  explain  to  us  the 
existence  of  the  world. 

Now,  we  conceive  that  the  ground-principle  of  the 
secondary  and  higher  education  is  to  be  found  in 
this  category  of  reflective  reason  in  which  the  self- 
active  spirit  first  achieves  a  rational  standing- 
ground  of  its  own  as  a  free  rational  and  personal 
agent ;  and  the  great  business  of  the  secondary  and 
higher  education  will,  therefore,  be  the  develop- 
ment of  this  rational  principle  out  of  potence  into 
actuality.  For  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that,  while 
the  end  of  all  culture  is  the  quickening  of  the  spirit, 
its  pedagogical  methods  and  the  instruments  it 
uses  must  adapt  themselves  to  the  stages  of  an 
evolution.  And  while  a  common  category  rests  at 
the  basis  of  the  secondary  and   higher  education, 


PSYCHIC  naturp:  113 

pedagogy  only  becomes  a  science  when  it  acts  on 
tlie  insight,  as  old  as  Socrates,  that  the  germ  of  re- 
flection is  at  first  hidden  in  a  mechanical  womb,  and 
that  it  must  practise  a  maieutic  art  in  helping  it  to 
birth  and  aiding  it  in  its  struggle  np  to  the  maturity 
of  a  fully  realized  activity. 

Another  consideration  is  that  of  the  connection 
between  the  empirical  and  rational  branches  of 
psychology.  We  conceive  that  the  real  connection 
arises  through  the  idea  of  the  soul.  It  is  impossible, 
we  think,  to  develop  a  psychology  without  a  soul. 
But  if  we  distinguish,  as  Bosanquet  has  done  in  his 
great  work  on  Logic,  between  generalization  and  ex- 
planatory theory,  it  is  possible  to  allow  that  the 
work  of  observation  and  generalization  of  psychic 
IDhenomena  may  be  performed  without  the  presup- 
position of  any  particular  conception  of  the  soul's 
nature.  The  emiairical  psychologist  may,  there- 
fore, content  himself  with  the  general  postulate  of 
some  unitary  subject  of  experience  as  a  working 
hypothesis,  without  troubling  himself  further  as  to 
its  nature.  This  attitude  will  not  justify  him,  how- 
ever, either  in  denying  the  soul's  existence  or  the 
importance  of  determining,  so  far  as  possible,  its 
nature. 

But  when  the  science  passes  from  the  stage  of  gen- 
eralization to  that  of  explanatory  theory,  this  prob- 
lem of  the  nature  of  the  soul  immediately  and  neces- 
sarily arises.  For  explanation,  as  distinguished 
from  generalization,  seeks  the  rationale  of  things, 
and  this,  as  Ave  have  seen,  can  be  found  only  in  some 
8 


114  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

principle  the  presupposition  of  wliicli  renders  tlie 
psychic  sphere  self-ex]3lanatory.  The  whole  of  the 
preceding"  discussion  goes  to  show  that  the  only 
self-explanatory  principle  in  psychology  is  the  pre- 
supposition of  a  soul  conceived  as  a  norm  of  po- 
tential self-activity,  and  which  stands  related  to 
the  psychological  sphere  as  the  unitary  and  indi- 
vidualizing energy  of  conscious  life  and  experience. 
In  determining  this  ultimate  principle  of  explana- 
tion, psychology  passes  from  the  empirical  to  the 
rational  stage.  The  connection  thus  becomes  clear, 
and  also  the  light  which  may  be  reflected  from  the 
conclusions  of  rational  psychology  into  the  em^oiri- 
cal  sphere.  For  we  have  seen  already  that  a 
rational  doctrine  of  the  soul's  nature  gives  a  new  in- 
sight into  the  real  character  of  the  processes  of  psy- 
chic experience,  and  thus  supplies  important  data 
to  pedagogical  science  ;  and  reflection  will  make  it 
equally  apparent  that  the  same  fountain  will  supply 
valuable  light  to  the  generalizer  of  psychic  phe- 
nomena. 


VIII 

CONSCIOUSNESS 

In  the  preceding  discussions  consciousness  lias 
been  nsed  as  a  datum  without  analysis.  In  this 
chapter  we  shall  examine  the  posited  element  in 
order  to  determine  its  nature  and  relation  to  being. 
Consciousness  is  an  underivable  element  of  the  real. 
Naturalistic  evolution,  which  stands  committed  to 
the  principle  of  "  deriving  everything  from  some- 
thing else,"  is  obliged  here  to  fall  back  on  the  dis- 
credited hypothesis  of  spontaneous  generation,  in 
order  to  account  for  the  genesis  of  consciousness 
out  of  the  unconscious.  There  is  no  conceivable 
ground  which  can  produce  consciousness,  except 
one  that  is  potentially  conscious.  Now,  potence  is 
an  unreal  abstraction  if  it  is  not  connected  with  a 
prior  actuality.  We  are  thus  led  to  ground  con- 
sciousness immediately  in  the  immanent  spiritual 
potency  of  the  world,  and  mediately  and  ultimately 
in  the  nature  of  absolute  being. 

Consciousness  has  its  primal  seat  in  the  activity 
of  absolute  being.  That  perfect  self-activity  which 
constitutes  the  spiritual  essence  of  the  Absolute 
must    be    conceived    as   a   self-conscious    activity. 


116  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

This  necessity  will  arise  from  one  of  two  alternative 
grounds :  Either  self-conscions  activity  and  the 
self-activity  of  the  Absolute  are  to  be  identified,  or 
the  former  is  to  be  regarded  as  necessarily  implied 
in  the  latter.  We  are  unable  to  realize  the  second 
alternative,  while  recognizing  its  possibility.  The 
former  is  not  only  conceivable,  but  also  demon- 
strable, as  we  have  shown  in  a  former  chapter  ;  the 
form  of  self-consciousness  and  self-activity  is  the 
same,  a  self-return  upon  self.  Their  substance  is 
also  the  same  ;  namely,  pure  self-activity.  Why 
then  should  they  not  be  identified,  and  why  should 
we  not  say  that  absolute  being  and  absolute  self- 
conscious  activity  are  one  and  the  same  ? 

Josiah  Royce  finds  in  absolute  Thought  the  point 
of  identity  between  being  and  consciousness,  and 
this  Thought  he  names  logos.  With  this  mode 
of  conception,  provided  logos  be  used  to  con- 
strue the  thought,  we  shall  have  no  quarrel.  That 
thought  is  the  logical  prius  of  every  other  form  of 
spiritual  activity,  follows  by  necessity  from  the 
logos  conception  of  the  self-active  spirit.  As  we 
shall  show  more  at  length  in  subsequent  discussions, 
the  dialectic  which  constitutes  the  inner  life  and 
movement  of  spiritual  activity  rests  on  a  dual  in- 
tuition which  is  a  function  of  intellection.  The 
absolute  spirit  must  think  itself  and  its  op^DOsite, 
in  order  that  the  motives  of  the  generative  and 
unifying  energies  of  creation  may  be  aroused.  The 
danger  in  the  rei3resentation  of  the  Absolute  as 
thought  is  that  intellection  will  be  allowed  to  swal- 


CONSCIOUSNESS  117 

low  up  every  other  spiritual  fuuction ;  whereas  the 
activities  we  call  will  and  love,  while  presupposing 
thought  as  their  logical  lyriiis,  are  not  derivative 
from  thought.  AVe  must  rather  suppose  a  synthesis 
of  thought  and  will  in  the  absolute  volition,  and  a 
further  synthesis  of  thought,  will,  and  emotion  in 
the  absolute  love. 

To  return,  then,  to  the  main  line  of  reflection,  we 
conceive  it  necessary  to  regard  self-conscious  activ- 
ity and  the  self-activity  of  absolute  being  as  iden- 
tical. Spirit  in  its  actuality  will,  therefore,  always 
be  self-conscious,  and  it  will  be  the  nature  of  a  spir- 
itual force,  wherever  it  manifests  itself,  to  become 
conscious  also.  Now,  if  we  conceive  the  self-activ- 
ity of  the  Absolute  to  be  essentially  self-conscious, 
it  will  be  necessary,  in  accordance  with  the  principle 
developed  in  the  second  chaiDter,  to  conceive  that 
the  same  outgo  of  this  energy  into  non-being  which 
transforms  it  into  spiritual  potency,  will  also  change 
its  consciousness  into  potentiality.  The  immanent 
world-ground,  while  not  actively  conscious,  therefore, 
will  contain  in  it  the  lootentiality  of  conscious  self- 
activity. 

The  progress  of  the  spiritual  world-principle  up 
to  the  stage  of  realized  self-activity  in  the  soul  of 
man,  will  also  be  a  process  of  the  evolution  of  con- 
sciousness. In  the  first  stages  of  this  evolution  the 
consciousness  in  which  the  world-movement  origi- 
nates is  one  that  wholly  transcends  it ;  namely,  the 
consciousness  of  the  Absolute.  In  the  stage  of 
pure  mechanism  no  consciousness  can  be  x^osited 


118  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

anywhere  in  the  world,  except  as  a  latent  potenti- 
ality in  its  ground-principle.  And  this  is  iDrobably 
true  also  of  the  vegetable  stage  of  organic  nature  ; 
for  although  the  plant  manifests  the  form  of  unitary 
individuality,  there  is  no  evidence  that  this  is  not 
external  to  the  j)lant  itself,  or  that  it  has  any  pres- 
age, even  the  vaguest,  of  its  own  life.  Could  the 
negative  of  this  be  established,  it  would  then  be 
reasonable  to  su^^pose  that  consciousness  in  some 
form  is  coextensive  with  life. 

So  far  as  we  know,  consciousness  manifests  itself 
in  the  world-series,  for  the  first  time,  in  the  animal 
organism.  It  appears  here  in  the  form  of  feeling 
without  ideality,  and  the  animal  intelligence  is 
therefore  rudimentary.  But  up  to  its  limit  it  seems 
to  realize  a  type  that  is  common  to  it  and  the  intel- 
ligence of  man.  If  the  animal  consciousness  differs, 
not  simply  in  degree,  but  also  in  kind,  from  the 
human,  the  rationale  of  the  differential  marks  must 
be  sought,  we  think,  not  in  an  original  distinction  of 
type,  but  in  the  various  degrees  of  development  of  a 
common  type.  If  we  suppose  the  world  to  spring 
out  of  a  spiritual  ground-principle,  and  its  stages  to 
represent  the  development  of  this  princi]3le  from 
potence  into  actuality,  it  follows  that  the  first  mani- 
festations of  consciousness  wdll  be  in  a  rudimental 
form,  and  that  more  adequate  manifestations  of  the 
same  spiritual  type  will  appear  later  on  in  the 
series.  Now,  this  rudimental  form  that  we  call  ani- 
mal intelligence  is  a  manifestation  of  consciousness 
as  feeling  without  ideality.     Such  a  consciousness  is 


COTiTSCIOUSNESS  119 

capable  of  feeling-  or  dimly  appreliending  itself  and 
its  environment,  but  it  is  unable  to  conceive  itself  or 
the  environment,  and  cannot,  therefore,  make  any 
intellectual  distinction  between  itself  and  the  world- 
stream  in  which  it  is  merg-ed.  Now,  this  category  of 
feeling  without  ideality,  or,  at  least,  in  which  ideal- 
ity remains  latent  and  potential,  is  the  one  under 
which  the  evolution  of  animal  consciousness  pro- 
ceeds. There  are  gradations  of  animal  intelligence 
from  a  lowest  stage  of  simplest  reaction  upon  stim- 
ulus, up  to  a  stage  which  seems  to  differ  little  from 
the  lowest  manifestations  of  human  intelligence. 
That  these  are  gradations  in  the  scale  of  a  feeling" 
consciousness  that  has  not  yet  achieved  ideality,  is 
rendered  intelligible  by  analysis.  Feeling*  in  com- 
l^arison  with  ideality  is  relatively  passive,  and  the 
supreme  principle  of  its  development  will  be  associ- 
ation. For,  until  a  consciousness  has  achieved  a 
power  of  reflection  which  is  a  true  function  of  self- 
activity,  its  processes  must  be  relatively  ijassive 
and,  therefore,  associative. 

Now,  analysis  has  reduced  the  principles  of  asso- 
ciation to  two,  namely,  contiguity  and  similarity, 
the  former  being  relatively  the  more  passive,  while 
the  latter  reiDresents  a  more  active  form  of  mentality 
and  immediately  underlies  the  ratiocinative  func- 
tions proper.  James,  in  Chapter  XXII.  of  his  "  Psy- 
cholog-y,"  takes  the  ground,  and  seeks  to  prove  it 
by  numerous  illustrations,  that  the  point  of  differ- 
ence between  the  animal  mind  and  the  human  is  the 
absence  from  the  former  of  the  principle  of  associ- 


120  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

ation  by  similarity.  All  cases  of  animal  reasoniBg 
in  which  similarity  seems  to  be  present,  are  resolv- 
able, he  thinks,  into  cases  of  contiguity.  It  is 
possible  that  this  may  be  true,  but  the  distinction 
seems  strained,  and  we  conceive  a  more  natural  ex- 
planation of  the  difference  to  be  possible.  For  if  we 
recognize  the  existence  of  a  rudimental  form  of  con- 
sciousness in  which  ideality  or  the  princi^Dle  of  re- 
flection is  yet  latent,  it  becomes  possible  for  us  to 
enlarge  the  scope  of  this  consciousness  in  another 
direction,  and  to  conceive  it  as  capable  of  feeling 
the  similarities  and  distinctions  of  things  as  well  as 
their  mere  contiguities  in  time  and  space.  For  ex- 
ample, when  a  dog  recognizes  his  master's  footsteps 
or  distinguishes  them  among  the  footsteps  of 
strangers,  he  may  feel  the  similarities  and  differences 
on  which  his  recognition  depends,  without  intellect- 
ually apprehending  them  at  all.  And  when  we  rec- 
ognize this  extension  of  the  principle  of  association 
in  animals,  we  may  also  admit  a  corresponding  ex- 
tension in  the  sphere  of  what  is  called  the  animal 
reason.  In  the  light  of  the  distinction  between 
feeling  and  ideality  it  is  possible  to  distinguish  be- 
tween two  species  of  reasoning ;  namely,  reasoning 
which  ends  in  volition  and  action,  and  reasoning 
which  ends  in  a  conception  or  logical  conclusion. 
The  latter  is  always  reflective,  while  the  former  is 
possible  without  reflection. 

To  see  how  this  may  be  it  is  only  necessary  to 
analyze  a  concrete  case.  A  showman  has  trained  a 
pony  to  select  out  of  a  series  of  the  first  seven  digits, 


CONSCIOUSNESS  121 

arrang-ed  in  order  on  separate  cards,  the  one  that 
represents  the  day  of  the  week,  say  Wednesday,  on 
which  the  exhibition  is  given.  He  orders  the  pony 
to  go  and  bring  him  the  number  for  Wednesday. 
The  pony  goes  as  commanded  and  placing  his  head 
by  the  row  of  figures,  seems  to  hesitate.  The  show- 
man repeats,  "  the  number  for  Wednesday !  bring  me 
the  number  for  Wednesday."  Prompted  by  some- 
thing in  these  words,  perhaps  a  iDeculiar  intonation, 
the  pony  recovers  from  his  hesitation  and  picks  out 
the  right  card.  In  order  to  understand  the  processes 
involved  in  this  we  must  connect  it  with  the  previous 
coiu-se  of  training,  in  which  each  stejD  in  the  executive 
process  has  been  laboriously  associated  with  some 
word,  or  gesture,  or  expression  of  the  trainer.  We 
have  only  to  suppose  now  that  the  irony's  conscious- 
ness has  the  power  of  associating  these  two  series 
and  of  feeling  the  connection  between  their  associated 
parts,  in  order  to  reach  an  explanation  of  his  action. 
And  we  have  only  to  generalize  the  illustration  in 
order  to  see  how,  on  the  presupposition  of  a  feeling 
consciousness  and  the  associative  principles  of  con- 
tiguity and  similarity,  the  ratiocinations  of  animals 
are  explicable  without  the  introduction  of  ideality. 

In  man  the  form  of  consciousness  is  completed  by 
the  appearance  of  ideality.  The  soul  of  man  is,  as 
we  have  seen,  a  circle  of  self-activity.  The  comple- 
tion of  this  circle  makes  the  function  of  reflection, 
the  return  of  self  upon  self,  possible,  and  reflection 
is  what  we  have  called  ideality.  Man's  conscious- 
ness is  one  that  not  only  feels  itself  and  its  environ- 


122  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

ment,  but  also  conceives  these  in  themselves  and  in 
their  distinction.  The  human  consciousness  has  the 
power,  therefore,  of  distinguishing-  itself  from  the 
stream  in  which  its  life  flows.  In  this  power  of  self- 
concexDtion  or  reflection  we  find  the  ground  of  that 
distinction  between  the  unitary  self  and  the  empiri- 
cal stream  of  consciousness  which  rests  at  the  basis 
of  the  manifested  life  of  man.  In  the  human  con- 
sciousness we  find  also  the  same  principles  of  as- 
sociation which  also  function  in  the  animal.  But 
there  lies  coiled  up  in  the  human  soul,  however  low 
down  in  the  scale,  this  principle  of  ideal  reflection 
which  on  the  theoretic  side  of  man's  intelligence 
lays  the  foundations  of  a  distinctive  development  of 
free  intellectual  activity ;  wdiile  on  the  practical 
side  it  leads  to  the  emergence  of  conscience  and  the 
life  of  free  ethical  individuality.  Consciousness  is 
from  the  start  the  j)otency  of  both  feeling  and  ideal- 
ity. But  in  the  animal  stage  of  its  manifestation 
feeling  alone  is  active,  while  ideality  must  be  con- 
ceived as  existing  only  as  a  latent  potence.  The 
arousal  of  this  potency  into  the  germ  of  an  active 
life  marks  the  beginning  of  an  intelligence  that  we 
call  human. 

We  have  rejoresented  the  activity  of  the  soul  as  a 
perpetual  passage  from  spiritual  potence  to  actual- 
ity. A  corresponding  representation  of  conscious- 
ness will  express  its  truth.  In  the  developed  con- 
sciousness we  find  a  synthesis  of  feeling  and  ideality, 
and  this,  in  view  of  the  nature  of  the  soul  of  which  it 
is  the  expression,  can  be  conceived  only  in  terms 


CONSCIOUSNESS  123 

of  perpetual  movement  as  a  passage  from  potency 
to  actuality.  We  have  seen  that  the  soul  is  an  epit- 
ome, a  microcosm  of  the  world  -  process  through 
which  it  is  realized.  It  leaves  nothing  behind,  but 
embraces  the  moments  of  potency  through  which 
it  has  passed  on  its  way  to  actuality,  in  the  com- 
pleted circle  of  its  life.  In  like  manner,  conscious- 
ness epitomizes  the  stages  of  its  evolution.  Man  is 
an  animal  with  an  animal  organism,  and  his  intelli- 
gence includes  in  it  the  animal  intelligence,  as  a 
point  which  he  must  perpetually  loass  through  in 
order  to  reach  his  own  standpoint.  But  this  animal 
intelligence  is  a  stage  or  moment  that  is  perpetually 
being  overcome  and  subordinated,  and  man  only 
reaches  the  i3lane  of  his  own  true  life  when  he  has 
attained  to  the  standpoint  of  reflective  idealit}^  and 
thus  become  a  free  intellectual  and  moral  agent. 

Synthesis  of  the  ideas  of  the  psychic  nature  and 
of  consciousness  here  reached,  makes  possible  an- 
other very  important  advance  in  i)hilosophic  con- 
ceptions. A  self-activity  that  unites  in  it  the  mo- 
ments of  feeling  and  ideality,  constitutes  a  fountain 
out  of  which  scoring  the  intellectual,  emotional,  and 
volitional  elements  of  man's  actual  experience.  But 
the  soul  is  to  be  conceived  also  as  in  a  perpetual 
movement  of  self-evolution  in  which  it  is  ever  pass- 
ing from  potency  to  actuality.  The  complete  act- 
uality at  which  it  aims  is  not,  therefore,  a  present 
possession,  but  an  aim  that  is  perpetually  being 
achieved.  It  is  an  ideal  which  embodies  the  true 
nature  of  the  soul,  and  which  is  constantly  pressing 


124  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

upon  the  spheres  of  its  activity  as  the  true  law  of  its 
being-.  Thus  arises  an  ideal  spring-  of  intellectual, 
moral,  and  sesthetic  elements  which  stands  for  the 
soul's  true  activity,  and  which  embodies  itself  in 
man's  spiritual  ideals  of  the  True,  the  Good,  and  the 
Beautiful.  The  synthesis  reached  above  gives  us 
an  insight  into  the  fact  that  the  ideal  is  no  external 
and  visionary  element  in  our  conscious  life,  but 
that  it  is  immanent  and  internal,  the  true  goal  tow- 
ard which  all  normal  psychic  activity  tends. 


IX 

MORALITY 

A  metaphysic  of  morality  cannot  be  developed 
exclusively  from  the  idea  of  the  human  soul.  It 
must  go  back  of  this  to  the  primal  ground  out  of 
which  the  soul  has  come.  The  soul  is  proximately 
the  highest  entelechy  or  actualization  of  the  spir- 
itual principle  which  constitutes  the  immanent 
ground  of  the  world.  But  this  immanent  principle 
is  a  potence  which  presupposes  a  transcendent  ac- 
tuality. This  actuality  is  the  absolute  self-active 
Spirit  which  energizes  as  the  ultimate  ground  of 
all  things. 

The  evolution  of  soul  may  be  conceived  as  the 
progressive  development  of  spiritual  activity.  For 
the  soul  is  a  self-active  principle.  But  it  is  not 
absolute,  nor  is  the  consciousness  it  develops  the 
consciousness  of  the  Absolute.  We  have  seen  that 
the  Absolute  has  its  own  immanent  consciousness, 
which  is  that  of  a  being  who  is  -peviect  self-activity 
and  in  whom  there  is  no  undeveloped  potency. 
There  can  be  no  develoiDment,  then,  in  the  absolute 
consciousness.  Now  the  soul,  though  it  realizes  at 
the  centre  of  its  being  the  same  category  of  self- 


126  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

activity,  yet  this  process  of  realization  is  an  evolu- 
tion or  development  out  of  potence  into  actuality, 
in  which  the  potence  and  its  categories  are  a  con- 
tained moment.  Actuality  in  such  a  nature  is  an 
ideal  which  represents  its  goal,  but  not  its  perma- 
nently secured  possession.  The  ideal  of  the  soul  is 
thus  an  absolute  life.  But  this  ideal  is  not  realized, 
and  in  the  nature  of  things  never  can  be.  For,  as 
we  have  seen,  the  soul  carries  the  moment  of  po- 
tentiality ever  with  it.  Its  movement  is  a  perpetual 
struggle  up  out  of  the  undeveloped  potences,  a  per- 
petual effort  to  overcome  and  transform  the  activities 
of  this  lower  life  into  the  complete  self-activities  of 
the  ideal.  Thus  arises  that  dualistic  dialectic,  which 
James  has  described  in  its  psychological  aspects, 
of  the  ideal  self-activity  of  the  human  spirit  to  over- 
come the  empirical  self  and  to  absorb  it  into  its  own 
unitary  individuality.  And  the  same  dialectic  be- 
comes moral  when  conscience  emerges  and  the  free 
ethical  self-activity  of  the  ideal  presses  upon  the 
empirical  will,  as  a  consciousness  of  the  higher  law 
which  its  activities  are  to  realize. 

Now,  as  it  is  in  the  ideal  ethical  activities  of 
the  soul  that  the  norms  of  duty  are  to  be  sought,  so 
it  is  in  this  same  activity  that  the  soul  comes  into 
closest  relation  with  the  absolute  Spirit,  its  ground. 
The  form  in  which  the  absolute  Spirit  realizes  it- 
self to  itself,  we  have  called  logos.  Now,  the  coun- 
teri^art  of  this  absolute  logos  in  the  psychic  sphere 
is  the  ideal  self  which  stands  ever  as  the  unattained 
goal  of  the  soul's  activity.     We  shall  name  this  the 


MORALITY  127 

Psycliic  Logos,  and  shall  use  the  term  always  in  the 
same  sense,  as  a  designation  for  that  ideal  soul- 
activity  which  functions  as  the  ever  unrealized  end 
of  an  infinite  sijiritual  evolution. 

It  is  through  the  psychic  logos  that  the  norms  of 
morality  are  introduced  into  the  human  soul.  But 
they  have  their  primal  springs  in  the  nature  of  the 
Absolute.  Now,  from  the  theoretic  stand^ooint  the 
absolute  activity  may  be  conceived  as  absolute 
Thought.  But  from  the  ethical  point  of  view  it 
must  rather  be  conceived  as  absolute  Will.  Abso- 
lute will  is  a  free  self-activity  of  choice  to  which 
the  motives  are  all  internal.  Absolute  will,  there- 
fore, always  and  only  wills  itself.  Even  when  it 
goes  out  of  itself  its  motive  is  self-realization  in  an 
outer,  negative  siDhere.  But  when  we  say  that  ab- 
solute will  wills  itself,  we  mean  that  absolute  self- 
activity  wills  itself,  and  therefore  wills  that  its 
spiritual  content  shall  be  realized. 

The  content  of  anjrthing  is  the  immanent  quality 
or  character  of  its  activity.  Now,  the  spiritual  dia- 
lectic will  enable  us  to  realize  the  ethical  content  of 
the  absolute  activity.  We  must  remember  that  the 
Absolute  is  identical  with  completely  actualized 
spirit,  and  that  all  the  highest  possibilities  are 
realized  in  it.  The  absolute  Thought,  then,  in  think- 
ing itself  will  think  absolute  truth,  and  this  ethi- 
cally conceived  is  absolute  Wisdom.  The  absolute 
Will  in  willing  itself  wills  absolute  Good,  and  this 
ethically  considered  has  two  asj^ects :  (1)  as  a  norm 
of  ethical  activity  it  is  the  Eight,  which  qualita- 


128  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

tively  conceived  is  Rigliteousness.  (2)  As  a  telos 
or  end  of  ethical  activity  it  is  the  Good,  which  quali- 
tatively conceived  is  Goodness.  Lastly,  the  abso- 
lute Love  energizes  as  the  absolute  Unity,  and  this 
ethically  conceived  is  absolute  Holiness,  while  aes- 
thetically it  is  the  absolute  Beauty. 

As  will  be  more  clearly  seen  hereafter,  the  three 
modes  of  the  activity  of  the  absolute  spirit  are  sim- 
ply different  aspects  of  its  whole  or  individual  life. 
"When  the  Absolute  thinks  itself,  will  and  love  are 
immanent  in  its  thought.  When  it  wills,  thought 
and  love  are  immanent  in  its  volition.  Now,  the 
form  of  ethical  activity  is  will,  and  the  absolute  will 
is  a  function  of  the  whole  absolute  individuality. 
The  character  of  the  absolute  will  is  its  immanent 
content,  and  this,  as  we  have  seen,  comprises  the 
qualities  of  wisdom,  righteousness,  goodness,  and 
holiness.  The  absolute  will  then,  in  willing  itself, 
wills  perfect  wisdom,  righteousness,  goodness,  and 
holiness.  This  immanent  content  is  essential  to 
the  conception  of  the  absolute  will.  Otherwise  no 
distinction  could  be  made  between  it  and  a  de- 
moniac will. 

But  when  we  say  that  morality  is  intrinsic  we  do 
not  mean  to  assert  that  the  absolute  consciousness 
stands  in  the  same  relation  to  it  as  does  the  human. 
A  little  reflection  will  show  the  fallacy  of  such  an 
assertion.  We  have  shown  that  the  human  con- 
sciousness is  ethically,  in  a  sense,  divided  against 
itself.  Conscience  reveals  a  distinction  between  an 
actual  and  an  ideal.     On  the  one  hand  the  psychic 


MORALITY  129 

logos  mediates  to  the  human  consciousness  the 
norms  of  absolute  morality  which  function  as  ideal 
laws.  On  the  other  hand,  the  empirical  self  is  imper- 
fect and  perhaps  also  depraved  by  evil,  and  its  will 
falls  short  of  the  ideal,  or  perhaps  goes  dead  against 
it.  A  dualistic  dilemma  thus  arises  out  of  the  natural 
conditions  of  finite  existence  and  there  is  war  in  the 
soul's  members  between  the  law  of  the  flesh  and 
the  law  of  the  spirit.  The  point  we  wish  to  empha- 
size here,  however,  is  the  fact  that  the  law  of  the 
spirit  or  ideal,  imposes  itself  on  the  empirical  self 
as  a  transcendent  obligation.  It  feels  obliged  to 
obey  a  law  that  is  objective  to  and  above  it.  Obli- 
gation and  the  Ought  are,  therefore,  in  this  trans- 
cendent sense  categories  of  the  relative,  and  can 
have  no  place  in  the  absolute  nature.  It  is  a  dual- 
istic nature,  one  in  which  an  ideal  law  presses  upon 
the  actual,  that  is  conscious  of  morality  as  trans- 
cendent, and  has,  therefore,  a  duty.  The  Absolute 
has  no  duty.  His  activity  is  the  activity  of  free  im- 
manent moral  perfection. 

It  is  through  the  psychic  logos  that  the  norms  of 
morality  w^ork  themselves  into  the  human  conscious- 
ness. This  does  not,  however,  free  them  from  the 
law  of  development.  We  have  seen  that  the  psy- 
chic logos  itself  is  subject  to  this  law.  There  is  a 
point  in  the  world-series  when  the  spiritual  princi- 
ple in  which  it  is  grounded  incorporates  itself  in  a 
human  soul.  This  soul  is  dual  from  the  outset,  and 
embodies  a  dialectic  between  what  it  is  in  realization 
and  what  it  ideally  is  in  the  perfect  self -activity  which 


130  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IT^   PHILOSOPHY 

is  the  goal  of  its  being.  This  is  tlie  ground  out  of 
which  conscience  emerges,  and  conscience  reveals 
the  struggle  as  a  dialectic  between  what  is  and  what 
ought  to  be.  The  psychic  logos  in  the  ethical 
sphere  is  the  seat  of  an  ideal  law  which  functions  as 
the  standard  of  duty. 

But  the  soul  in  its  unity  is  a  developing  real,  and 
as  a  moral  personality  it  is  subject  to  the  same  lavs^. 
The  moral  consciousness  is  at  first  a  germinal  activ- 
ity. The  moral  life  is  largely  potential,  but  it  is 
going  on  to  actuality  and  in  every  stage  of  its  evo- 
lution there  is  present  in  it  this  sense  of  a  dialectic 
between  an  actual  and  an  ideal,  between  what  is  and 
w^hat  ought  to  be.  If  it  be  asked  how  an  ideal  can 
be  subject  to  the  law  of  development,  the  answer  is 
that  growth  is  the  law  of  a  being  that  passes  from  po- 
tentiality into  actuality.  And  when  this  being  be- 
comes conscious ;  that  is,  begins  to  realize  itself  to 
itself,  the  duality  of  its  nature  will  be  revealed  to  it 
and  it  will  not  only  be  conscious  of  what  it  is — a  be- 
ing whose  self-activity  is  tangled  up  in  the  skein  of 
mechanism — but  it  will  have  a  consciousness  of  the 
true  ideal  law  of  its  nature,  that  of  unimpeded  self - 
activity  which  in  the  moral  sphere  is  self-determina- 
tion, and  this  ideal  law  will  press  upon  it  as  the  true 
principle  of  its  being,  a  law  that  it  is  obliged  to  re- 
alize. But  it  is  not  necessary  for  an  ideal  to  reveal 
actually  a  jperfect  content  in  order  to  become  a  stand- 
ard of  duty.  The  moral  law  of  conscience  as  it  re- 
veals itself  is  simply  a  law  of  trend.  It  is  the  recog- 
nition of  the  fact  that  perfection  is  the  only  true  end 


MORALITY  131 

of  our  being,  and  that  a  perfect  law — that  is,  a  law 
that  commands  perfection— is  the  only  law  that  can 
command  our  nature  with  unconditional  authority. 

Now,  it  is  obvious  that  the  force  of  such  a  law 
may  be  clearly  recognized,  while  at  the  same  time  it 
may  not  be  at  all  clear  what  content  of  duty  the  law 
enjoins.  It  is  in  the  sphere  of  content  mainly  that 
the  principle  of  development  applies,  since  man 
must  learn  through  a  growing  experience  and 
through  many  different  channels,  what  his  duty  is. 

If  it  be  asked  further,  how  this  moral  develop- 
ment takes  place,  we  answer  by  pointing  to  the 
whole  history  of  humanity.  Everything  that  con- 
tributes to  or  affects  human  development  also 
affects  moral  development.  The  labor  of  pointing 
out  the  successive  stages  of  the  evolution,  the  forces 
that  are  active  in  it,  and  the  conditions  out  of  which 
it  arises,  is  one  that  cannot  be  undertaken  here. 
But  it  is  essential  that  the  movement  should  be  in- 
terpreted in  the  light  of  its  true  ontological  con- 
ditions. The  whole  process  of  evolution  springs 
out  of  a  potential  spiritual  principle  which  has  its 
immediate  presupposition  in  the  self  -  activity  of 
absolute  Spirit.  This  spiritual  potency,  in  x>assing 
gradually  into  actuality,  realizes  the  stages  of  a  de- 
velopment from  mechanism  up  to  spirit.  On  the 
ethical  side  of  the  evolution  conscience  stands  cen- 
tral, for  conscience  is  simply  the  ethical  form  of 
the  conscious  self-activity  of  spirit.  Conscience 
reveals  the  dualistic  dialectic  between  the  realized 
actual  and  the  ideal  Ought  which  conditions  and  de- 


132  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

termines  tlie  form  of  all  moral  experience.  Moral 
evolution  is  a  movement  that  presupposes  this  dua- 
listic  struggle  and  the  ideal  function  of  conscience. 
Without  this  it  is  nugatory,  for  it  is  only  through 
this  condition  that  man  can  become  a  subject  of 
moral  experience  at  all.  It  is  conscience  or  the 
psychic  logos  as  ethical  will,  imposing  its  ideal  law 
upon  the  human  soul  as  unconditionally  obligatory, 
that  supplies  the  inner  motive  of  ethical  evolution. 
And  it  is  conscience,  as  containing  the  ideal  norms 
of  character  and  conduct,  that  supplies  the  teleologi- 
cal  force  of  the  movement.  Out  of  the  moral  dialec- 
tic which  arises  bet  Ave  en  what  man  has  achieved  and 
the  urgent  sense  of  something  that  he  ought  to 
achieve  siDrings  the  spiritual  activity  through  which 
all  his  moral  riches  are  acquired. 

There  is  a  sense  in  which  the  whole  dialectic  of 
moral  progress  may  be  represented  as  the  achieve- 
ment of  Freedom.  Morality  is  a  function  of  con- 
science, but  conscience  itself  is  an  ideal  will.  The 
law  of  ideal  will  is  free  self-determination.  Now,  we 
have  seen  how  the  empiric  will  only  partially  reali- 
zes this  self-activity.  It  is  in  partial  bondage  to 
mechanical  categories.  Its  life  flows  along  in  the 
world-stream  and  is  subject  to  its  law  of  causal  ante- 
cedence. While,  then,  the  form  of  empiric  choice 
is  self-determination  and,  therefore,  formal  freedom, 
in  fact  this  freedom  tends  to  lapse  into  a  species  of 
mechanical  determinism.  The  empirical  condition 
of  actual  choice  is  character,  and  character  grows 
largely  out  of  serial  antecedents.    Why,  then,  is  the 


MORALITY  133 

determinist  not  right  when  he  denies  freedom  and 
asserts  the  choice  of  the  will  to  be  strictly  deter- 
mined ? 

We  answer  that  the  determinist  only  blunders 
through  an  inadequate  conception  of  the  condi- 
tions of  his  problem.  The  freedom  he  denies  is  a 
will-o'-the-wisp,  and  the  necessity  he  asserts  has 
little  more  substantiality.  It  is  true  that  the  empiri- 
cal will  belongs  to  the  series  in  the  sense  that  what  a 
man  has  been  helps  to  determine  what  he  is,  and 
that  what  he  is  is  the  immediate  antecedent  of  his 
choice.  This  is  inyolved  in  saying  that  all  determi- 
nation is  self-determination.  What  the  determinist 
insists  on  is  the  fact  that  the  self  that  determines  is 
resolvable  into  a  chain  of  antecedent  selves,  and  that 
each  antecedent  self  functions  in  choice  to  deter- 
mine the  self  that  follows.  The  determinist  im- 
agines that  this  destroys  freedom ;  and  he  is  right  if 
the  idea  of  the  series  be  an  adequate  representation 
of  the  moral  situation.  But  it  is  not,  for  we  must 
take  into  account  the  nature  of  the  soul  as  a  princi- 
ple of  spiritual  self- activity,  and  we  must  identify 
this  self-activity  with  freedom.  And  in  connection 
with  this  we  must  exercise  our  whole  insight,  and 
realize  that  conscience  is  the  organ  of  this  self-ac- 
tivity in  its  ideal  form,  and  that  out  of  the  moral 
consciousness  arises  the  intuition  of  a  dialectic  be- 
tween the  actual  which  is  caught,  so  to  speak,  in  the 
mechanical  toils  of  the  series,  and  the  ideal  law  of 
self-activity  which  is  revealed  and  imposed  in  con- 
science.    We  must  grasp  all  this  in  our  intuition. 


134  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

and  then  we  will  be  able  to  attach  a  meaning  to 
freedom  that  will  bring  it  into  vital  relations  with 
mechanism  without  being  submerged  by  it.  For  we 
may  admit  the  main  contention  of  determinism ; 
namely,  that  the  choices  of  the  will  have  as  their  im- 
mediately determining  antecedents  a  series  of  em- 
pirical selves,  and  this  will  supply  one  of  the  essen- 
tial conditions  of  the  moral  problem.  We  have  to 
recognize  in  connection  with  this,  that  the  essence 
of  freedom  is  self-activity,  and  that  the  inner  history 
of  the  soul  is  an  evolution  of  self-activity  out  of  po- 
tentiality. And  in  addition  to  this  we  have  to  rec- 
ognize that  conscience  is  the  organ  of  this  ideal  free 
activity,  and  that  from  the  standpoint  of  conscience 
the  dualistic  basis  of  moral  progress  is  revealed. 

From  these  data  it  will  become  apparent  that 
mechanism  is  the  handmaid  of  freedom.  For  free- 
dom as  self -activity  is  the  inner  motive  of  the  whole 
process.  And  while  the  process  itself  is  to  be  con- 
ceived as  serial  and  as  subject,  therefore,  to  the 
laws  of  mechanical  determinism,  we  are  able  to  see 
that  the  motive  of  the  i:)rocess  is  to  be  teleologically 
rather  than  mechanically  conceived.  The  teleologi- 
cal  standpoint  of  morality  is  that  of  conscience, 
which  is  the  organ  of  ideal  freedom.  And  the  proc- 
ess of  moral  exi^erience  can  only  be  adequately 
grasped  when  we  conceive  it  as  a  dualism  in  which 
the  ideal  force  of  conscience  is  perpetually  operat- 
ing upon  the  empirical  self,  which  is  the  immediate 
antecedent  of  choice,  in  order  to  modify  it,  and 
transform  it  into  harmony  with  its  own  law.     The 


MORALITY  135 

realization  of  freedom  thus  stands  as  tlie  telos  of  tlie 
whole  moral  drama,  and  moral  evolution  is  seen  to 
be  but  an  aspect  of  the  larger  evolution  of  the  hu- 
man soul,  an  unending  process  in  which  the  activity 
of  mechanism  passes  into  the  completer  and  freer 
activity  of  the  spirit  without  being  thereby  sup- 
pressed or  destro3^ed. 

A  sense  of  the  dualistic  basis  of  moralitj^  constitutes 
the  richest  vein  in  the  Kantian  speculations.  But 
Kant  fails  to  realize  fully  the  true  character  of  moral 
dualism,  not  from  any  lack  of  native  insight,  but 
because  he  has  never  achieved  adequate  ideas  of 
being,  non-being,  and  the  nature  of  the  soul.  While 
he  has  a,  profound  intuition,  therefore,  his  failure 
consists  in  weakness  in  the  sphere  of  its  apxolication. 
Kant  draws  from  his  dualistic  data  an  inadequate 
conception  of  the  ultimate  sources  of  morality  and 
a  defective  doctrine  of  moral  freedom.  He  truly 
conceives  that  the  norms  of  morality  are  to  be  found 
in  man's  rational  and  spiritual  nature.  He,  there- 
fore, makes  the  ideal  moral  reason  of  the  soul  self- 
legislating,  and  conceives  autonomy  to  be  the  only 
true  principle  of  morals.  So  far  he  reasons  well. 
But  because  he  has  made  a  cleft  between  the  moral 
reason  and  the  Absolute,  he  is  forced  to  regard  the 
principle  which  finds  the  ultimate  springs  of  moral- 
ity in  the  nature  of  the  Absolute  as  heteronomous 
and,  therefore,  false.  The  principle  of  moral  auton- 
omy thus  becomes  abstractly  humanistic  and  irre- 
ligious, and  a  chasm  yawns  between  morality  and 
relig-ion  which  nothins:  can  bridge  over. 


136  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

A  more  adequate  conception  of  the  x^bsolute  and 
of  the  ideal,  rational  and  spiritual  element  in  man's 
nature  would  have  enabled  Kant  to  escape  this  fatal 
error,  without  sacrificing  the  principle  of  autonomy. 
Had  he  reached  a  true  conception  of  the  psychic 
logos  and  its  relation  to  its  primal  ground  in  the 
absolute  nature,  he  would  have  seen  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  autonomy  is  not  irreligious,  and  that  when 
it  is  thoroughly  applied  it  will  lead  to  the  subsump- 
tion  of  the  moral  idea  under  the  idea  of  religion. 

Kant  also  erects  upon  his  dualistic  basis  an  inad- 
equate doctrine  of  moral  freedom.  He  truly  con- 
ceives the  empiric  will  to  be  subject  to  natural  cau- 
sation, though  he  does  not  clearly  grasp  its  form  as 
self-determination  in  a  series  ;  and  since  all  actual 
choice  and  action  belong  to  the  sphere  of  temporal 
succession,  he  concludes  that  freedom  has  no  place 
in  a  world  like  ours.  Turning  now  to  the  sphere  of 
the  noumenon  or  ideal,  he  is  able  to  conceive  a  nat- 
ure which  is  not  subject  to  the  law  of  natural  causa- 
tion, and  had  he  been  able  to  fully  realize  this  nature 
he  would  have  been  in  possession  of  the  data  for  a 
true  doctrine.  But  an  unfortunate  breach  which  he 
has  already  made  between  the  phenomenal  and  nou- 
menal  spheres,  renders  him  impotent.  He  can 
never  reach  the  intuition  of  spirit  as  real,  and  his 
sphere  of  noumena  remains  empty  of  reality  and  is 
filled  with  mere  possibility.  True,  he  finds  grounds 
of  moral  necessity  for  postulating  the  reality  of  this 
sphere,  but  postulation  is  not  intuition,  and  his  post- 
ulate  remains  a  virtual   abstraction.      The   law   of 


MORALITY  137 

freedom  which  he  conceives  as  belonging  to  this 
sphere  is,  therefore,  of  no  real  effect,  and  the  whole 
case  for  morality  is  left  virtually  in  the  hands  of 
natural  causation. 

It  is  evident  that  had  Kant  conceived  true  ideas  of 
the  Absolute  and  of  the  psychic  nature  of  man,  his 
fine  dualistic  intuition  would  have  led  him  to  more 
adequate  results.  He  would  have  seen  the  vital 
connection  between  morality  and  religion,  and  the 
true  idea  of  freedom  would  have  been  opened  to 
him.  For  he  would  have  seen  clearly  that  the  recog- 
nition of  natural  causation  as  a  principle  of  self- 
determination  in  the  empirical  series  is  consistent 
with  a  true  doctrine  of  freedom.  Conscience  would 
have  revealed  to  him  the  real  nature  of  freedom  as 
an  ideal  self-activity  of  the  soul,  which  is  ever  oper- 
ating upon  and  through  the  empiric  will  toward  its 
own  self-realization.  Freedom  is,  therefore,  the  in- 
ner essence  of  the  empirical  process,  and  the  tele- 
ologic  law  of  moral  achievement,  without  which 
morality  would  lose  all  its  meaning  and  value. 


NON-BEING   AND   EVIL 

The  practical  working-  out  of  moral  experience, 
and  especially  the  fortunes  of  the  struggle  of  the 
spirit  to  transform  the  empirical  will,  is  profoundly 
affected  by  the  presence  of  evil  in  the  world.  Evil 
is  a  factor  that  has  been  variously  treated  in  our 
modern  thinking.  It  has  been  identified  with  be- 
ing as  positive  iDrinciple,  while  good  has  been  con- 
ceived as  negative  in  its  character,  and  pessimism 
has  been  the  resulting  theory.  Again,  it  has  been 
identified  with  non-being  and  non-being  with  rela- 
tivity, and  a  theosophic  mysticism  has  emerged 
whose  ideal  is  the  breaking  of  the  mould  of  psychic 
existence  and  absorption  into  Nirvana.  Lastl}^, 
evil  has  been  identified  with  non-being,  and  non- 
being  with  unreality,  and  optimism  has  emerged 
with  its  denial  of  the  reality  of  evil,  and  its  blind 
adherence  to  the  dogma  that  the  actual  and  the  ideal 
are  one,  or  that  whatever  is  is  right. 

Now,  in  order  to  treat  the  problem  of  evil  with 
true  insight,  we  must  approach  it  from  the  stand- 
point of  the  fundamental  categories,  being,  non- 
beinsr,  and  becoming-.     For  the  most  serious  defects 


NON-BEING  AND   EVIL  139 

of  theories  of  evil  liave  sprung  as  a  rale  either  from 
an  oversight  of  some  of  these  categories,  or  from  a 
confused  identification  of  evil  with  some  of  them. 
In  view  of  this  we  lay  down  the  proposition  that  evil 
cannot  be  truly  theorized  except  in  the  light  of  the 
trinal  categories  of  reality,  and  also  that  it  cannot 
be  identified  with  either  being,  non-being,  or  becom- 
ing, although  it  has  its  roots  in  non-being. 

The  typical  pessimist  of   modern  philosophy  is 
Schopenhauer.     But  the  roots  of  his  pessimism  are 
to  be  sought  in    the  depths  of    his    metaphysics. 
Schopenhauer  denies  the  rationality  of  the  world, 
conceiving  it  to  be  the  product  of  the  blind  and  un- 
reasoning impulse  of  a  will  which  strives  wholly 
without  intelligence.     The  reason  and  intelligence  of 
the  world  do  not  spring  from  its  groand-principle, 
but  are  an  afterthought,  a  by-product   of  blindly 
groping  instinct.     The  rationality  and  intelligibility 
of  the   world   are,   therefore,  appearance    and  not 
reality.    The  only  realities  are  unreason,  caprice, 
chaos,  and  mal-adaptation.     Now,  the  metaphysical 
doctrine  of  the  blindness  and    irrationality  of  the 
world,  when  carried  into  the  ethical  sphere,  becomes 
the  ground-principle  of  pessimism.     The  Schopen- 
hauerian  pessimism  does  not  follow  logically  from 
the  identification  of  the  world-ground  with  will,  but 
rather  from  the  disjunction  of  will  from  intelligence 
and  the  identification   of  Avill  with  non-intelligent 
instinct.     Pessimism  does  not  deny  that  there  are 
reason  and  order  in  the  world,  but  these  are  late 
comers,  and  they  find  that  unreason  and  caprice 


140  BASAL   CONCEPTS    IN   PHILOSOPHY 

have  been  beforehand  with  them,  and  have  sat,  as  it 
were,  as  the  privy  councillors  of  the  Creator.  The 
world  is  conceived  as  springing-  out  of  an  irrational 
and  chaotic  root.  Its  tendency  to  mal-adax3tation, 
to  the  production  of  misery  instead  of  happiness, 
caprice  instead  of  reason,  chaos  instead  of  law,  con- 
fusion instead  of  order,  disease  and  poverty  instead 
of  health  and  riches,  is,  therefore,  constitutional, 
chronic,  and  incurable. 

Now,  after  Schopenhauer  it  is  no  longer  ]oossible 
to  rest  in  the  easy-going  optimism  of  Leibnitz  and 
the  eighteenth  century.  Schopenhauer  has  opened 
our  eyes  to  the  fact  that  evil  is  a  real  and  very  se- 
rious factor  in  the  world.  We  can  no  longer  ignore 
the  existence  of  evil  or  treat  it  as  a  phase  of  good  in 
the  making.  Evil  is  not  good  in  the  making,  but 
always  and  everywhere  the  opposite  and  foe  of 
good.  But  there  is  a  root  of  illusion  in  Schopen- 
hauer. We  have  seen  that  the  universe  becomes 
intelligible  only  when  we  undo  the  disjunction  of 
will  and  intelligence  and  conceive  the  first  impulse 
of  being  to  be  intelligent  and  rational.  This  is 
what  Schox)enhauer  denies,  but  his  denial  carries 
him  too  far.  In  order  that  the  philosophy  of  Scho- 
penhauer may  be  rational  the  intelligence  of  Scho- 
penhauer himself  must  be  rational.  The  world, 
then  must  in  Schopenhauer  have  achieved  a  stage 
of  rationality  and  order.  Schopenhauer  says  that 
this  is  a  by-product,  and  has  no  more  right  against 
the  nature  of  things  than  any  other  epi-phenomenon. 
Well,  if  that  be  true,  the  standpoint  of  reason  and 


NON-BEING   AND   EVIL  141 

intelligence  has  no  more  riglit,  claim,  or  value  than 
any  other.  It  is  a  passing  phase  of  existence  like 
the  rest,  and  why  should  the  clay  cry  out  against  the 
potter  "i.  In  short,  the  logic  of  Schopenhauer's  po- 
sition leaves  no  ground  or  motive  for  the  impressive 
moral  which  Schopenhauer  draws  and  which  alone 
clothes  pessimism  with  the  dignity  of  a  serious 
theory.  The  root  of  illusion  in  Schopenhauer  is 
his  identification  of  being  and  evil.  This  reduces 
rationality  and  good  to  negativity.  If  being  and 
evil  are  one  and  good,  and  rationality  be  negative, 
then  the  irresistible  and  inevitable  tendency  of  the 
universe  is  toward  the  generation  of  caprice,  un- 
reason, and  chaos,  and  against  that  of  reason  and 
order.  It,  therefore,  swallows  up  all  standpoints,  in- 
cluding that  of  Schopenhauer,  and  leaves  no  ground 
for  any  theory  of  things  whatsoever.  For  a  little 
man  to  sit  in  his  study  and  write,  and  seriously  be- 
lieve, that  caprice  and  unreason  constitute  the  es- 
sence of  things  thus  involves  a  self-contradiction 
that  is  little  less  than  ludicrous. 

The  typical  optimist  of  modem  philosophy  is 
Leibnitz.  The  roots  of  his  optimism  are  to  be 
sought  in  the  metaphysical  theory  on  which  it 
rests.  Leibnitz  distinguishes  three  species  of  evil 
—metaphysical,  natural,  and  moral.  Metaphysical 
evil  he  identifies  with  imperfection,  thus  commit- 
ting himself  unwittingly  to  the  contradictory  posi- 
tion that  all  relativity  and  becoming  are  evil.  Leib- 
nitz did  not  mean  this,  but  he  falls  unwittingly  into 
the   mistake  because  he   has   overlooked  the  real 


142  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

metaphysical  ground  of  evil.  Or  rather,  he  traces 
it  wrongly  to  the  will  of  the  Creator,  who  after  re- 
volving- an  infinite  number  of  world-patterns,  some 
of  which,  Leibnitz  lets  us  think,  were  perfect,  chose 
the  present  imperfect  pattern  as  the  best  practi- 
cable scheme.  Leibnitz  was  sharp-witted  enough 
to  see  that  his  reference  of  the  imperfection  of 
the  world  to  the  oi^tion  of  the  Creator  committed 
him  logically  and  ethically  to  a  conception  of  evil 
which  would  deprive  it  of  all  serious  reality.  Other- 
wise the  goodness  of  the  Creator  would  be  im- 
pugned. He  therefore  conceives  evil  in  both  a  neg- 
ative and  an  unreal  sense,  as  mere  defect  of  good,  as 
good  in  the  making.  Leibnitz  shows  little  signs  of 
any  intuition  of  the  fact  that  evil  is  the  opposite  and 
foe  of  the  good,  that  it  is  that  which  the  good  must 
forever  suppress  and  annul.  Identifying  evil  thus 
with  the  unreal,  Leibnitz  is  utterly  blind  to  the  grav- 
ity of  its  nature  and  to  the  serious  issues  in  life  and 
destiny  to  which  it  gives  rise.  Like  the  typical 
optimist  that  he  is,  he  confounds  and  even  identifies 
the  actual  and  the  ideal.  For  though  he  is  not  the 
author  of  the  dictum  that  whatever  is  is  right,  the 
spirit  of  his  general  view  is  in  sympathy  with  such  a 
sentiment.  Leibnitz  recognizes  evil,  it  is  true,  but 
his  recognition  is  a  kind  of  lip-service,  for  he  cannot 
for  the  life  of  him  see  that  there  is  anything  serious- 
ly wrong  with  the  world.  Evil  to  Leibnitz  is  merely 
a  kind  of  a  disciplinary  agent,  which  an  optimist 
Deity  employs  to  train  his  creatures  and  lead  them 
to  higher  stages  of  good. 


NON-BEING  AND  EVIL  143 

Well,  the  pedagogical  aspects    of    the  question 
should  not  be  overlooked.     But  it  is  a  shallow  view 
of  evil  that  would  seat  it  in  the  chair  of  a  Divinity 
School  as  a  teacher  of  morals.     The  truth  of  the 
matter  is  that  Leibnitz  has  missed  almost  the  entire 
philosophy  of  evil     It  is  of  no  avail  to  recognize 
good  as  positive  and  identical  with  being,  and  evil 
as  negative,  if  we  do  not  also  conceive  evil  as  the 
opposite  of  good,  and  therefore  real.     If  evil  can 
pass  into  the  good,  or  if  it  is  good  in  the  making  or 
a  pedagogical  condition  of  good  merely,  then  it  has 
no  reality,  but  is  an  appearance,  and  optimism  of 
the  most  roseate  hue  is  the  true  theory.     But  the 
whole  rationality  of  a  philosophic  theory  rests  pri- 
marily in  its  insistence  on  the  cardinal  position  that 
real  opposites  cannot  pass   into  one   another,  but 
deny  and  annul  one  another.     Evil  is  opposed  to 
good,  and  must  be  suppressed  and  annulled  in  order 
that  good  may  be  realized. 

But  Leibnitz  lacked  the  philosophic  basis  from 
which  an  intuition  of  the  true  relation  of  opposites 
becomes  possible.  Leibnitz  had  an  intuition  of  be- 
ing, but  none  of  non-being.  We  must  trace  the  rela- 
tion of  opposites  back  into  the  very  root  of  spiritual 
activity  itself.  There  we  will  see  that  the  primal 
impulse  of  being  which  leads  to  the  intuition  and 
conscious  assertion  of  self,  leads  also  by  a  necessary 
dualism  to  an  intuition  and  denial  of  being's  op- 
posite, or  non-being.  We  must  realize  how  the 
intuition  of  this  negative  or  non-being  supplies  the 
rational  motive  for  a  disjunction  of  the  energy  of 


144  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

being  and  a  distinction  between  immanent  self-reali- 
zation and  tlie  outgoing  energy  of  voluntary  creation. 
We  must  realize  how  the  outgo  of  creative  energy 
into  this  SjDhere  of  negation,  in  order  to  annul  it  by 
the  generation  of  forms  of  being,  in  the  very  neces- 
sities of  the  case  generates  only  the  relative  and 
imperfect,  not  the  absolute  and  perfect.  We  must 
realize  that  this  imperfection  and  relativity  has  its 
root  in  the  absence  from  the  creature  of  the  ground 
and  jDrinciple  of  its  own  existence.  The  law  of  the 
creature  is,  therefore,  that  of  dependence  on  other, 
the  self-existent  principle  on  which  its  own  exist- 
ence depends,  transcending  it.  We  must  finally 
realize  that  this  lack  of  self-existent  ground  and 
consequent  dependence  on  other  which  is  the  very 
essence  of  generated  being,  is  the  negative  ground 
of  that  differentia  of  the  creature  ;  namely,  its  muta- 
hility,  which,  as  Augustine  profoundly  saw,  is  the 
root  of  the  possibility  of  evil. 

From  this  view  it  becomes  evident  that  a  distinc- 
tion must  be  recognized  between  imperfection  and 
evil.  We  must  deny  that  what  Leibnitz  calls  meta- 
physical evil  is  evil  at  all.  No  relative  being  can 
exist  without  imperfection.  If  then  imperfection  is 
evil,  the  relative  is  evil,  and  we  are  led  by  a  short-cut 
from  optimism  to  the  Hindu  form  of  pessimism. 
For  it  is  the  tendency  of  Hindu  thinking  to  identify 
all  true  being  with  the  Absolute,  and  to  carry  the 
idea  of  the  unity  of  this  being  so  far  as  to  virtually 
cut  off  all  possible  participation  of  the  relative  in 
being.     The  result  is  that  the  two  poles  of  Hindu 


NON-BEING  AND   EVIL  145 

thinking  are,  on  the  one  hand  an  unapproachable 
One  which  is  the  sum  of  all  reality,  and  on  the  other 
a  sphere  of  plurality  and  change  which  is  pure  illu- 
sion. This  is  the  world  of  relativity  and  becoming, 
w^hich  the  oriental  mind  reduces  to  illusion  and 
evil,  a  defective  veil  of  2faia  which  must  be  i3ene- 
trated  in  order  that  true  being  may  be  realized. 
The  good  consists  in  the  soul's  rifting  this  veil  of 
illusion  and  losing  itself  in  Nirvana  or  the  absolute 
One. 

It  is  a  curiously  ironical  fact  that  we  find  one  of 
the  keenest  of  modern  thinkers  thus  resting  opti- 
mism upon  a  plank  which  had  ages  before  been  ap- 
propriated by  one  of  the  extremest  forms  of  pes- 
simism. The  defect  in  the  position,  whether  subsi- 
dized in  the  interests  of  i^essimism  or  optimism,  is 
its  virtual  identification  of  relativity  and  evil.  This 
renders  the  conclusion  inevitable  that  the  Creator 
is  the  immediate  and  intentional  author  of  evil ;  a 
thought  from  which  the  human  reason  shrinks,  and 
in  order  to  escape  the  issue  chooses  rather  to  bury 
itself  in  loantheism  or  atheism,  or,  if  it  still  clings  to 
theism,  to  vindicate  the  Creator  by  espousing  a 
theory  of  evil  which  identifies  it  substantially  with 
good. 

The  difficulty  is  overcome  when  we  make  a  dis- 
tinction between  imperfection  and  evil.  The  law  of 
a  created  being  is  development,  and  a  developing 
being  must  be  imperfect.  But  an  imperfect  being 
may  be  developing  along  a  true  curve  toward  the 
realization  of  its  ideal  end.  Imperfection  in  such 
10 


146  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

a  being  will  be  inseparable  from  undeveloped  po- 
tence.  But  normally  tliis  potence  will  go  on  to  re- 
alize itself,  and  in  doing  so  the  creature  is  achieving 
the  true  end  of  its  being.  There  are  then  normal 
types  of  relative  and  generated  being  which  must  be 
conceived  as  good.  In  a  system  of  relative  being, 
therefore,  if  evil  arise  it  must  arise  as  something 
abnormal,  as  some  kind  of  aberration  or  departure 
from  the  normal  types  of  relativity. 

We  cannot,  then,  identify  evil  with  any  of  the 
three  categories  being,  non-being,  or  becoming.  And 
that  means  that  evil  is  not  necessary  as  an  element 
in  any  system  of  reality.  The  question  then  arises, 
what  is  evil  1  Well,  when  Leibnitz  identified  meta- 
physical evil  with  imperfection  he  simply  mistook 
the  contingency  or  the  liability  to  evil  for  evil  it- 
self. We  cannot  do  better  here  than  fall  back  on  the 
intuition  of  St.  Augustine.  The  creature  is  imper- 
fect, and  this  imperfection,  which,  as  we  saw,  has  its 
source  in  the  non-self-existence  of  the  creature  and 
its  dependence  on  other,  expresses  itself  in  "  a  cer- 
tain mutability  "  through  which  the  creature  is  sub- 
ject to  contingency.  Now,  it  is  this  mutability  or 
contingency  in  the  creative  nature  that  is  the  nega- 
tive ground  of  its  fall  into  evil.  Mutability  is  not 
in  itself  evil,  for  a  thing  may  be,  as  Augustine  says, 
mutable  and  yet  good.  Mutability  is  inseparable 
from  undevelox)ed  potency,  and  the  capacity  for 
growth  and  development  is  inseparable  from  con- 
tingency or  liability  to  evil. 

In  what  sense,  then,  is  the  mutability  of  the  rela- 


NON-BEING   AND   EVIL  147 

tive  the  condition  of  the  origin  and  existence  of 
evil  ?  We  must  translate  mutability  into  tendency 
to  non-being.  The  normal,  that  is,  the  good  type  of 
a  relative  being,  is  the  development-type,  and  its  law 
is  the  law  of  growth  or  progress  toward  the  perfec- 
tion of  the  type.  But  the  negative  of  the  develop- 
ment-type and  its  law  of  growth,  is  imperfection, 
mutability,  tendency  toward  non-being.  Now,  evil, 
in  its  most  general  and  unethical  sense,  arises  when 
the  tendency  to  non-being  so  far  prevails  over  the 
develoi^ment-type  and  its  law  as  either  to  arrest 
growth  and  initiate  the  opposite  process  of  decay 
and  dissolution,  or  when  the  being  falls  from  its  nor- 
mal path  into  a  kind  of  aberration.  All  relativity 
has  in  it  the  contingency  of  decay  or  aberration,  and 
when  this  contingency  becomes  actual,  then  evil  has 
originated  and  become  a  feature  of  reality. 

What  Leibnitz  calls  metaphysical  evil,  then,  is  not 
evil  but  the  negative  potentiality  of  evil ;  that  is,  it 
is 'that  which  renders  a  relative  creature  liable  to 
evil.  Evil  proper  is  some  property  or  characteris- 
tic of  the  relative  which  has  its  root  in  this  negative 
ground.  All  evil  may  be  classed  as  two  species, 
natural  and  moral.  Natural  evil  in  its  principle  will 
be  departure  from  the  normal  type  and  law  of  de- 
velopment either  as  a  process  of  decay  or  as  aber- 
ration, and  its  manifestation  throughout  nature  will 
be  disorder,  caprice,  destructiveness,  mal-adapta- 
tion,  and  in  the  sentient  sphere,  i^ain,  disease,  pov- 
ei-ty,  and  death. 

We  can  only  deal  intelligently  with  natural  evil 


148  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSORHY 

when  we  disting-uish  between  the  principle  of  eyil 
and  its  manifestations  or  effects.  The  term  is  i^opu- 
larly  applied  to  the  manifestations  such  as  pain  and 
disease.  These  are  undoubtedly  evils.  But  a  phi- 
losophy of  evil  must  emphasize  the  principle  rather 
than  the  mere  manifestations.  Now,  it  is  coming  to 
be  a  recognized  doctrine  in  the  psychology  of  pain, 
for  example,  that  it  has  its  root  in  some  departure 
from  the  normal  type  and  its  law,  either  in  func- 
tional failure  of  the  life  processes,  or  in  failure  of 
the  organism  to  adapt  itself  to  its  conditions.  Not 
only  does  this  confirm  the  theory  of  evil  we  are  de- 
fending here,  but  it  also  indicates  very  clearly  the 
teleological  character  of  the  idea  of  evil.  Evil  is 
departure  from  the  good  and  must  have  its  primal 
significance  in  its  relation  to  the  good.  But  for  a 
developing  creature  good  can  only  be  teleological, 
and  it  will  be  expressed  in  the  end  or  ideal  which 
the  law  of  its  being  is  realizing.  The  good  of  a 
creature  will  thus  be  the  whole  meaning  and  ration- 
ale of  its  existence.  It  will  include  its  whole  posi- 
tive reality.  The  evil  of  a  creature  will  be  the  ojj- 
posite  of  this,  the  negative  of  the  positive  content 
of  the  good,  in  that  it  tends  to  defeat  and  annul  the 
good  end.  Whatever  tends  thus  in  the  negative 
teleological  direction,  produces  the  manifestation  of 
evil  in  nature  and  sentient  existence — disorder,  des- 
tructiveness,  lawlessness,  pain,  disease,  and  poverty. 
Moral  evil  arises  only  as  a  function  of  the  will  of 
an  intelligent  and  personal  agent.  Moral  evil  super- 
adds the  element  of  choice  to  the  generic  concept 


NOiS^-BEING   AND   EVIL  149 

of  evil.  Choice  or  option  is  thus  the  differentia 
of  moral  evil.  How  then  shall  moral  evil  be  con- 
ceived ?  In  the  first  place  it  is  evident  that  evil 
must  be  chosen  in  order  to  become  moral.  Mere 
spontaneous  aberration  from  the  good  can  never  rise 
to  the  gravity  of  moral  evil.  But  the  choice  of  evil 
implies  an  option,  and  this  must  be  an  oi)tion  that 
is  teleological  and  in  view  of  alternatives  which 
the  dual  nature  of  the  agent  places  before  it.  This 
is  a  vital  part  of  the  theory,  for  if  the  nature  of 
the  agent  were  monal  it  could  have  only  one  con- 
stitutional good  and  the  dilemma  of  choice  between 
good  and  evil  could  not  arise.  The  Absolute,  whose 
nature  is  conceived  to  be  monal,  must  also  be  con- 
ceived as  free  from  temptation.  The  evil  is  that  to 
which  the  absolute  nature  is  opposed,  and  its  choice 
is  essentially  an  annulment  of  evil.  But  the  psy- 
chic nature  of  the  creature  is  dual,  and  there  is  a 
perpetual  dialectic  between  the  empirical  will  of  the 
actualized  or  empirical  self  and  the  law  of  con- 
science or  the  will  of  the  ideal  self.  Man's  dualis- 
tic  nature  thus  confronts  him  with  an  everlasting 
option  between  the  ideal  and  the  end  to  which  the 
empirical  will  is  drawn. 

This  is  the  cardinal  moral  situation  out  of  which 
the  whole  drama  of  good  and  evil  arises.  Moral 
evil  arises  when  the  empirical  will  asserts  itself 
against  the  ideal.  It  thus  cuts  itself  off  from  the 
spring  of  its  rationality  and  spirituality,  and  be- 
comes the  organ  of  capricious  impulse  and  unspir- 
itual   and   animal  propensity.     The  negative  thus 


150  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

g-ets  the  upper  hand,  and  the  empirical  will  having 
broken  with  reason  and  spirit,  yields  itself  to  the 
lawless  forces  of  caiDrice  and  passion.  The  result,  if 
the  rebellion  continues,  has  been  vividly  portrayed 
by  Plato.  The  steeds  of  the  lower  nature  having- 
overcome  their  guide,  take  the  bits  in  their  teeth 
and  plunge  madly  downward  with  chariot  and  driver 
toward  the  abyss.  This  figure  of  Plato's  symbolizes 
the  lawlessness  and  destructiveness  of  the  empiric 
will  when  it  has  asserted  itself  against  the  ideal,  and 
the  fall  into  depravity  and  moral  ruin  that  inevitably 
follows. 

Again,  the  negative  character  of  evil  comes  out 
clearly  in  its  moral  form.  There  is  involved,  it  is 
true,  the  choice  of  some  end  which  is  conceived  to 
be  a  good.  But  this  does  not  constitute  the  act 
morally  evil.  It  becomes  moral  evil  only  as  it  is  a 
rebellion  against  the  ideal  good  which  is  imposed 
on  our  nature  as  a  law,  and  the  evil  arises  out  of  the 
fact  that  we  voluntarily  annul  and  negate  what  we 
recognize  at  the  same  time  we  ought  to  choose  as 
our  true  good.  Our  choice  becomes  moral  evil 
when  it  repudiates  the  higher  ideal  good  and  falls 
on  a  lower  supposed  good.  All  moral  evil  is  thus  in 
its  essence  a  rebellion  against  good  and  the  taking 
of  a  negative,  destructive  attitude  toward  it. 

The  most  aggravated  form  of  moral  evil  embodies 
itself  in  the  will  that  we  call  satanic.  This  last  stage 
of  moral  obliquity  is  finely  embodied  in  Milton's 
Satan,  who  although  a  rebel  against  God  and  fallen 
into  perdition,  has  still  some  remains  of  his  former 


NON-BEING   AND   EVIL  151 

g-lory  in  his  nature.  He  does  not  become  a  complete 
devil  until,  after  reflection  on  his  defeat  and  fall,  he 
deliberately  renounces  his  allegiance  to  good  and 
chooses  evil ;  that  is,  rebellion  and  warfare  against 
God,  as  his  good.  Here  the  place  of  the  ideal 
good  is  deliberately  vacated  of  its  true  occupants, 
righteousness,  goodness,  and  love,  and  unrighteous- 
ness, wickedness,  and  hate  are  enthroned  in  their 
stead.  The  normal  relations  between  good  and 
evil  are  thus  completely  inverted,  and  a  demoniac 
will  holds  the  place  of  the  ejected  ideal.  The  Spirit 
is  thus  quenched,  which  is  the  unpardonable  sin  of 
a  creature,  and  the  lost  soul  has  before  it  only  the 
abyss  and  an  everlasting  downward  progress  in  evil. 
What  light  does  this  view  of  evil  throw  upon  its 
relation  to  the  absolute  Author  of  the  world  ?  It  is 
clear  that  we  cannot  affirm  unqualifiedly  either  that 
the  Creator  is,  or  that  he  is  not,  the  author  of  evil. 
We  have  seen  that  evil  is  no  necessary  part  of  the 
relative  order.  But  its  root,  the  mutability  and 
contingency  of  the  relative,  is  a  necessary  feature, 
and  this  has  its  presupposition  in  non-being.  The 
Creator  does  not  generate  evil,  but  he  generates  con- 
ditions which  have  the  contingency  of  evil  in  them. 
Why  then  is  the  Creator  not  morally  responsible  for 
evil  ?  and  how  can  the  system  of  things  in  which 
the  contingency  of  evil  exists  be  any  longer  re- 
garded as  good  ?  It  is  clear  that  moral  respon- 
sibility could  not  be  escaped  if  the  option  of 
creation  is  between  a  i3erfect  and  immutable,  and  an 
imperfect  and  mutable  world,  both  of  which  are  pos- 


152  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

sible.  If  we  carry  the  idea  of  absolute  power  to  the 
extent  of  inclnding"  this  dual  possibility  in  its  scope, 
then  the  actual  imperfection  and  evil  of  the  world 
impugns  the  goodness  of  the  Creator  and  leaves  no 
distinctive  basis  for  religion.  But  if  the  whole 
doctrine  of  being,  non-being,  and  becoming  as  un- 
folded in  this  treatise  be  true,  then  the  option  sup- 
posed above  is  a  fiction.  The  very  facts  that  creative 
energy  is  outgoing  and  not  immanent,  and  that  cre- 
ated being  must  originate  not  immanentally,  but  out 
of  the  Absolute,  in  non-being,  carry  with  them  the 
necessity  that  created  being  should  be  imperfect 
and  mutable.  Only  the  uncreated  and  self-existent 
Absolute  can  be  jperfect  and  immutable  in  its  nature. 
The  option  then  which  really  exists  and  which  con- 
fronts the  creative  intelligence  is  a  choice  between 
non-being  and  becoming.  The  creative  energy  must 
forever  remain  quiescent  in  face  of  the  intuition  of 
the  outer  sphere  of  pure  negation,  or  it  must  rouse 
itself  volitionally  to  an  effort  to  generate  being 
where  now  pure  negation  exists.  If,  now,  the  option 
is  between  non-being  and  no  created  existence,  and 
created  existence  which  shall  be  imperfect  and  con- 
tain in  it  the  contingency  of  evil,  the  moral  situa- 
tion is  completely  altered.  It  is  better  that  becom- 
ing or  relative  and  imperfect  being  should  take  the 
place  of  pure  negation  and  non-being.  The  spirit 
can  only  assert  itself  against  the  negative  by  letting 
free  the  creative  energy  and  generating  in  the  sphere 
of  its  opposite  its  own  image. 
The  existence  of  evil  is,  therefore,  not  inconsistent 


NOX-BEING    AND   EVIL  153 

with  the  supremacy  of  good.  The  development- 
type  and  law  of  a  relative  creature,  as  we  have  seen, 
is  good.  Now,  if  the  contingency  of  evil  is  insepar- 
able from  this  development-type  and  law,  and  if  this 
contingency  results  in  actual  evil  in  a  given  sys- 
tem of  relativity,  it  is  i:>ossible  for  such  evil  to  exist 
and  be  real,  without  thereby  vitiating  the  constitu- 
tion of  things.  In  other  words,  it  is  possible  that  the 
evil  of  the  world  is  a  subordinate  feature  of  reality, 
and  that  the  force  and  trend  of  the  good  tends  con- 
tinually to  annul  and  transcend  the  evil.  The  possi- 
bility of  this  will  become  more  clear  if  we  view  the 
world  from  the  teleological  standpoint  in  the  light 
of  that  world-idea  which  to  the  Absolute  includes 
within  it  the  whole  world-process.  If  the  world- 
process  when  comprehended  under  the  world-idea  is 
good,  then  it  stands  justified,  notwithstanding  the 
negative  feature  which  has  been  its  inseparable 
accompaniment.  It  appears  then,  that  the  final 
judgment  of  evil  must  be  teleologic,  and  that  its 
nature  will  be  largely  determined  by  the  conception 
we  are  able  to  reach  of  the  end  and  pur^^ose  of  the 
world. 

It  is  clear  then  that  neither  optimism  nor  pessi- 
mism sui)ply  us  with  an  adequate  theory  of  evil. 
Optimism  treats  it  altogether  too  lightly,  while  pes- 
simism sacrifices  the  good  to  the  evil  Moloch.  A 
more  adequate  view  than  either  is  meliorism,  which 
while  recognizing  the  reality  and  gravity  of  evil, 
subordinates  it  to  the  good  and  believes,  therefore, 
that   the  condition  of  the  world  is  not   altoorether 


154  BASAL  CONCEPTS   IN  PHILOSOPHY 

hopeless,  but  tliat  improvement  is  possible.  The 
meliorist,  with  a  keen  intuition  of  the  evils  that  are 
eating'  into  the  fibres  of  the  world  and  humanity,  will 
yet  not  lose  hope  but  rather  find  in  these  a  motive 
for  spiritual  activitj^  For  althoug-h  the  end  and 
supreme  category  of  things  is  the  good,  this  can  be 
attained  only  through  perjDetual  struggle.  "We  must 
be  continually  rising  above  and  crucifying  our  em- 
pirical selves.  This  is  a  universal  law  of  progress, 
and  in  its  realization  man  will  find  that  he  must 
not  only  avail  himself  of  his  own  most  strenuous 
endeavors,  but  also  of  the  power  that  transcends 
him. 


XI 

COMMUNAL   NATURE 

Lucretius  pictures  man  in  his  primitive  state  as  a 
naked  savage  dominated  by  animal  instincts,  desti- 
tute of  the  arts  of  civilized  life,  wandering  over  the 
earth  without  shelter,  or  finding  a  temporary  lodg- 
ing in  caves,  and  subsisting  on  berries,  nuts,  and  the 
uncooked  flesh  of  animals.  He  represents  him  as 
anti-social,  engaging  in  a  hand-to-hand  struggle 
with  his  fellows,  and  making  war  the  chief  business 
of  his  life.  Out  of  this  war  of  antagonistic  interests 
sociality  gradually  emerges ;  fire  is  discovered  and 
man  becomes  the  cooking  animal ;  clothing  and 
habitations  are  invented,  speech  is  developed,  and 
man  becomes  the  rational  animal  and  evolves  grad- 
ually the  varied  arts  and  complex  organisms  of 
civilized  life. 

The  Lucretian  model  has  served  for  a  whole 
school  of  modern  publicists,  of  whom  Hobbes  is  the 
chief,  who  represent  man  as  being,  in  a  state  of 
nature  preceding  the  birth  of  social  order,  a  purely 
individualistic,  anti-social,  and  warring  animal,  who 
in  pursuit  of  his  own  selfish  interests  is  in  a  state  of 
perpetual  conflict  with  his  fellow-mortals.     These 


156  BASAL    CONCEPTS   I^   PHILOSOPHY 

publicists  follow  Lucretius  in  representing  the 
g-erms  of  sociality  and  civic  order  as  springing  out 
of  these  anti-social  conditions,  and  as  being,  there- 
fore, a  kind  of  artificial  and  conventional  growth 
superinduced  upon  a  soil  that  is  primarily  alien  to 
them. 

Another  school,  of  which  Aristotle  is  the  first  and 
greatest  exponent,  takes  an  opposite  view,  rei^ resent- 
ing man  as  by  nature  a  jiolitical  animal,  containing 
in  his  nature  from  the  start  the  germs  of  sociality 
and  civic  order.  The  representatives  of  this  school 
do  not  deny  an  evolution  of  sociality  and  social 
forms.  They  in  fact  assert  it  as  a  cardinal  doctrine 
of  their  creed.  What  they  do  deny  is  that  the 
growth  can  be  regarded  as  in  any  sense  artificial  or 
conventional,  or  that  man  ever  existed  in  a  state  of 
pure  antagonistic  individualism.  They  maintain 
that  the  evolution  has  as  its  necessary  presupposi- 
tion a  rudimental  sociality,  and  that  the  social  life 
and  order  which  arise  are  normal  and  natural. 

Now,  there  is,  without  doubt,  a  large  measure  of 
truth  in  the  Lucretian  view.  For,  aside  from  the 
question  whether  or  not  man,  historically,  began 
his  career  as  a  naked  and  quarrelsome  savage,  it 
must  be  admitted  that  there  are  forces  in  man's 
nature  which  antagonize  the  social  order  and  which 
must  be  overcome,  therefore,  before  the  social  order 
can  be  established.  If  we  name  such  forces  indi- 
vidualism, it  follows  that  the  grounding  of  the  social 
order  will  involve  a  conflict  with  the  individual- 
istic forces,  and  that  the  development  which  ensues 


COMMUNAL   NATURE  157 

will  have  its  inception  in  a  condition  of  things  in 
which  the  individualistic  and  antisocial  forces  dom- 
inate. The  primal  condition  will  thus  be  one  that  is 
explicitly  and  overtly  a  state  of  warring-  individual- 
ities, hostile  to  social  organization. 

What  this  theory  overlooks  or  ignores,  is  the  pres- 
ence in  human  nature  of  implicit  but  real  social  in- 
stincts and  forces,  and  this  oversight  blinds  it  to 
the  real  nature  of  the  struggle  out  of  which  the 
social  order  arises,  which  is  not  a  mere  aimless  and 
fatalistic  onset  of  individualistic  forces,  but  rather  a 
duel  between  these  and  their  enemy,  the  developing 
energy  of  social  order.  The  deeper  intuition  of  the 
school  of  Aristotle  realizes  this  fact,  and  while 
admitting  the  warfare,  is  able  to  put  a  different  and 
more  rational  construction  upon  it.  Recognizing 
the  fact  that  social  and  civic  order  grows  out  of  a 
struggle  of  conflicting  forces,  they  see  in  this 
struggle  the  perpetual  effort  of  a  unitary  principle 
to  overcome  and  transform  the  forces  of  division 
and  disorder. 

All  theories  rest  on  the  common  presupposition  of 
an  underlying  human  nature.  Frog  nature,  or  in 
fact  the  most  gifted  animal  nature,  would  not  serve 
as  a  basis  for  the  structure  that  is  to  be  erected  upon 
it.  Lucretius  himself  recognizes  this  in  the  fact 
that  his  naked  savage  dominated  by  animal  instincts, 
is  a  very  different  type  of  animal  from  lions  or  tigers, 
who  also  have  their  unending  w^arfare,  but  out  of  it 
do  not  obtain  the  rich  result  which  falls  to  the 
lot  of  man.     Lucretius  and  Hobbes  in  truth  assume 


158  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN  PHILOSOPHY 

on  the  part  of  the  human  animal,  a  wealth  of  capacity 
which  belies  their  contention  that  his  rationality  and 
civic  and  social  life  have  emerged  out  of  conditions 
from  which  their  rudiments  were  absent.  For  why, 
under  the  stress  of  antagonism,  should  all  this  rich 
fruitage  come  if  all  the  parties  to  the  conflict  are 
purely  individualistic  forces  ?  The  answer  will  be, 
of  course,  that  man  is  a  creature  who  is  capable  of 
learning  the  lessons  of  exi^erience,  and  who,  seeing 
that  unrestricted  antagonism  defeats  the  end  he  has 
in  view,  therefore,  calls  a  halt  and  sets  up  a  tribunal 
for  the  regulation  of  his  lawless  tendencies. 

But  this  answer  contains  the  very  assumption  that 
destroys  it.  A  creature  that  is  capable  of  drawing 
such  lessons  from  experience  must  already  have  the 
germs  of  rationality  in  its  najbure,  and  in  the  lull  of 
passion  it  will  be  the  still  small  voice  of  reason  that 
will  be  heard  speaking  of  a  better  way.  If  we  assume 
that  man  in  his  original  nature  is  a  creature  of  purely 
selfish  and  individual  passions,  then  we  are  logically 
committed  to  the  conclusion  that  any  principle  of 
conduct  which  may  arise  out  of  such  a  soil  will  be 
selfish  and  individualistic  also.  Men  will,  there- 
fore, never  rise  above  selfish  individualism.  The  only 
escape  from  this  conclusion  open  to  the  advocate 
of  the  theory  in  question,  is  the  old  recourse  to  spon- 
taneous generation,  which,  to  use  Hume's  phrase,  can 
produce  anything  out  of  anything.  But  for  that  very 
reason  it  is  worthless. 

The  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  human  nature  has 
been  slandered  and  that  man  is  not  a  purely  selfish  in- 


COMMUNAL   NATURE  159 

dividualist,  but  has  in  liis  nature  a  geiTninating  sense 
of  justice,  which  is  the  root-principle  of  altruism  and 
social  and  civic  order.  Even  social  philosophers  of 
the  Aristotelian  school  have  not  always  apprehended 
all  the  implications  of  this  truth.  They  have  con- 
tented themselves,  as  a  rule,  with  i^ointing  to  the 
social  relations  as  the  soil  out  of  which  the  social 
institutions  have  sprung*.  But  they  have  overlooked 
the  fact  that  the  social  relations  presuppose  some- 
thing more  ultimate  than  themselves  ;  namely,  a  so- 
cial nature  or  consciousness  out  of  which  they  spring*. 
Otherwise  the  organic  sexual  instinct  would  not  lead 
to  the  family,  nor  Avould  there  jDroceed  from  this  the 
g-erms  of  the  community  and  the  state.  Underlying 
the  question  of  the  social  relations  is  the  more  fun- 
damental one,  as  to  what  kind  of  creature  the  bearer 
of  such  relations  must  be. 

It  is  evident  that  social  relations  cannot  rest  on 
the  presupposition  of  a  nature  endowed  only  with 
organic  instincts  and  individualistic  passions.  To 
assert  that  it  could,  would  be  to  enter  the  school  of 
Hobbes  by  the  back  door.  It  is  necessary,  in  order 
to  ground  solidly  an  adequate  politico-social  theory, 
to  postulate  a  communal  principle  or  force  in  man's 
nature  as  the  basis  of  his  social  and  civic  develop- 
ment. Such  a  principle  is  found,  we  think,  in  the 
idea  or  sense  of  justice. 

The  old  Greek  thinkers  of  the  Socratic  school  mani- 
fested not  only  a  sound  instinct  but  profound  in- 
sight in  the  place  they  assigned  to  Justice  in  their 
politico-social  speculations.     Socrates  regards  it  as 


160  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

fundamental  and  is  constantly  seeking-  its  definition. 
Plato  lays  it  at  the  foundation  of  his  Eepublic  as  the 
principle  of  all  communal  life.  Aristotle  gives  it  a 
central  place  in  his  political  theory,  and  defines  it  as 
a  principle  of  equality  in  the  distribution  both  of 
awards  and  possessions,  and  Aristotle's  definition 
has  been  the  basis  of  modern  conceptions  of  what  is 
equitable  and  right,  as  between  man  and  man. 

What  is  needed,  then,  is  an  analysis  of  the  idea  of 
justice  as  the  basis  of  communal  consciousness  and 
life.  The  first  step  in  this  analysis  will  be  found  in 
the  fact  that  the  conception  of  justice  as  a  principle 
of  distribution  is  not  its  ultimate  idea.  Underlying 
distribution  must  be  some  criterion  or  standard,  and 
this  the  definition  includes  in  the  term  equal. 
Equality  is  then  a  simpler  idea  than  Justice.  Now, 
equal  comes  originally  from  the  Greek  verb  eiW, 
which  means  primarily  to  be  like,  and  then  to  be 
fitting,  and  then  to  be  right,  seemly,  or  reasonable. 
Justice  is  from  J^i^,  which  means  primarily  that 
which  binds  or  constrains.  In  the  light  of  its  der- 
ivation, then,  justice  is  the  idea  of  equality  with 
the  idea  of  authority  attached  to  it. 

Terms  swing  loosely  on  their  etymologies,  but 
these  in  general  indicate  the  kind  of  reflection  out 
of  which  they  have  arisen.  It  is  clear  that  the  Greek 
root  ecKw  from  which  equal  is  derived  does  not  embody 
a  primary  reflection,  but  has  a  presupposition.  To 
be  like  presupposes  a  standard  of  likeness  and  the 
progress  of  the  reflection  from  likeness  to  fitness 
and  reasonableness  indicates  what  the  primary  pre- 


COMMUNAL   NATURE  161 

supposition  is.  It  is  simply  the  self  when  it  has  be- 
come conscious  of  itself  and  thus  realized  its  own 
independent  unitary  individuality.  We  saw  before 
that  this  is  the  iDoint  where  that  ethical  conscious- 
ness arises  which  reveals  man  to  himself  as  a  free 
moral  and  responsible  agent.  This  ethical  self  is  the 
presupposition  we  are  in  search  of.  The  reflection 
of  etKO)  is  founded  on  this  primary  reflection  which 
reveals  the  self  to  itself  as  a  free  ethical  individual. 

Now,  the  further  question  presses,  why  this  ethical 
self-reflection  should  go  beyond  itself  and  include 
other  individuals.  We  strike  here  the  root  of  the 
whole  matter.  If  we  revert  to  the  larimal  category 
of  being,  that  of  self-activity,  and  translate  this  ac- 
tivity into  will,  the  outcome  will  be  the  notion  of  a 
will  that  is  self-willing.  Now,  we  have  seen  that 
conscience  is  to  be  conceived  as  such  a  will.  But  a 
will  that  is  self-willing,  b^  virtue  of  that  fact  tran- 
scends particularity  and  hecomes  universal.  Con- 
science, as  we  have  also  seen,  is  the  principle  of  eth- 
ical individuality,  since  in  it  the  soul  rises  to  an 
assertion  of  its  free  personality.  The  conclusion 
follows  that  the  conscious  activity  in  which  man  as- 
serts his  own  ethical  personality,  is  the  activity 
which  also  asserts  itself  as  universal.  True  ethical 
personality  is  therefore  universal. 

Kant  had  an  intuition  of  this  truth  when  he  de- 
duced from  his  conception  of  the  moral  will  that  of 
the  universal  legislator  whose  dicta  are  binding  on 
all  rational  beings.  But  he  did  not  clearly  show 
the  connection  by  pointing  out  that  moral  will  and 
11 


162  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

universality  come  to  light  in  the  self-same  reflec- 
tion. Had  he  done  this  the  relation  of  his  moral 
principles  to  legislation  would  have  been  clearer. 

Returning  now  to  the  main  line  of  reflection,  we 
see  that  equality  is  grounded  in  this  self-assertion 
of  the  will  of  a  free  moral  personality  as  universally 
binding.  Justice  adds  to  this  idea  that  of  the  moral 
will  as  a  law-giver  whose  commands  are,  therefore, 
universally  binding  in  the  sphere  of  moral  person- 
ality. If  now  we  assume  that  man  is  the  bearer  of 
such  a  principle  as  this,  it  will  follow  that  when  he 
becomes  conscious  of  the  existence  of  other  beings, 
like  himself,  the  principle  of  justice  will  assert  it- 
self as  a  law  of  reciprocity  among  these  beings,  and 
each  will  feel  obliged,  just  in  proportion  as  he 
arrives  at  a  clear  conception  of  the  dignity  of  his 
own  j)erson,  to  recognize  and  respect  a  correspond- 
ing dignity  in  the  persons  of  others. 

It  is  only  necessary  to  conceive  a  being  endowed 
with  the  organic  instincts  and  selfish  passions  which 
the  Lucretians  picture,  as  also  having  in  his  nature 
the  germs  of  a  principle  of  justice  as  analyzed 
above,  call  it  sense  or  instinct  or  what  you  will,  in 
order  to  see  how  such  a  being  may  and  will  natural- 
ly and  normally  develop  a  communal  consciousness, 
and  out  of  it  the  elements  of  social  and  civic  order. 
For  in  the  inevitable  conflicts  and  antagonisms 
which  the  exercise  of  the  instincts  for  self-  and  race- 
conservation  will  engender,  the  sense  of  justice  will 
also  enter  as  a  moderating  force.  And  since  most 
of  the  conflicts  will  arise   in  connection  with  the 


COMMUNAL  NATURE  163 

share  each  one  is  to  have  of  the  goods  and  ills  of 
life,  justice  will  function  as  a  principle  of  distribu- 
tion. The  sense,  however  obscure,  that  the  personal- 
ity of  your  antagonist  is  as  sacred  as  your  own  will 
have  its  influence  on  your  treatment  of  him,  and  if 
you  have  succeeded  in  wresting  from  him  the  whole 
proceeds  of  his  day's  toil,  this  sense  will  operate  in 
your  bosom  as  an  evil  conscience  and  will  prompt 
you  to  make  an  equitable  restitution. 

Now,  what  we  assert  is  that  the  existence  of  the 
germ  of  this  ethical  principle  of  justice  in  the  nat- 
ure of  man  is  the  real  presupposition  of  the  Aris- 
totelian politico-social  theory.  It  supplies  what  w^e 
have  seen  is  the  great  need,  a  rational  foundation 
for  those  social  relations  which  the  theory  postu- 
lates as  the  basis  of  social  evolution.  And  it  is 
their  oversight  of  this  principle,  or  their  positive 
denial  of  its  necessity,  that  renders  the  opposing 
theories  irrational  at  this  point.  In  order  to  ration- 
alize the  picture  of  Lucretius  and  Hobbes,  we  must 
endow  the  naked  and  militant  savage  not  alone  with 
organic  instincts  and  selfish  passions,  but  also  with 
the  germs  of  a  sense  of  justice.  There  will  be  hope 
then,  that  in  the  intervals  of  his  heated  conflicts  with 
his  fellows,  the  voice  of  reflection  will  be  heard  giv- 
ing him  some  dim  intuition  of  the  fact  that  his  an- 
tagonist is  his  neighbor,  to  whom  he  should  give 
the  same  measure  he  would  hope  to  have  meted  out 
to  himself. 

How,  then,  is  the  principle  of  justice  to  be  con- 
ceived in  its  adequacy  as  the  constitutive  force  of 


164  BASAL   COlSrCEPTS   IN  PHILOSOPHY 

tlie  communal  nature  ?  Tlie  elements  of  our  answer 
have  already  been  given.  The  principle  of  justice, 
when  translated  into  its  most  adequate  form,  is  sim- 
ply the  universal  ethic  will.  Its  norm  is  to  be  found 
in  the  individual  conscience,  which  is  the  conscious 
will  of  the  ethical  personality  in  man's  nature,  and 
we  have  only  to  conceive  conscience  as  comprehend- 
ing under  its  unitary  principle  all  individual  cen- 
tres of  moral  activity,  in  order  to  reach  an  adequate 
conception  of  the  nature  of  justice.  Justice  is  the 
voice  of  the  universal  ethic  will,  and  as  such  is  the 
immanent  principle  of  communal  activity  and  life. 

This  does  not  mean  that  sociality  deiDends  exclu- 
sively on  the  sense  of  justice  among  men.  Men  are 
brought  together  by  the  organic  instincts,  by  various 
relations  of  dependence.  No  man  can  live  to  him- 
self or  without  the  help  of  his  fellows.  But  all 
these  connections  are  consistent  with  selfish  indi- 
vidualism, and  on  the  assumption  that  they  are  the 
only  original  endowments  of  man's  nature,  there  is 
nothing  in  them  to  render  the  birth  of  real  altruism 
intelligible.  Altruism  is  not  a  system  of  relations, 
but  rather  a  spirit  in  which  relations  are  viewed. 
Why  should  not  the  sense  of  man's  dependence  on 
his  fellows  but  tend  to  foster  his  selfishness  and 
render  his  egoism  more  sensitive  and  exacting  ? 
Again,  sympathy  as  well  as  a  sense  of  a  certain  com- 
munity of  relations  are  social  forces.  But  sympa- 
thy, wherever  it  is  not  the  emotional  side  of  justice, 
is  a  blind  feeling  which  may  co-exist  with  the  gross- 
est selfishness,  while  selfishness  is  apt  to  be  blind 


COMMUNAL   NATURE  165 

to  the  community  of  interests,  and  when  it  does  real- 
ize them,  subordinates  them  not  to  any  genuine 
ethical  principle,  but  to  maxims  of  i^rudence. 

The  principle  of  justice  alone  supplies  the  "  hold- 
ing- turn  "  which  is  necessary  to  translate  all  the 
forces  and  relations  we  have  noted  into  terms  of 
sociality.  Under  the  moulding  influence  of  justice 
the  organic  instincts  are  modified  and  touched  with 
ethical  feeling,  while  antagonisms  are  softened  and 
conflicts  are  mediated.  In  its  light  the  solidarity  of 
interests  becomes  apparent,  and  conflicting  interests, 
where  they  remain  unmediated,  are  arbitrated  before 
a  higher  tribunal.  Under  its  transforming  touch 
sympathy  becomes  wide-eyed  love  and  regard  for 
human  kind,  while  the  selfish  passions  are  more  and 
more  restrained  within  the  bounds  of  moderation. 
Thus  the  foundations  of  social  and  civic  organization 
are  laid,  and  upon  these  man  through  his  checkered 
experience  is  able  to  build  the  fabric  of  his  com- 
munal life. 

The  principle  of  justice  as  the  ground  of  commu- 
nal nature  is  to  be  conceived  as  the  communal  con- 
science, and  therefore  as  an  ideal  will.  This  enables 
us  to  determine  the  real  form  of  the  dualism  that 
underlies  the  social  life  of  man.  The  terms  are,  on 
the  one  hand,  a  plexus  of  forces  which  are  either  anti- 
social and  disintegrating,  or  without  ethical  import. 
This  plexus,  when  viewed  in  the  abstract  as  unmodi- 
fied by  any  other  influences,  does  not  tend  to  lift  man 
above  the  level  of  egoism.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
principle  of  justice  functions  as  an  ideal  communal 


166  BASAL   CONCEPTS   11^   PHILOSOPHY 

will,  and  as  a  norm  of  social  organization.  Man  as 
swayed  by  the  unetliical  forces  is  an  egoist,  but  the 
ethical  forces  are  altruistic  and  tend  to  subordinate 
the  unethical  elements  of  his  nature  to  altruistic  laws. 
If  then  we  conceive  the  unethical  forces  as  constitut- 
ing an  egoistic  will,  and  the  ethical  as  constituting 
an  ideal  altruistic  will,  the  communal  dialectic  may 
be  represented  as  a  struggle  between  the  egoistic 
and  altruistic  wills  in  which  the  latter  makes  per- 
petually for  the  social  life  of  man.  The  conflict  is 
ever  waged  on  these  lines.  The  egoistic  will  ever 
tending  to  seliish  individualism,  while  the  effort  of 
the  altruistic  will  is  to  subordinate  egoism  to  the 
social  and  civic  order.  This  dualism  is  the  inner 
motive  of  social  development.  Subject  to  the  modi- 
fying influence  of  the  environment,  it  gives  rise  to 
existing  communal  organisms  in  any  given  time 
and  place.  Now,  the  determining  force  in  such  an 
organism  is  called  sovereign.  How  then  shall  the 
sovereign  power  of  a  community  be  construed  %  We 
may  regard  the  community  itself  as  rising  out  of 
unethical  grounds,  and  then  we  will  be  committed 
to  the  view  of  Hobbes  ;  namely,  that  sovereignty  is 
unethical,  and  therefore  arbitrary.  Or  we  may  con- 
ceive the  community  as  grounded  in  ethical  princi- 
ple, and  then  sovereignty  will  be  affected  by  moral 
quality.  The  whole  view  elaborated  above  is  con- 
sistent only  with  the  latter  supposition.  We  con- 
ceive the  community  to  be  an  ethical  individual 
whose  sovereignty  embodies  itself  in  a  communal 
will.      Will  is  not  arbitrary  unethical  force.      But 


COMMUT^AL   TTATURE  167 

wliere  there  is  will  there  is  also  conscience,  which,  as 
we  have  seen,  is  an  ideal  and  universal  will  that 
imposes  its  law  on  the  actual.  And  where  there 
is  conscience  there  is  a  consciousness  of  right  as 
well  as  a  consciousness  of  responsibility.  We  do 
not  mean  to  assert  that  the  individual  conscience  as 
such  dominates  or  should  dominate  the  community. 
But  the  same  ethical  norms  are  active  in  conscience 
whether  it  be  an  organ  of  the  individual  or  an  organ 
of  the  community.  The  communal  will  thus  stands 
related  to  a  communal  conscience  in  a  way  that  is 
analogous  to  the  relation  of  the  individual  will  to 
the  individual  conscience.  The  communal  will,  like 
that  of  the  individual,  may  act  capriciously  and  arbi- 
trarily. But  the  relation  of  the  individual  will  to 
conscience  imposes  upon  it  the  ideas  of  right  and 
responsibility.  In  like  manner  there  is  a  public 
conscience  which  contains  the  norms  of  communal 
right  and  responsibility.  The  public  conscience  like 
the  individual  is  an  ideal  will  founded  on  the  princi- 
ple of  justice.  It  arises  through  the  sphering  out 
of  the  individual  conscience  into  an  organ  of  the 
community.  The  communal  conscience  is  the  con- 
scious recognition  of  justice  as  the  norm  of  commu- 
nal right.  Thus  the  idea  of  Eight  arises  in  the 
social  sphere.  Communal  right  is  simply  justice, 
regarded  as  a  standard  or  law  of  action,  and  obliga- 
tion in  this  sphere  is  the  pressure  of  this  ideal  stan- 
dard on  the  will  of  the  community. 

It  cannot  be  said,  then,  with  truth,  that  the  com- 
munal sovereignty  is  unethical,  or,  on  the  contrary, 


168  BASAL   COT^CEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

that  it  is  the  basis  of  ethical  distinctions.  It  cannot 
be  said  that  it  creates  right  or  justice  in  the  ethical 
sense.  It  is  an  inversion  of  the  true  order  to  say 
that  any  thing  is  morally  right  or  just  because  it  has 
been  ordained  by  law.  It  is  legally  right,  of  course, 
but  that  is  tautology.  The  community  that  utters 
the  law  rises  upon  the  principle  of  justice.  This  is 
the  conscience  that  functions  in  it,  that  gives  it  the 
sense  of  right  and  responsibility,  and  that  infuses 
all  its  energy  with  ethical  quality. 

The  community  is  an  ethical  individual  endowed 
with  will  and  conscience.  Like  all  true  individ- 
uality, its  life  is  a  process  which  is  to  be  construed 
as  a  dialectic  struggle  between  an  actual  and  an 
ideal.  The  actual  is  the  plexus  of  forces  and  condi- 
tions which  determine  the  actual  energizing  will  of 
the  community.  The  ideal  is  that  sense  or  principle 
of  justice  which  functions  in  the  communal  con- 
science. The  progress  or  evolution  of  communal 
life  arises  from  the  perpetual  dialectic  between 
these  forces,  the  communal  individual  uttering  its 
will  under  the  i^ressure  of  the  communal  conscience, 
which  is  ever  striving  to  bring  it  into  harmony  with 
its  own  law.  The  progressive  outcome  is  the  uttered 
life  of  the  community,  its  body  of  laws  written  and 
unwritten,  its  civil  and  ecclesiastical  organisms,  its 
constitutions  and  forms  of  government. 

It  is  only  when  we  view  the  community  as  an  un- 
folding individual,  that  we  can  determine  its  true 
end  or  good.  The  immanent  end  of  individual  ac- 
tivity is  self-realization.      But  it  is  self-realization 


COMMUNAL   NATURE  169 

in  view  of  an  ideal  which  imposes  the  standard  of 
the  self  to  be  realized.  The  immanent  end  thus 
transcends  the  actual,  and  throngh  translation  into 
the  law  of  the  ideal  becomes  the  ideal  good  and  true 
good  of  the  individual  activity.  We  may  apply  this 
without  modification  to  the  community.  The  im- 
manent end  of  the  communal  individual  is  what  it  is 
realizing  in  its  progressive  life.  But  the  communal 
conscience  imposes  upon  its  activity  the  standard 
and  law  of  ideal  justice.  The  true  end  thus  trans- 
cends the  limits  of  actual  self-realization,  and  takes 
the  form  of  an  ideal  and  teleologic  good.  The 
good  of  communal  activity  is,  therefore,  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  ideal  communal  life.  What,  then,  is  this 
ideal  communal  life  ?  The  principle  of  justice  will 
here  be  our  true  guide.  That  principle,  as  we  saw, 
is  one  that  imposes  on  each  individual's  will  the 
obligation  to  regard  the  right  and  good  of  every 
other  individual  as  equal  to  his  own.  Justice  thus 
effects  an  equation  of  individual  wills,  and  thereby 
subordinates  them  to  a  common,  universal  standard. 
The  idea  of  the  community  is  that  of  an  organism  in 
which  individual  wills  are  subordinated  to  the  will 
of  the  whole,  and  the  ideal  community  is  one  in 
whose  will  the  principle  of  justice  is  completely 
triumphant. 

We  thus  reach  the  idea  of  an  organism  in  which 
justice  is  completely  dominant,  an  organism  in 
which  the  universal  right  comprehends  and  realizes 
all  individual  rights.  And  since  this  universal  right 
thus  conserves  the  true  individuality  of  the  members 


170  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  community  in  realizing"  its  own  liigliest  self, 
it  becomes  the  highest  good  of  the  community. 
For  it  is  an  ideal  good  of  the  whole  in  which  the 
ideal  good  of  all  the  parts  is  contained.  The  notion 
of  such  an  organism  is  an  ideal  that  is  never  com- 
IDletely  realized.  But  it  functions  in  every  commu- 
nal organization  as  its  conscience,  and  it  is  the 
guiding  light  of  all  true  political  philosophy  and 
statesmanship. 

The  rise  of  the  community  is  a  momentous  step 
in  the  evolution  of  the  free  spirit  of  man.  As  the 
old  Greeks  clearly  saw,  it  establishes  the  conditions 
in  which  alone  man's  highest  and  truest  activities 
can  be  realized.  The  community  is  an  ethical  indi- 
vidual and  has  its  roots  in  the  spiritual  principle 
which  underlies  the  world..  We  have  seen  how  this 
principle  embodies  itself  in  the  psychic  constitu- 
tion of  man,  and  lays  the  foundation  of  the  evolu- 
tion of  free  spiritual  life.  We  see  here  how  it 
achieves  a  further  embodiment  in  a  communal  life 
of  humanity,  an  embodiment  whose  ideal  is  the 
realization  of  spiritual  activity  in  its  highest  and 
freest  form.  It  is  as  an  organ  of  the  communal  con- 
sciousness and  as  an  intelligent  member  of  a  com- 
munal organism  that  man  reaches  the  highest  devel- 
opment possible  to  him  in  this  world,  and  in  losing 
his  life  in  the  common  life  of  humanity  finds  it 
again  in  a  higher  and  nobler  form. 


xn 

HISTORY 

The  idea  of  communal  nature  mediates  that  of 
Humanity  in  that  it  supplies  the  sphere  in  which 
the  common  life  of  man  is  unfolded.  The  motive 
which  leads  the  individual  consciousness  to  sphere 
out  into  a  universal  life  is  practical,  springing  from 
the  activity  of  the  ideal  principle  of  justice.  When 
through  ethic  principles,  hovv^ever,  man  has  achieved 
the  basis  of  a  common  life,  this  gives  opportunity, 
as  we  have  seen,  for  a  freer  and  larger  exercise  of 
his  spiritual  activities,  and  his  whole  rich  nature 
pours  the  fruits  of  its  energies  into  the  common  lap. 
The  idea  of  humanity  is  that  of  a  common  life  in 
v/hich  the  potencies  of  individual  lives  are  realized. 

This  idea  may  be  conceived  either  statically  or 
dynamically,  and  two  branches  of  humanistic  sci- 
ence will  thus  arise  which  may  be  styled  resx)ective- 
ly,  Anthropostatic  and  Anthropodynamic.  These 
will  have  the  same  content,  the  outj^ut  of  the 
human  spirit  energizing  in  the  communal  sphere ; 
but  anthropostatics  will  treat  this  output  under  the 
category  of  work  done,  as  the  achieved  product  of 
the  psychic  activities  ;  while  anthropodynamics  v*  ill 


172  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN  PHILOSOPHY 

proceed  under  the  category  of  active  energy  to  in- 
vestigate the  processes  in  and  through  which  the 
results  are  obtained. 

The  idea  of  anthropostatics  is  that  of  culture,  a 
term  that  is  used  here  as  identical  with  civilization, 
and  stands  for  the  whole  achieved  product  of  man's 
activities  in  any  great  age  and  place.  It  will  include 
Science,  Art,  Religion,  and  Social  Organization. 
The  idea  of  anthropodynamics  is  that  of  History. 
History  is  culture  conceived  in  the  making,  and 
therefore  under  the  categories  of  force  and  energy. 
History  deals  with  the  common  life  as  a  sphere 
of  becoming  which  expresses  itself  in  an  evolving 
series.  It  treats  science,  art,  religion,  and  the  social 
organism,  therefore,  not  as  products,  but  under  the 
category  of  development.  -  The  idea  of  liistory  sug- 
gests its  fundamental  problems,  which  are,  (1)  the 
nature  of  the  historic  series,  (2)  the  conditions  of  his- 
toric progress,  and,  (3)  the  laws  of  historic  progress. 

History  deals  with  a  series.  The  life  of  humanity 
embodies  itself  in  a  succession  of  manifestations. 
This  succession  is  a  conditional  one.  Not  only  does 
it  represent  a  temporal  order,  but  also  a  dynamic 
and  causal  order.  If  we  look  at  it  externally  it  pre- 
sents the  unbroken  appearance  of  a  flowing  stream. 
"When  we  penetrate  deeper  we  discover  that  the 
stream  is  subject  to  the  law  of  conditions,  that  each 
phase  of  its  manifestation  is  traceable  to  its  causal 
antecedents.  And  when  we  cast  our  glance  forward 
the  phenomenon  presented  is  that  of  evolution.  The 
life  of  humanity  is  a  procession,  a  becoming,  in 


HISTORY  173 

which  every  stage  is  found  to  rise  out  of  some 
series  of  conditions  that  precedes  it. 

The  most  obvious  view  that  we  can  take  of  the 
historical  movement  is,  therefore,  a  mechanical  one. 
The  categories  of  the  cosmic  series  may  be  applied 
without  modification  to  the  historic  series,  and  every- 
thing may  be  conceived  as  springing  out  of  antece- 
dent conditions  by  a  species  of  invincible  mechanical 
necessity.  This  view  leads,  therefore,  to  a  kind  of 
fatalism  which  eliminates  freedom  from  the  life  of 
humanity,  and  with  it  the  larger  part  of  its  ethical 
significance.  History,  from  this  point  of  view,  is 
simply  a  species  of  statistic  gathering  for  which  a 
strict  mathematical  calculus  is  all  that  is  needed  in 
order  to  deduce  the  past  and  work  out  infallible  pre- 
dictions for  the  future. 

Now,  fatalism  would  be  true  if  nothing  had  been 
overlooked  in  the  inventory.  But  there  has  been 
an  important  oversight.  It  is  true  that  if  we  cut  the 
plexus  of  historic  tissues  transversely  at  any  point, 
we  will  find  that  its  strands  are  continuous,  and  this 
may  seem  to  demonstrate  the  fatalistic  conclusion. 
But  it  is  forgotten  or  denied  that  what  has  been  cut 
at  the  centre  is  the  quivering  heart  of  humanity  it- 
self. And  this  quivering  heart  is  the  self-active 
spirit  of  man  himself.  If  we  eliminate  the  self- 
active  human  spirit  from  the  problem,  we  have  left 
a  corpse  and  not  a  living  organism.  If,  however, 
we  count  the  self-active  spirit  as  one  of  the  factors, 
then  our  evolution  is  secured,  but  it  has  lost  its  fatal- 
istic aspect ;  for  a  series  of  manifestations  which  has 


174  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

at  its  heart  the  pulsatory  movement  of  a  self-active 
spirit,  may  in  the  order  of  its  outward  manifestation 
obey  the  law  of  mechanical  necessity,  but  its  inner 
spring-  will  be  a  fountain  of  free  activity. 

The  question  here  is  not  one  of  fact,  but  rather  of 
interpretation.  The  fact  is  a  humanistic  world- 
series  that  realizes  the  phases  of  an  evolution.  The 
problem  is  how  this  evolution  is  to  be  construed  ? 
"We  have  seen,  in  treating-  of  other  aspects  of  the 
world-series,  that  evolution  is  unintelligible  and 
irrational,  if  we  do  not  ground  it  in  a  spiritual 
X)rinciple.  From  this  point  of  view,  mechanism, 
and  in  particular  mechanical  evolution,  is  to  be 
conceived  as  a  form  of  energizing  which  presup- 
poses, but  does  not  contain,  the  self-activity  of  the 
spiritual  principle.  To  characterize  the  humanistic 
series  as  mechanical,  would,  therefore,  be  to  place  it 
on  a  level  with  the  cosmic  series,  and  to  affirm  that 
while  it  presupposes,  it  does  not  contain,  the  spir- 
itual principle. 

But  such  a  view  is  not  tenable.  We  have  seen 
how  in  the  psychic  stage  of  the  world-evolution,  the 
self-activity  of  spirit  enters  into  the  series  as  its  cen- 
tral category,  so  that  the  x^henomena  of  the  psychic 
series  are  not  open  to  purely  mechanical  construc- 
tion. Now,  the  psychic  series  simply  spheres  out 
into  the  humanistic  world-series,  at  the  heart  of 
which,  therefore,  functions  the  spiritual  energy  of 
the  psychic  nature.  The  humanistic  world-series  is 
no  more  open,  then,  to  the  purely  mechanical  con- 
struction than  is  the  individual  psychic  series,  for 


HISTORY  175 

it  contains  in  it  as  its  central  category  the  principle 
of  spiritual  activity.  And  where  there  is  spiritual 
self-activity,  there  also  is  the  i3rinciple  of  free  activ- 
ity. Freedom  thus  enters  into  the  series,  and  func- 
tions at  the  heart  of  the  mechanical  conditions  as  a 
force  which  transcends  mechanism  and  lifts  the 
whole  historic  process  above  the  plane  of  the  purely 
mechanical. 

In  order  to  discover  the  conditions  of  historic 
progress  it  is  necessary,  first,  to  realize  the  problem 
to  be  solved.  This  is  not  purely  spiritual  or  purely 
mechanical,  but  rather  mechanico-spiritual.  It  is 
the  problem  of  the  development  of  a  spiritual  ac- 
tivity under  mechanical  categories  and  conditions. 
The  elements  to  be  taken  into  account  w^ill  be,  (1) 
the  historic  series  itself,  which  may  be  analyzed 
into  two  parts,  the  inner  activity  of  the  spiritual 
principle  and  the  form  of  mechanism  or  outer  ne- 
cessity which  this  activity  assumes  ;  (2)  the  external 
and  limiting  conditions  of  the  series  as  a  whole. 

Now,  the  central  element  of  the  series  which  de- 
termines its  essential  character,  is  the  spiritual 
energy  that  works  at  its  heart.  This  spiritual  en- 
ergy we  have  already  treated  in  the  chapters  on 
Psychic  and  Communal  nature,  and  have  reached 
the  conception  of  it  as  a  self-active  principle  whose 
movement  or  dialectic  is  to  be  construed  as  an 
evolution  out  of  potentiality  into  actuality.  It  is 
this  immanent  dialectic  which  constitutes  the  inner 
motive  of  the  evolution,  and  also  determines  it  as 
spiritual  in  its  character.      But  as  we  have  seen,  the 


176  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

order  of  development  in  a  world  of  becoming  is 
from  mechanism  to  spirit.  Spiritual  activities  must 
manifest  themselves  in  and  through  mechanical 
categories  and  conditions.  We  thus  have  the  me- 
chanical form  of  the  spiritual  manifestation  and  its 
principle  of  natural  necessity  which  determines  the 
dependence  of  its  parts. 

The  first  question  to  be  settled  is  that  of  the  rela- 
tion of  the  spiritual  activity  to  the  form  of  necessity 
in  which  it  manifests  itself.  Spiritual  activity  and 
freedom  are  identical,  as  we  have  seen,  and  the  rec- 
ognition of  spiritual  activity  at  the  heart  of  the 
historic  series  is  also  the  recognition  of  the  princi- 
ple of  freedom  at  its  heart.  Assuming  that  human- 
ity holds  the  principle  of  free  activity  in  its  bosom, 
the  question  is  whether  the  form  of  necessity  which 
mechanism  imposes  on  its  expression  leaves  man  in 
possession  of  any  actual  freedom.  This  seems  to 
admit  of  the  following  answer.  The  existence  of 
the  principle  of  free  activity  is  at  all  events  left  un- 
touched by  the  conditions  of  the  problem.  Man  has, 
therefore,  a  princi^ole  of  free  activity  in  his  nature. 
But  the  categories  and  laws  of  manifestation  in  this 
world  are  all  mechanical,  and  the  sphere  of  mani- 
festation is  dominated,  therefore,  by  necessity. 
Does  this  effectually  block  freedom,  or  is  it  possible 
for  freedom  to  overcome  necessity  ? 

In  the  chapter  on  Morality  we  have  already 
pointed  out  the  dualism  to  which  this  antinomy 
between  freedom  and  necessity  gives  rise.  From 
the  moral  point  of  view,  the  spiritual  dialectic  takes 


HISTORY  177 

the  form  of  a  struggle  of  the  spiritual  principle  to 
overcome  mechanical  necessity,  and  bring  it  into 
harmony  with  its  law  of  freedom.  This  is  a  step 
toward  the  solution  of  the  present  difficultj^  We 
have  only  to  ascertain  how  freedom  can  overcome 
mechanism  in  order  to  make  the  solution  complete. 
Now,  we  may  concede  at  the  outset  that  freedom 
cannot  overcome  mechanism  by  suppressing  it.  Such 
is  not  the  mode  of  spiritual  progress.  But  it  may 
overcome  by  transformation.  The  law  of  the  series 
is  mechanical  causation  ;  that  is,  the  determination 
of  consequents  through  antecedent  conditions.  But 
choice,  as  we  have  seen,  is  self-determination,  the 
self  which  determines  being  the  empirical  self. 
Now,  if  we  suppose  that  this  empirical  self  is  the 
term  in  the  series  through  which  mechanical  ne- 
cessity maintains  its  grip  on  human  volition,  we 
have  only  to  conceive  that  free  self-activity,  in  the 
form  of  conscience  or  ideal  will,  is  able  to  modify 
the  empirical  self  in  such  a  way  that  its  determina- 
tions will  gradually  approximate  to  the  requirements 
of  the  ideal  law.  This  would  mean  the  triumph 
of  freedom  over  mechanism,  not  by  its  suppression, 
but  by  its  transformation,  so  that  while  maintaining 
the  integrity  of  its  form,  it  becomes  the  instrument 
of  a  free  sxiirit. 

The  j)ossibility  of  subordinating  mechanical  ne- 
cessity to  freedom  is  the  first  and  most  fundamental 
condition  of  historic  progress.  To  deny  this  is 
tantamount  to  denying  the  possibility  of  progress. 
The  remaining  conditions  are  important,  but  they 

12 


178  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

are  external.  The  closest  of  these  are  the  biologi- 
cal. The  spirit  of  man  animates  a  corporeal  organ- 
ism which  modifies  and  conditions  the  whole  form 
of  his  existence.  The  biological  series  includes  the 
psychological  and  is  itself  included  in  the  cosmic. 
The  cosmic  conditions  embrace  man's  whole  phys- 
ical environment  external  to  his  own  organism, 
such  as  climate,  soil,  food,  habitat. 

The  biologic  and  cosmic  conditions  are  to  be  in- 
cluded in  the  plexus  of  mechanical  forces  which 
enter  into  and  affect  the  destiny  of  man.  The  vari- 
ous degrees  in  which  this  influence  is  exerted  rela- 
tive to  the  strength  of  the  human  spirit,  have  doubt- 
less much  to  do  in  determining  race  differences  and 
the  distinctive  characteristics  of  different  tribes  or 
nations.  Now,  we  may  accord  to  these  mechanical 
forces  and  agencies  the  full  measure  of  influence 
which  the  most  liberal  construction  of  facts  may 
call  for,  without  thereby  establishing  any  valid  plea 
for  fatalistic  necessity.  Fatalism  rests  on  the  pre- 
suppositions of  the  pure  passivity  of  the  human 
spirit  and  the  absolute  inflexibility  of  mechanical 
conditions.  Both  presuppositions  are  false,  for,  in 
the  first  place,  we  have  seen  that  the  very  idea  of 
spirit  involves  activity  of  the  highest  form.  The 
soul  of  man,  which  is  a  developing  spiritual  activity, 
cannot  in  its  nature  be  a  mere  sufferer  from  the 
mechanical  forces,  but  must  react  upon  them  and 
modify  them  as  they  modify  it.  In  the  second 
place,  mechanism  is  not  inflexible.  It  is  itself  a 
modified  function  of  a  spiritual  principle  and  is  to 


HISTORY  179 

be  conceived,  therefore,  as  holding  an  inner  fluency 
within  its  inflexible  outer  form.  The  world-process, 
as  we  have  seen,  is  an  evolution  in  which  an  inner 
force  passes  throug'h  mechanism  to  higher  forms  of 
activity.  The  temper  of  mechanism  is,  therefore, 
flexible  and  may  be  moulded  into  a  variety  of 
shapes. 

Without  its  presuppositions  fatalism  falls  to  the 
ground,  and  the  conception  of  necessity  that  re- 
mains is  one  which  identifies  it  with  mechanical 
causation  or  the  iDrinciple  that  connects  phenomena 
with  conditions  out  of  which  they  arise,  and  thus 
maintains  the  continuity  of  the  series.  But  this 
principle,  as  we  have  seen,  only  limits  the  freedom 
of  spirit  in  this  sense  that  it  determines  the  form  of 
spiritual  manifestation.  Mechanism  and  spirit  are 
not  completely  antithetic  terms.  They  rather  make 
up  a  complemental  dualism  which  expresses  the 
potential  and  actual,  the  outer  and  inner  of  reality. 

The  above  conception  of  the  conditions  of  man's 
life  enables  us  to  see  how  the  gradual  evolution  in 
and  through  them  of  a  spiritual  type  of  being  is 
possible.  If  the  spiritual  principle  in  man  is  active 
it  will  react  upon  the  mechanism  which  environs  it, 
and  if  this  mechanism  is  flexible,  then  it  will  be 
modified  and  the  conditions  of  progress  will  be 
established.  Not  only  so,  but  that  very  principle  of 
continuity  which  enables  mechanism  to  impose  a 
limit  upon  spiritual  activity  is  an  instrument  which 
spirit  turns  to  its  own  use.  For  if,  through  it,  mech- 
anism loads  its  dice  and  predetermines  results,  it 


180  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

is  always  possible  that  the  weights  may  be  spir- 
itual and  that  the  outcome  may  be  spiritual  advance. 
The  only  inflexible  strand  in  mechanical  causation 
is  that  which  binds  every  part  of  the  series  fast 
to  the  car  of  some  antecedent.  It  demands  that 
in  this  antecedent  shall  be  found  the  determinants 
of  what  follows.  But  it  gives  no  insight  into  the 
nature  of  these  determinants.  They  may  be  me- 
chanical agents  or  they  may  be  a  spiritual  activity. 
In  the  psychic  series  the  antecedent  of  choice  is  the 
empirical  self,  that  is,  the  self  with  all  the  modifica- 
tions it  has  inherited  and  acquired  through  its  own 
experience.  But  we  have  seen  how  this  empirical 
self  is  open  to  the  constant  modifying  influence  of 
an  ideal  spiritual  force  which  is  ever  active  in  the 
human  consciousness,  and  how,  upon  this  activity 
of  the  ideal  the  possibility  of  an  approximation  of 
the  empirical  self  to  the  ideal  standard  is  grounded. 

In  the  psychic  series  the  antecedent  is  a  fluent 
term  and  may  be  spiritually  modified,  and  we  have 
only  to  recognize  the  same  essential  conditions  as 
affecting  the  life  of  humanity  in  order  to  see  hoAV 
the  antecedent  in  the  historic  series,  which  is  some- 
thing analogous  to  the  empirical  self  of  the  psycLic 
series,  will  be  always  open  to  the  modifying  influ- 
ence of  that  ideal  spiritual  activity  which  is  ever 
energizing  in  the  conscious  experience  of  man. 
The  principle  of  mechanical  continuity  may  thus  be 
made  subservient  to  the  development  of  spiritual 
freedom. 

The  great  obstacle  in  the  way  of  recognizing  this 


HISTORY  181 

is  a  false  idea  of  freedom.  The  only  absolute  free- 
dom is  that  of  a  self-active  spirit  which  has  all  the 
conditions  of  its  activity  within  itself.  That  is  to 
say,  the  only  absolutely  free  being  is  absolute 
spirit.  But  man  is  not  absolute  spirit.  He  is  a 
creature  endowed  with  a  spiritual  iDrinciple,  but  this 
principle  is  not  in  a  state  of  pure  actuality,  but  it  is 
rather  passing-  perpetually  from  potence  into  actu- 
ality. This  determines  man  as  a  developing  being 
who  has  a  history  in  time,  and  whose  life  is  subject 
to  mechanical  conditions.  The  freedom  of  such  a 
being  cannot  be  absolute,  but  must  be  that  which 
is  open  to  a  developing  creature.  At  the  centre  of 
man's  nature  is  a  spiritual  iDrinciple,  which  is  the 
potency  of  absolute  freedom.  Its  ideal  is,  therefore, 
absolute  freedom,  and  this  ideal  is  uttered  in  the 
voice  of  conscience.  But  the  ideal  stands  as  the 
goal  of  an  infinite  progress  through  mechanical 
conditions  which  modify  the  spiritual  activity  in 
the  following  manner. 

Choice  is  self-determination,  and  if  all  the  condi- 
tions of  it  were  immanent  to  the  self-activity  that 
chooses,  then  absolute  freedom  would  be  realized. 
But  some  of  the  conditions  of  man's  self-determina- 
tion are  external  to  his  self-activity  and  enter  into  it, 
therefore,  as  modifying  elements.  Now,  the  empiri- 
cal self  that  determines  in  choice  is  the  self-activity 
thus  modified.  And  since  it  is  a  modified  self  that 
determines,  it  will  be  a  modified  self  that  is  deter- 
mined. The  form  of  absolute  freedom ;  that  is,  self- 
determination,  will  be  maintained  in  this  activity, 


182  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

but  the  activity  itself  will  be  one  that  is  modified  by 
external  and  mechanical  conditions.  The  freedom 
that  is  realized  in  such  an  activity  will  not  be  an  ab- 
solute freedom,  but  one  that  is  modified  in  various 
degrees  by  the  mechanical  conditions  to  which  the 
spiritual  activity  is  subject. 

It  is  clear  that  the  extent  to  which  the  mechanical 
conditions  are  able  to  modify  the  spiritual  activity 
and  bring  it  down  from  the  plane  of  absolute  free- 
dom, will  depend  on  the  state  of  development  of  this 
spiritual  activity  itself,  and  that  it  will  vary  with 
this  development.  And  here  comes  in  the  function 
of  the  ideal  through  which  the  law  of  perfect  free- 
dom is  kept  perpetually  before  the  spirit  of  man, 
quickening  it  ever  into  higher  stages  of  activity,  and 
thus  xDenetrating  and  modifying  that  mass  which  we 
call  the  empirical  self.  The  presence  of  an  ideal  of 
freedom  in  the  human  consciousness  as  the  goal  of 
spiritual  activity  thus  makes  the  achievement  of  a 
relative  and  modified  freedom  possible.  For,  while 
man  has  a  spiritual  principle  in  his  nature  which 
sets  before  him  an  ideal  freedom  as  the  law  of  his 
being,  he  is  a  developing  creature  and  the  law  of 
his  activity  must  be  a  law  of  becoming,  that  is,  a 
law  of  xDrogress.  His  relative  freedom,  the  only 
freedom  that  is  open  to  him,  is  achieved  in  an  in- 
finite and  perpetual  progress  toward  the  realization 
of  a  spiritual  ideal. 

It  is  on  the  negative  side  of  the  problem  that  we 
hit  upon  the  only  real  element  of  fatalism  with  which 
the  destiny  of  man  is  affected.     So  long  as  we  deal 


HISTORY  188 

with  positive  principles  and  forces,  we  are  in  the 
sphere  of  progress,  growth,  and  development.  But 
there  is  a  negative  side  to  human  life  as  well  as  to 
the  world  in  general.  We  have  seen  in  the  chapter 
on  Non-Being  and  Evil,  that  evil  is  a  kind  of  eccen- 
tricity or  aberration  which  arises  out  of  negative 
grounds.  These  negative  grounds  are  inevitable  to 
creature  existence  and  may  be  traced  to  one  primal 
root,  the  absence  from  the  creature  of  the  principle 
of  self -existence  and  its  primal  dependence,  therefore, 
upon  another.  If  we  ask  for  the  primal  ground  of 
the  world  we  are  led  out  of  the  world  to  its  transcen- 
dent source.  This  negative  quality  of  the  creature 
constitutes  its  dependence,  and  out  of  its  dependence 
springs  its  mutability  and  liability  to  aberration. 
It  is  true  that  the  creative  energy  expresses  itself  in 
a  spiritual  potence  in  the  world  as  the  immanent 
IDrinciple  of  its  development.  But  the  immediate 
presupposition  of  this  potence  is  the  self-activity  of 
absolute  Spirit.  It  would  otherwise  be  an  abstrac- 
tion. Now,  when  we  represent  this  potentiality  as 
gradually  passing  into  actuality  in  the  world-series, 
and  as  finally  becoming  the  norm  of  conscious  spirit- 
ual life  in  the  soul  of  man,  we  do  not  in  reality  bring 
in  a  mediatory  principle  between  the  Creator  and 
the  world,  but  we  rather  indicate  the  mode  in  which 
absolute  self-activity  can  be  conceived  as  becoming 
the  creative  energy  of  an  imperfect  and  dependent 
world.  The  world  could  not  be  the  immediate  phe- 
nomenon of  the  Absolute  without  being  absolute 
itself.      But    as  the  gradual    product  of    absolute 


184  BASAL    CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

energy  conceived  as  going-  out  into  the  negative 
sphere  in  the  form  of  spiritual  potence,  the  rise  of  a 
real  world  which  is  yet  absolutely  dependent  on  a 
transcendent  ground  becomes  intelligible. 

If  now  we  suppose  the  world-series  to  become  self- 
conscious  at  any  point,  as  it  does  in  the  soul  of  man, 
we  can  well  understand  that  its  consciousness  will 
not  be  that  of  the  Absolute,  but  rather  a  creature  con- 
sciousness which,  through  the  same  process  by  which 
it  becomes  conscious  of  itself,  will  also  arrive  at  the 
consciousness  of  the  absolute  ground  on  which  it 
depends.  Some  such  reflection  as  this  must  have 
been  in  the  mind  of  Descartes  when  he  affirmed  a 
necessary  connection  between  man's  idea  of  himself 
and  his  idea  of  God,  and  further  conceived  the  idea 
of  God  to  be  the  presupposition  of  man's  self-con- 
sciousness. Descartes  must  have  felt  dimly  what 
may  be  apprehended  more  clearly;  namely,  that 
what  we  have  called  the  ideal  self  in  man  or  the 
psychic  logos,  is  the  immediate  organ  of  man's 
intuition  or  intimation  of  the  Absolute  whom  his 
spirit  calls  Father.  And  since  this  ideal  self  con- 
tains the  norms  of  our  conceptions  of  absolute  good- 
ness, beauty,  and  truth,  the  spontaneous  synthesis  in 
which  our  consciousness  binds  these  with  the  idea 
of  God  and  represents  God  as  the  ideal  good  of 
man,  is  the  true  voice  of  a  profound  reason. 

To  return  now  from  a  seeming  digression  :  We 
have  said  that  it  is  on  the  negative  side  of  the  prob- 
lem that  we  hit  upon  the  only  element  of  fatalism 
with  which  the  destiny  of  man  is  affected.     This  can 


HISTORY  185 

now  be  verified.  If  fatalism  enters  our  world  at  all, 
it  comes  in  through  the  door  of  evil.  "We  have  seen 
that  evil  is  aberration,  or  departure  of  any  creature 
from  its  normal  orbit  which  represents  its  good.  It 
is  only  when  the  creature  is  in  its  normal  i^osition, 
fulfilling"  the  true  law  of  its  being,  that  the  world  is 
friendly  to  it  and  x^resents  itself  as  a  sphere  of  order, 
law,  and  development.  If  it  wanders  from  its  true 
path,  the  forces  which  before  were  propitious  be- 
come hostile  and  do  it  harm.  What  was  before  a 
sphere  of  order  becomes  one  of  cross  purposes  and 
caprice.  To  the  wandering  planet  the  world  is  out 
of  joint  and  cosmos  has  been  turned  into  chaos. 
Evil  enters  as  an  active  force  into  the  destiny  of 
man  through  the  will.  The  normal  choice  of  the 
human  will  is  the  ideal  good,  and  the  normal  path- 
way of  its  orbit  is  toward  its  realization.  This  is 
true  however  we  may  conceive  the  ideal  good, 
whether  as  an  ideal  spiritual  self  or  as  God.  Evil 
enters  into  the  life  of  such  a  being  when  it  departs 
from  its  true  orbit  and  chooses  some  other  guide  than 
the  law  of  conscience  which  is  the  law  of  the  ideal,  or 
when,  in  the  extreme  case,  it  says  to  evil  "  be  thou 
my  good."  The  soul  that  thus  chooses  has  wrenched 
itself  from  its  true  orbit  and  become  a  wanderer  in 
the  moral  universe.  The  forces  which  made  for 
good  when  it  was  in  its  true  plane,  now  make  for 
evil.  The  vision  of  the  soul  becomes  distorted  and 
it  can  no  longer  see  truth  or  beauty.  Its  will  hav- 
ing lost  its  ideal  guide,  yields  itself  to  i^assion  and 
caprice.     The  stars  seem  to  fight  against  it,  and  it 


186  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

gradually  sinks  into  the  pit  of  darkness  and  "  jDri- 
mal  eldest  chaos." 

If  we  generalize  this  rei^resentation  we  will  reach 
the  idea  of  evil  as  a  negative  factor  in  human  prog- 
ress. The  ills  of  humanity  do  not  all  spring  from 
normal  causes.  The  worst  of  them  are  the  fruits  of 
an  abnormal  force.  Evil  enters  the  human  series 
as  a  deioravity  of  will,  it  leads  to  a  degradation  of 
character  and  type.  It  acts  as  a  disturbing  factor, 
creating  disorder,  strife,  warfare  and  devastation. 
It  is  the  principle  of  hate  instead  of  love,  of  chaos 
instead  of  cosmos,  of  stagnation  instead  of  healthful 
activity,  of  dissolution  instead  of  development,  of 
death  instead  of  life. 

We  have  now  reached  a  point  from  which  it  is 
possible  to  obtain  a  general  conce^Dtion  of  the  con- 
ditions of  historic  progress.  There  are  two  main 
factors  in  the  historic  stream,  one  positive,  the 
other  negative.  The  positive  factor  includes  all 
the  positive  forces,  spiritual  and  mechanical.  The 
negative  is  the  force  of  evil.  The  positive  forces  are 
conditions  of  development  and  determine  the  on- 
ward movements  of  the  race.  Central  among  these, 
functions  the  activity  of  the  human  spirit.  But  this 
spiritual  activity,  as  we  saw,  is  conditioned  and  modi- 
fied in  various  modes  and  degrees  by  the  mechan- 
ical forces  which  surround  and  affect  it.  These  forces 
themselves  are  not,  however,  inflexible  and  fatalistic 
in  their  nature  and  tendency,  but  are  fluent  and  flex- 
ible, and  while  determining  the  empirical  form  of 
the  spiritual  life  of  humanity,  are  open  to  the  modi- 


HISTORY  187 

iying  and  moulcling-  influences  of  spiritual  laws. 
The  result  of  the  synthesis  of  the  spiritual  and  me- 
chanical forces  is  the  possibility  of  a  movement  of 
spiritual  evolution  toward  an  ideal  which  may  be 
characterized  as  the  gradual  realization  of  human 
freedom. 

The  great  foe  to  this  movement  of  spiritual  evo- 
lution, as  we  have  seen,  is  evil,  which  having  its 
negative  grounds  in  non-being,  is  ever  tending  tow- 
ard non-being.  Evil  enters  the  humanistic  stream 
through  the  inlet  of  will.  It  is  a  capricious,  fatalis- 
tic force,  opposing  and  destroying  the  work  of  the 
positive  principles,  and  acting  ever  as  a  disintegra- 
tive, dissolutive  agent.  The  principle  of  evil  is  the 
motive  force  of  disturbance,  disorder,  anarchy  and 
chaos.  It  is  the  one  irreconcilable  foe  of  freedom, 
the  one  baleful,  demoniac  spirit  which  ever  dogs  the 
footsteps  of  life  with  the  shadow  of  death. 

The  laws  of  historic  progress  are  to  be  determined 
in  view  of  the  nature  and  conditions  of  the  historic 
series.  We  do  not  mean  by  laws,  in  this  connection, 
the  particular  forces  which  enter  into  the  historic 
movement.  These  are  all  included  in  the  conditions 
of  the  movement.  By  law  is  here  meant  mode  or 
method,  and  when  we  seek  the  laws  of  the  historic 
movement  we  are  looking  for  the  categories  that 
will  adequately  represent  it  as  a  whole. 

Now,  it  is  possible  to  advance  two  radically  differ- 
ent theories  in  explanation  of  the  same  fact.  The 
historic  series  may  be  subsumed  under  either  the 
category   of  mechanical  causation  or  that  of  self- 


188  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

determining  will.  The  first  alternative  will  give 
rise  to  tlie  necessarian,  and  in  some  cases  fatalis- 
tic, theories  in  which  all  things  are  conceived  to 
be  strictly  predetermined  by  mechanical  conditions, 
and  no  place  is  left  for  freedom.  The  second  alter- 
native leads  to  the  denial  of  necessity  and  the  as- 
cription of  everything  to  a  self-determining  agent. 
Freedom,  therefore,  reigns  supreme  and  the  ten- 
dency is  to  ignore  the  claims  of  mechanism. 

But  we  have  seen  in  the  preceding  analysis  that 
no  such  short  and  easy  methods  are  possible.  The 
fact  we  have  to  deal  with  is  two-sided,  and  its  ex- 
planation is  one  which  must  in  some  way  effect  a 
synthesis  of  mechanism  and  freedom.  How  this  is 
to  be  done  may  be  suggested  by  the  insight  we 
have  already  obtained  into  the  nature  and  condi- 
tions of  the  historic  series.  In  the  light  of  all  the 
elements  that  enter  into  it,  the  whole  significance  of 
the  historic  movement  is  expressed  in  the  idea  of  a 
progressive  struggle  of  the  human  spirit  toward  the 
realization  of  ideal  freedom.  In  the  progress  itself 
consists  the  actual  freedom  that  is  open  to  a  devel- 
oping creature. 

Now,  if  we  confine  our  attention  to  the  positive 
factors,  the  fact  that  presents  itself  is  a  dialectic  in- 
teraction between  spiritual  and  mechanical  forces,  in 
which  progress  is  made  when  the  spiritual  forces 
are  able  to  dominate  and  modify  the  mechanical.  If 
we  suppose  this  to  be  uniformly  the  case  and  also 
assume  the  constancy  of  the  forces,  the  result  will 
be  a  straight-forward  and  gradual  process  of  spirit- 


HISTORY  189 

ual  evolution.  But  nowhere  does  such  a  movement 
appear,  and  this  because  neither  of  our  suppositions 
is  strictly  true.  In  the  history  of  the  race  it  is  not 
true  that  the  spiritual  forces  have  uniformly  domi- 
nated, or  that  the  interacting  forces  have  remained 
constant.  Given  a  particular  combination  of  me- 
chanical forces,  as  for  example  the  environment  of 
a  particular  nation  or  race,  and  it  may  be  assumed 
that  the  operation  of  these  will  be  fairly  uniform. 
But  the  spiritual  forces  show  a  disposition  to  ebb 
and  flow.  The  human  spirit  is  mysteriously  seized 
by  some  inspiration  and  the  force  of  its  energy 
sweeps  everything  before  it.  Again,  some  paralysis 
seems  to  fall  on  the  spirit  of  a  people,  and  there  fol- 
low an  atrophy  of  spiritual  activities  and  a  lapse  to 
a  lower  stratum  of  development. 

80  our  expectation  of  even-paced  jDrogress  is  dis- 
appointed, and  instead  we  find  a  dual  movement  in 
which  the  fruits  of  development  seem  to  be  ever  fall- 
ing into  the  jaws  of  dissolution.  The  truth  is,  the 
positive  forces  never  act  alone,  but  the  whole  drama 
has  its  negative  side.  There  is  in  the  world  a  ten- 
dency to  non-being  which  makes  it  necessary  for  the 
evolution  i3hilosopher  to  couple  with  his  category  of 
development  that  of  dissolution.  Progress  is  made 
through  the  triumph  of  integrative  over  disintegra- 
tive forces.  But  at  length  equilibrium  is  reached, 
a  period  of  stagnation  ensues,  and  then  the  destruc- 
tive forces  take  the  lead  in  the  race  and  the  whole 
labor  of  the  builders  is  gradually  undone.  This  is 
the    picture  in  the    sphere  of    mechanical  forces. 


190  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

Where  tlie  spiritual  forces  enter  the  fact  is  not  al- 
tered, but  it  requires  different  interpretation.  Upon 
the  mechanical  dialectic  which  still  goes  on  is  su- 
perimposed a  dialectic  of  spirit.  Mechanism  affects 
spirit  not  externally  but  through  spirit  itself.  All 
the  conditions,  positive  and  negative,  are  translated 
into  spiritual  effect  and  become  immanent  in  the 
spiritual  struggle. 

Thus  arises  a  law  of  duality  which  brings  the 
whole  movement  under  the  categories  of  develop- 
ment and  dissolution.  The  forces  of  growth  and 
organization  prevail  for  a  time  and  we  have  the 
phenomena  of  human  progress,  of  nations  develop- 
ing in  power  and  civilization,  of  races  moving  on  to 
a  splendid  destiny.  But  a  time  comes  Avhen  the 
forces  of  negation  which  Imve  been  held  in  solution 
assert  themselves,  paralysis  of  energy  ensues  and 
then  the  sinews  of  the  people's  strength  begin  to 
rot  under  the  corroding  influence  of  vice,  their  faith 
bov/s  to  scepticism,  the  rich  fabrics  which  they  have 
built  with  the  travail  of  their  spirit  dissolve  and, 
amid  the  ruins  of  the  once  fair  tenement  of  their 
spirit,  courage  fails  and  hope  sinks  into  the  night 
of  despair. 

The  world  thus  seems  to  be  a  monster  that  swal- 
lows up  all  its  own  children.  The  baleful  spell  of 
evil  and  negation  seems  to  have  destroyed  our  fair 
vision  of  a  humanity  rising  gradually  into  the  light 
of  freedom  and  thrown  the  shadow  of  fatalism  over 
the  whole  scene.  This  would  be  the  logical  conclu- 
sion were  not  a  higher  interpretation  of  the  human 


HISTORY  191 

story  iDossible,  which  enables  us  to  see  light  through 
the  darkness  and  to  bind  again  the  broken  threads 
of  continuity. 

The  true  method  of  history  can  be  best  appre- 
hended, we  think,  by  conceiving  the  origin  in  in- 
dividual form,  of  reservoirs  of  stored-up  spiritual 
energy  which  stand  at  the  beginning  of  each  new 
ex^och.  We  may  represent  a  new  increment  of  con- 
scious spiritual  force  as  being  generated  in  these 
reservoirs  and  as  supplying  the  living  inspiration 
of  a  new  culture.  The  new  movement  may  be  local, 
national,  or  racial ;  its  history  will  be  that  of  the 
struggle  of  a  new  ideal,  partial  as  it  ordinarily  is,  to 
transform  the  emj^irical  conditions  in  which  it  en- 
ergizes, into  new  and  higher  forms.  The  struggle 
will  under  normal  conditions  be  successful  until  the 
potential  of  the  primal  inspiration  has  been  ex- 
hausted. Then  the  forces  of  the  negative  will  begin 
to  dominate  and  a  movement  will  set  in  toward  dis- 
solution and  death. 

Now,  there  is  no  natural  reason  why  the  movement 
of  decay  should  not  end  in  dissolution  and  bring 
historic  evolution  to  a  close.  And  this  Avould  in- 
evitably happen,  we  think,  did  not  the  historic  in- 
dividual or  group,  in  which  the  new  order  is  ini- 
tiated, bear  a  peculiar  relation  to  the  old.  The  rise 
of  prophets  of  new  dispensations  is  coincident  with 
the  deep  decline  of  the  old.  When  the  destnictive 
forces  are  most  rampant  and  the  spiritual  world  in 
which  man  has  lived  crumbles  about  his  ears,  hoi:>e 
is  crushed  and  the  spiritual  consciousness  is  thrown 


192  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

back  violently  upon  itself.  It  is  tliis  violent  back- 
flow  of  spiritual  reaction  that  precedes  new  incarna- 
tions of  organizing  force  and  the  incoming  of  a  new 
and  higher  ideal  in  the  consciousness  of  some  his- 
toric individual.  There  appears  on  earth  then  a 
new  hero,  perhaps  a  new  martyr,  the  founder  of  a 
new  movement,  or  a  spiritual  regenerator  of  the 
order  that  is  dying  out. 

This  back- flow  of  the  spiritual  consciousness  upon 
itself,  caused  by  a  deep  sense  of  the  prevalence  of 
death  and  dissolution,  is  a  necessary  condition  of 
the  birth  of  new  spiritual  forces  and  ideals.  But  it 
alone  will  not  explain  the  result.  The  reactionary 
wave  is  one  of  despair  and  in  itself  will  produce  only 
the  skeptical  iDessimist  who  gives  up  the  struggle 
and  escapes  the  anguish  of  it  by  a  plunge  into  non- 
being,  or  the  stoic  who  stubbornly  resists  in  the  in- 
ner citadel  of  his  personality,  the  onset  of  despair 
and  when  his  dearest  hopes  are  dead  "  orders  his 
stout  heart  to  bear  it."  But  it  is  only  when  the 
back-flow  is  met  and  overcome  by  some  Divine  in- 
flow of  new  si3iritual  energy,  that  the  historic  indi- 
vidual is  born  and  the  stoic  is  transformed  into  the 
hero-martyr  of  a  new  dispensation. 

In  order,  then,  to  conceive  the  true  fortunes  of  the 
struggle  for  spiritual  freedom  in  human  history,  we 
must  modify  our  concept  of  fatalistic  evolution  and 
decay  by  this  idea  of  an  epochal  inflow  of  spiritual 
force  which  embodies  itself  in  the  consciousness  of 
some  historic  individual  or  group,  in  whom  it  be- 
comes the  living  energy  of  new  ideals  of  life  and 


HISTORY  193 

culture,  and  in  whom  also  it  stands  related  to  the 
dissolutive  stag-es  of  the  old  order,  checking  its  re- 
action of  spiritual  des^Dair  by  that  inflowing-  wave  of 
new  Divine  force  which  brings  to  light  new  spheres 
of  ideal  spiritual  life. 

This  intuition  enables  us  to  restore  the  broken 
threads  of  continuity  and  to  see  how  the  X3athway 
of  humanity  may  through  all  its  vicissitudes  be  up- 
ward toward  the  light.  But  it  contains  a  x^resuppo- 
sition  ;  namely,  the  inability  of  the  race  to  conserve 
its  own  development  and  its  dependence  on  some 
power  that  transcends  it  for  the  renovation  of  its 
springs  of  spiritual  energy.  For,  just  as  we  discov- 
ered in  the  sphere  of  the  individual  life,  the  neces- 
sary function  of  a  psychic  logos  which  at  the  same 
time  supplies  an  ideal  spiritual  force  to  its  devel- 
opment and  binds  it  in  a  living  bond  to  the  being 
that  transcends  it ;  so  here,  in  the  broader  sphere 
of  the  universal  life  of  humanity,  we  come  upon  the 
necessity  for  a  historic  logos  which  shall  at  the 
same  time  supply  the  race  with  its  advancing  spir- 
itual ideals  and  bind  it  with  an  indefectible  bond 
to  that  absolute  fountain  of  spiritual  energy  to  which 
it  owes  the  continuity  of  its  life. 

13 


XIII 

EELIGION 

Eeligion  is  the  highest  spiritual  outcome  of  the 
common  life  of  humanity.  Its  spring-  is  that  his- 
toric log-OS  in  which  there  is  a  functional  union  of 
man's  spiritual  nature  with  the  absolute  Spirit 
which  is  its  presupposition.  It  is  in  this  synthetic 
spring  that  religion  has  its  primal  source.  An  in- 
tuition of  this  fact  enables  us  to  understand,  as  we 
could  not  otherwise  do,  the  religious  phenomena  of 
the  race.  Man's  religious  consciousness,  even  in  its 
lowest  forms  and  whatever  be  the  circumstances  and 
conditions  of  its  rise,  holds  in  it  a  sense,  however 
vague,  of  some  power  that  transcends  it,  upon  which 
it  depends,  and  with  which  it  needs  to  be  at  peace. 
The  conscience  of  man,  instinctively  at  first  and  re- 
flectively afterward,  identifies  this  power  with  the 
source  of  its  own  ideal  life,  and  thus  the  object  of 
the  religious  consciousness  becomes  also  the  ideal 
of  supreme  good. 

Eeligion  thus  includes  the  ethic  springs  in  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  are  contained  the  norms  of  the 
social  and  civic  life  of  man.  And  this  explains,  we 
think,  the  universal  fact  that  all  social  and  civic  life 


RELIGIOIS-  195 

and  organization  are  historically  g-rounded  in  relig- 
ious soil.  For  religion  is  the  faith  by  which  the 
spirit  of  man  maintains  its  vital  connection  with  the 
transcendent  ground  of  its  existence  and  activity, 
and  this  faith,  however  rudimental  it  may  be,  con- 
stitutes the  medium  in  w^hich  man's  whole  life  is 
unified  and  developed. 

But  we  are  specially  interested  at  this  point,  not  so 
much  in  the  historic  aspect  of  religion  as  in  its  nat- 
ure and  the  grounds  on  which  it  rests.  The  idea  of 
religion  presupposes  certain  structural  conceptions 
treated  of  in  former  chapters  ;  namely,  the  ideas  of 
absolute  being,  the  world-process  as  related  to  its 
absolute  ground,  and  the  human  soul.  Without 
some  rational  notions  of  these  it  will  be  impossi- 
ble to  conceive  either  the  grounds  out  of  which  the 
religious  consciousness  arises  or  the  fundamental 
problems  it  has  to  solve. 

Religion  rests  on  a  dual  relation  of  distinction 
and  synthesis  between  the  human  soul  and  its  ab- 
solute ground.  This  connection  can  be  rendered 
intelligible  only  when  we  conceive  the  Absolute  as 
spirit,  that  is,  as  self-conscious  personal  being. 
This  absolute  Spirit,  energizing  in  the  outer  nega- 
tive sphere,  generates  the  world  which  is  to  be  con- 
ceived as  the  product  of  a  transcendent  spiritual 
cause  and  as  containing  the  potence  of  spiritual 
development  in  it  as  the  immanent  principle  of  its 
activity.  This  potence,  which  is  nothing  independ- 
ent of  the  Absolute,  represents  the  mode  in  which 
the  creative  force  generates  a  developing  and  de- 


196  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

pendent  sphere  of  reality.  It  actualizes  itself  in  tlie 
world-process,  passing  u]3  from  mechanism  to  spir- 
itual actuality,  which  it  first  achieves  in  the  soul  of 
man. 

The  human  soul  is  thus  the  highest  actualization 
of  the  spiritual  potence  that  is  immanent  in  the 
world.  But  the  human  soul  is  not  complete  actual- 
ity. In  it  the  unfolding  world-energy  has  become 
conscious,  and  it  is,  therefore,  a  being  that  is  ever 
passing  out  of  potence  into  actuality.  This  consti- 
tutes its  activity  a  ceaseless  evolution,  the  infinite 
good  of  which  is  completely  actualized  spirit. 

Ui3on  this  basis,  as  we  have  seen,  rises  the  soul's 
dual  consciousness  and  life.  Its  activity  is  a  dualistic 
dialectic,  a  passage  from  mechanism  to  spirit  and  in 
its  consciousness  exiDerieiice  is  a  species  of  dialectic 
between  an  empirically  limited  and  modified  self 
and  an  ideal  self  which  we  have  called  the  psychic 
logos.  This  logos  functions  as  a  spiritual  ideal 
which  contains  the  norms  of  perfection  and  im- 
poses its  ethical  law  upon  the  soul  as  its  uncondi- 
tional standard  of  duty.  We  have  seen,  also,  how 
this  psychic  logos  spheres  out  into  the  historic  lo- 
gos in  the  universal  life  of  humanity,  and  how  this 
historic  logos  becomes  the  special  organ  of  religion. 

In  order,  however,  to  determine  truly  the  nature 
and  grounds  of  religion,  there  is  a  special  factor 
which  must  be  taken  into  account,  and  that  is  the 
existence  of  evil.  We  have  in  another  place  endea- 
vored to  theorize  evil  as  a  factor  of  reality.  Here 
the  point  of  interest  is  its  bearing  on  the  conditions 


KELIGION  197 

witli  which  religion  has  to  deal.  This,  however,  is  a 
diffic-iilt  problem  w^hose  solution  involves  a  rational 
insig-ht  into  the  nature  of  the  relation  that  subsists 
between  the  soul  of  man  and  the  Absolute,  since  on 
our  conception  of  this  relation  hangs  our  whole 
theory  of  the  nature  of  evil.  Now,  in  the  light  of 
conceptions  already  achieved  we  are  led  to  view 
the  relation  as  being  necessarily  one  of  consciously 
distinct  individualities.  The  Absolute  can  be  con- 
ceived only  as  purus  actus  or  completely  actualized 
spirit,  and  its  consciousness  will  consequently  be 
that  of  comi^lete  and  self -realized  individuality, 
while  the  human  soul  is  ever  passing  from  potence 
to  actuality  in  the  stages  of  an  evolution,  and  its 
consciousness  is  that  of  an  imi:>erfect,  developing 
creature.  The  synthesis  is  the  function  of  the  lo- 
gos. This  is  one  of  the  hardest  points  in  religious 
philosophy ;  namel}^  to  realize  how  the  ideal  which 
imposes  its  law  upon  the  soul,  functions  also  as  the 
organ  of  religion.  It  is  necessary,  however,  to  mas- 
ter it  in  order  to  become  competent  to  deal  with  the 
most  vital  issues  of  religious  theory.  When  we  posit 
a  synthesis  between  the  human  soul  and  the  Abso- 
lute in  the  logos,  we  do  not  assert  the  ultimate 
identity  of  the  two.  There  is  an  identity  of  essence, 
since  both  are  spiritual  activities.  But  there  is  not 
identity  of  individuality,  of  consciousness,  or  of  per- 
sonality. The  individualities  are  distinct  in  that, 
while  both  are  unitary,  the  Absolute  is  self-compre- 
hended in  an  eternal  circle,  while  the  human  ego  is 
related  to  an  empirical  stream  which  it  is  ever  gath- 


198  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

ering  up  into  knots,  but  never  completely  comxDre- 
hending.  The  consciousnesses  and  personalities  are 
distinct  for  analogous  reasons,  because  in  man  they 
are  functions  of  imperfect,  developing  activities 
which  determine  their  distinctive  characteristics, 
while  the  consciousness  and  personality  of  the  Ab- 
solute are  absolute  and,  therefore,  incapable  of  de- 
velopment. 

The  synthesis  involved  must  then  mean  something 
other  than  identity.  It  is  a  common  experience  in 
imparting  instruction,  that  the  thoughts  which  are 
perfectly  comprehended  in  the  mind  of  the  master 
are  able  to  penetrate  the  consciousness  of  the  pupil, 
even  when  they  are  very  imperfectly  understood. 
In  such  case  they  are  only  seeds  planted,  which 
must  spring  up  and  ripen  before  they  are  capable 
of  becoming  in  the  mind  of  the  pupil  what  they 
are  in  that  of  the  master.  Now,  we  may  find  in  this 
experience  of  the  interaction  of  minds  a  key  to  the 
connection  between  the  Absolute  and  the  human 
soul,  in  the  logos.  It  is  possible  that  the  contents 
of  the  absolute  consciousness  may  enter  the  human 
consciousness  as  norms  of  a  perfection  which  it 
only  dimly  comprehends,  and  the  reasonableness  of 
this  supposition  is  borne  out  by  the  fact  that  man 
has  in  conscience  such  anticipations  of  a  perfection 
that  he  does  not  understand,  but  which  at  the  same 
time  presses  on  him  as  the  ideal  law  of  his  nature. 

We  conceive,  then,  that  in  the  consciousness  of  the 
ideal  self  or  psychic  logos,  there  is  such  a  synthesis 
of  the  Absolute  and  the  soul  of  man  as  enables  the 


RELIGION  199 

Absolute  to  communicate  its  own  thought  to  the  hu- 
man consciousness  as  the  norm  of  ideal  truth,  and  its 
own  will  or  volition  as  the  norm  or  law  of  an  ideal 
good.  We  conceive,  in  short,  the  existence  of  such 
a  synthesis  as  makes  the  inflow  of  the  Absolute's 
thought  and  energy  into  the  channels  of  human  spir- 
itual activity  not  only  iDossible  but  rational  and 
probable. 

The  result  we  obtain  from  this,  perhaps  over- 
subtle,  disquisition,  is  the  concei^t  of  the  human  soul 
as  a  being  distinct  in  its  conscious  individuality 
and  in  the  type  of  its  activity,  from  the  absolute 
Spirit,  while  it  is  yet,  through  its  logos-conscious- 
ness, in  close  and  effective  connection  with  it.  And 
this  brings  us  to  the  point  where  the  bearing  of 
evil  on  the  religious  problem  can  be  most  clearly 
seen.  If  the  individuality  of  the  soul  is  distinct 
from  that  of  the  Absolute,  then  the  will  of  the  soul 
is  also  distinct  and  it  has  the  power  of  individual 
choice.  But  we  have  seen  that  the  ideal  perfection 
of  the  soul  consists  in  thinking  what  the  Absolute 
thinks  and  willing  what  the  Absolute  wills.  The 
soul  has  a  distinct  will,  however,  and  may  use  it  to 
dethrone  the  Absolute  from  the  place  of  the  ideal 
and  to  put  some  inferior  and  creature  good  in  its 
place.  Thus  evil  will  originate  in  the  soul  and  aber- 
ration or  departure  from  its  normal  orbit  will  fol- 
low, with  all  the  consequences  which  have  been  de- 
tailed in  the  preceding  chapter. 

The  effect  of  this  fall  into  evil,  in  the  religious 
sphere,  will  be  twofold.     In  the  first  place,  it  will 


200  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

produce  within  the  soul  a  depravation  of  will  and 
a  consequent  corruption  of  the  whole  nature.  In 
the  dualistic  strug-gle  between  the  positive  and 
negative  forces  of  good  and  evil,  the  negative 
will  gain  the  ascendancy  and  the  soul  will  set  out 
on  a  downward  road.  In  the  second  place,  it  will 
produce  what  we  may  call  a  typed  defection,  namely, 
a  fall  from  God.  The  distinction  between  the  soul 
and  its  absolute  ground  will  widen  into  a  breach  and 
the  difference  of  will  and  consciousness  will  become 
a  gulf  and  the  soul  will  become  possessed  with  a 
painful  sense  of  its  distance  and  alienation  from 
God.  Accompanying  this  sense  of  alienation  will  be 
a  deepening  experience  of  the  disturbance  of  the 
normal  emotional  relation  of  the  soul  to  God.  The 
sense  of  harmony  and  of  the  Divine  favor  will  be 
exchanged  for  a  growing  feeling  of  discordance  and 
a  deepening  sense  of  the  Divine  Avrath,  and  under 
the  weight  of  the  sense  of  its  own  fall  from  the  path 
of  the  ideal  and  its  own  consequent  demerit,  a  load 
of  conscious  guilt  will  begin  to  weigh  it  down,  until 
instead  of  a  joyful  bathing  of  the  soul  in  the  light 
of  God's  countenance,  there  will  be  a  fearful  look- 
ing for  of  Divine  judgment. 

The  primal  sense  of  religious  need  is  founded  in 
the  nature  of  man  as  an  imperfect  creature  whose 
progressive  life  must  consist  in  a  development  of 
his  spiritual  potencies  into  actuality.  AVe  have  seen 
in  the  last  chapter  that  humanity  has  not  the  power 
in  itself  to  conserve  its  own  development,  but  that 
the  springs  of  its  strength  are  in  the  Absolute.    Man 


RELIGION  201 

is,  therefore,  both  a  growing  and  a  dependent  creat- 
ure, and  out  of  this  springs  his  sense  and  his  need 
of  religion.  The  primal  function  of  religion,  there- 
fore, is  to  subserve  the  sxDiritual  evolution  of  man 
by  binding  his  soul  fast  to  the  absolute  source 
of  its  strength,  and  by  opening  it  to  the  inflow  of 
the  Divine  grace  through  the  channel  of  unifying 
love.  But  this  religious  need  is  intensified  and  made 
more  urgent  hy  evil.  The  moral  degradation  of  the 
soul  under  the  sense  of  its  fall  becomes  a  conviction 
of  sin,  and  the  feeling  of  guilt  and  the  consequent 
anticipation  of  the  Divine  wrath  are  all  experiences 
arising  from  the  soul's  aberration  from  the  normal 
of  its  true  orbit.  In  view  of  them  the  religious  need 
becomes  not  simply  spiritual  development  and  com- 
munion with  God  but  redemption,  regeneration,  re- 
storation from  a  fall,  atonement  and  pardon. 

Conceiving  the  need  of  religion  as  thus  intensified 
by  the  existence  of  evil  and  its  effects  in  the  spirit- 
ual world,  we  see  that  the  problem  of  religion  is 
profounder  than  that  of  simple  morality.  It  is  true 
that  religion  must  conserve  morality,  but  this  arises 
not  from  the  identity  of  religion  with  morality,  but 
from  the  fact  that  religion  includes  morality.  The 
moral  intuition  conceives  spiritual  renovation  and 
the  evolution  of  man  from  the  inner  standpoint  of 
conscience.  In  conscience  the  ideal  law  of  the 
soul's  higher  self  is  revealed  and  moral  progress 
consists  in  the  gradual  approximation  of  the  em- 
liirical  self  to  the  standard  of  the  ideal.  The  moral 
drama  is,  therefore,  the  inner  drama  of  conscience 


202  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

as  an  autonomous  force.  The  relig-ious  intuition 
goes  deeper.  It  sees  that  conscience  can  be  auton- 
omous only  so  far  as  the  Absolute  functions  in  it  and 
causes  it  to  think  the  divine  thoughts  and  utter  in 
its  legislation  the  divine  will.  Only  thus,  by  becom- 
ing the  voice  of  God,  does  conscience  become  the 
organ  of  an  ideal  law  and,  therefore,  autonomous. 
Eeligion  recognizes  the  fact  that  conscience  may  be- 
come perverted  by  turning  away  from  the  primal 
source  of  its  inspiration  and  becoming  either  self- 
willed  and  trusting  to  its  own  inner  light,  or  plac- 
ing some  inferior  and  creature  good  upon  the 
throne  of  the  ideal.  Eeligion  says,  therefore,  that 
the  primal  need  of  all,  which  underlies  the  moral, 
and  the  satisfaction  of  Avhich  is  the  precondition  of 
moral  good,  is  the  soul's  i*ecognition  of  its  depend- 
ence on  God  and  its  need  of  a  life  in  union  with 
his. 

Man  is  an  individual  with  a  conscience  and  a 
moral  ideal  to  realize.  He  is  also  a  type  of  being 
standing  in  relation  to  the  absolute  ground  of  his  ex- 
istence and  toward  which  the  normal  law  of  his  be- 
ing tends  in  an  upward  spiritual  progress.  He  has, 
therefore,  a  typal  destiny  before  him,  the  achieve- 
ment of  unity  with  the  divine  life.  In  view  of  the 
issues  evil  has  created  in  the  exx^erience  of  our  race, 
both  the  moral  and  typal  problems  have  become 
more  grave  and  more  urgent.  The  synthesis  of  re- 
ligion must  include  both.  It  must  conserve  moral 
renovation  and  development ;  it  must  also  conserve 
the  typal  need  by  leading  man  back  to  God  and 


RELIGIOT^  203 

keeping"  ever  alive  in  liim  tlie  consciousness  of  liis 
divine  relationship. 

The  conclusions  we  come  to  here  enable  us  to 
interpret  another  element  which  stands  central  in 
religious  experience  and  connects  it  with  the  pro- 
foundest  law  of  historic  i)rogress.  It  has  already 
appeared  that  humanity  is  not  able  to  conserve  its 
own  spiritual  evolution,  but  must  seek  the  springs  of 
its  i^ower  in  the  Absolute.  From  this  point  of  view 
the  energy  of  the  Absolute  must  be  conveyed  into  the 
channels  of  human  activity,  and  hence  arises  the  ne- 
cessity for  mediation.  Historic  progress  in  general, 
as  we  saw,  is  mediated  by  the  appearance  of  historic 
characters  and  groups,  through  whom  the  spiritual 
supply  is  introduced  from  the  Absolute  into  the  hu- 
man sphere.  These  historic  individuals  or  groups 
thus  serve  as  reservoirs  of  a  stored-up  siDiritual  energy 
which  gradually  permeates  the  mass  of  humanity  and 
constitutes  the  inspiration  of  a  new  national  devel- 
opment, or  it  may  be,  a  new  chapter  in  civilization. 
This  law  of  mediation  finds  its  most  important  and 
momentous  application  in  the  sphere  of  religion. 
The  profoundest  root  of  religion  is,  as  we  have  seen, 
the  synthesis  of  the  human  consciousness  with  the 
Divine  in  the  historic  logos,  and  out  of  this  root 
springs  also  the  deepest  issue  of  religion  ;  namel}^ 
the  typal  union  of  tbe  soul  with  God  as  the  primal 
condition  of  all  spiritual  and  moral  good. 

Since,  then,  religion  is  concerned  with  the  springs 
and  roots  of  all  spiritual  life  and  development,  it  is 
to  be  expected  that  this  spiritual  law  of  mediation 


204  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

will  have  its  most  momentous  application  in  the  re- 
ligious sphere.  Every  historic  personage  through 
whom  a  real  advance  is  made  in  human  progress  is 
a  mediator,  and  every  group  or  nation  which  adds  a 
chapter  to  the  spiritual  evolution  of  humanity  is  the 
bearer  of  an  inspiration  which  it  has  received  from 
a  higher  source.  But  the  mediator  may  not  be  con- 
scious of  his  mission.  The  historic  logos  may  use 
the  individual  or  the  nation  for  the  accomplishment 
of  a  purpose  which  the  agent  does  not  realize.  This 
has  been  finely  portrayed  by  Shakespeare  in  the  his- 
torical plays.  Julius  Cfcsar,  as  the  incarnation  of 
the  imperial  spirit,  rides  triumphantly  into  power 
over  the  ruins  of  the  Republic,  although  his  own  re- 
flection shows  little  other  motive  than  personal  am- 
bition. Again,  in  the  English  series,  Bolingbroke 
is  able  to  destroy  the  old  monarchy  and  introduce 
a  new  chapter  in  English  history,  because  he  is  the 
bearer  of  the  new  national  spirit,  although  he  shows 
little  consciousness  of  the  mission  he  is  realizing 
and  is  dominated,  in  the  main,  by  somewhat  paltry 
personal  aims.  The  historic  logos  employs  uncon- 
scions  and,  it  may  be,  hostile  instruments  to  accom- 
i:)lish  its  purposes,  and  history  will  be  studied  with- 
out discernment  if  the  wide  and  important  scope  of 
this  unwitting  mediational  function  be  not  recog- 
nized. For  there  is  a  true  sense  in  which  the  logos 
overrules  all  things,  and  even  the  wrath  of  wicked 
men  is  made  to  subserve  the  ends  of  good. 

But  the  religious  mediator  is  one  who  is  conscious 
of  his  spiritual  mission.     Whether  he  be  the  foun- 


RELIGION 


205 


cler  of  a  new  dispensatioii  or  a  prophet  and  reformer 
of  an  old  one,  he  must  feel  himself  to  be  the  mouth- 
piece and  organ  of  the  Supreme  Power.  He  must 
be  God's  man,  and  speak  and  act  as  he  is  moved  by 
the  Holy  Ghost.  He  may  be  mistaken  and  the  light 
that  is  in  him  may  be  mingled  with  darkness,  but  he 
must  always  be  the  conscious  organ  of  a  spiritual 
power  that  is  higher  than  himself.  Every  new  re- 
ligion and  every  great  reform,  or  revival  of  an  old 
religion,  is  mediated  by  such  a  historic  individual  or 
group,  and  the  new  spiritual  impulse  that  is  thus 
commiinicated  to  the  race  will  have  a  power  to  mould 
and  elevate  humanity  that  is  proportioned  to  the 
spiritual  purity  and  elevation  of  its  organ. 

The  mediation  effected  may,  however,  be  only  rel- 
ative and  incomplete.     The  historic  individual  may 
found  a  new  dispensation,  as  Mohammed  did,  with- 
out himself  claiming  divine  honors  or  becoming  an 
object  of  religious  worship.     The  historic  mediator 
may  simply  regard  himself  as  God's  prophet.     He 
may  be  conscious  simply  of  speaking  as  he  is  moved 
by  the  Holy  Ghost,  and  although  in  performing  this 
function  he  may  found  a  new  religion  or  introduce 
a  new  spiritual  content  into  one  that  already  exists, 
his  function  will  be  different  from  that  of  a  media- 
tor who  is  also  the  Christ.     This  will  appear  if  we 
determine  what  the  Christ-function  is  and  what  it 
implies.     The  historic  logos  is  the  medium  through 
which  all  spiritual  truth  comes  to  man.     Now,  the 
primal  ground  of  spiritual  communication  in  this 
medium  is  a  synthesis  of  the  divine  and  the  human, 


206  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN    PHILOSOPHY 

in  wliicli  the  divine  s^Dirit  informs  the  human  spirit 
with  energies  that  inspire  it,  but  which  the  human 
spirit  only  partly  apprehends.  The  prophet  is  the 
man  who  realizes  this  mode  of  divine  communica- 
tion in  his  consciousness,  and  is  inspired  by  it  to 
the  utterance  of  new  truth. 

There  is  conceivable,  however,  a  higher  conscious- 
ness than  this  ;  namely,  the  consciousness  of  the  syn- 
thesis itself.  The  logos,  as  we  have  seen,  is  that  or- 
gan in  which  the  norms  of  perfection  are  revealed, 
conscience  giving  the  revelation  on  the  ethical  side. 
These  norms  imperfectly  apprehended  by  the  human 
spirit,  are  recognized  as  lineaments  of  an  absolute 
consciousness  in  which  they  are  completely  realized. 
Could  the  logos  now  completely  realize  its  con- 
tent, there  would  appear- a  soul  in  which  the  con- 
sciousness of  the  synthesis  would  arise  and  it  would 
feel  itself  to  be  both  human  and  divine.  There  is  no 
contradiction  involved  in  the  conception  of  such  a 
nature.  It  is  in  fact  the  logical  outcome  of  the  idea 
of  creation  developed  in  the  chapters  on  Being  and 
Non-Being  and  Becoming.  We  there  reached  the 
conception  of  the  world  as  the  product  of  the  logos- 
energy  of  the  Absolute.  But  the  world  rises  to 
spiritual  consciousness  in  the  human  soul  and  this 
soul  has  immanent  in  it  the  consciousness  of  an  ideal 
which  it  cannot  fully  realize  and  this  ideal,  con- 
ceived as  completely  actualized,  is  also  its  idea  of 
absolute  spirit.  The  ideal  thus  mediates  between 
the  soul  and  the  Absolute,  entering  on  the  one  side 
into  the  developing  series  of  the  temporal  life  and 


RELIGION-  207 

on  the  other  side  resting"  in  the  eternal  blessedness 
of  the  Absolute.  In  it  the  teleological  idea  of  the 
creation  is  therefore  realized. 

The  synthetic  consciousness  which  thus  arises  is 
that  of  the  Christ  as  distinguished  from  the  religious 
IDrophet.  It  is  a  consciousness  in  which  an  ideal 
harmony  or  atonement  is  established  between  the 
divine  and  the  human.  It  is  a  consciousness  in 
which  the  typal  gulf  is  perpetually  closed  and  unity 
is  restored  by  the  entering  of  the  soul  into  the  son- 
ship  of  God  and  the  reciprocal  passage  of  the  divine 
Father  spirit  into  the  soul  as  God  in  the  Christ, 
reconciling  the  world  to  himself. 

The  Christ,  then,  is  the  ideal  mediator  between 
God  and  the  human  spirit.  There  may  be  prophets 
without  number,  who  embody  the  divine  inspira- 
tion, and  founders  of  new  dispensations  which  mark 
decided  spiritual  advances  of  the  race.  But  as  there 
is  only  one  God  and  one  perfect  ideal  for  humanity, 
it  is  not  conceivable  that  there  should  be  more 
than  one  perfect  type  of  mediation.  The  historic 
individual  in  whom  this  perfect  type  is  embodied, 
will  stand,  therefore,  as  the  Christ  of  the  race.  He 
will  be  the  founder  of  the  perfect  universal  religion 
of  the  spirit,  which  will  ideally  meet  every  need 
and  become  the  great  spiritual  fountain-light  for  all 
humanity. 

The  above  analysis  supplies  criteria  by  which 
various  religious  conceptions  may  be  judged.  Of 
these  conceptions  the  leading  at  the  present  day  are 
mysticism,  agnosticism,  i^ositivism,  the   moralistic 


208  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

theory  of  Kant,  and  the  absolutism  of  the  school 
of  Hegel.  Mysticism  is  an  element  in  true  as  well 
as  false  religion.  Its  truth  consists  in  the  fact  that 
the  soul,  through  the  organ  of  the  logos,  becomes 
inspired  with  truth  which  it  can  only  imperfectly 
understand.  It  is  compelled,  therefore,  to  resort  to 
symbols  and  imagery  which  present  in  concrete 
vision  what  the  reason  is  able  only  xoartially  to 
translate.  Mysticism  becomes  false  when  it  at- 
tempts to  substitute  its  symbols  for  completely 
rationalized  conceptions.  The  two  historic  embodi- 
ments of  this  misuse  of  mysticism  are  Hindu  pan- 
theism and  the  Theosophy  of  Jacob  Bohme.  Hindu 
pantheism  starts  with  the  conception  of  the  noth- 
ingness of  the  relative  or  phenomenal  world  and 
reaches  with  a  bound  the  idea  of  the  Absolute  as 
the  unitary  negation  of  this  nothingness,  an  un- 
thinkable Nirvana  into  which  everything  falls  and 
is  lost.  Jacob  Bohme  starts  with  the  conception  of 
absolute  being  as  a  chaos  of  struggling  and  hetero- 
geneous elements,  light  and  darkness,  life  and 
death,  good  and  evil,  out  of  which  a  dualistic  world 
gradually  emerges. 

Neither  of  these  forms  of  mysticism  are  able,  how- 
ever, to  arrive  consistently  at  true  religious  concep- 
tions. Hindu  pantheism,  through  its  negative  idea 
of  the  Absolute,  can  achieve  nothing  but  an  ideal 
which  swallows  up  the  human  spirit,  and  it  can 
found  no  religious  discipline,  therefore,  except  a 
prescription  for  self-annihilation.  The  Bohmistic 
scheme  fails  also,  but  in  a  somewhat  different  way. 


KELIGION  209 

Through  its  confusion  of  being  and  non-being  in 
one  concei3tion,  it  is  unable  to  achieve  any  rational 
or  coherent  ideas  of  the  world.  The  result  is  a 
species  of  intellectual  chaos  out  of  which  the  pro- 
foundly religious  feeling  of  Bohme  is  able  to  elicit 
onh^  the  semblance  of  order. 

Agnosticism  is  the  theory  that  postulates  the  ex- 
istence of  an  unintelligible  absolute  as  the  ground 
of  the  world.  It  clings  to  the  transcendent  idea  of 
religion,  but  because  the  absolute  nature  is  incon- 
ceivable it  finds  itself  unable  to  realize  any  nexus 
between  the  Absolute  and  the  relative.  This  deprives 
it  of  any  intelligible  basis  for  religion  and  it  is  com- 
pelled to  fall  back  on  the  sense  of  mystery  as  the 
sole  content  of  the  religious  consciousness.  This  is 
tantamount  to  defecating  the  religious  idea  of  both 
its  moral  and  tjq^al  significance.  The  agnostic  may 
then  speak  of  reverence  and  worship,  but  these 
sentiments  can  only  be  called  forth  by  moral  and 
spiritual  attributes.  The  logic  of  agnosticism  in 
the  end  reduces  the  whole  religious  problem  to  an 
enigma  which  it  is  compelled  to  give  up. 

Positivism  eliminates  the  Absolute  from  its  relig- 
ious conceptions  altogether  and  seeks  to  find  in 
humanity  a  satisfying  object  for  the  religious  con- 
sciousness. Its  idea  of  man  is  also  a  purely  natural- 
istic one,  from  which  all  sx3iritual  elements  are  elim- 
inated. There  is,  thus,  no  sj^iritual  foundation  left  to 
build  on  and  what  it  proposes  is  not  religion,  but 
a  substitute  that  fails  to  satisfy  most  of  the  pro- 
founder  demands  of  the  religious  consciousness. 
14 


210  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN    PHILOSOPHY 

Of  the  moralistic  theory  of  rehgion  Kant  is  the 
ablest  exponent.  "Religion  Within  the  Limits  of 
Pure  Reason  "  is  almost  the  greatest  modern  phil- 
osophical treatise  on  religion.  It  is  founded  on  a 
line  intuition  of  the  dualistic  nature  of  man's  moral 
consciousness.  The  indwelling  in  man  of  opposing 
principles  of  good  and  evil  is  posited  as  the  ground 
of  an  everlasting  moral  struggle.  And  this  strug- 
gle supplies  the  basis,  on  the  humanistic  side,  for  a 
doctrine  of  the  atonement  made  by  Jesus  Christ, 
through  which  is  secured  the  victory  of  the  good 
over  the  evil  and  the  establishment  of  a  kingdom  of 
God  on  earth.  Here  is  a  moral  conception  which 
leads  us  to  expect  much  when  the  philosopher  takes 
up  the  consideration  of  the  transcendent  aspect  of 
his  problem.  But  here  Kant  strikes  the  limits  of 
his  philosophy.  The  root  of  the  difficulty  is  his 
failure,  in  dealing  with  the  metaphysical  side  of  the 
problem  of  knowledge,  to  reach  any  adequate  notion 
of  the  nature  of  God  or  any  solid  assurance  of  his 
existence.  His  failure  here  cuts  him  off  from  any 
rational  doctrine  of  transcendence,  a  failure  which  is 
not  retrieved  in  his  moral  postulates.  For  these 
simply  assert  as  moral  necessities,  but  without  any 
additional  speculative  insight,  the  fundamental  data 
of  religion ;  namely,  the  existence  of  God  as  a  tran- 
scendent being  and  the  freedom  and  immortality 
of  the  soul.  And  depending  absolutely  on  moral 
grounds  for  their  validity,  the  data  of  religion  must 
be  subordinated  to  the  data  of  morality.  The  result 
of  this  failure  to  assert  any  real  transcendence  is 


RELIGION  211 

tliat  relig-iou  is  virtually  redaced  to  a  humanistic 
basis.  Kant's  theory  of  religion  is  line  on  its  ethical 
side,  but  its  siDeculative  blindness  causes  it  to  miss 
or  adumbrate  many  of  the  basal  ideas  and  distinc- 
tions on  which  an  adequate  philosophy  of  religion 
must  be  grounded. 

Absolutism  in  religion  is  represented  by  the  Heg- 
elian school.  Hegel's  intuition  strikes  deeper  than 
Kant's,  and  obtains  a  fuller  and  firmer  grasp  of  spirit- 
ual reality.  For  a  concex)tion  of  the  internal  move- 
ment of  spiritual  activity  and  of  the  living  process  of 
absolute  spirit,  Hegelism  alone,  of  modern  systems, 
supplies  an  effective  clue.  But  Hegel  fails  in  one 
cardinal  point  of  religious  theory.  He  is  never  able 
to  differentiate  absolute  spirit  from  the  spirit  of  man. 
This  weakness  arises,  as  we  have  seen  m  an  earlier 
chapter,  from  his  failure  to  achieve  a  true  doctrine  of 
the  negative.  This  alone  enables  us  to  conceive  the 
modification  that  constitutes  tbe  differentia  of  rela- 
tivity and  consequently  the  differentia  of  the  human 
soul.  Not  being  able  to  differentiate  the  Absolute 
from  the  conscious  activity  in  man,  Hegel  sees  no  oth- 
er way  of  defining  religion  than  as  the  consciousness 
which  the  Absolute  has  of  itself.  This  is  virtually  to 
annul  the  human  spirit  as  a  distinct  individuality, 
and,  as  we  have  seen,  this  would  suppress  the  basal  re- 
lation out  of  which  the  religious  consciousness  arises. 

This  difficulty  appears  very  clearly,  in  a  somewhat 
different  form,  in  a  recent  work  by  a  distinguished 
member  of  the  school.^    The  primal  distinction  in 
'  Evolution  of  Religion — Edward  Caird. 


212  BASAL    CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

consciousness,  this  antlior  reasons,  is  that  between 
subject  and  object.  But  this  dualism  is  reduced  to 
unity  by  a  hig-her  bond.  This  bond  which  unifies 
subject  and  object  is  God,  and  the  unitary  con- 
sciousness is  what  Hegel  would  call  the  Absolute's 
consciousness  of  himself.  This  doctrine  has  far- 
reaching-  consequences  in  the  work  alluded  to,  for 
it  virtually  assumes  that  God  and  the  principle  of 
unity  are  one  and  the  same.  The  author  so  under- 
stands it,  and  when  the  question  of  God's  relation  to 
the  world-process  arises  he  flatly  denies  all  tran- 
scendence and  identifies  God  completely  with  the 
immanent  principle  of  the  world's  evolution. 

The  truth  is,  we  find  a  common  microbe  at  work 
here  and  in  old  Hegelism.  For  the  unitary  bond 
which  is  here  identified!  with  the  Absolute  is  the 
common  possession  of  all  self-conscious  spiritual 
beings.  That  fact,  however,  is  consistent  with  the 
existence  of  distinct  consciousnesses,  individualities, 
and  wills,  and  these  constitute  the  real  distinctions 
in  the  spiritual  world.  What  this  author  calls  God 
is  an  abstraction,  for  it  is  what  is  left  of  spirit  when 
all  distinctive  characteristics  have  been  abstracted 
from.  The  idea  of  the  unitary  bond  is  the  bare  idea 
of  spiritual  substance.  And  it  is  clear  that  when  this 
abstract  notion  of  spiritual  substance  is  mistaken 
for  the  idea  of  God,  the  thinker  who  commits  the 
mistake  will  be  in  a  dilemma  similar  to  that  of 
Spinoza,  and  there  will  be  no  escape  from  a  species 
of  naturalistic  pantheism. 

An  adequate  conception  of  the  historic  evolution 


RELIGION  213 

of  religion  is  possible  only  in  view  of  the  true  data 
of  religion.  These,  as  we  have  seen,  are  (1)  a  trans- 
cendent Absolute  whose  energy  functions  creatively 
in  the  world  as  an  immanent  spiritual  princij)le  or  po- 
tency ;  (2)  the  human  soul  a  spiritual  principle  pass- 
ing perpetually  from  potence  to  actuality  and  thus 
epitomizing  the  world-progress  from  mechanism  up 
to  actualized  spirit ;  (3)  the  logos  which  functions 
immanently  as  man's  ideal  law -giver  and  tran- 
scendentl}^  as  the  organ  of  divine  communication  to 
the  human  soul.  It  thus  becomes  the  organ  of  the 
religious  consciousness.  Oat  of  these  conditions  the 
evolution  of  religion  arises.  No  evolution  is  con- 
ceivable on  a  i^urely  naturalistic  basis  ;  much  less 
an  evolution  of  religion,  for,  as  we  have  seen,  all 
world-progress  is  the  function  of  a  spiritual  potence 
and  the  immediate  presupposition  of  this  potence  is 
a  transcendent  actuality.  Now,  the  religious  con- 
sciousness involves  this  presupposition  raised  to  its 
highest  power,  since  it  is  the  organ  of  man's  highest, 
that  is,  his  ideal  spirituality,  and  springs  out  of  the 
function  of  the  logos,  which  is  the  point  of  imme- 
diate spiritual  communion  between  the  human  and 
the  divine.  The  very  existence  of  this  communion 
involves  the  idea  of  an  absolute  spiritual  energy 
transcending  in  its  conscious  individuality  and  will 
the  human  spirit  with  which  it  communicates.  And 
the  evolution  of  religion  is  the  direct  function  of 
this  inter-communion  which  is  the  spring  of  a  de- 
veloping spirituality  and  of  an  evolving  religious 
consciousness. 


214  BASAL   CONCEPTS    IN   PHILOSOPHY 

The  law  of  religious  evolution  is  also  that  law  of 
general  spiritual  progress  which  we  have  developed 
in  the  preceding  chapter,  raised  to  its  highest 
power.  That  law  is  founded  on  the  presupposition 
of  an  inter-communion  between  the  human  spirit 
and  its  transcendent  ground.  Its  operation  is  con- 
ditioned, as  we  have  seen,  by  two  circumstances  of 
profound  import.  One  is  the  inter-dependence  of 
the  transcendent  and  immanent  agencies  in  deter- 
mining the  stages  of  the  evolution.  It  has  been 
pointed  out  how  the  ap]3earance  of  the  pro^ihet  or 
founder  of  a  new  dispensation  is  conditioned  on  the 
one  hand  by  a  back-flowing  wave  of  spiritual  de- 
spair and  on  the  other,  by  an  inflow  of  new  spiritual 
energy  from  the  absolute  spring.  The  juncture  and 
inter-action  of  the  immanent  and  transcendent  forces, 
thus  produces  the  spiritual  embodiment  of  a  new 
advance  in  the  religious  progress  of  humanity.  The 
other  circumstance  is  the  inter-play  of  evil  with  the 
forces  of  good.  Evil  is  an  omnipresent  fact  and  con- 
tingency in  the  world  and  it  functions  as  an  adver- 
sary, as  a  principle  of  degeneration,  rotting  spiritual 
fibre  and  producing  an  ever-active  tendency  to  dis- 
solution and  death.  "We  have  seen  how  active  moral 
evil  arises  as  an  effect  of  the  human  will  wresting 
itself  from  the  divine  and  embarking  on  its  own  re- 
sources. It  thus  attempts  to  ignore  or  cancel  one 
of  the  profoundest  negative  laws  of  human  experi- 
ence ;  namely,  man's  inability,  either  as  an  individ- 
ual or  as  a  race,  to  conserve  his  own  spiritual  evolu- 
tion.     The   option  of  the  evil  will  cuts  the  divine 


RELIGION  215 

branch  on  which  humanity  rests  and  the  inevitable 
tendency  is  a  gravitation  downward  toward  spiritual 
death.  The  operation  of  evil  thus  comx3licates  and 
intensifies  the  situation  and  gives  to  the  whole  spir- 
itual history  of  humanity  the  ajopearance  of  an  evo- 
lution which  is  constantly  being  swallowed  up  in 
dissolution. 

It  is  only  in  the  light  of  the  true  law  of  spiritual 
IDrogress  that  the  outlook  becomes  more  hopeful. 
The  spiritual  ocean  may  on  its  surface  seem  a  stag- 
nant x^ool  covered  with  the  debris  of  dead  and  de- 
caying religions  and  civilizations.  But  beneath  are 
the  currents  that  conserve  its  life  and  enable  it  to 
throw  off  the  miasma  of  death.  These  embody 
themselves  in  new  spiritual  reservoirs  which  supply 
the  energy  of  a  new  national  development  or  civili- 
zation. And  since  exi3erience  teaches  us  that  the 
absolute  springs  require  many  human  vessels  and 
that  it  is  not  given  to  the  same  nature  or  line  of 
historic  individuals  to  be  the  bearers  of  the  highest 
inspirations  in  art,  literature,  iDhilosophy  or  civil 
government,  so  we  must  bear  the  same  lesson  in 
mind  in  our  search  for  the  true  steps  of  religious 
evolution.  We  must  look  for  the  nations  and  lines 
of  prophets  which  are  the  bearers  of  the  highest 
religious  inspiration  and  which  embody,  therefore, 
the  gulf-stream  of  spiritual  history.  The  fortunes  of 
the  movement  which  embodies  the  highest  religious 
experience  of  the  race,  will  not  include  the  whole 
record  of  religious  evolution,  nor  will  it  enable  us 
to  isrnore  the  inferior  liofhts  of  other  movements  in 


216  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PIIILOSOPHY 

spiritual  history,  but  it  will  mark  the  line  of  g:reat- 
est  intensity,  the  i^oints  where  the  religious  forces 
converg-e,  and  where  the  highest  issues  of  the  spirit- 
ual drama  of  the  race  are  decided. 

We  may  expect  also  that  the  race  mediator  and 
the  race  religion,  if  they  are  to  be  born  into  the 
world,  will  appear  in  connection  with  this  supreme 
movement.  For  if  spirit  finds  it  necessary  to  con- 
centrate its  energies  into  special  lines  in  order 
to  produce  the  master-results  in  other  spheres  of 
race-progress,  much  more  shall  we  expect  that  in 
this  highest  sphere  of  its  energizing  the  same  law 
will  apply  and  that  the  embodiment  of  the  supreme 
ideal  of  the  religious  consciousness  of  the  race  will 
emerge  in  historic  form  at  the  flood-tide  of  the  gulf- 
stream  of  spiritual  experience.  That  the  spirit  of 
man  requires  but  one  ideal  mediator  is  clear.  That 
the  embodiment  of  such  a  mediator  must  be  the  su- 
preme effort  of  spiritual  evolution  seems  no  less 
clear.  And  from  this  it  seems  to  follow  with  con- 
vincing force  that  but  one  such  embodiment  is  pos- 
sible to  a  race,  and  that  in  this  it  achieves  the  ideal 
basis  of  its  universal  religion. 

The  religious  theory  of  evolution  posits  as  its 
primal  ground  a  transcendent  and  absolute  spirit 
whose  creative  energy  is  the  presupposition  of  the 
spiritual  potence  of  the  world.  It  posits  a  world- 
process  which  passes  from  mechanism  to  spirit,  and 
which  has  for  its  immanent  ground  a  spiritual  po- 
tence that  contains  the  forms  of  relative  being.  It 
posits  a  human   soul  which  is  a   spiritual   i^otence 


RELIGION  217 

passing"  into  actuality,  and  which  in  its  experience 
epitomizes  the  world  -  process  through  which  its 
self-conscious  individuality  has  been  achieved.  It 
posits  in  this  soul  an  immanent  ideal  which  ener- 
gizes as  the  main-spring'  of  its  moral  and  spiritual 
activity  and  as  the  logos  in  which  it  is  individually 
and  historically  united  to  its  transcendent  spiritual 
ground  and  which  functions,  therefore,  as  the  spring 
of  its  religious  consciousness  and  life.  It  posits  on 
this  basis  a  religious  evolution  in  which,  through 
the  divine  agency  and  assistance  manifesting  itself 
through  the  law  of  spiritual  mediation,  the  race 
presses  upward  toward  God  its  Father.  And  it 
posits  as  the  supreme  point  of  this  movement,  as 
appearing  at  a  supreme  crisis  in  spiritual  history, 
the  ideal  mediator  and  the  founder  of  the  universal 
religion  of  humanity.  This  ideal  mediator  is  the 
incarnation  of  the  consciousness  of  the  logos  in 
which  God  is  manifest,  reconciling  the  world  to  him- 
self. This  is  the  highest,  the  ideal  outcome  of  the 
world's  spiritual  history.  The  religious  theory  of 
evolution  thus  posits  a  divine  process  which,  as  be- 
gun, continued  and  ended  rests  upon  God,  but  a  proc- 
ess which  cannot  be  i^antheistically  conceived,  since 
in  its  inception,  in  every  stej)  of  its  progress,  and  in 
its  ideal  culmination  in  the  logos,  a  real  distinction 
is  grounded  and  maintained  between  the  creation 
and  the  absolute  spirit  to  whose  energy  it  owes  its 
being-. 


XIV 

ART 

A  true  Metaphysic  of  Art  can  be  achieved  only  in 
the  lig-ht  of  the  categories  of  being,  non-being,  and 
becoming.  We  have  already  seen  how  these  ideas 
supply  a  basis  for  a  structural  ontology  of  theo- 
retic and  practical  xjhilosophy.  They  will  be  found 
equally  effective  in  helping  us  to  arrive  at  a  rational 
theory  of  art. 

There  are  three  categories  in  the  philosophy  of 
art  which  must  be  kept  distinct ;  namely.  Art  Crea- 
tion, Art  Bepresentation,  and  Art  Appreciation. 
The  highest  category  is  that  of  art  creation.  In 
dealing  with  it,  it  will  be  necessary,  as  in  the  treat- 
ment of  morality  and  theoretic  science,  to  distin- 
guish between  absolute  and  relative  and  to  seek  the 
first  norms  of  art  in  the  bosom  of  absolute  being. 

In  the  chapter  on  Morality,  we  followed  the  dia- 
lectic of  the  absolute  spirit  through  stages  of  intel- 
lection and  volition  to  that  of  love,  which  includes 
both  and  i3roceeds  under  the  category  of  unity  to 
realize  wholeness  or  com^^leteness  of  being.  And  we 
saw  how  out  of  this  unifying  impulse  of  the  Abso- 
lute spring  the  norms  both  of  the  moral  idea  of  lioli- 


ART  219 

ness  and  the  sestbetic  idea  of  beauty.  Now,  back  of 
this  impulse  lies  the  concrete  spiritual  activity  it- 
self, which  in  this  relation  we  may  call  the  artistic 
intelligence,  which  is  to  be  conceived  on  one  side  as 
a  sense  for  unity  and  on  the  other,  in  Mathew  Ar- 
nold's phrase,  as  a  sense  for  beauty.  We  will  have, 
in  short,  the  idea  of  an  intelligence  that  apprehends 
and  grasps  all  parts  and  details  mediately  through 
the  idea  of  the  whole  from  the  contemplation  of 
which  it  also  derives  an  aesthetic  satisfaction. 

If  we  apprehend  rightly  the  nature  of  art-intelli- 
gence we  have  a  clue  also  to  the  ideal  of  all  art-crea- 
tion. For  no  category  will  be  adequate  to  the  art- 
intelligence  but  that  of  unity,  and  no  ideal  but  that 
of  wholeness.  And  in  the  absolute  sphere  this 
ideal  can  be  none  other  than  the  idea  of  absolute 
being  itself.  It  is  the  idea  of  a  nature  in  which 
unity  is  not  reached  through  the  compounding  of 
differences,  but  in  which  the  unity  strikes  first,  so  to 
speak,  and  differences  arise  through  it  and  exist  and 
are  intelligible  only  in  relation  to  it.  The  idea  of 
absolute  art  is,  therefore,  absolute  being  conceived 
from  the  standpoint  of  its  individual  unity,  that  is, 
as  a  unity  that  comprehends  all  differences. 

It  is  clear,  in  view  of  the  above  conceptions,  that 
the  art-process  in  the  Absolute  is  identical  with  that 
of  the  absolute  self-activity  as  a  whole  and  in  its 
most  concrete  form.  This  self  -  activity  conceived 
in  the  light  of  the  logos  includes  the  categories  of 
intellection  or  ideal  truth  and  of  volition  or  ideal 
good,  as  well  as  that  of  feeling  or  ideal  beauty,  and 


220  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

it  enables  us  to  reach  tlie  intuition  of  absolute  art 
as  realizing  beauty,  the  ideal  of  feeling-,  under  the 
highest  idea  or  form  of  the  intellect  and  in  the  mode 
of  the  ideal  good,  which  is  free  self-expression. 

Now,  the  idea  of  absolute  art  here  reached  does  not 
differ  materially  from  that  of  Plato,  or  his  modern 
disciples,  so  far  as  they  reproduce  the  spirit  of  the 
master.  But  in  Plato's  theory  there  are  two  defects. 
In  the  first  place  he  does  not  anywhere  clearly 
distinguish  between  absolute  and  relative  art,  and 
secondly,  he  is  never  able  to  hit  upon  a  rational  rela- 
tion of  the  ideas  of  the  beautiful  and  the  good. 
He  tends,  therefore,  continually  to  merge  the  beau- 
tiful in  the  good,  and  to  restrict  art  to  the  represen- 
tation of  the  good. 

His  shortcomings  in  tlifs  latter  respect  come  out 
somewhat  glaringly  in  his  Eepublic,  where  for  ex- 
ample, in  adapting  the  products  of  art  to  pedagogi- 
cal needs  the  Iliad  is  so  expurgated  as  to  metamor- 
phose Homer  into  a  species  of  Hellenic  Tupper 
sedately  aiming  moral  aphorisms  at  the  heads  of  the 
Greeks.  Had  Plato  carried  out  his  dialectic  more 
completely  and  realized  the  true  distinction  between 
the  beautiful  which  is  an  emotional  category,  and 
the  good  which  is  a  category  of  will,  he  would  have 
been  enabled  to  determine  a  sphere  for  art  at  once 
related  to  ethics  and  distinct  from  it. 

Kant  in  all  his  Critiques  has  the  vision  of  an  intel- 
ligence that  is  constitutive,  to  use  his  own  term,  and 
whose  activities  are  creative  rather  than  representa- 
tive.    But  he  is  never  fully  able  to  realize  his  intui- 


ART  221 

tion.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  in  this  notion  of  a 
constitutive  intelligence  is  contained  a  germ  Avliich 
might  be  unfolded  into  the  idea  of  self-activity,  and 
it  is  clear  also  that  the  conception  of  such  an  activity 
would  have  supplied  to  Kant  a  clue  he  was  con- 
stantly searching  for  but  could  never  find,  to  the 
true  idea  of  art. 

Heg-el  has  discovered  this  clue  and  conceives  art 
to  be  the  immediate  self-manifestation  of  absolute 
sx3irit  in  the  sensuous  sphere,  while  the  beautiful 
is  the  absolute  idea  shining  in  sensuous  form. 
Hegel's  intuition  is  the  Platonic  and  he  realizes 
clearly  enough  the  essential  nature  of  absolute 
beauty.  But  he  falls  into  a  difficulty  analogous  to 
that  of  Plato  ;  namely,  a  failure  to  make  a  true  dis- 
tinction between  the  absolute  and  relative  spheres 
and  conceptions  of  art.  In  view  of  the  modification 
which  the  absolute  energy  undergoes  in  constitut- 
ing the  categories  of  relativity  it  is  evident  that  there 
can  be  no  unmediated  manifestation  of  the  Absolute 
in  sensuous  form,  and  that  the  categories  of  relative 
art  must  be  determined  in  view  of  this  modification. 

The  sphere  of  absolute  art  is  the  absolute  nat- 
ure, and  the  objects  of  the  absolute  artist  in  that 
sphere  is  the  eternal  and  absolute  Spirit,  -which  em- 
bodies the  supernal  beauty.  Relative  art -creation 
has  two  spheres,  that  of  the  creative  artist  and  that 
of  man.  The  relative  products  of  the  creative  artist 
can  be  conceived  only  through  a  true  idea  of  crea- 
tion, which  we  have  seen  to  be,  not  an  immanental, 
but  an  outgoing,  activity  of  the  Absolute  and  to 


222  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

consist  in  the  production  of  forms  and  energies  of 
becoming  in  the  sphere  of  non-being.  We  have 
also  seen  how  the  categories  of  the  absolute  energy 
are  modified  in  this  process  into  the  categories  of 
relativity,  and  how  a  process  of  development  is 
grounded  in  which  the  creature  passes  from  mechan- 
ism U13  to  spirit. 

It  is  only  through  the  idea  of  creation  as  a  mode 
of  the  absolute  energy  that  a  true  notion  of  the 
work  of  the  absolute  artist  in  the  sphere  of  becom- 
ing can  be  achieved.  Creation  is  to  be  conceived 
as  a  formative  energy  working  ui^on  pure  formless 
negation  and  producing  out  of  it  a  relative,  and  not 
an  absolute,  manifestation.  It  is  also  through  the 
same  idea  that  an  intelligible  conception  of  the 
archetypes  of  becoming  may  be  realized.  We  have 
already  seen  how  the  absolute  energy  becomes  im- 
manent in  the  world  as  the  sjjiritual  potentiality 
out  of  Avhich  its  development, springs.  Here  we  have 
to  add,  that  this  potentiality  is  not  undifferentiat- 
ed capacity  but  rather  a  sphere  of  archetypal  ener- 
gies which  realize  themselves  in  the  progressive 
categories  of  the  world.  This  spiritual  potential 
-stands  thus  as  the  equivalent  of  the  Aristotelian 
forms  before  they  have  become  actualized.  And 
conceived  as  containing  the  potential  archetypes  of 
the  creation,  this  spiritual  ]3otence  stands  for  the 
world-idea  as  it  exists  in  the  mind  of  the  divine 
artist. 

Now  the  world-idea  as  it  embodies  itself  creative- 
ly in  the  spheres   of  cosmic  and  psychic   nature, 


ART  223 

may  be  conceived  as  passing"  through  the  categories 
of  mechanism,  mechano  -  teleology,  and  teleology. 
Mechanism  realizes  itself  in  cosmic  nature  and  has 
its  norm  in  a  mathematico-mechanical  idea  of  order 
and  harmony.  The  old  Pythagorean  notion  of  num- 
ber as  constituting  the  principle  of  cosmic  order  is 
an  anticipation  of  this  mechanical  ideal.  It  is  this 
notion  of  a  mathematically  complete  order,  harmo- 
ny and  system  in  space  and  time  that  must  be  con- 
ceived as  constituting  the  immanent  idea  of  art  in 
the  sphere  of  mechanical  becoming.  Mechano-teleo- 
logy  manifests  itself  in  that  process  in  cosmic  nat- 
ure which  leads  to  its  transcendence  in  the  genesis 
of  psychic  nature.  Its  idea  is  that  of  mechanism  as 
implicitly  containing  a  teleologic  iDrinciple  which  is 
wholly  concealed  in  the  inorganic  sphere,  but  be- 
gins to  manifest  itself  in  the  organic  in  the  form  of 
an  explicit  design  or  adaptation  of  organs  and  parts 
to  a  rational  idea  which  can  only  be  construed  ade- 
quately as  their  end.  In  the  sphere  of  organisms, 
therefore,  we  come  upon  the  first  explicit  traces  of 
teleology.  It  is  only  in  the  culmination  of  the  or- 
ganic, however,  in  the  appearance  of  soul  as  an  or- 
gan of  spiritual  self -activity  that  mechano-teleology 
reaches  its  climax,  in  the  notion  of  the  production 
of  soul  as  the  final  goal  of  cosmic  nature.  In  other 
words,  it  is  only  in  psychic  nature  as  embodied  in 
man  that  the  underlying  design  and  rationality  of 
cosmic  nature  is  completely  manifested. 

Teleology  is  the  artistic  category  of  psychic  nat- 
ure.     Here   we   enter   the    sphere    of   the    explicit 


224  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN    PHILOSOPHY 

strug-g-le  of  tlie  ideal  rational  and  spiritual,  to  over- 
come and  transform  the  mechanical.  The  idea  of 
this  strug-g-le  and  its  solution  is  the  immanent  ar- 
tistic motive  of  the  psychic  movement,  while  the 
transcendent  ideal  which  stands  as  its  goal  is  the 
idea  of  typal  reconciliation  between  the  psyche 
and  its  absolute  ground.  The  artistic  idea  in  the 
psychic  sphere  embraces  therefore  the  whole  strug- 
g-le  of  humanity,  viewed  from  the  ideal  teleologic 
standpoint,  as  a  progressive  triumph  of  the  ideal  ra- 
tional and  spiritual  principle  over  its  opposite,  a  tri- 
umph which  realizes  itself  in  sensuous,  intellectual, 
moral,  politico-social  and  religious  stages.  The  su- 
preme idea  of  art  in  the  teleologic  sphere  is  that 
of  the  absolute  religion  which  embraces,  as  we  have 
seen,  a  perfect  form  of  mediation  in  its  ideal  syn- 
thesis of  relative  and  absolute  nature  in  the  divine 
logos.  Teleologically,  the  wdiole  drama  of  becom- 
ing culminates  in  this  idea. 

The  absolute  artist  thus  realizes  beauty  in  abso- 
lute and  relative  forms.  Now,  art  creation  viewed 
as  a  function  of  the  human  psyche,  in  the  most  gene- 
ral sense  of  the  term,  includes  all  civilization  and 
culture,  the  whole  output  of  humanity.  But  more 
restrictedly  it  embraces  only  that  part  of  the  output 
which  has  had  for  its  dominating  motive  the  grati- 
fication of  what  Mathew  Arnold  calls  the  sense  for 
beauty.  We  have  already  analyzed  the  idea  of 
beauty  into  the  emotional  aiDprehension  of  the 
unity  of  a  whole,  and  the  artistic  intelligence  into 
that  free  teleologic  activity  which   proceeds  from 


ART  225 

tlie  idea  of  the  whole  to  that  of  distinctions  and  de- 
tails. It  is  activity  working'  under  the  category  of 
free  self-ex^Dression  rather  than  mechanical  activity 
working  under  a  laAV  externally  imposed.  Now,  an 
artistic  product,  even  in  its  most  rudimental  form, 
whenever  it  is  genuinely  motived  by  the  impulse  of 
beauty,  will  be  found  to  rise  above  the  requirements 
of  utilitarian  necessity.  Thus  a  drinking  vessel  will 
serve  the  utilitarian  demand  just  as  well  if  it  is 
wholly  devoid  of  beauty  or  even  positively  ugly. 
The  motive  that  leads  to  the  moulding  of  it  into 
proportions  of  symmetry  and  to  the  executing  on  it 
of  some  design,  however  rude,  of  a  vine  or  a  drink- 
ing scene,  will  not,  therefore,  be  the  promi^ting  of 
necessity,  but  will  rather  spring  from  the  free  im- 
pulse of  beauty. 

Art-creation  then,  as  distinguished  from  other 
forms  of  human  productivity,  is  free  construction 
motived  by  the  sense  of  beauty.  This  differentiates 
it  from  industry  and  all  other  forms  of  loroduction. 
It  is  only  the  absolute  Spirit,  however,  that  can 
realize  the  ideal  of  absolute  beauty.  The  psychic 
nature  of  man  rises  out  of  a  dualism  of  being  and 
non-being  which  determines  its  whole  activity  as  a 
development  from  potence  into  actuality.  The  ideal 
of  beauty,  then,  so  far  as  it  is  realizable  in  a  human 
intelligence,  will  be  relative  and  imperfect.  This 
being  the  case  there  will  arise  in  the  artistic  sphere 
the  same  necessity  for  unending  development  as 
exists  in  other  spheres  of  i:)sychic  activity.  The 
perfect  ideal  is  just  as  unattainable  in  art  as  it  is  in 
15 


226  BASAL   CONCEPTS    IN   PHILOSOPHY 

the  spheres  of  morality  and  religion.  Art  aspires 
after  the  absolute  beauty,  but  the  ideal  of  its  aims 
is  something-  that  can  never  be  completely  realized. 
The  soul  of  art  is  its  creative  spirit ;  its  body  is 
the  mode  of  representation  in  which  it  manifests 
itself.  This  mode  embraces  both  the  i^rinciple  and 
the  form  of  representation.  Plato  originated  the 
false  theory  that  art  is  mere  imitation,  and  he  con- 
ceived imitation  in  the  ig-noble  form  of  mimicry, 
thus  confounding  the  first  form  of  the  art  impulse 
with  its  essential  nature.  That  the  first  form  of  the 
art  impulse  is  imitation  seems  to  be  a  well-estab- 
lished doctrine.*  What  is  denied  here  is  that  the 
impulse  would  develop  true  art  if  it  did  not  event- 
ually rise  above  imitation.  Aristotle  adopts  the 
Platonic  idea,  but  represents  imitation  as  something 
worthy  and  dignified.  Now,  there  are  branches  of 
art,  as  statuary  and  portrait  painting,  in  which  imi- 
tation plays  a  leading  part.  But  even  here  it  is 
modified  by  the  conception  of  the  artist.  Imitation 
is  only  a  secondary  principle  in  art  proi3er,  whose 

*  This  follows  from  the  general  course  of  Psjcho-geiiesis,  which 
is  from  mechanism  up  to  spirit.  Genetically  the  art-impulse  would 
first  take  the  form  of  imitation.  See  an  ahle  and  suggestive  article 
on  Imitation  —  A  Chapter  in  the  Natural  History  of  Conscious- 
ness, by  Professor  J,  Mark  Baldwin,  in  Mind,  January,  1804.  The 
principle  developed  in  this  article  would  admit  of  a  special  applica- 
tion to  the  genesis  of  the  art-impulse.  Only  we  must  here  as  else- 
where interpret  the  genetic  process  in  the  light  of  the  basal  cate- 
gory of  spirit  which  is  development  from  mechanism  to  self  activity. 
Imitation  is  the  mechanical  moment  in  a  process  through  which  it 
is  at  length  subordinated  to  a  higher  form  of  activity. 


ART  227 

essence  is  free  creation.  Ai't  does  not  imitate  life 
merely,  but  reproduces  it  Avitli  a  free  hand  and 
embodies  it  in  its  characteristic  forms.  The  form 
of  art-representation  is  both  sensuous  and  symbolic. 
In  its  sensuous  form  it  appeals  to  either  eye  or  ear 
and  expresses  itself  either  in  the  static  order  of 
coexistence  in  space  or  in  the  dynamic  order  of 
the  time-series.  As  symbolic  the  static  branch 
subdivides  into  the  plastic  and  the  pictorial,  the 
former  employing  as  its  material,  substances  that 
are  capable  of  being  moulded  into  solid  form,  the 
latter  achieving  its  results  by  means  of  a  blending 
of  color  and  light  and  shade  on  a  flat  surface.  The 
dynamic  branch  employs  the  rhythmic  series  of 
sound  and  subdivides  according  as  the  sounds  are 
simx)ly  tones  or  articulate  speech.  We  thus  arrive 
at  the  following  classification  according  to  sensuous 
and  symbolic  form.  (1)  Static  :  architecture,  sculpt- 
ure, and  painting.  (2)  Dynamic :  music,  poetry 
and  artistic  prose. 

Art  may  also  be  classified  according  to  the  degree 
in  which  it  realizes  freedom  of  expression,  as  fol- 
lows : — architecture,  which  is  hampered  both  by  util- 
ity and  mass ;  sculpture,  which  escapes  utility  and 
reduces  mass  ;  painting,  which  escapes  mass,  and  is 
limited  only  'hy  the  capacity  of  light  and  colors  to 
create  perspective  ;  poetry  and  artistic  prose,  which 
escape  spatial  restrictions  and  are  bound  only  by  the 
limits  of  rhythmic  succession  of  articulate  sounds, 
and  lastly  music,  which  escapes  the  restrictions  of 
articulate  speech  and  is  obliged  to  observe  only  one 


228  BA.SAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

limit,  that  of  rliytlimic  tone.  In  the  freedom  of  its 
expression  music  is,  therefore,  the  supreme  art,  since 
its  rhythmic  forms  present,  so  to  speak,  typal  moukls 
into  which  infinite  varieties  of  spiritual  histories  may 
be  poured. 

The  question  as  to  relative  worth  and  dignity  of 
modes  of  representation  arises  in  the  siDhere  of  each 
art,  but  has  no  special  significance  as  between  dif- 
fent  types  of  art.  Every  art  may  be  made  a  vehicle 
of  the  highest  spiritual  expression,  and  all  arts  are, 
therefore,  equally  worthy  in  themselves.  Different 
arts  may,  however,  and  do,  differ  in  their  capacities 
for  various  modes  of  representation.  Thus  an  im- 
portant distinction  between  the  static  and  dynamic 
arts  consists  in  the  superior  capacity  of  the  former 
to  express  more  and  to  express  it  more  comi^letely, 
in  the  unity  of  a  single  representation.  Sculpture, 
painting,  and  architecture  are  in  this  respect  vastly 
superior  to  music  and  literature.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  dynamic  arts  have  a  great  advantage  in 
their  superior  capacity  for  representing  the  stages 
of  spiritual  history.  While,  therefore,  in  their  power 
to  gather  up  a  history  into  a  single  representation, 
they  are  greatly  inferior  to  the  static  arts,  they 
are  perhaps  more  than  compensated  for  this  by  their 
capacity  for  a  series  of  representations  in  which 
almost  unbounded  liberty  as  to  details  is  enjoyed. 
One  of  Lessing's  greatest  contributions  to  the  phi- 
losophy of  art  is  his  recognition  of  this  distinction. 
Lessing  also  observes  the  other  fact  which  is  a  de- 
duction from  the   primal  distinction ;  namely,  the 


ART  229 

greater  freedom  of  expression  which  is  enjoyed  by 
the  dynamic  arts.  All  art  is  free  to  represent  the 
ugly  and  the  horrible  as  well  as  the  beautiful, 
provided  that  in  the  whole  representation  these 
features  be  subordinated  to  the  requirements  of 
beauty.  But,  as  Lessing"  shows  in  his  reflections 
on  the  Laocoon,  this  proviso  is  a  much  more  strin- 
gent limit  upon  freedom  in  the  static  than  in  the 
dynamic  arts.  And  the  stringency  is  only  i^artially 
relieved  in  a  series  of  representations  Avhich  em- 
body a  history.  But  in  the  dynamic  arts,  where  it 
is  not  the  repose  of  the  figures  or  the  perfection  of 
single  pulsations,  but  the  iDrogressive  movement, 
that  impresses,  there  may  be  included  an  indefinite 
amount  of  horrible  and  repulsive  details,  i3rovided 
the  movement  as  a  whole  realizes  the  idea  of  the 
beautiful. 

On  the  whole,  it  is  doubtless  true  that  the  greater 
freedom  of  musical  and  literary  representation  ren- 
ders these  arts  superior  as  vehicles  of  spiritual 
self-expression.  There  seems  to  be  a  philosophical 
reason  for  this  at  once  profound  and  simple.  The 
inner  motive  of  art-creation,  as  we  have  seen,  is 
what  may  be  called  a  sense  for  wholeness.  Now, 
the  conception  of  this  sense  for  wholeness  as  oper- 
ating under  the  category  of  free  self-expression, 
gives  us  the  most  general  idea  of  love.  Love 
seeks  wholeness  and  love  is,  therefore,  everywhere 
sjmthetic  and  mediatory.  But  mediation  is,  as  we 
have  seen,  not  only  the  inner  core  of  all  relative 
spiritual  history,  but  it  is  a  teleologic  idea  which 


230  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

can  be  realized  only  in  a  dynamic  series.  The 
representation-form  of  music  and  literature  is  this 
dynamic  series,  and  this  renders  them  the  most 
fitting  vehicles  for  the  representation  of  the  drama 
of  mediation. 

The  g-reatest  and  most  typal  spiritual  theme  of 
art  is  a  struggle  which  is  mediated  by  love  and 
ends  in  reconciliation  and  peace.  Music,  on  account 
of  its  freedom  from  the  definite  suggestiveness  of 
articulate  speech,  is  the  highest  vehicle  of  this 
mediational  motive  and  touches  most  profoundly 
the  fountains  of  love.  Literature  in  its  supremest 
forms  of  epic  and  dramatic  poetry,  is  an  embodi- 
ment of  this  same  typal  spiritual  theme.  The 
epic  works  out  the  struggle  and  achieves  its  media- 
tion and  unity  in  the  "broad  field  of  national  or 
tribal  history,  while  the  drama  embodies  the  same 
theme  in  the  sphere  of  particular  individualities. 
Comedy  presents  the  lighter  phases  of  the  theme, 
while  in  tragedy  the  deepest  notes  of  spiritual  ex- 
perience are  struck.  The  struggle  is  to  the  death 
and  mediation  can  be  achieved  only  by  the  shed- 
ding of  blood,  while  the  reconciliation  and  peace 
which  ensues  is  the  attainment  of  a  higher  plane  of 
spiritual  life  and  experience.  Aristotle  has  a  pro- 
found insight  into  the  cathartic  quality  of  real 
tragedy  which  renders  it  a  means  of  purification 
through  terror  and  pity.  A  profounder  and  simpler 
insight  will  see  in  it,  as  its  core  of  spiritual  meaning, 
a  drama  of  love  and  mediation. 

Art  and  religion  are  very  closely  allied  both  in 


ART  231 

their  history  and  their  essence.  It  is  in  the  common 
theme  of  the  hig-hest  music  and  the  profomidest 
literature  that  their  ideas  seem  to  coalesce.  In  the 
same  theme  we  seem  to  discover  the  inner  spiritual 
idea  of  art  in  the  lig-ht  of  which  the  whole  develop- 
ment becomes  teleologic.  For  just  as  the  real  tele- 
olog-y  of  cosmic  nature  manifests  itself  in  soul,  and 
the  real  teleology  of  psychic  nature  reveals  itself  in 
the  perfect  type  of  religion,  so  here  in  the  idea  of 
spiritual  struggle  mediated  through  sacrifice,  and 
reconciliation  and  peace  achieved  on  a  higher  plane, 
we  seem  to  find  the  real  teleologic  ideal  of  art. 

Art-appreciation  is  not  a  category  of  the  artist, 
but  rather  of  the  spectator  and  student  of  art.  This 
appreciation  has  two  branches,  the  intellectual  and 
the  emotional,  and  it  passes  through  psychological 
and  ontological  stages.  Ontologically  its  intellect- 
ual branch  is  a  species  of  rational  knowledge  and 
consists  in  the  apprehension  of  the  fundamental 
ideas  of  art.  Rational  art-knowledge,  in  common 
with  other  forms,  can  be  completely  achieved  only 
in  the  light  of  the  categories  of  being,  non-being, 
and  becoming.  For  the  philosophy  of  art,  in 
common  with  all  philosophy,  must  find  its  start- 
ing-point in  the  idea  of  absolute  being.  From  this 
idea  it  is  able  to  deduce  the  notions  of  absolute 
creativeness  and  absolute  beauty.  But  these  ideas 
cannot,  as  we  have  seen,  be  carried  over  unmodified 
into  the  relative  sphere.  We  cannot  truly  define 
human  art  as  the  Absolute  manifesting  itself  in 
sensuous  form  until  by  a  true  conception  of  non- 


232  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PiriLOSOPIIY 

being  and  the  clualistic  conditions  of  creation,  we 
have  achieved  a  rational  idea  of  the  form  of  becom- 
ing and  its  differentia.  It  will  then  be  possible  to 
conceive  the  iDresence  and  activity  of  a  principle  of 
absolute  intelligence  in  the  psychic  sphere,  pro- 
ducing manifestations  that  do  not  transcend  the  rel- 
ative limitations.  This  is  a  crucial  point  in  art  as 
it  is  in  all  i)hilosophic  theory.  The  psychic  intelli- 
gence contains  an  absolute  princi^Dle.  But  this  prin- 
ciple is  embodied  in  a  dualistic  and  developing 
type  of  individuality,  and  this  difference  of  type  de- 
termines its  actual  consciousness  as  relative  and  dis- 
tinguished from  the  Absolute.  Ai-t,  so  far  as  it  is  a 
function  of  the  human  psyche,  is  a  manifestation  of 
the  dual  psychic  activity  in  sensuous  form. 

Psychologic  art-appreciation  on  its  intellectual 
side  manifests  itself  as  art-perception.  It  follows  an 
empirical  and  genetic  order,  beginning  Avith  the 
simplest  and  most  sensuous  relations  whose  appre- 
hensions are  accompanied  with  x>leasurable  or  jiain- 
ful  feeling,  and  passing  through  stages  correspond- 
ing pretty  well  to  those  laid  doAvn  to  Socrates  b}^  the 
Theban  i3rophetess.  In  its  j^ath  upward  the  psyche 
first  apprehends  the  beauty  of  sensuous  forms  in 
colors  and  x^hysical  proportions.  A  higher  stage 
is  the  ajoprehension  of  the  mathematical  relations  of 
symmetry,  harmony,  and  proportion.  The  upward 
footsteps  then  enter  the  sphere  of  teleology,  passing 
through  the  joortal  of  mechano-teleology  into  teleol- 
ogy proper,  where  the  spiritual  types  of  beauty  are 
realized,  its  highest  manifestation  being  in  the  ideal 


ART  233 

form  of  spiritual  mediation  and  unity  embodied  iu 
the  highest  conceptions  of  art  and  religion. 

Art-appreciation  on  the  side  of  feeling  is  the 
emotional  impulse  aroused  by  the  contemplation  of 
the  beautiful.  It  is  the  Eros  of  the  Greeks  and  ex- 
presses not  simply  i^assive  enjoyment,  but  an  active 
appropriation  of  the  object.  The  art-feeling,  like 
other  forms  of  spiritual  activity,  however,  passes 
from  a  potential  stage  of  relative  passivity  to  one  of 
realized  actuality.  It  begins  as  a  feeling  of  pleasure 
or  pain  that  is  immediately  aroused  by  the  contem- 
plation of  sensuous  beauty.  The  development  of 
actuality  in  the  aesthetic  emotion  accompanies  the 
progress  of  the  ideal  element.  As  the  higher  ideas 
and  relations  of  beauty  dawn  uiDon  the  intelligence 
they  constitute  the  ideal  basis  of  higher  forms  of 
cesthetic  emotion.  Thus  the  emotional  appreciation 
of  the  beautiful  rises  through  the  categories  of 
moral  beauty  to  that  of  spiritual  beauty  proper,  the 
sphere  of  the  religious  emotions,  and  culminates  in 
the  ecstatic  state  of  emotion  aroused  by  the  beauty 
of  holiness. 

Art  and  utility  are  very  closely  related  in  certain 
departments  of  art,  as  for  exam^Dle  in  architecture. 
But  even  here  art  begins  where  utility  leaves  off.  A 
homely  and  even  hideous  structure  will  serve  the 
ends  of  utilitarian  comfort.  It  is  the  sense  for 
beauty  that  dictates  and  motives  all  the  features  of 
architecture  that  can  be  called  artistic.  This  is 
universally  true  and  the  only  claim  utility  can  have 
on  beauty  is  that  of  self-i^reservation.     It  can  justly 


234  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPPIY 

demand  that  it  be  not  sacrificed  in  the  interest  of 
beauty. 

Art  and  morality  are  more  intimately  connected. 
They  are  one  in  the  sense  that  the  supreme  motive 
of  both  is  love,  and  so  far  as  morality  embodies  love, 
it  is  beautiful.  The  relation  of  the  moral  law  to 
art,  however,  is  analogous  to  that  of  utility.  Mo- 
rality has  the  right  to  demand  that  its  law  be  re- 
spected and  that  the  good  be  not  sacrificed  in  the 
interest  of  beauty. 

The  relations  between  art  and  religion  are  of  the 
closest  kind.  The  form  of  the  artistic  intelligence 
is  the  same  as  that  of  religion.  Both  are  synthetic 
and  teleologic,  operating  under  the  categories  of 
unity  and  design.  Both  are  spiritual  and  concrete, 
appealing  with  equal  power  to  reason  and  feeling. 
And  both  contemplate  in  their  highest  forms  the 
same  spiritual  ideal,  the  solution  of  spiritual  strug- 
gle and  the  realization  of  unity  and  peace  on  a 
higher  plane  through  mediational  sacrifice. 


XY 

KNOWLEDGE 

Knowledge  is  not  reality,  bnt  the  conception  of 
reality.  The  real  is,  therefore,  its  presupposition. 
To  deny  reality  is  to  abolish  the  possibility  of 
knowledge.  But  the  denial  is  not  dangerous,  for  it 
begins  with  the  denial  of  itself.  If  the  sphere  of 
knowledge  is  only  a  sx)here  of  illusion,  then  illusion 
itself  becomes  real.  Illusion  is  not  an  ultimate 
concept.  It  is  the  real  masquerading  in  a  false 
dress.  The  false  dress  presu^Dposes  normal  cloth- 
ing.   The  illusory  is  a  species  within  the  genus  real. 

Kegarding  knowledge,  four  fundamental  questions 
arise  :  (1)  How  is  knovdedge  possible  ?  (2)  How  is 
it  made  actual  ?  (3)  How  are  the  processes  of 
knowledge  correlated  ?  (4)  Has  knowledge  any  limit  ? 

The  first  question  involves  two  considerations  :  (1) 
the  presupposition ;  (2)  the  first  principle  of  knowl- 
edge. McCosh  says  the  presux^position  of  knowl- 
edge is  reality,  and  this  we  also  assert.  If  the  real 
is  not,  then  knowledge  falls  into  self-contradiction. 
To  say,  however,  that  knowledge  presupposes  the 
real  is  only  affirming  in  other  words  that  philosophy 
must  have  a  primal  datum  to  start  from.     A  little 


236  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

reflection  will  show  the  identity  of  these  proposi- 
tions. The  reality  assumed  cannot  be  every  or  any 
sort  of  existence.  Let  us  start  with  some  jDhenom- 
enon  which  is  a  species  of  reality  and  we  find  our- 
selves forced  back  of  the  iDhenomenon  to  its  ante- 
cedent in  time.  But  the  temporal  antecedent  is 
only  a  jDassing  stag-e  in  a  procession  of  reason  which 
moves  on  from  the  idea  of  antecedent  to  that  of 
causal  nexus  as  a  form  of  mechanical  activity  and 
from  this  to  the  idea  of  ground  or  activity  that 
returns  upon  itself  and  is,  therefore,  self -existent. 
This  iDroves  that  every  assumption  is  provisional 
except  the  last,  and  that  every  species  of  reality  ex- 
cept the  last  is  provisionally  assumed  and  depends 
upon  that  last  for  its  justification. 

The  unconditional  -  assumption  of  knowledge, 
that  on  which  all  provisional  assumptions  depend, 
is  absolute  reality.  We  thus  come  back  to  the  primal 
insight  of  Plato  and  Aristotle,  v/ho  saw  that  philos- 
ophy must  have  an  absolute  foundation.  This  ab- 
solute was  construed  by  Aristotle,  as  we  already 
know,  into  purus  actus,  or  pure  self-activity,  in  which 
there  is  no  unrealized  potency.  The  conclusion  we 
reach  here  is  simply  a  reassertion  of  the  Aristotelian 
principle  which  makes  absolute  reality,  that  is, 
absolute  self-activity,  the  first  and  only  uncon- 
ditional presupposition  of  knowledge. 

This  first  presupposition  of  knowledge  leads  us 
by  a  few  steps  to  the  first  principle  of  knowledge. 
When  Descartes  pointed  to  self-consciousness  as  the 
first  iDrinciple  of  philosophy  and  defined  mind  as 


KNOWLEDGE  237 

tliiuking  substance,  he  had  one  foot  in  the  kingdom 
but  was  misled  by  his  false  notion  of  substance. 
Had  he  learned  the  lesson  of  Aristotle  and  trans- 
lated the  idea  of  substance  into  that  of  self -activity, 
his  whole  theory  would  have  been  revolutionized. 
If  to  the  position  here  asserted,  that  pure  self- 
activity  is  the  first  xDresupposition  of  knowledge,  we 
add  the  position  reached  in  the  chapter  on  Con- 
sciousness ;  namely,  that  self-activity  and  self-con- 
scious activity  are  identical,  we  arrive  at  the  idea  of 
self -consciousness  as  the  first  jjriJicq^le  of  Tinowledge. 
But  so  conceived  it  is  a  more  effective  principle 
than  that  of  Descartes.  For  the  idea  of  substance 
has  been  translated  into  the  idea  of  self -activity,  and 
when  self-consciousness  and  self-conscious  activit}^ 
are  identified  the  principle  of  self -consciousness  be- 
comes one  with  the  princiiole  of  self-activity.  Self- 
consciousness  thus  absorbs  the  idea  of  substance 
into  itself. 

The  consequences  of  this  are  far-reaching.  In 
the  first  place  it  reveals  the  fact  that  all  knowledge 
rests  on  an  absolute  first  principle.  If  the  pre- 
supposition of  knowledge  is  pure  self-activity,  and 
its  first  iDrinciple  self-consciousness,  which  is  con- 
scious self -activity,  then  it  is  clear  that  no  catego- 
ries short  of  pure  self-activity  and  the  conscious- 
ness of  pure  self -activity  will  serve  as  x>rimal  grounds 
for  knowledge.  But  pure  self-activity  is  absolute 
being  and  pure  self-consciousness  is  the  self-con- 
sciousness of  absolute  being.  The  ground  and  first 
principle  of  knowledge  are,  therefore,  absolute. 


238  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

Descartes  apprehended,  thoug-h  not  very  clearly, 
the  force  of  this  reflection  when  he  argued  that  the 
existence  of  an  infinite  and  perfect  being  is  tlie  nec- 
essary presupposition  of  the  self -consciousness  of 
man,  a  contention  that  is  perfectly  sound,  but  which 
rests  on  its  true  and  irrefragable  ground  only  when 
the  principle  in  the  human  consciousness  is  asserted 
to  be  absolute  in  its  essence  and,  therefore,  in  its 
perfect  activity,  the  necessary  bearer  of  an  abso- 
lute consciousness.  Absolute  being  is  thus  an  im- 
mediate presupposition  of  self-consciousness. 

In  the  second  place,  this  conception  of  self-con- 
sciousness enables  us  to  discover  and  ground  the 
categories  of  an  adequate  and  comprehensive  theory 
of  knowledge.  Self -activity  is  the  immediate  id  re- 
supposition  of  self-consciousness,  but  its  primal 
categories  are  those  of  self  and  the  not -self  con- 
ceived as  its  negative  opposite.  That  both  these 
categories  are  not  categories  of  being  Avill  appear 
from  the  following  reflection.  Absolute  being  is 
pure  self -activity,  and  pure  self -consciousness  is 
consciousness  of  pure  self-activity.  The  self  then 
of  the  dual  categories  must  be  self-active.  What 
then  is  the  not-self  ?  What  is  it  that  can  be  dis- 
tinguished from  self-activity  as  its  negation  ?  There 
is  no  completely  rational  answer  to  this  possible,  ex- 
cept one  that  endows  being  with  a  primal  power  to 
distinguish  itself  from  its  negative  opposite,  non- 
being.  And  this  non- being  cannot,  therefore,  be 
conceived  as  in  being  but  as  out  of  it,  as  its  qualita- 
tive opposite  and  adversary. 


KNOWLEDGE  239 

The  primal  not-self,  or  object,  of  pure  self-activity 
or  absolute  being  is  not,  then,  anything-  internal  to 
being.  It  is  not  being  (self- activity)  going  out  in 
self-alienation  into  its  other,  for  this  other  would 
still  be  the  self  and  the  dialectic  which  leads  to  it 
would  be  only  the  activity  of  internal  self-evolution. 
The  primal  not -self  is  the  negative  and  foe  of  all 
this  self-active  process.  It  is  something  that  must 
be  annuled  before  the  universe  can  contain  any 
other  conscious  individualities  distinct  from  the 
self-conscious  absolute.  How  this  negative  of  be- 
ing is  to  be  conceived  and  characterized,  we  have 
treated  at  length  in  the  chapter  on  Being  and  Non- 
Being.  The  j)oint  we  wish  to  insist  on  here  is  that 
the  primal  categories  of  reality  are  being  and  non- 
being,  and  that  non-being  is  not  the  alter  ego  but  the 
opposite  of  being.  The  alter  ego  of  being  is  being  in 
some  form,  but  the  negative  of  being  is  its  opj)osite, 
non-being. 

Now,  it  is  to  be  remembered  that  while  these 
categories  of  self  and  not-self  are  ]primal  in  self- 
consciousness,  there  is  an  immediate  presupposition 
of  self-consciousness  and  that  is  self-activity.  If  we 
call  this  being,  we  may  then  say  that  the  very  first 
step  of  all  is  being's  consciousness  of  self.  Being 
becomes  conscious  of  itself.  This  is  the  princijDle 
of  self-consciousness.  The  second  step  is  that  of 
the  distinction  noted  above.  Being  becomes  con- 
scious of  itself  as  distinguished  from  and  opposed 
to  non-being  ;  that  is,  negation  and  want.  The  fact 
that  self-consciousness  is  the  prcsuj^position  of  this 


240  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

distinction  between  self  and  not-self,  has  led  some 
thinkers  to  the  conclusion  that  self-consciousness  is 
the  unity  of  self  and  its  negative,  or  as  they  prefer  to 
say,  subject  and  object.  The  logic  of  this  position 
is  that  the  negative  is  only  the  other  of  the  self  and 
ultimately  identical  with  it.  Self-consciousness  is 
thus  made  a  one-sided  i^rinciple  of  comprehension 
which  identifies  opposites,  and  comprehends  in  being 
want  and  negation  as  well  as  the  plenum  of  ]30sitive 
reality.  But  it  must  be  evident  that  if  this  ab- 
solute principle  comiorehends  vacuum,  that  is,  want 
and  negation,  its  integrity  and  its  absoluteness  are 
destroyed.  The  Absolute  as  pure  self -activity  must 
exclude  want,  negation,  and  imperfection. 

We  must  construe  the  principle  of  self-conscious- 
ness as  the  unity  of  being  and  as  the  i3rincij)le  which, 
therefore,  distinguishes  being  from  its  not-self, 
negation  and  want,  and  excludes  it  as  qualitatively 
outside  of  and  opposed  to  it.  The  primal  category 
of  knowledge,  after  its  first  principle,  self-conscious- 
ness, is  the  distinction  of  self  from  its  negative,  or  as 
we  prefer  to  say,  being  from  non-being.  Now,  knowl- 
edge we  have  defined  as  the  conception  or  idea 
of  reality.  The  two  terms  of  reality  here  reached  are 
being  and  non-being.  A  complete  theory  of  knowl- 
edge must  then  embrace  conceptions  of  non-being 
as  well  as  conceptions  of  being.  We  have  seen,  how- 
ever, in  the  second  and  third  chapters  of  this  book, 
that  no  positive  idea  of  non-being  is  possible.  Non- 
being  is  the  purely  negative  term  in  the  universe  of 
reality.     As  pure  negative  it  must  be  represented 


KNOWLEDGE  241 

by  neg-ative  conceptions.  We  have  seen  that  it  may 
be  best  symbolized  as  an  outer  sphere  which  con- 
tains the  neg-ative  oppositesof  the  energies  of  being, 
and  which  must,  therefore,  be  overcome  in  order 
that  being  may  realize  itself. 

The  part  which  non-being  plays  as  a  datum  in  a 
theory  of  knowledg-e  enters  in  those  modifications 
of  relativity  which  cannot  otherwise  be  explained. 
Postulating  the  negative,  however,  it  may  be  said 
that  the  chief  industry  of  a  theory  of  knowledge  is 
to  be  devoted  to  the  discovery  and  exposition  of  the 
categories  of  being.  In  fact  its  sole  interest  consists 
in  tracing-  the  fortunes  of  being,  non-being  playing 
the  i^art  of  an  adversary  that  must  be  warred  against 
and  overcome. 

Those  thinkers  who  adopt  the  monal  concept  of 
reality  criticised  above,  also  limit  the  inner  dialectic 
of  being  to  self-affirmation  and  self-negation.  But 
the  conception  of  non-being  as  the  antithetic  of  being- 
cancels  the  moment  of  self -negation  and  makes  it  nec- 
essary to  distinguish  between  the  internal  activity  of 
self-affirmation  and  the  transitive  energy  by  which 
being  goes  out  upon  its  oi:)posite.  We  have  seen  in 
the  chapters  on  Being  and  Non-being,  and  Becoming-, 
how  non- being  supplies  a  rational  motive  for  this 
outgo  of  energy  and  thus  grounds  negatively  the 
whole  process  of  becoming.  It  is  this  dual  energiz- 
ing of  self-assertion,  and  negation  of  the  not-self 
or  non-being,  that  is  comx^rehended  in  the  unity  of 
self-consciousness.  The  dual  activity  is  a  function 
of  being,  therefore,  but  the  negated  is  not  included, 
16 


242  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

but  excluded  and  opposed  by  the  energy  of  being. 
The  idea  of  the  self-negation  of  being  involves  a 
subtle  self-contradiction. 

The  dialectic  of  self-consciousness  begins  with  the 
primal  distinction  between  self  and  not-self.  The 
not-self  is  non-being,  the  negation  and  opposite  of 
the  self.  The  second  step  is  one  in  which  the  self  is 
volitionally  asserted,  and  the  not-self  volitionally 
denied.  But  this  denial  of  the  not-self  is  not  a  pure 
intellectual  activity  of  the  self;  it  is  rather  its 
volitional  activity  which  is  to  be  construed  as  the 
putting  forth  of  creative  energy  in  the  process  of 
producing  being  out  of  non-being. 

Of  this  comiDOund  dialectic  the  first  step  is  domi- 
nantly  a  process  of  intellection.  In  the  logic  of  be- 
ing conception  precedes  and  is  presupposed  in  voli- 
tion. Else  the  whole  movement  is  dark  and  irrational. 
The  position  of  Schopenhauer  and  his  school  is  an 
inversion  of  the  necessary  logic  of  being.  But  they 
draw  the  inevitable  conclusion  from  their  transposed 
premises.  If  we  invert  the  world  it  becomes  irra- 
tional and  absurd,  and  life  becomes  a  ghastly  joke. 
We  agree  with  the  philosophy  that  identifies  the 
Absolute  with  absolute  thought,  in  its  main  con- 
tention ;  namely,  that  logically  the  first  activity  of 
all  must  be  intellection.  The  Absolute  must  t/iink  in 
order  to  i.viU  and  act  rationally.  We  only  deprecate 
in  such  thinking  its  rationalistic  tendency  to  force 
every  spiritual  function  into  the  intellectual  mould,  a 
tendency  which  may  be  cured  by  the  reflection  that 
in  the  Absolute,  which  can  only  be  conceived  as  pure 


KNOWLEDGE  243 

actuality  without  undeveloped  potence,  there  may 
be  logical  dependence,  but  no  derivation.  If  we  do 
not  mean  then  to  eliminate  volitional  function  from 
our  idea  of  the  Absolute,  we  must  conceive  its  depen- 
dence on  intellection  in  a  way  that  will  consist  with 
its  originality.  This,  we  think,  is  possible  only  on  the 
supposition  that  self-conscious  activity  has  three 
perfectly  primal  and  insex)arable  modes  or  aspects  ; 
that  in  one  aspect  it  is  intellection ;  in  another  emo- 
tion ;  in  another  volition ;  but  that  in  every  move- 
ment of  its  activity,  intellection  is  the  first  presup- 
position. 

If  in  this  sense  the  first  act  of  the  spiritual  dia- 
lectic is  one  of  thinking,  we  can  see  how  the  intel- 
lectual activity  completes  its  circle,  going  out  from 
itself  in  the  intuition  of  the  negative  outer  sphere 
and  returning  upon  itself  enriched  with  a  dual  intui- 
tion of  being  and  non-being.  And  this  will  motive, 
as  we  have  seen,  the  second  act,  which  is  one  of  will, 
the  volitional  activity  going  out  in  the  energy  of 
creation  into  the  negative  sphere,  and  returning 
upon  itself  enriched  with  a  dual  realization  of  being 
and  becoming,  or,  in  other  phrase,  of  self  and  the 
other.  This  again,  to  complete  the  movement,  will 
motive  the  third  act,  which  is  dominantly  one  of 
unity,  in  which  the  absolute  activity,  going  out  in 
the  energy  of  love  upon  the  other,  or  becoming,  re- 
turns upon  itself  enriched  with  a  dual  realization 
of  self  and  the  other  reconciled. 

In  this  dialectic  of  spiritual  activity  it  is  funda- 
mental to  observe  that  the  primal  intellectual  intui- 


244  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN  PHILOSOPHY 

tion  which  differentiates  non-being  from  being  is 
not  mediated,  but  stands  open,  and  that  this  supplies 
the  motive  for  the  whole  consequent  dialectic,  the 
will  to  cancel  the  negative  by  producing  being  in 
its  sphere,  which  gives  rise  to  the  creature,  a  nature 
that  contains  the  potentiality  of  spiritual  being, 
and  lastly  the  outflow  of  synthetic  love  which 
mediates  the  spiritual  evolution  of  the  creature  and 
brings  it  into  harmony  with  the  creative  spirit.  A 
clear  conception  of  this,  as  we  think,  fundamental 
truth,  will  make  it  plain  that  non-being  cannot  be 
comprehended  as  a  moment  in  the  evolution  of 
being,  but  that  it  is  the  op^DOsite  of  spirit  and  to 
be  mediated  only  by  being  overcome.  This  medi- 
ation can  be  effected  only  by  volition  and  love,  and 
has  for  its  moments  creation  and  evolution,  the  pro- 
duction of  potential  being  out  of  non-being  and 
the  development  of  this  potence  toward  the  ideal  of 
actualized  spirit. 

In  grounding  a  theory  of  knowledge  it  is  not  cus- 
tomary to  go  so  deep  into  ontology.  The  sufficient 
justification  for  doing  so,  however,  is  its  necessity. 
The  first  principle  of  knowledge  is  self -conscious- 
ness, and  we  have  seen  that  this  cannot  be  conceived 
in  any  other  way  than  as  conscious  self-activit}^  It, 
therefore,  absorbs  the  idea  of  substance  into  it  and 
becomes  also  the  first  principle  of  ontology.  It  is 
impossible  to  develop  a  rational  theory  of  knoAvledge 
without  showing  the  ontologic  grounds  on  which 
it  rests,  and  since  a  complete  theory  of  knowledge 
must  include  both  the  Absolute  and  the  relative,  its 


KNOWLEDGE  245 

structural  oiitolog'y  will  include  a  rational  insig-lit 
into  tlie  nature  of  absolute  and  relative  being.  Not 
only  so,  but  since  there  is  a  difterence  between 
absolute  and  relative  as  well  as  a  sameness,  these 
relations  must  have  their  reason  for  knowledge  in 
real  ontological  grounds.  For  it  is  rationally  clear 
that  no  theory  of  knowledge  can  profess  adequacy 
which  does  not  correlate  the  world  and  its  absolute 
ground  in  such  a  manner  that  reflection  may  find 
in  the  ground  the  rationale,  not  only  of  the  world's 
existence,  but  also  of  its  distinctive  nature  and  evo- 
lution. 

From  the  development  of  the  first  principle  of 
knovdedge  and  the  presupi^osition  of  reality  on 
which  it  rests,  namely,  that  of  self  -  existence,  we 
reach  a  structural  conception  of  the  system  of  reality. 
x4nd  this,  taken  as  a  whole,  is  to  be  regarded  as  the 
condition  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge.  For, 
when  the  situation  has  been  thoroughly  analyzed, 
the  discovery  is  made  that  the  real  presupj)osition 
of  knowledge  is  a  whole  system  of  reality  ;  that  the 
assumption  of  self-existence  leads  reflection  by  an 
inevitable  route  to  the  ideas  of  being  and  non-being 
and  the  sphere  of  dependent  being  and  relativity. 
Knowledge  confronts  this  structural  system  of 
things  and  its  practical  problem  is  how  this  sys- 
tem of  reality  is  to  be  actuiilized  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  the  individual.  This  ranks  as  the  second 
great  question  in  a  theory  of  knowledge. 

The  mode  of  individual  acquisition  is  grounded 
in  the  nature  of  the  human  soul.     The  soul,  as  vv^e 


246  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

have  seen,  is  a  develoiDing  spiritual  principle.  It 
is,  therefore,  dual  in  its  constitution,  combining"  in 
itself  both  potence  and  actuality.  As  a  developing- 
]3otence  it  is  a  flowing  stream  ;  as  an  actuality  it  is  a 
self-centred  individual.  Its  life  and  evolution  con- 
sist in  a  progressive  dialectic  between  these  terms, 
in  which  the  tendency  is  to  iDass  from  a  stage  in 
which  the  life  is  dominated  by  mechanical  categories 
to  one  in  which  spirit  has  realized  its  free  activity. 
This  idea  of  the  soul  as  a  developing  spiritual  prin- 
ciple explains  two  fundamental  characteristics  of 
individual  knowledge.  The  first  is  the  possibility 
of  knoAvledge  being  an  individual  possession  at  all 
when  its  first  principle  is  a  universal.  There  is  a 
common  fund  of  reality,  but  there  can  be  no  com- 
mon fund  of  knowledge.  This  arises  from  the  fact 
that  man  is  a  developing  creature.  If  he  were  abso- 
lute there  Avould  be  a  common  fund  of  knowledge, 
but  there  would  be  only  one  being  to  enjoy  it,  for 
there  can  be  but  one  absolute  consciousness.  But, 
as  we  have  seen  in  the  preceding  chapter,  the  mode 
of  man's  spiritual  activity  as  a  developing  creature, 
determines  his  conscious  individuality  and  will  as 
distinct.  The  human  consciousness,  therefore,  con- 
tains an  absolute  lorinciple  ;  namely,  that  of  spiritual 
self-activity,  but  in  man,  it  is  a  principle  of  a  de- 
veloping life  that  is  ever  passing  through  potence  to 
actuality  in  the  stages  of  growth  and  evolution. 

The  second  fundamental  characteristic  of  knowl- 
edge which  the  idea  of  the  soul  explains  is  the  proc- 
ess of  acquisition.     From  mechanism  to   spirit  is 


KNOWLEDGE  247 

the  law  of  evolution.  The  process  of  acqiiisitio]i  will 
follow  this  law,  and  the  stages  in  the  development 
of  its  modes,  from  sensation  up  to  the  highest  ra- 
tional activity,  will  correspond  to  and  depend  on 
the  stages  in  the  evolution  of  the  spiritual  principle. 
The  fact  that  in  the  beginnings  of  the  intellectual 
activity  the  categories  of  space  and  time  determine 
the  form  of  experience,  is  not  wholly  explained  by 
conceiving  a  budding  soul  in  a  bodily  organism ; 
but  a  deeper  root  of  this  is  to  be  found  in  the  fact 
that  the  spiritual  potence  of  the  soul  is  itself  in  that 
stage  of  activity  when  the  form  of  its  activity  is 
most  dominated  by  the  mechanical  categories.  This 
explains  why  the  whole  representation  -  framework 
of  its  life  is  mechanical,  so  that  any  truth  that  aims 
to  reach  the  inner  citadel  of  aj)prehension  must  come 
thickly  coated  in  the  dress  of  material  representa- 
tion. 

As  the  life  i^rogresses  the  modes  of  apprehension 
change  ;  the  merely  spatio-temi)oral  forms  begin  to 
give  place  to  the  dynamic,  and  the  intelligence  be- 
gins to  grasp  causation,  the  inner  principle  of  the 
series.  This  marks  the  starting-point  of  reflection 
and  of  the  intellectual  life  proper.  For  the  appre- 
hension of  causation,  even  in  its  most  mechanical 
form,  leads  the  mind  to  look  from  the  fact  to  the 
condition  out  of  which  it  rises.  And  this  marks  the 
transition  from  mere  representation  to  conception, 
which  is  the  first  term  of  the  life  of  reflection.  The 
central  principle  of  the  conceptive  form  of  intellec- 
tion is  causation  conceived  as  a  bond  that  connects 


248  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

plienomena  with  a  chain  or  series  of  conditions.  It 
is  the  dominating"  category  of  that  middle  stage  of 
mentality  to  which  the  name  understanding  has  been 
applied.  But  the  evolution  of  spiritual  activity 
makes  it  impossible  for  the  reflective  life  to  stop 
here.  Mechanical  causation  which  holds  phenomena 
in  the  bonds  of  conditions  external  to  them  is  not 
an  ultimate  form  of  activity,  but  has  coiled  up  in  it 
the  suggestion  of  a  mode  of  activity  that  transcends 
it.  In  other  words  reflection  must  progress  from  the 
idea  of  the  dependent,  or  that  which  has  the  reason 
of  its  being  outside  of  itself,  to  the  idea  of  ground, 
or  that  which  has  the  reason  of  its  being  within 
itself  and  is,  therefore,  self-existent.  The  idea  of 
ground  is  that  of  self-activity,  and  thus  in  the  no- 
tion of  ground  spirit  has  achieved  an  idea  of  its  own 
highest  category  which  is  self-explanatory. 

Thus  the  intellectual  life  culminates  on  the  ob- 
jective side  in  the  category  of  self  -  existence  or 
absolute  being  which  we  have  seen  in  another 
connection  to  be  the  unconditional  presuiD position 
of  knowledge.  On  its  inner  side  the  conscious  life 
passes  from  its  representation-form,  in  which  flows 
the  life  of  the  purely  empirical  self,  through  the  con- 
cept-form, which  embodies  the  emi3irico-rationaI 
self,  up  to  the  idea -form,  whose  principle  is  self- 
consciousness  and  whose  embodiment  is  the  purely 
rational  self.  On  its  inner  side,  therefore,  the  intel- 
lectual life  culminates  in  the  principle  of  self-con- 
sciousness, which  we  have  found  to  be  the  ground- 
principle   of   knowledge.      By   following   the  clew 


KNOWLEDGE  249 

furnished  by  the  idea  of  a  spiritual  principle  de- 
veloping* from  potence  to  actuality,  we  are  thus  able 
to  show  how  the  process  of  acquisition  leads  u-p 
to  that  synthesis  of  ground-principle  and  presup- 
position on  which  the  possibility  of  knowledge  de- 
pends. 

The  third  fundamental  question  is  that  of  the 
correlation  of  i^rocesses  of  knowledge.  There  are 
two  generic  methods,  the  deductive  or  rational,  and 
the  inductive  or  empirical.  These  are  both  founded 
on  what  are  called  the  fundamental  axioms  of 
thought ;  namely,  identity  and  contradiction,  or,  in 
Platonic  phrase,  the  same  and  the  different,  and  suf- 
ficient reason.  Now,  these  laws  Avlien  reduced  to 
their  primal  form  resolve  into  the  dialectic  of  spirit 
which  we  have  already  unfolded.  This  dialectic  is 
a  primal  antithetic  of  thinking  by  which  self-includ- 
ing being  excludes  its  opposite,  non-being. 

The  two  antithetic  categories,  the  same  and  the  dif- 
ferent, constitute  the  primeval  eyes  of  thinking,  and 
its  original  constitution,  therefore,  predetermines 
it  to  be  ever  on  the  search  for  the  same  throughout  a 
chaos  of  differences.  Translating  this  into  terms  of 
self-activity  which  is  the  highest  category  of  si3int, 
we  may  say  that  the  fundamental  law  of  thinking 
is  dual,  and  that  it  is  of  the  essence  of  thought 
to  think  itself  inclusively,  and  its  oi^posite  exclu- 
sively and  antithetically.  This  dialectic  functions 
at  the  heart  of  all  intellectual  processes.  But  it 
is  capable  of  two  different  modes  of  application, 
and  these  modes  are  the  two  generic  methods.     If 


250  BASAL    CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

we  start  with  a  rational  presupposition  and  apply 
our  dual  dialectic  to  it,  the  method  is  rational.  Here 
the  thought  is  a  two-armed  instrument  and  the  move- 
ment of  demonstx'ation  is  the  self-inclusion  of  the 
same  and  the  antithetic  exclusion  of  the  different. 
Thought  thus  cuts  both  ways,  like  a  double  plough- 
share, and  the  demonstrated  result  of  the  process 
is  the  thought's  own  self-included  offspring.  The 
hackneyed  syllogism,  "  Man  is  mortal,  Socrates  is  a 
man  ;  therefore,  Socrates  is  mortal,"  illustrates  this. 
The  thought  has  combined  humanity  and  mortality, 
and  wherever  it  finds  humanity  it  reasserts  itself 
and  binds  humanity  to  its  fellow,  mortality.  But 
this  process  of  inclusion  is  by  itself  an  abstraction 
and  impossible.  The  act  that  connects  man  and 
mortality  is  only  half  a  complete  thought.  The 
concrete  thought  has  its  negative  exclusive  side, 
not-mortal,  not-man,  which  forms  the  negative  back- 
ground of  the  intellection  and  follows  it  through 
every  step  to  the  end.  The  dialectic  of  thought  is 
negative  and  exclusive  as  well  as  positive  and  inclu- 
sive. But  it  never  negates  or  excludes  itself,  always 
its  oiD^Dosite. 

If,  however,  we  start,  not  with  a  rational  presup- 
position but  a  fact  or  group  of  facts,  the  same  dia- 
lectic will  proceed  in  a  different  manner.  In  the  ra- 
tional process  the  dialectic  proceeds  from  an  assumed 
relation,  and  its  business  is  that  of  dual  inclusion 
and  exclusion  under  this  relation.  But  here  we 
seem  to  have  isolated  facts  without  any  relation. 
Thought,  however,  cannot  get  on  without  relations. 


KNOWLEDGE  251 

How  then  does  the  dialectic  of  thought  apply  to  the 
case  ?  Evidently  in  this  way :  In  thinking,  reason 
includes  her  own,  but  excludes  and  negates  her  op- 
posite. Now,  facts  without  relations,  that  is,  iso- 
lated unaccounted  facts,  are  irrational.  Thought 
expels  them  from  her  province  and  then  goes  out 
upon  them  by  a  volitional  act  in  order  to  overcome 
them  and  create  a  rational  system  out  of  the  irra- 
tional. Here  we  get  at  the  root  of  the  other  great 
l^rinciple  of  thinking ;  namely,  sufficient  reason. 
For  sufficient  reason  is  not  a  purely  intellectual 
princij)le,  but  contains  an  element  of  volition.  It  is 
the  demand  of  the  human  spirit  that  the  irrational 
shall  be  su^Dpressed,  and  that  out  of  it  shall  be  pro- 
duced a  rational  system.  This  demand,  which  arises 
in  view  of  the  negative,  is  the  motive  that  leads  to 
the  reference  of  isolated  facts  or  groups  to  their 
causal  conditions.  The  result  is  the  emergence  of  a 
rational  order  out  of  the  irrational.  And  we  have 
only  to  follow  this  process  through  its  successive 
stages  of  rational  genesis  until  it  reaches  the  high- 
est category  and  realizes  a  spiritual  result,  in  order 
to  see  that  in  this  law  of  sufficient  reason  we  have 
struck  a  motive,  in  substance  the  same  as  that  which 
we  have  been  led  to  attribute  to  the  absolute  spirit 
as  the  motive  of  creation. 

Now,  regarding  the  correlation  of  these  two  pro- 
cesses, rational  and  empirical,  it  is  clear  that  they 
ought  to  mutually  bear  out  and  supplement  one 
another.  For  whether  we  stai-t  with  a  rational  sup- 
position and  come  down  to  the  details  of  its  appli- 


252  BASAL   COXCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

cation  under  the  guidance  of  the  dual  law  of  identity 
and  difference,  or  begin  with  irrational  and  isolat- 
ed facts,  or  groups,  and  proceed  upward  under  the 
impulse  of  sufficient  reason,  we  are  but  traversing 
the  same  circle  in  opposite  directions,  and  ought  to 
come  around  to  some  point  where  the  conclusion  of 
one  method  will  bear  out  the  other.  That  this  is  the 
true  idea  of  correlation  finds  confirmation  in  the 
fact  illustrated  in  the  first  division  of  this  chapter ; 
namely,  that  if  we  start  from  self -consciousness  as  the 
first  principle  of  knowledge,  we  are  led  by  rational 
reflection  upon  it  to  a  structural  ontology  in  which 
a  sphere  of  relative  and  created  being  is  grounded 
on  the  self-existent  absolute.  Whereas,  if  we  start 
from  x^henomena  and  follow  the  demand  of  sufficient 
reason,  we  are  led  step  by  step  to  a  point  where  we 
find  in  self-existence  the  objective  ground,  and  in 
self-consciousness  the  inner  principle  of  all  rational 
knowledge.  The  result  here  is,  on  the  one  hand, 
the  grounding  of  the  empirical  sphere  by  means  of 
the  rational  method  ;  on  the  other,  the  confirmation 
of  the  primal  data  of  the  rational  method  by  means 
of  the  empirical  iDrocedure. 

That  one  method  should  confirm  the  other  is  only 
riitional.  For  whether  we  start  with  the  i^rinciple 
of  identity  and  difference,  or  with  that  of  sufficient 
reason,  the  procedure  is  one  and  the  same,  the  self- 
assertion  of  spirit  against  its  negative.  If  we  pro- 
ceed upon  the  former  principle,  spirit  asserts  itself 
overtly  and  explicitly,  and  excludes  and  sublates  its 
negative ;  whereas,  if  our  procedure  is  under  the 


KNOWLEDGE  253 

principle  of  sufficient  reason,  spirit  overtly  and  ex- 
plicitly excludes  and  sublates  tlie  negative,  wliile 
tlie  implicit  motive  of  its  whole  movement  is  its  as- 
sertion of  itself.  The  whole  movement,  for  instance, 
of  the  logic  of  Hegel  is  intelligible  and  rational  if 
we  conceive  that  here  spirit  is  proceeding  under  the 
principle  of  sufficient  reason  and  asserting  itself 
against  the  negative  in  an  activity  which  is  continu- 
ally producing  out  of  the  irrational  the  stages  of  a 
rational  evolution.  On  the  other  hand,  Hegel's  or- 
dinary i3rocedure  is  an  application  of  identity  and 
difference,  the  principle  of  the  common  logic,  and 
its  dialectic  when  truly  understood  consists  in  an 
overt  dualistic  movement  in  which  spirit  persistent- 
ly asserts  and  includes  itself,  while  it  just  as  persist- 
ently excludes  and  sublates  its  negative. 

As  to  the  limits  of  knowledge,  we  have  seen  that 
all  method  is  reducible  to  one  formula,  si3irit's  as- 
sertion of  itself.  Now,  as  spirit  includes  both  ab- 
solute and  relative,  this  formula  must  include  the 
whole  continent  of  reality.  Log'icall}^,  then,  there 
can  be  no  a  priori  limit  of  knowledge.  The  principle 
of  knowledge  is  all-comprehensive,  and  this  renders 
omniscience  logically  possible.  But  there  is  an  onto- 
logical,  or  rather  an  onto-psychological,  principle  of 
limitation  which  is  to  be  found  in  the  nature  of  the 
human  soul.  We  have  seen  that  the  soul  is  not 
13ure  actuality,  but  rather  a  spiritual  principle  that  is 
passing  continually  from  potence  to  actuality.  This 
means  that  the  soul  is  an  imperfect,  developing 
creature.     Now,  undeveloped  potence  is,  as  we  have 


254  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

seen,  a  limitation  which  determines  the  distinctive 
form  and  bounds  of  the  soul's  activity.  It  is  here 
that  we  strike  the  true  limit  of  knowledge.  It  is  a 
limit  of  energy,  of  spirit's  ]3ower  of  asserting  itself, 
and  rests  therefore  primarily  in  the  will,  and  not  in 
the  thought  or  intelligence. 

The  limit  of  knowledge  is,  therefore,  not  fixed  but 
movable.  As  the  human  spirit  unfolds  into  actual- 
ity, its  ]30wer  of  asserting  itself  increases,  and  as  its 
intelligence  unfolds,  thought  in  its  self-assertion  is 
able  to  master  progressively  higher  categories.  The 
highest  category  is  that  of  spirit  itself,  and  when 
the  human  soul  is  able  to  realize  all  things  com- 
pletely under  the  self-active  category  of  spirit,  it  is 
able  to  say  that  it  apprehends  even  as  it  is  appre- 
hended. 


XVI 

LOGOS 

We  have  seen  in  the  first  chapter  of  this  book  that 
the  logos-principle  is  the  norm  of  intelligibility  in 
the  sphere  of  reality.  What  this  logos-princij)le  is 
we  are  now  able  more  clearly  to  determine.  His- 
torically, the  principle  has  its  ontologic  root  in  the 
idealism  of  Plato.  From  Plato  it  gradually  worked 
its  way  into  the  heart  of  xDhilosox3hic  thinking  until, 
under  the  spiritual  impulse  of  Christianity,  it  be- 
came, as  the  category  of  immanent  self-conscious 
liersonality,  the  constructive  norm  of  theological  as 
well  as  philosophical  conceptions.  The  unapproach- 
able One  of  Neo-Platonism,  the  unrelated  Absolute  of 
Hellenic  Judaism,  which  is  connected  with  the  world 
only  through  an  external  logos,  becomes  the  divine 
logos,  the  Being  who  is  internally  self-conscious  and 
personal  and  who  manifests  himself  as  the  Creator 
of  the  world  out  of  non-being,  and  as  the  mediator 
who  leads  the  world  out  of  its  alienation  up  to  God. 
Psychologically,  we  have  found  this  same  principle 
energizing  at  the  centre  of  modern  thinking  as  the 
basis  of  certitude  and  the  ground-category  of  knowl- 
edge.   In  modern  philosophy  it  is  the  principle  of 


256  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

self-consciousness,  which,  as  conceived  by  Descartes 
failed  to  realize  its  full  i30wer.  But  the  tendency  of 
modern  thinking  has  been  in  the  direction  of  a  spe- 
cies of  psychological  immanence  which  conceives 
the  logos  as  the  inner  category  of  substance  and 
thus  translates  it  into  living  spirit. 

The  principle  of  self-consciousness  becomes  thus 
a  norm  of  conscious  self-activity,  and  conscious  self- 
activity  is  identical  with  personal,  spiritual  being. 
And  combining  the  ontologic  and  psychologic  intu- 
itions, the  conclusion  is  reached  that  all  being  is  in 
its  core  spiritual  and  personal. 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  the  logos-principle  and  the 
principle  of  pure  self-conscious  personality  are  iden- 
tical ;  that  when  we  call  God  the  logos  we  call  him 
the  self-conscious  personal  being,  and  that  when  we 
call  man  a  self-conscious  personal  being  we  thereby 
conceive  him  as  a  being  of  whose  spiritual  nature 
the  logos  is  the  immanent  principle.  There  is  then  a 
relation  of  sameness  between  the  absolute  spirit  and 
the  soul  of  man  in  the  principle  which  determines 
their  conscious  and  personal  life. 

This  vital  point  gives  rise  to  two  important  con- 
siderations. The  first  concerns  the  function  of  the 
logos-principle  as  enabling  us  to  determine  the  in- 
ner natures,  respectively,  of  the  absolute  spirit  and 
the  soul  of  man.  Regarding  absolute  spirit,  we  only 
need  here  to  summarize  the  results  of  former  reflec- 
tions. In  the  chapter  on  Knowledge  we  were  able,  by 
conceiving  the  logos-principle  as  a  norm  of  spiritual 
activity,  to  follow  the  immanent  dialectic  of  spirit 


LOGOS  257 

and  determine  the  self-conscious  personal  life  of  the 
Absolute  under  three  logically  correlated  aspects,  as 
absolute  thought,  absolute  will,  and  absolute  love. 
And  by  construing  the  negative  side  of  this  dialectic 
in  the  light  of  the  same  princii^le  we  were  able  to 
see  how  the  intuition  of  non-being  arising  in  the 
primal  activity  of  absolute  thought,  supplies  the 
motive  for  the  out-go  of  the  absolute  will  in  the  cre- 
ation of  the  world  in  the  sphere  of  non-being,  and 
how  also  the  imperfect  and  undeveloped  nature 
of  the  creature,  its  distance  from  the  creator,  sup- 
13lies  the  motive  for  the  out-go  of  the  absolute  love 
in  the  work  of  evolution  and  mediation. 

The  principle  is  equally  potent  in  revealing  the 
inner  nature  of  the  human  soul.  We  have  seen  how 
the  true  idea  of  the  creative  function  leads  to  a 
rational  conception  of  becoming  and  relative  nature. 
It  determines  the  soul  as  a  spiritual  potence  which  is 
consciously  passing  into  actuality,  as  a  developing 
creature,  therefore,  with  an  infinite  spiritual  ideal. 
It  leads,  therefore,  to  a  rational  conception  of  the 
dualism  of  the  soul's  conscious  experience,  and  ena- 
bles us  to  translate  it  into  a  struggle  of  the  ideal 
jprinciple  of  self-conscious  activity,  to  overcome  and 
comprehend  the  flowing  stream  of  the  empirical  life. 
And  it  further  leads  to  a  rational  idea  of  the  con- 
scious stages  which  the  sovd  passes  through  in  this 
dual  evolution.  For  just  as  the  ai^plication  of  the 
idea  of  self-conscious  dialectic  enables  us  to  conceive 
three  logically  correlated  aspects  of  the  personal  life 
of  the  Absolute  ;  namely,  absolute  thought,  absolute 
17 


258  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

will,  and  absolute  love  ;  so  in  tlie  psychic  sphere  its 
application  reveals  to  us  a  corresponding  dialectic 
in  which  the  spirit  asserts  itself  intellectually  in  the 
Xorinciple  of  identity  and  diflerence,  volitionally  in 
the  princii^le  of  sufficient  reason  and  aesthetically  in 
the  principle  of  unity  which  is  the  soul  of  love.  But 
in  the  human  spirit  this  self-assertion  is  an  ideal 
that  is  never  completely  realized,  since  the  spirit 
itself  is  a  developing  xootence  whose  basal  movement 
is  an  evolution. 

The  second  consideration  is  that  of  the  relation 
between  the  absolute  logos  and  the  spirit  of  man. 
We  have  seen  that  in  the  possession  of  a  common 
principle  they  are  the  same.  But  this  sameness  is 
only  community  of  essence.  It  justifies  the  assertion, 
that  the  ideal  principre  of  man's  spiritual  nature  is 
absolute,  and  that  he  may,  therefore,  be  the  bearer 
of  absolute  ideas  and  a  knowledge  of  the  Absolute. 
But  this  only  implies  community  of  essence.  The 
modification  which  constitutes  man  a  creature  ;  name- 
ly, the  form  of  his  spiritual  activity  as  a  growth  or 
evolution  from  potence  to  actuality,  which  also  de- 
termines the  order  of  his  progress  from  mechanism 
to  sx3irit,  is  the  basis  of  his  distinction  of  conscious- 
ness, individuality,  and  will.  This  constitutes  him 
the  bearer  of  a  conscious  life  whose  principle  is 
ideally  absolute,  but  whose  individuality  is  relative 
and  distinct. 

There  is  thus  community  and  distinction  between 
the  absolute  logos  and  the  spirit  of  man.  And  we 
have  seen  in  the  chaj^ter  on  Religion  how,  through 


LOGOS  259 

this  community  of  spiritual  jDrinciple  embodying-  it- 
self on  the  one  hand  in  the  soul's  ideal  and  on  the 
other  in  the  Divine  logos,  a  medium  of  interaction 
and  intercommunion  is  maintained  between  the  soul 
and  its  transcendent  ground. 

The  log-OS  stands  thus  as  a  fruitful  norm  of  phil- 
osophic ideas.  It  is  the  principle  from  Avhich  a 
rational  conception  of  absolute  being  may  be  de- 
duced. Without  it  only  the  existence  of  an  abso- 
lute could  be  affirmed,  while  its  nature  would  baffle 
conception.  It  is  the  only  princi]3le  also  that  makes 
a  true  conception  of  the  dualistic  dialectic  of  spirit 
possible.  "Without  the  insight  it  gives  the  true  nat- 
ure and  differentia  of  relativity  would  be  hidden 
mysteries,  and  no  adequate  conception  of  the  nature 
of  the  human  spirit  and  its  relation  to  the  Absolute 
would  be  possible.  On  any  other  princii)le  agnos- 
ticism could  not  be  clearly  transcended,  nor  yet 
pantheism  or  atheistic  individualism.  The  logos 
is  a  principle  that  intelligizes  the  whole  system  of 
reality,  binding  absolute  and  relative  each  to  each 
in  close  bonds,  without  infringing  the  vested  rights 
of  either. 

The  logos  also  mediates  the  evolution  of  the 
world-process.  The  categories  of  its  progress  are, 
as  we  have  seen,  mechanism,  life,  and  spirit.  The 
mechanical  forces  are  the  first  actualities  of  the  po- 
tential world-ground.  They  act  without  conscious- 
ness or  teleologic  motive  of  their  own,  but  they  are 
not  to  be  conceived,  therefore,  as  blindly  working 
forces,  for  hidden  in  them  is  the  will  of  the  logos 


260  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

working  under  the  categ-ory  unity.  Cosmic  nature 
is  the  si3here  of  mechanism  and  of  mechanical  forces 
and  laws.  But  her  x3resupposition  is  a  sx)iritual  ac- 
tivity which  can  alone  supj)ly  a  completely  rational 
idea  of  her  order. 

The  world-process,  under  the  impelling*  will  of 
the  log-OS  at  length  transcends  the  pure  mechanical 
stage  and  enters  that  of  life,  where  the  spiritual  prin- 
ciple begins  to  function  as  an  immanent  unifying 
force  in  the  production  of  organisms.  In  the  plant 
consciousness  is  transcendent,  but  it  enters  the  ani- 
mal as  instinct  and  feeling,  and  the  animal  is  able, 
therefore,  to  assert  itself  against  a  merely  mechani- 
cal existence  and  to  develop  a  species  of  imperfect 
individuality.  But  to  the  animal,  ideality  is  still  a 
hidden  force.  The  animal  is  a  blind  servant  of  the 
logos  and  represents  only  a  transitional  stage  in 
the  passage  of  the  world  from  the  cosmic  to  the 
psychic  sphere. 

The  category  of  life  is  that  of  mechano-teleology. 
Its  overt  forces  and  laws  are  mechanical,  but  under 
the  influence  of  the  hidden  activity  of  the  logos 
these  forces  realize  a  product  which  transcends  them 
and  points  necessarily  to  a  spiritual  ground.  In 
the  psychic  nature,  as  Ave  have  seen,  the  logos  be- 
comes immanent  as  a  principle  of  self-conscious 
activity  and  experience,  not  as  the  logos  of  God, 
however,  bringing  with  it  an  absolute  consciousness, 
but  rather  as  the  ideal  principle  in  the  conscious- 
ness of  an  imperfect  and  develox3ing  creature.  Here 
it  functions  as  the  principle  of  knowledge  and  as  the 


LOGOS  261 

organ  that  contains  the  ideal  norms  of  philosophy, 
science,  morality,  and  art. 

It  is  by  virtue  of  the  logos-principle  also  that  the 
soul  of  man  is  able  to  transcend  the  limits  of  its 
particular  individuality  and  to  achieve  a  race-con- 
sciousness as  the  arena  for  a  historic  experience  and 
common  civic  life.  Here  its  outj^ut  is  culture  and 
civilization  and  all  that  splendid  and  pathetic  record 
that  is  embodied  in  human  historj^  In  this  sphere 
the  logos  also  functions  as  a  i3rinciple  of  spiritual 
freedom  motiving  and  inspiring  that  teleologic  up- 
ward movement  of  social,  intellectual,  and  spiritual 
progress,  which  through  and  over  all  negative  oppo- 
sition and  in  spite  of  all  subversive  and  destructive 
tendencies  has  made  the  historic  record,  with  all  its 
obverse  side  of  darkness  and  disorder,  one  of  splen- 
did and  enduring  achievement. 

But  not  without  the  Logos  of  God.  The  deepest 
intuition  of  j)hilosophy  is  that  Avhich  beholds  the 
spirit  of  man  in  close  and  living  union  with  its  di- 
vine fellow.  The  human  psyche  is  never  away  from 
the  logos  of  God,  but,  as  the  profound  Descartes 
asserted,  the  conscious  lorinciple  which  gives  the 
soul  its  idea  of  self  gives  it  also  in  inseparable  fel- 
lowship its  idea  of  God.  The  plummet  that  sounds 
the  profoundest  depths  of  psychic  nature  touches 
also  the  nature  of  God.  That  God  and  the  psyche 
are  identical  is,  and  ever  must  be,  precluded  by  the 
basal  type  of  psychic  nature.  But  there  is  unity  of 
principle  in  diversity  of  type  and  distinction  of  con- 
sciousness.    The  psychic  logos  and  the  logos  of  God 


262  BASAL   CONCEPTS    IN   PHILOSOPHY 

are  one  in  their  ground  principle.  Only,  the  latter  is 
pu7'us  actus  in  the  nature  and  consciousness  of  the 
Absolute,  while  the  psychic  logos  is  a  germ  con- 
taining the  potency  of  rational  and  spiritual  evo- 
lution. 

It  is  in  the  light  of  this  potentiality  that  psychic 
history  transcends  the  category  of  mechanism  and 
becomes  com]3letely  teleologic.  For  just  as  the 
teleologic  meaning  of  cosmic  nature  is  only  revealed 
in  the  appearance  of  the  psyche,  so  the  teleology  of 
psychic  nature,  and  through  it  of  all  relativity,  is 
made  clear  only  in  the  ideal  realization  of  the 
psychic  type.  This,  as  we  have  seen,  is  achieved  by 
gradations  in  the  spiritual  movements  of  humanity 
and  in  the  medium  of  historic  individuals  through 
whom  new  increments  'of  spiritual  force  flow  in  from 
the  transcendent  logos  into  human  channels.  Thus 
humanity  travels  the  toilsome  road  of  a  spiritual 
development  through  which  it  is  enabled  to  ap- 
proach the  goal  of  its  asi3iration. 

It  is  only  from  the  stand-point  of  religion,  how- 
ever, that  the  teleology  of  the  world  can  be  com- 
pletely understood.  Religion,  as  we  saw,  is  founded 
on  a  need  of  mediation  which  is  inherent  in  the 
psychic  nature.  Even  though  evil  had  never  be- 
come real  the  psyche  is  mutable  and  needs  tran- 
scendent help  to  work  out  its  si3iritual  destiny. 
Much  more,  then,  is  this  assistance  needful  when  the 
psyche  has  fallen  into  evil  and  sin  has  become  a 
baleful  and  destructive  force.  The  medial  function 
must  in   that  case   also  become   remedial,  and  the 


LOGOS  263 

psycliic  nature  must  be  renovated  as  well  as  spirit- 
ualized. 

But  the  remedial  function  can  be  no  after-tliouglit 
to  the  Absoluts.  For  the  possibility  of  evil  in  the 
sphere  of  the  relative  can  be  no  after-thought.  And 
if  no  after- thought,  then  it  must  be  contemplated  in 
the  world-idea  which  underlies  creation,  and  in  which 
the  ultimate  key  to  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  evil 
and  all  other  problems  is  to  be  sought.  How,  then, 
is  this  world-idea  to  be  conceived  ?  What  is  the 
highest  thought  of  the  Absolute  for  the  relative? 
It  must  be  the  thought  of  the  absolute  religion.  It 
must  be  a  mediation  that  transcends  ordinary  his- 
toric channels  although  it  embodies  itself  in  the  su- 
l^reme  historic  individual.  The  logos  of  God  must 
come  down  to  us  men  from  God,  must  enter  into  the 
sphere  of  relativity,  into  the  world  of  the  psychic 
logos,  must  achieve  a  consciousness  of  the  material 
and  corporeal,  must  achieve  an  empiric  character 
and  consciousness,  and  a  dualistic  nature  in  which 
a  spiritual  principle  and  law  dominates  the  empiri- 
cal and  brings  it  into  harmony  Avith  itself.  The 
logos  of  God  must  enter  the  psychic  mould  and  the 
psycliic  consciousness  in  order  that  it  may  pene- 
trate the  whole  sphere  of  relative  being  with  a  realiz- 
ing sense ;  in  order  that  it  may  have  a  sense  of  the 
nature,  the  needs,  the  weaknesses,  the  woes,  the 
sins,  and  the  struggles  of  psychic  existence.  For 
only  thus  can  the  ideal  good  of  the  race  be  actual- 
ized, and  only  thus  can  the  whole  relative  order  be 
finally  justified. 


264  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

In  actualizing  this  highest  good  of  the  relative, 
the  logos  of  God  becomes  the  ideal  mediator  and 
redeemer  of  an  evil-smitten  and  struggling  race. 
The  ideal  spiritual  life  into  which  man  is  perpetu- 
ally to  enter  is  not  finite  but  infinite  and  divine. 
The  Christ-idea  is  thus  no  product  of  the  mytholog- 
ical fancy.  It  springs  out  of  a  necessity  that  is  con- 
stitutional to  the  psychic  nature.  It  is  the  spirit- 
ual ideal,  which  though  but  dimly  ai^prehended  the 
relative  order  has  ever  had  at  its  heart.  The  Christ- 
idea  is  the  true  infinite  ideal  of  humanity  conceived 
as  actualized  in  self-conscious  and  personal  form. 
And  as  God  is  the  infinite  ideal  of  the  soul  con- 
ceived as  actual,  the  Christ-idea,  when  it  has  once 
become  a  self-conscious  and  personal  being,  will 
embody  an  ideal  syntliesis  of  the  human  and  divine. 

But  such  an  actualization  cannot  be  the  product  of 
speculation  or  reflective  activity.  The  redemption 
of  humanity  cannot  be  worked  out  in  the  closet  of 
the  philosopher.  It  must  embody  itself  in  concrete 
personal  form  in  some  historic  individual  manifesta- 
tion which  philosophy  may  reflect  and  translate  into 
terms  of  knowledge,  but  which  she  could  never  create 
from  her  own  resources.  The  logos  of  God  thus 
becomes  the  necessary  medium  of  the  highest  spirit- 
ual revelation  and  the  highest  good  to  humanity.  It 
becomes  the  supreme  revelation  of  the  divine  right- 
eousness and  truth.  It  embodies  the  divine  pity, 
the  divine  love  and  mercy.  Into  it  the  divine  help- 
fulness and  the  heart  of  the  divine  goodness  enter 
in  their  fulness.     It  is  in  the  vision  of  the  logos  of 


LOGOS  265 

God  that  the  problem  of  the  relative  order  and  the 
world's  destiny  finds  its  most  adequate  solution,  and 
it  is  in  the  light  of  that  vision  that  science,  philos- 
ophy, art,  and  religion  may  clasp  hands  in  the  bonds 
of  a  common  faith  and  hope. 


XVII 

GOD 

The  greatest  thoug-lit  of  the  human  spirit  is  the 
thong-ht  of  God.  The  org-an  of  this  thought  is  the 
logos,  and  to  attain  to  it  the  spirit  must  j^ut  forth 
its  supremest  effort.  The  genesis  of  the  divine  idea 
has  both  subjective  and  objective  roots.  Subjec- 
tively the  idea  of  God  arises  as  the  first  presupposi- 
tion of  the  human  spirit.  We  have  seen  that  this  is 
self-existence.  The  idea  of  God  arises  out  of  that  of 
self-existence  when  the  spirit  construes  it  under  its 
own  highest  category,  namely,  that  of  personal- 
ity. The  objective  genesis  proceeds  from  the  idea 
of  the  world-ground.  The  idea  of  cause  has  coiled 
up  in  it  the  idea  of  self-activity,  and  when  this  pre- 
sui3X3osition  is  drawn  out  the  idea  of  the  world  ground 
is  born.  The  last  step  in  tlie  objective  sphere  is 
identical  with  that  in  the  subjective.  To  the  idea  of 
a  self-active  world-principle  the  spirit  applies  its 
own  highest  category,  and  the  idea  of  God  emerges 
as  the  ground  of  the  world. 

A  true  insight  will  be  able  to  apprehend  the  ra- 
tionale of  this  process.  It  is  the  siDirit's  assertion  of 
its  own  ideal-self ;  tliat  is,  of  its  infinite  and  perfect 


GOD  2G7 

self,  as  actual.  God  is  tlie  ideal  of  siiirit,  and  the 
idea  of  God  is  the  idea  of  a  being-  in  whom  this  ideal 
is  actual.  "We  thus  come  around  again  to  the  Ai'is- 
totelian  conception  of  purus  actus,  but  now  trans- 
lated into  terms  of  spiritual  selfhood.  The  idea  of 
God  is,  therefore,  the  ideal  of  the  human  sjnrit  assei^ted 
as  actual.  * 

The  problem  of  God's  existence,  or  rather  of  his 
actuality,  plaj^s  a  great  part  in  all  human  thinking. 
The  basis  of  the  problem  is  the  synthesis  which  we 
have  discovered  in  the  idea  of  God  between  the  con- 
cept of  the  ideal  and  the  assertion  of  its  actuality. 
This  identifies  the  idea  of  God  as  it  comes  into  the 
human  consciousness  with  the  spirit's  assertion  of  its 
ideal  and  infinite  self.  The  God -consciousness  of 
humanity,  as  it  may  be  called,  is  not,  then,  a  pure 
intellection.  It  is  not  the  absolute  thought  think- 
ing itself,  but  it  is  the  absolute  will,  in  which  the 
thought  is  presupposed,  asserting  itself.  The  idea 
of  God  is,  therefore,  the  function  of  the  logos,  in 
which  there  is  a  synthesis  of  thought  and  will. 

The  various  attitudes  which  the  human  spirit  may 
take  toward  the  problem  of  God's  actually  can  be 
most  clearly  conceived  from  the  stand-point  of  spirit- 

*  It  is  not  sufficient  to  say  that  God  is  the  ideal  of  the  human 
spirit.  The  spirit  does  not  leave  the  ideal  floating  about  us  a  mere 
idea.  But  the  self-assertion  of  its  actuality  is  part  of  its  essence. 
Spirit  either  affirms  or  denies  God  as  an  actuality.  Tliis  is,  I  think, 
the  real  core  of  Des  Cartes'  contention  that  the  idea  of  God  involves 
the  predicate  of  existence.  But  Des  Cartes'  argument  is  only  an 
adumbration  of  the  truth. 


268  BASAL   CONCEPTS    IN   PHILOSOPHY 

ual  dialectic.  We  have  seen  how  the  primal  intui- 
tion of  being  and  non-being-  arises  in  the  intellect  and 
forms  the  basis  of  the  self-assertion  of  the  spirit 
under  the  category  of  will  against  non-being,  in  the 
energy  of  creation.  This  self-assertion,  as  we  have 
seen,  is  the  function  of  the  spirit  as  logos.  Now  if 
we  keep  the  dual  dialectic  before  us  we  will  see  that 
the  spirit  may  (1)  deny  its  ideal  self,  and  this  gives 
rise  to  atheism  ;  (2)  it  may  assert  its  ideal  self,  which 
gives  rise  to  positive  theism  ;  (3)  it  may  assert  the 
negative  of  its  ideal  self  or  the  a-logos,  and  this  will 
give  rise  to  negative  theism,  a  theory  that  finds  the 
negative  ground  of  things  in  God  ;  (4)  it  may  assert 
its  ideal-self  as  the  unity  of  being  and  non-being, 
and  this  will  give  rise  to  four  species  of  pan-ontology. 
Of  these  two  will  be  negative ;  (a)  the  negative  pan- 
theism of  the  Orient  which  conceives  the  plurality  of 
definite  existence  as  emanating  out  of  a  negative  and 
indeterminate  one ;  {!?)  naturalism  which  reverses 
the  process  and  conceives  the  cosmos  as  emerging 
from  a  negative  and  indeterminate  plurality.  The 
remaining  alternatives  are  species  of  positive  panthe- 
ism ;  (c)  a  theory  in  which  non-being  is  conceived  sim- 
ply as  the  self -limitation  of  being  ;  this  gives  rise  to 
a  pantheism  of  the  type  of  Spinoza  in  which  all  de- 
termination is  negation  ;  (d)  a  theory  in  which  nega- 
tion is  conceived  as  a  principle  of  self-diremption 
and  non-being,  therefore,  as  a  moment  of  being. 
This  gives  rise  to  an  absolutism  of  the  type  that  is 
ordinarily  ascribed  to  Hegel. 
The  insight  of  the  dialectic  will  also  make  a  very 


GOD  269 

brief  criticism  of  these  theories  possible.  If  we 
penetrate  to  the  heart  of  atheism  we  find  that  it  in- 
volves a  self-contradiction,  for  it  is  the  virtual  denial 
of  self-existence,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  the  first 
presupposition  of  knowledge.  Atheism  in  thus  can- 
celling knowledge  cancels  itself.  Negative  theism 
arises,  we  saw,  from  the  spirit's  asserting  its  ideal 
as  the  negative  of  self;  that  is,  as  a  spiritual  be- 
ing whose  nature  negates  spiritual  categories  and 
cannot,  therefore,  be  conceived.  It  is  clear  that  this 
is  self-contradictory,  since  the  assertion  of  spiritual 
being  carries  with  it  the  assertion  of  spiritual  at- 
tributes. Negative  theism  is  founded  on  a  kind  of 
amphiboly  of  the  spirit  in  which  an  oscillation  be- 
tween i)ositive  and  negative  conceptions  generates 
perpetual  illusion. 

In  what  we  have  called  the  pan-ontological  theo- 
ries there  is  a  common  fault  that  vitiates  them  all. 
In  these  theories  the  spirit  asserts  its  ideal  self  as  the 
unity  of  being  and  non-being.  But  this  reduces  dif- 
ference ultimately  to  identity,  which  means  stagna- 
tion and  spiritual  death  rather  than  life.  In  assert- 
ing itself  as  the  unity  of  being  and  non-being  spirit 
virtually  cancels  itself.  Now  this  suicidal  movement 
may  be  discovered  in  all  the  theories  which  rest  on 
this  assumi^tion.  The  Oriental  thinking  in  its  type 
is  a  species  of  negative  pantheism,  in  which  from 
a  negative  one  the  all  is  conceived  as  proceeding 
by  emanation.  But  if  the  one  negates  plurality  it  is 
a  contradiction  to  conceive  a  plurality  as  arising  out 
of  it.     The  world  is,  therefore,  cancelled.     Natural- 


270  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

ism  inverts  the  mistake  by  conceiving  the  unity  of 
the  cosmos  as  emerging  from  a  negative  plurality. 
Here,  however,  the  negation  of  unity  in  the  ground 
contradicts  the  assumption  of  unity  in  the  product, 
and  the  cosmos  is  therefore  cancelled. 

The  positive  theories  of  the  iDantheistic  type  are  no 
better  off.  In  Spinozism  difference  arises  through 
the  self-limitation  of  being.  But  being  can  limit  it- 
self and  i3ass  into  its  opposite  only  so  far  as  it  can- 
cels itself.  Si^inoza  avoids  this  i3it  by  asserting  the 
unreality  of  being's  opposite,  thus  cancelling  differ- 
ence and  reducing  the  universe  to  the  stillness  of  a 
moveless  identity.  In  the  second  species  of  positive 
pantheism,  the  conception  of  non-being  as  a  move- 
ment in  being  identifies  it  with  being.  Difference 
is  thus  cancelled  and  the  foundation  taken  away 
from  that  living  dialectic  of  siDirit  the  affirmation  of 
which  constitutes  the  principal  merit  of  Hegelism. 

There  remains,  then,  positive  theism,  in  which  the 
spirit  asserts  the  ideal  of  its  infinite  and  perfect 
self  as  actual.  Now,  if  we  scrutinize  the  logic  of 
positive  theism  we  will  find  it  to  be  the  only  religi- 
ous theory  that  keeps  straight  with  the  inner  dialec- 
tic of  spirit.  AVe  have  seen  how  this  dialectic  starts 
with  an  intuition  of  being  and  non-being,  and  hoAV 
this  intuition  rouses  the  Avill  and  induces  the  logos 
to  go  out  creatively  into  the  sphere  of  non-being  as 
well  as  to  energize  internally  as  a  principle  of  self- 
realization.  This  dialectic  keeps  wholly  clear  of  the 
confusions  of  being  and  non-being,  into  which  the 
theories   criticised  above  have  fallen.      The  losfos 


GOD  271 

acts  on  tlie  dual  intuition  of  identity  and  difference, 
the  former  being  the  principle  of  an  eternal  self- 
assertion  by  the  divine  Spirit ;  the  latter  that  of  an 
eternal  opiDOsition  to  non-being  in  the  activity  of 
creation.  It  is  precisely  this  dialectical  being  that 
positive  theism  asserts.  The  God  of  theism  is  the 
Logos  who  asserts  himself  and  creatively  opi30ses 
non-being,  who  loves  good  and  hates  evil,  who  gives 
light  and  causes  darkness  to  flee  away.  The  God 
of  positive  theism  is  the  God  of  the  spirit  whose 
vision  is  unclouded  and  whose  intuitions  grasp  the 
primal  dualism  of  reality. 

The  ontological  proof  of  God's  existence  is,  when 
reduced  to  its  essence,  simply  the  spirit's  assertion 
of  the  actuality  of  its  infinite  ideal.  The  force  of 
the  proof  lies  partly  in  an  assumx^tion  that  under- 
lies it,  namely,  that  of  self-existence.  But  we  have 
seen  that  this  assumption  is  the  primal  datum  of  phi- 
losophy, namely,  that  primal  being  is  self-existent. 
Now  the  inner  dialectic  of  the  ontological  proof  is 
this  :  self-existent  being  is  self-active,  and  self-activ- 
ity is  a  spiritual  category,  and,  therefore,  the  primal 
being  is  spirit.  The  proof  asserts,  if  self -existence, 
then  spiritual  existence.  God  can  be  denied  only  by 
denying  self-existence,  which  is  tantamount  to  the 
spirit's  denying  itself,  which  is  self -contradictory. 

The  founders  of  this  proof  in  modern  philosophy 
failed  to  clearly  apprehend  the  inner  nerve  of  it. 
Anselm  defines  God  as  a  being  than  whom  a  greater 
cannot  be  conceived,  and  then  reasons  that  to  deny 
his  existence  would  leave  him  less  than  the  greatest 


272  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

conceivable  being,  which  is  contradictory.  Had 
Anselm  translated  his  quantitative  conceptions  into 
quality  he  would  have  seen  the  force  of  his  reason- 
ing" to  be  that  the  last  x3resupposition  of  all  think- 
ing is  self-existence,  and  that  this  presupposition 
cannot  be  construed  under  other  than  spiritual 
categories.  The  primal  being  is,  therefore,  spirit. 
Des  Cartes  unfolds  three  as]3ects  of  the  same  proof  : 
(1)  That  the  idea  of  God  involves  the  X3redicate  of 
existence ;  (2)  that  the  idea  of  God  involves  an  ade- 
quate cause  which  must  be  an  infinite  and  perfect 
being;  (3)  that  the  idea  of  God  is  the  immediate 
presupiDOsition  of  man's  idea  of  himself,  and,  there- 
fore, God  exists.  Underlying  all  these  is  a  common 
dialectic  process  which  Des  Cartes  did  not  clearly 
apx3rehend.  For  the  aim  of  the  ontological  proof  is 
not  to  establish  mere  existence,  but  rather  to  identify 
the  idea  of  God  with  that  of  self-existence,  which 
must  be  assumed.  Now  self-existence,  as  we  have 
seen,  is  identical  with  self-activity,  and  self-activity 
is  spirit.  But  the  idea  of  God  is  that  of  a  self-active 
spirit.  It  is  therefore  identical  with  that  of  the  self- 
existent,  which  must  be  assumed.  The  idea  of  God 
is,  therefore,  the  spirit's  assertion  of  the  actuality  of 
its  ideal ;  that  is,  of  an  infinite  and  perfect  self. 

The  Kantian  criticism  of  the  ontological  proof 
misses  the  fact  that  the  relation  of  ideality  on  which 
the  proof  rests  is  resolvable  into  the  self-assertion 
of  spirit.  The  idea  of  God  is  identical  with  the 
idea  of  self-existent  being,  because  they  are  both 
identical  with   that   of  spiritual   self-activity,    and 


GOD  273 

spiritual  self  -  activity  is  primal  reality.  Kant's 
thought  had  not  reached  the  plane  where  such  re- 
flection is  possible,  and  his  criticism  is,  therefore, 
inconclusive. 

The  criticism  of  Kant  rests,  however,  on  the  plane 
where  doubt  arises.  The  ontological  proof  contains, 
as  we  have  seen,  a  volitional  element  of  self-asser- 
tion, the  sx)irit  asserting  its  own  infinite  ideal  as  the 
highest  actuality.  Now,  wherever  will  enters  as  a 
factor  in  conviction  doubt  is  possible,  for  thought 
may  abstract  itself  from  will,  and  the  mere  abstract 
concept  does  not  carry  the  reality  of  its  object  with 
it.  From  the  stand-point  of  abstract  thinking  Kant 
is  right  and  the  doubt  is  natural. 

The  historical  proofs  from  cosmology  and  final 
cause  are  to  be  regarded,  primarily,  as  reflections 
entered  upon  by  the  spirit  for  the  purpose  of  restor- 
ing its  lost  confidence  in  its  own  ideal  self-assertion. 
The  x^roof  from  cosmology  is  simply  the  reassertion 
in  an  objective  form  of  the  identity  between  the  idea 
of  God  and  that  of  self-existent  being.  Kant's  criti- 
cism of  this,  that  it  is  incomplete  and  cannot  reach 
God  without  having  recourse  to  ontology,  is  a  jDiece 
of  insight  which  he  misuses ;  for,  as  we  have  seen, 
ontology  proceeds  on  the  same  assertion  of  identity 
but  finds  the  clinch  which  realizes  the  whole  in  the 
idea  of  spirit  as  self-activity,  and,  therefore,  primal 
being.  Now,  cosmology  falls  back  ui^on  ontology 
to  the  extent  of  borrowing  this  clinch  from  her  in 
order  to  complete  its  own  dialectic. 

What  Kant  should  have  observed  is  the  substan- 
18 


274:  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

tial  identity  of  the  two  proofs,  since  they  involve 
the  same  dialectic  in  subjective  and  objective  forms. 
The  proof  from  final  cause  is  founded  on  a  differ- 
ent principle,  namely,  that  of  sufficient  reason.  It 
observes  in  the  world-series,  mainly  in  the  sphere 
of  living-  organisms,  certain  i)henomena,  manifesta- 
tions of  a  principle  of  unitary  individuality,  which 
it  can  explain  only  on  the  supposition  that  there  is  a 
unitary  cause,  and  when  it  further  analyzes  this  as- 
sumption of  unitary  cause  it  finds  wrapped  up  in  it 
the  presupposition  of  self -activity,  which  leads  by  a 
further  step  of  refiection  to  the  assertion  of  self- 
active  spirit.  The  proof  from  final  cause  thus  leads 
to  the  same  goal  that  is  reached  by  the  other  two 
proofs. 

Kant's  criticism  of  tliis  proof  is  an  act  of  logical 
abortion.  He  sees  that  it  touches  points  that  are 
common  to  ontology  and  cosmology,  and  assumes 
that  it  is  compelled  therefore  to  have  recourse  to 
these  two  arguments  in  order  to  complete  its  own 
case.  "What  Kant  fails  to  see  is  that  the  proof  from 
final  cause  rests  on  a  different  principle  from  the 
others,  that  while  they  proceed  analytically  on  the 
principle  of  identity,  the  argument  from  final  cause 
proceeds  synthetically  on  the  princii^le  of  sufficient 
reason.  It  is,  therefore,  homogeneous,  and  expresses 
the  self-assertion  of  spirit  negatively  as  its  refusal 
to  be  satisfied  with  any  exi^lanation  that  does  not 
rest  ultimately  on  a  spiritual  principle. 

The  legitimate  force  of  these  proofs  in  removing 
doubt  and  restoring  conviction  may  be  seen  from 


GOD  275 

two  considerations.  In  the  first  place,  they  reveal 
the  fact  that  whether  our  reflection  proceeds  sjm- 
thetically  or  analytically,  upon  the  iDrinciple  of 
sufficient  reason  or  upon  that  of  identity,  it  reaches 
the  same  conclusion ;  namely,  that  the  ultimate 
g-round  of  the  world  must  be  self-existent  spirit.  In 
the  second  place,  they  fit  into  that  dialectic  which 
constitutes  the  spirit's  inner  activity.  This  dialectic, 
as  we  have  seen,  is  dual,  and  includes  three  stages 
of  spiritual  life ;  first,  that  of  thought,  in  which 
siDirit  thinks  itself  and  its  opposite  non  -  being  ; 
second,  that  of  will,  in  which  spirit  affirms  itself  in 
the  princii)le  of  identity  and  denies  its  opposite  in 
the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  ;  third,  that  of  love, 
in  which  spirit  mediates  the  dual  activities  of  iden- 
tity and  sufficient  reason  in  the  principle  of  unity. 
If  this  dialectic  be  conceived  as  the  inner  activity  of 
the  absolute  Spirit,  we  arrive  at  the  intuition  of  the 
absolute  intellect  as  intuiting  itself  and  its  opx)o- 
site;  the  absolute  intellect  and  will  as  affirming 
itself  and  going  out  creatively  upon  its  negative  in 
the  production  of  the  creation ;  the  absolute  intel- 
lect, will,  and  love  mediating  the  dual  activities  of 
the  spirit  and  bringing  the  creature  into  unity  with 
the  Creator. 

If  this  dialectic  be  conceived  as  the  inner  activity 
of  the  human  spirit,  the  same  moments  will  be  real- 
ized as  in  the  absolute  consciousness.  There  must 
first  be  the  self-conscious  thought  that  thinks  itself 
and  its  opposite  the  not-self.  This  supplies  the 
inner  motive  to  the  will,  and  the  second  stage  arises 


276  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

in  wliicli  the  human  spirit,  as  thought  and  will,  as- 
serts itself  affirmatively  in  the  iDrinciple  of  identity, 
and  negatively  against  its  opposite  in  the  principle 
of  sufficient  reason.  But  here  the  human  spirit 
strikes  upon  the  limitations  of  its  creaturely  nature. 
It  is  largely  undeveloped  potence  jpassing  into  actu- 
ality, and  its  undeveloped  potence  limits  the  effec- 
tive energy  of  will  and  leads  to  a  sense  of  its  own 
impotence.  It  also  limits  the  spirit  in  this  sphere 
qualitatively,  robbing  it  of  the  creative  function,  for 
it  finds  that  the  creative  intelligence  has  been  before- 
hand with  it,  and  that  its  function  is  to  rethink  the 
thoughts  of  the  Absolute  and  to  reproduce  the  crea- 
tions of  its  power.  The  spirit  finds  that  the  pathway 
of  its  knowledge  and  experience  leads  it  in  the  foot- 
steps of  a  creative  intelligence  that  has  preceded  it. 
Now^  it  is  in  this  sphere  where  the  spirit  expresses 
itself  in  a  synthesis  of  thought  and  will  that  the  reflec- 
tions embodied  in  the  lines  of  theistic  loroof  consid- 
ered above  have  their  rise-.  They  arise  in  the  human 
spirit's  assertion  of  the  ideal  and  infinite  self,  affirm- 
atively and  negatively,  under  the  categories  of  iden- 
tity and  sufficient  reason,  as  the  ultimate  ground  of 
being.  And  they  simply  indicate  trails  which  the 
finite  intellect  and  will  follow  in  their  effort  to  make 
their  way  from  the  creature  up  to  the  Creator.  But 
these  proofs  are  not  final  or  complete.  There  is  a 
third  stage  in  spiritual  dialectic  in  which  the  spirit, 
as  thought,  will,  and  love  asserts  itself  synthetically 
in  the  principle  of  unity.  In  love  spirit  asserts  itself 
emotionally  as  well  as  intellectually  and  volitionally. 


GOD  277 

What  the  spirit  loves  as  well  as  wills  and  thinks, 
is  an  object  of  worth  or  value.  Modern  thinking- 
j)roceeding'  upon  this  recognition  has  shown  a  ten- 
dency to  separate  the  possessions  of  the  spirit  in- 
to two  groups,  labelling-  them  respectively  things 
of  knowledge  and  things  of  worth  or  value,  the  one 
group  catering  to  the  intellectual  satisfaction  of  the 
human  spirit,  the  other  to  its  aesthetic  and  moral 
demands.  On  the  basis  of  this  distinction  a  further 
distribution  of  principles  has  been  made,  identity 
and  sufficient  reason  being  assigned  to  the  intellect 
or  theoretic  function,  while  to  the  aesthetic  is  allotted 
the  category  of  unity.  Against  this  division  nothing 
special  can  be  urged.  But  the  unity  of  the  spirit 
is  imiDcrilled  when  a  further  step  is  taken  and  it 
is  proposed  to  effect  a  complete  divorce  of  the  in- 
tellectual from  the  aesthetic  and  moral  spheres. 
Motives  for  this  divorce  spring  from  two  opposite 
sources  :  (1)  from  a  species  of  neo-Kantian  thought, 
which,  having  despaired  of  the  intellect  as  an  organ 
of  religious  truth,  aims  to  found  religion  exclu- 
sively upon  aesthetic  and  moral  grounds ;  (2)  from  a 
rationalistic  type  of  thinking,  which  resents  the  in- 
trusion of  aesthetic  and  moral  considerations  and 
aims  to  restrict  philosophy  to  the  plane  of  purely 
intellectual  motives.  It  is  to  the  interest  of  both 
these  styles  of  thinking  to  separate  the  sphere  of 
the  aesthetic  off  from  that  of  the  intellect  and  to 
apply  to  it  a  different  standard  of  valuation. 

No  such  separation  is  x^ossible.  We  have  seen 
that  the  spirit  completes  itself  in  the  third  sphere  of 


278  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

its  dialectic  activity  in  the  principle  of  unity.  But 
this  third  sphere  is  not  purely  emotional,  it  is  the 
completest  expression  of  si:>iritual  activity,  a  syn- 
thesis of  the  intellectual,  volitional,  and  emotional. 
The  principle  of  unity  is  not,  then,  a  category  of 
emotional  satisfaction  simply,  but  it  is  a  category 
that  embodies  the  w^hole  demand  of  the  spirit,  intel- 
lectual and  volitional  as  well  as  emotional.  It  is  the 
completest  and  most  adequate  form  of  the  spirit's 
assertion  of  itself.  In  order,  then,  to  complete  the 
proof  of  God's  existence  we  must  supplement  the 
lines  of  evidence  which  have  been  supplied  by 
identity  and  sufficient  reason,  by  the  evidence  of 
the  category  of  unity.  The  very  constitution  of  the 
spirit  forbids  that  we  should  wrest  the  moral  de- 
mand, as  Kant  does,  from  its  affiliations  with  the  the- 
oretic reason,  or  that  we  should  attempt,  with  Jacobi 
and  Schleiermacher,  to  effect  the  same  diremption 
between  theoretic  reason  and  feeling.  The  insight 
of  the  dialectic  warns  us  that  we  are  the  rather  to 
conceive  the  principles  and  demands  of  the  theoretic 
reason  as  achieving  their  comjDletest  and  rii^est 
fruitage  in  the  principle  and  demand  of  the  moral 
and  aesthetic  nature. 

The  principle  of  unity  must  then  be  taken  as  hav- 
ing the  same  species  of  authority  as  the  principles 
of  identity  and  sufficient  reason.  They  are  all  modes 
of  spiritual  self-assertion.  They  all  embodj^  de- 
mands of  the  spirit.  And  when  the  principle  of 
unity  comes  with  its  demand  for  moral  satisfaction 
in  God,  and  for  aesthetic  satisfaction  in  a  being  in 


GOD  279 

whom  it  finds  tlie  fruition  of  the  budding  hopes  of 
its  own  nature,  the  demands  cannot  be  dismissed  as 
mere  vain  longings.  They  are  the  richest  fruitage 
and  the  most  adequate  expression  of  that  spiritual 
activity  which  motives  the  entire  fabric  of  man's 
knowledge  and  experience. 

If  God  is,  how  is  he  related  to  the  world  ?  This 
question  has  been  virtually  answered  in  preceding 
chapters.  God  is,  in  the  first  place,  the  absolute  and 
transcendent  ground  of  the  world.  The  world  is 
the  product  of  an  immanent  spiritual  potence  which 
has  as  its  immediate  presupposition  spiritual  self- 
activity.  This  self-activity  as  the  self-existent  /^rw^s 
of  all  being  we  have  found  to  be  God.  God  cannot 
be  completely  immanated  in  the  world-process. 
His  self -activity  is  a  presupposition  of  immanent 
potence  and  its  denial  leaves  no  foundation  for 
any  immanent  function.  God  is  the  Creator  of  the 
world.  We  have  already  in  the  earlier  chapters  of 
this  book  endeavored  to  ground  rationally  the  crea- 
tive idea.  It  is  only  intelligible  in  the  light  of  that 
living  spiritual  dialectic  in  which  a  key  is  found  to 
so  many  mysteries.  God  as  the  Creator  is  the  logos. 
He  is  God,  conceived  as  intellect  and  will,  assert- 
ing his  divine  energy  in  the  production  of  the  creat- 
ure out  of  non-being.  We  have  seen  how  this  neg- 
ative sphere  arises  as  an  intuition  of  the  divine 
intellect.  The  logos  as  the  di^dne  intellect  and  will 
asserts  its  energy  against  non-being,  producing  out 
of  it  creature  existence  and  the  order  of  becoming. 
Thus  the  world-process  is  grounded.    The  immanent 


280  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

ground  of  tliis  process  is  a  spiritual  potence  which 
leads  it  in  its  evolution  through  stages  of  mechan- 
ism and  life  up  to  the  soul  of  man,  in  which  spirit 
becomes  self-conscious. 

As  world-creator  God  is  the  logos,  the  will  of  the 
absolute  spirit,  uttering  itself  in  the  energ}^  that  an- 
nuls non-being  and  produces  out  of  it  the  creature. 
But  God  is  also  related  to  the  world  as  its  builder  and 
completer.  The  world  as  it  begins  is  in  its  nature  far 
from  God ;  it  originates  as  unconscious  matter  and 
mechanical  force  and  energy.  We  have  seen  how 
this  mechanism  is  rationally  grounded  only  in  a  po- 
tential spiritual  principle.  But  it  is  the  lowest  po- 
tence of  spirit,  unconscious,  undesigning,  pluralistic, 
and  held  in  the  clinch  of  necessity.  The  world  is  fai 
from  God  and  must  be  brought  to  him.  This  is  the 
motive  of  the  world-evolution  which  is  a  process  of 
development  along  the  pathway  of  spirit.  Now  God 
as  the  Creator  is  the  logos,  but  God  as  the  world- 
builder  and  developer  is  the  unifying  Spirit.  The 
principle  of  his  activity  is  unity  and  his  motive  is 
love.  The  process  of  evolution  is  not  identical  with 
creation.  It  presupposes  and  in  a  sense  includes  it 
just  as  unity  includes  all  other  principles.  The  proc- 
ess of  evolution  is  the  upward  progress  of  the  creat- 
ure toward  unity  with  the  Creator.  In  the  first  stages 
of  the  world-process  the  motive  of  this  unification  is 
transcendent.  The  mediation  which  it  involves  is 
also  transcendent,  therefore,  embodying  itself  in  the 
unconscious  advance  of  nature  to  higher  planes  of 
activity,  the  unconscious  establishment  of  stores  of 


GOD  281 

potential  energy  as  the  basis  of  nature's  advances,  and 
the  unconscious  sacrifice  which  is  involved  in  the 
achievement  of  higher  forms  of  life.  Though  tran- 
scendent, however,  the  motive  must  be  conceived 
as  immanent  in  the  divine  activity  that  pulsates  at 
the  heart  of  the  world-i^rocess.  God's  relation  to 
the  world  can  be  adequately  conceived  only  when  we 
combine  the  ideas  of  the  logos  and  the  unifying 
Spirit,  the  one  the  activity  that  brings  the  world 
into  existence  out  of  chaos,  the  other  the  activity 
that  moves  on  the  face  of  the  deep  and  leads  the 
world  on  the  pathway  of  order  and  development. 

God's  relations  to  humanity  are  closer  because 
they  enter  more  into  consciousness.  They  are,  how- 
ever, generically  the  same  as  his  relations  to  the 
world.  God  is  the  Creator,  the  Father  of  the  human 
spirit.  He  plants  in  man  creatively  the  same  spirit- 
ual principle  which  he  immanates  in  the  world.  Man 
is  part  of  the  world-process.  But  this  principle  in 
man  becomes  self-conscious,  and  thus  energizes  as 
the  centre  of  a  spiritual  life  that  allies  it  to  its 
divine  author.  But  man  is  not  God.  He  is  only  his 
image  ;  that  is,  he  is  only  a  potency  whose  infinite 
and  perfect  actuality  is  God.  God  is,  therefore,  the 
ideal  of  the  human  sjiirit.  And  it  is  because  the 
spirit  is  conscious  of  this  ideal  that  it  can  call  God 
Father.  God  the  logos  is  the  creative  principle  of 
humanity.  We  have  seen  how  through  the  ideal 
consciousness  of  man  an  organ  of  close  intercommu- 
nion exists  between  God  and  the  human  spirit,  en- 
abling God  on  the  one  hand  to  inform  the  human 


282  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

spirit  with  the  norms  of  an  ideal  life,  and  the 
human  spirit,  on  the  other,  to  call  God  Father  and 
to  hold  communion  with  him. 

God  as  unifying-  Spirit  is  also  the  builder  and 
developer  of  humanity.  We  have  seen  that  the  uni- 
fying Spirit  works  under  the  category  of  unity,  and 
that  its  energizing-  motive  is  love.  This  unity  is 
effected  by  mediation,  and  just  as  we  saw  in  the 
world  below  humanity  that  the  mediational  function 
transcends  the  consciousness  of  the  woiid-forces, 
which  are  its  unwitting  instruments  in  leading-  the 
world  up  to  God,  so  in  the  evolution  of  humanity 
there  is  a  stage  where  the  true  idea  of  this  mediation 
is  transcendent  and  its  human  instruments  realize  it 
unwittingly,  or  with  only  half  consciousness.  We 
have  said  in  the  chapter  on  Eeligion  that  the  relig- 
ious prophet  or  founder  of  a  new  dispensation  must 
be  conscious  of  his  mission.  He  must  intend  to  be 
God's  man,  speaking  the  thoughts  and  doing  the 
will  of  God.  But  this  is  consistent  with  the  exist- 
ence of  only  a  partial  consciousness  of  the  divine 
idea  he  is  uttering.  The  prophet  is  only  the  organ 
which  the  divine  energy  flows  into  and  inspires,  but 
does  not  fully  enlighten.  Devout  men  of  old  spake 
as  they  were  moved  by  the  Holy  Ghost,  which  had 
not  as  yet  become  immanent,  so  that  it  could  speak 
in  its  own  proper  voice. 

But  there  comes  a  point  in  the  spiritual  evolution 
of  the  race  when  God  becomes  immanent  in  the 
consciousness  of  humanity.  The  mode  of  this  has 
been  considered  in  the  previous  chapter,  and  the 


GOD  283 

synthetic  unification  of  the  divine  and  human  con- 
sciousness is  effected  in  an  individual  soul,  and  the 
God-man  is  Ijorn  into  the  world.  Not  only  so,  but 
the  God-man  consciousness  is  born  into  humanitj^ 
and  can  no  long-er  be  foreig-n  or  merely  transcendent 
to  it.  And  this  new  birth  of  humanity  into  the  di- 
vine likeness  is  the  initiation  of  a  new  epoch  in  the 
mission  of  the  sj^irit.  The  unifying-  Spirit  has  been 
in  a  sense  a  transcendent  agent  in  human  history. 
But  now  the  door  of  a  new  dispensation  has  been 
opened.  The  logos-ideal  has  become  a  conscious 
possession  of  humanity,  and  through  and  in  this  lo- 
gos-ideal the  unifying  Spirit  becomes  immanent  in 
man's  consciousness  and  functions  as  the  regenera- 
tor, the  illuminator,  the  sanctifier,  the  comforter. 
It  performs  the  mediation  of  love  more  effectually 
than  before,  because  now  it  is  the  spirit  of  the  Christ, 
and  through  and  in  the  Christ  it  enters  the  heart  of 
humanity  and  leads  the  race  on  the  pathway  up  to 
glory.  Thus  God  as  unifying  Si)irit  energizing  as 
the  principle  of  atonement  and  as  the  heart  of  love, 
perfects  the  mediational  work  as  God  in  the  Christ 
reconciling  the  world  to  himself. 

God  is  free  and  sovereign  in  his  own  world.  It  is 
true,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  chajiter  on  Non-being 
and  Evil,  that  the  divine  option  cannot  include  the 
X^ossibility  of  creating  an  absolute  and  immutable 
world.  The  idea  of  a  created  Absolute,  to  which  this 
is  tantamount,  is  self-contradictory.  It  is  true  also 
that  the  relative  order  is  one  of  time  and  develop- 
ment, and  that  not  even  absolute  power  could  invert 


284  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

the  laws  of  growth  and  development  so  that  the 
spiritual  should  be  first  in  the  temporal  order,  and 
then  the  material  and  mechanical.  For  if  creative 
power  could  produce  at  a  cov^)  that  which  is  nearest 
to  itself,  then  the  whole  labor  and  process  of  crea- 
tion becomes  irrational,  for  it  would  be  unnecessary. 
Again,  it  is  true  that  absolute  power  cannot  gen- 
erate a  creature  that  shall  not  be  mutable,  and, 
therefore,  conting-ent  to  evil.  A  creature  that  has 
not  the  conting-ency  of  evil  in  it  must  be  immuta- 
ble, and  therefore  self-existent,  which  is  contradic- 
tory. 

If  absolute  power  be  subject  to  these  apparent 
limitations,  how  can  we  say  that  God  is  free  and 
sovereign  in  his  own  world  ?  The  answer  is  to  be 
found  not  in  denying -the  limitations,  but  in  showing 
that  they  are  only  apparent,  but  not  real,  limitations 
of  iDOwer.  In  the  first  place,  power  is  a  function  of 
will,  and  a  limit  arises  when  iDower  falls  short  of  will. 
Were  the  creative  volition  to  go  forth  and  no  crea- 
tion be  forthcoming,  or  were  the  creature  to  tremble 
on  the  verge  of  being  and  then  drop  back  into  the 
abyss  of  non-being,  in  either  case  the  power  of  the 
Absolute  would  meet  a  real  limit  and  would  no  longer 
be  absolute.  But  the  very  supposition  that  the  ab- 
solute volition  should  contemplate  the  creation  of 
another  absolute  outside  of  itself,  or  in  addition  to 
itself,  involves,  as  we  have  seen,  a  monstrous  self-con- 
tradiction. No  real  limit  is  involved  in  the  avoid- 
ance of  self-contradiction.  There  is  no  rationality, 
but  the  opposite,  therefore,  in  conceiving  the  neces- 


GOD  285 

sary  finitiide  and  mutability  of  the  creature  as  im- 
posing a  limitation  on  absolute  xDOwer. 

But  is  not  the  subjection  of  the  creative  energ-y, 
as  it  enters  into  the  world,  to  the  orders  of  time 
and  development,  a  limitation  of  the  absolute  pow- 
er? Now,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  this  question 
becomes  identical  with  the  one  considered  above, 
and  involves  the  same  contradiction.  It  may  mean 
why  does  not  the  absolute  creative  energy,  if  it  be 
absolute,  produce  an  absolute  world  that  shall  be 
perfect  and  immutable  and  not  subject  to  the  finite 
relation  of  time  and  development  ?  We  do  not  need 
to  thrash  over  again  the  old  irrationality. 

Avoiding  this  absurdity  the  sober  question  is, 
whether  the  necessary  subjection  of  relative  and 
created  being  to  the  orders  of  time  and  development 
is  any  limitation  on  the  power  of  the  Absolute  ?  To 
this  the  answer  is  patent.  Not  if  time  and  develop- 
ment themselves  are  not  conceived  as  absolute.  The 
relation  of  the  creative  energy  to  these  categories  of 
relativity  is  that  of  their  founder.  They  are  the 
modes  in  which  the  energy  of  the  Absolute  enters 
into  relative  production.  Development  is  a  category, 
therefore,  which  depends  on  the  Absolute,  and  in- 
stead of  shutting  God  out  of  his  world,  or  limiting 
his  power,  its  whole  rationality  rests  in  its  neces- 
sary presupposition  of  the  transcendent  function 
of  the  Absolute,  ^\e  saw  in  the  chapters  on  History 
and  Eeligion,  as  well  as  in  those  on  Cosmic,  Organic, 
and  Psychic  Nature,  how  development  necessitates 
the  perpetual  inflow  of  energy  from  absolute  springs. 


286  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

If  development  is  God's  creature  and  rests  directly 
upon  the  divine  energy  it  can  contain  no  real  limit 
of  the  divine  power. 

Analogous  considerations  bear  on  the  problem  of 
the  temporal  order.  If  we  make  time  absolute,  then 
God  must  work  in  time,  and  the  accomplishment  of 
his  purposes  will  have  to  wait.  And  so  between  the 
creative  fiat  and  the  completion  of  the  world  aeons 
must  elapse  sufficient  to  tire,  if  possible,  even  the 
divine  patience.  "  God  spake  and  it  was  done  "  thus 
becomes  a  poetic  fiction,  and  the  true  idea  of  the  deity 
is  that  of  one  who  must  wait  through  all  the  ages  for 
the  accomplishment  of  his  purposes,  while  in  the 
meantime  rack  and  ruin  are  threatening  the  world. 
Such  a  view  is  irrational.  Time  can  be  conceived  as 
only  relative,  and,  as  such,  a  creature  of  the  Absolute. 
Lotze  argues  this  question  very  subtly  in  his  "  Dic- 
tata  on  the  Philosophy  of  Religion."  God,  he  says, 
cannot  be  conceived  as  being  in  time.  His  relation  to 
time  is  that  of  its  founder.  Now  if  God  founds  time, 
"  its  free  ends  " — this  is  Lotze's  iDlirase— must  con- 
verge in  God.  The  consciousness  of  God  will  there- 
fore be  related  in  the  same  way  to  all  the  parts  of  time. 
There  will  be  no  vanishing  past  or  oncoming  future, 
but  the  whole  temporal  order  will  be  what  the  psy- 
chologists call  a  "  specious  present."  This  view  of 
time  brings  God  into  immediate  relation  with  every 
part  of  the  world.  It  closes  up  the  chasm  between 
the  divine  purpose  and  its  fulfilment.  It  brings  the 
world-idea  in  God's  mind,  and  the  world-end  as  it 
embodies  itself  in  the  far-off  divine  event,  into  im- 


GOD  287 

mediate  relation.  It  restores  tlie  old  sublime  con- 
ception of  God's  free  sovereignty  over  his  own 
world.  God  speaks  and  it  is  done.  God  does  not 
have  to  wait  through  the  long  ages  for  the  fulfil- 
ment of  his  designs.  To  God  the  end  and  the  be- 
ginning are  one.  The  weary  waiting,  the  long  ages 
of  gi'adual  evolution,  the  purpose  back  in  eternity, 
and  the  fulfilment  yonder,  are  ours.  These  things 
are  true  for  us,  they  are  necessary  categories  of  the 
relative,  but  to  God  all  things  are  present,  open  and 
immediate. 

God's  life  is  immutable  and  eternal.  Therefore 
the  soul's  faith  in  God  creates  in  it  a  divine  thirst 
for  immortality.  The  sj^nthesis  between  belief  in 
God  and  belief  in  immortality  is  normal  and  natu- 
ral. Belief  in  God  may  be  eclii^sed,  and  then  the 
rose  of  immortality  begins  to  fade.  But  the  resto- 
ration of  the  spirit's  belief  in  the  actuality  of  its  own 
infinite  ideal  brings  with  it  a  revival  of  faith  in  an 
infinite  progress  of  the  spirit  toward  the  ideal.  The 
law  of  the  soul's  life,  as  we  have  seen,  is  that  of 
progress  toward  the  ideal.  Whatever  vivifies  the 
ideal,  therefore,  and  makes  it  real,  will  stimulate  the 
ideal  aspirations  of  the  soul  and  gender  in  it  the 
idea  of  a  life  that  is  commensurate  with  their  reali- 
zation. In  the  olden  time,  before  the  Christ-idea 
became  a  jiossession  of  humanity,  when  the  abso- 
lute Spirit  was  wont  to  work  in  a  transcendent 
manner,  the  idea  of  an  immortal  life  could  not  "be 
fully  apprehended.  But  when  the  Christ-idea  be- 
came immanent,  then  the  thought  of  the  immortal 


288  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN  PHILOSOPHY 

life  came  into  the  foreground,  and  as  it  grew  clear 
and  definite  man's  faith  in  it  became  a  firm  and  liv- 
ing conviction. 

There  are  two  species  of  difficulty  which  the  faith 
in  immortality  has  been  obliged  to  meet,  one  phil- 
osophical and  the  other  scientific.  The  former  takes 
various  forms,  but  here,  since  our  conception  of 
the  human  soul  is  generically  the  same  as  Aristo- 
tle's, the  difficulty  will  be  also  of  the  Aristotelian 
type.  Aristotle  distinguishes  between  the  active 
and  passive  reason  {vov<;  -TroirjTLKO';  and  vov?  Tra^r^riKos), 
and  connecting  the  latter  with  the  corporeal  prin- 
ciple, as  a  function  is  related  to  its  organ,  conceives 
that  at  death  it  perishes,  and  that  the  active  reason 
alone  is  the  immortal  principle  in  the  soul.  Aris- 
totle teaches  the  doctrine  of  immortality,  but  inas- 
much as  the  root  of  personality  is  by  him  located  in 
the  passive  reason,  the  difficulty  has  been  to  conceive 
the  survival  of  any  principle  of  personal  and  indi- 
vidual consciousness.  This  difficulty  led  the  Ara- 
bian commentators  on  Aristotle  in  the  middle  ages, 
as  a  rule,  to  pronounce  against  the  personal  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,  and  this  was  one  of  the  chief 
points  of  controversy  between  them  and  the  later 
schoolmen.  We  avoid  the  difficulty,  however,  when 
we  conceive  the  soul  itself  to  be  a  developing  spirit- 
ual principle  which  is  continually  passing  from  po- 
tence  to  actuality,  and  thus  as  including  a  synthesis 
of  the  passive  and  active  rationality  in  its  own  con- 
stitution. This  dual  constitution  also,  as  we  have 
seen,  involves  the  possibility  of  a  conscious  Individ- 


GOD  289 

ual  life  distinct  from  that  of  the  Absohite.  It  is  clear 
that  Aristotle  did  not  realize  to  the  full  the  signifi- 
cance of  his  own  principle,  or  if  so,  that  his  com- 
mentators have  not  fully  understood  him.  For  if  we 
conceive  the  soul  as  containing  in  its  constitution 
the  dual  moments  of  potence  and  actuality,  we  have 
an  idea  of  its  nature  which  renders  the  persistence 
of  its  distinctive  life  both  conceivable  and  rational. 

The  scientific  difficulty  may  be  stated  as  follows  : 
Modern  science  has  come  to  regard  the  brain  as  the 
organ  of  conscious  life,  and  our  modern  thinking 
finds  it  hard  to  conceive  any  idea  of  conscious 
psychic  existence  apart  from  a  brain.  The  diffi- 
culty seems  to  increase  as  physiological  knowledge 
grows  in  accuracy  and  detail.  Not  only  do  we 
ahvays  find  psj'chic  consciousness  in  connection 
with  a  brain,  but  the  method  of  difference  seems  to 
demonstrate  that  where  there  is  no  brain  there  can 
be  no  consciousness.  A  blow  on  the  head  causes  a 
cessation  of  consciousness  ;  a  lesion  of  a  particular 
part  interrupts  the  flow  of  some  portion  of  the  con- 
scious stream.  Brain  conditions  seem  to  determine 
conscious  states,  and  as  an  organized  whole  as  well 
as  in  its  molecular  constitution  nerve-tissue  seems 
to  constitute  an  indispensable  condition  of  psychic 
life. 

This  difficulty  would  be  insurmountable,  we 
think,  if  the  relation  between  the  human  soul  and 
its  corporeal  organism  were  conceived  as  one  of 
mutually  exclusive  entities.  The  fact  that  it  is  ordi- 
narily so  conceived  simply  testifies  to  the  survival 
19 


290  BASAL   COiS-CEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  Cartesian  dualism.  The  whole  theory  of  this 
treatise  is,  however,  a  denial  of  that  view  and  an 
assertion  of  a  merely  relative  distinction  between 
them,  one  that  is  mediated  by  a  spiritual  principle. 
Matter  is  the  first  potency  of  spirit,  and  mechanism 
and  its  laws  are  spiritual  in  their  foundations.  Now 
as  the  soul  is  not  only  a  part  of  the  world-energ"y, 
but  also  an  epitome  and  synthesis  of  it,  there  is  log- 
ically involved  in  the  idea  of  the  soul  that  of  a  prin- 
ciple which  holds  in  it  a  duality  of  potencies,  mate- 
rial and  spiritual.  We  thus  transfer  the  bond  which 
binds  the  material  and  spiritual  together  from  an 
external  position  to  its  seat  in  the  soul  itself.  And 
by  so  doing  we  arrive  at  the  conception  of  a  dual 
psychic  constitution,  Avhich  contains  in  itself  the 
germs  of  both  material  and  spiritual  organiza- 
tion. The  corporeal  organism  may  dissolve,  then, 
and  the  basal  constitution  of  the  soul  will  still  re- 
main intact  as  the  norm  of  a  continuous  life  of 
conscious  growth  and  activity.  And  when  the  idea 
of  an  ultimate  Psychic  constitution  has  once  been 
achieved,  the  i^resumption  of  science  changes,  for  it 
is  then  seen  that  the  dissolution  of  the  body  does 
not  necessitate  the  destruction  of  the  soul. 

Thus  the  negative  presumptions  of  i^hilosoiDliy  and 
science  are  overcome,  and  the  spirit  is  left  free  to 
assert  its  own  ideal  life.  It  is  the  same  voice  of 
the  spirit  under  the  same  category  of  unity  that  de- 
mands both  the  divine  ideal  and  the  unending  life. 
It  is  in  this  dual  synthesis  of  God  and  immortality 
that  the  soul  finds  the  satisfaction  of  its  thirst  for 


GOD  291 

unity  and  completeness.  In  the  same  synthesis  is 
found  an  unfailing  well-sx)ring'  of  joyous  and  hope- 
ful activity  both  for  the  individual  soul  and  for  hu- 
manity. 

Man  is  born  an  heir  to  immortal  existence.  The 
voice  that  cries  out  in  him  for  an  unending  life  is 
the  utterance  of  his  deepest  nature.  But  the  soul 
tragedy  of  modern  life  is  that  the  intellect  has 
grown  sceptical  and  contradicts  the  deeper  voice 
of  the  spirit.  The  spirit  cries  out  for  immortality, 
but  the  intellect  saj^s,  Cease  your  striving,  nor  vain- 
ly imagine  that  the  universe  exists  only  for  your 
delectation.  But  the  soul's  demand  is  vital  and 
its  disappointment  means  death.  So  the  waters  of 
existence  become  bitter  to  the  palate,  and  the  fine 
spiritual  nature,  robbed  of  its  holiest  birthright, 
plunges  into  pessimistic  despair  and  longs  for  some 
Lethe  stream  in  which  to  forget  its  troubled  dream. 
Or,  if  it  wills  to  live  bravely  on  and  work,  the  joys 
of  life  become  apples  of  Sodom  in  its  mouth  and 
the  solid  structure  of  the  world  that  surrounds  it 
shrinks  into  a  mere  veil  of  illusion  behind  which 
stalks,  not  Nirvana,  but  the  gaunt  spectre  of  Abad- 
don, For  when  the  immortal  hope  is  gone,  life 
shrinks  into  a  thing  of  shreds  and  patches  and  all 
philosophy  becomes  in  truth  *'  a  meditation  on 
death  and  annihilation." 


XVIII 

SPIRITUAL   ACTIVITY 

We  have  seen  that  primal  being*  can  be  conceived 
only  as  self-activity.  Self-activity  is  activity  that 
contains  its  primal  impulse  within  itself.  Self-ac- 
tivity is  also  self-conscious  activity.  And  we  have 
seen  that  self  -  conscious  activity  is  self-asserting- 
and  self-realizing-.  We  inean  this  when  we  say  that 
primal  being-  is  spirit.  - 

The  dialectic  of  spirit  is  the  form  of  its  activity. 
The  dialectic  i^resupposes  the  primal  motive.  AVhy 
being  should  be  active  is  a  question  that  transcends 
all  answer.  We  assume  it  when  we  say  primal  be- 
ing is  self-activity.  Its  first  impulse  to  action  is 
identical  with  itself.  Now  this  first  impulse  is  the 
initial  step  of  the  dialectic.  The  moments  of  it  are 
all  iDulsations  of  self-assertion.  The  initial  pulsa- 
tion, as  we  have  seen,  is  one  of  intellection.  Being 
is  primally  intelligent  and  rational.  Its  first  activ- 
ity is  thought,  a  thought  in  which  the  primal  im- 
pulse embodies  itself.  It  thinks  itself.  But  the 
primal  impulse  reveals  the  primal  distinction.  The 
thought  that  thinks  itself  also  thinks  its  opposite. 
It  is  as  impossible  to  derive  difference  as  it  is  to  de- 


SPIRITUAL   ACTIVITY  293 

rive  identity.  They  are  involved  in  the  primal  im- 
pulse of  being.  It  is  the  essence  of  spirit  to  think 
the  same  and  the  different. 

The  result  of  the  primal  impulse  is  the  dual  intui- 
tion of  being's  self,  and  being's  not-self,  or  of  being 
and  non-being.  It  is  here  that  we  strike  upon  the 
crucial  point  of  tlie  whole  dialectic  of  spirit.  When 
in  this  primal  activity  being  thinks  the  not -self, 
does  it  simply  negate  itself  and  then  by  another 
act  negate  the  negation,  and  thus  reach  self-affirma- 
tion through  negation?  Or,  putting  it  in  another 
form,  is  it  being  that  goes  out  as  the  nothing  and 
then  returns  again  as  a  higher  form  of  being  ?  This 
is  the  ordinary  Hegelian  interpretation.  We  think  a 
radical  reform  is  needed  at  this  cardinal  point.  Be- 
ing never  denies  itself  except  in  a  relative  sense. 
Its  negation  is  directed  against  its  opposite.  We 
would  then  construe  the  movement  of  the  primal 
imiDulse  as  follows.  When  in  accordance  with  the 
original  dual  category  being  thinks  the  not-self,  it 
thinks  objectively,  and  its  intuition  is  of  that  which 
negates  self  ;  that  is,  the  opposite  of  self.  Now  the 
intuition  of  that  Avhich  is  opposite  to  self  is  a  point 
of  reaction  for  what  is  called  the  return  upon  self, 
which  means  the  reassertion  of  the  self  against  its 
opposite,  or  the  reassertion  of  identity  against  differ- 
ence. We  may  speak  by  a  species  of  dialectic  license 
of  this  movement  as  a  return  of  being  out  of  nothing 
upon  itself,  or  as  a  return  of  identity  out  of  differ- 
ence, if  we  avoid  the  contradictory  assumption  that 
being  has  ever  lost  itself  in  nothing,  or  identity  in 


294  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

difference.  The  distinction  liere  is  just  as  primal  as 
the  thinking  itself,  for  it  is  constitutional  to  it.  The 
primal  movement  of  spirit,  as  we  have  said,  is  self- 
assertion,  and  in  this  primal  intellection  it  is  self-as- 
sertion through  identity  and  difference.  This  does 
not  mean,  however,  that  spirit  thinks  itself  as  the 
same  and  then  thinks  itself  as  the  different ;  that 
is,  as  the  not-self.  Spirit  is  not  the  arch- juggler  of 
the  universe.  What  is  meant  is  something  simpler. 
Spirit  thinks  itself  as  the  same  ;  that  is,  the  self  be- 
comes conscious  of  itself.  Spirit  thinks  the  not-self 
as  different ;  that  is,  the  self  becomes  conscious  of 
a  not-self,  as  its  different  or  opposite.  The  primal 
dialectic  of  thinking  is  between  the  same  and  the 
different.  But  they  are  never  identified.  The  intel- 
lectual impulse  has  nothing  erudite  about  it.  To 
it  being  and  nothing  are  not  identical  but  opposite, 
and  the  true  genius  of  intellection  is  sacrificed  when- 
ever this  distinction  is  obscured. 

To  be  clear  on  this  cardinal  point  settles  the 
whole  dialectic  of  spirit.  The  other  moments  fol- 
low from  the  nature  of  spirit  as  self-conscious  activ- 
ity. The  intuition  of  the  negative  or  non-being 
constitutes  a  motive  that  determines  the  procession 
of  the  spirit.  The  primal  impulse  to  self-assertion 
in  view  of  this  intuition  becomes  self-assertion 
against  the  negative,  in  a  volitional  form  ;  that  is,  as 
the  will  to  suppress  and  annul  the  negative.  Now, 
absolute  will  is  self-active  and  moves  upon  the  nega- 
tive or  non-being  as  energy  of  creation.  The  crea- 
tive impulse  is  not  primal,  if  we  use  the  term  in  a 


SPIRITUAL   ACTIVITY  295 

log-ical  sense,  but  has  as  its  presupposition  tlie  ac- 
tivity of  absolute  intellection  which  reveals  the 
negative  sphere.  Creation  is  thus  both  rational  and 
volitional  and  may  be  conceived  as  the  will  to  annul 
non- being  by  the  production  of  forms  of  being-. 
But  here  again  our  thinking  must  avoid  entangle- 
ment. In  creation  the  distinction  of  being  and 
non-being  is  not  annulled.  Creation  is  not  a  proces- 
sion of  the  Absolute  in  a  relative  and  finite  dress. 
Eelativity  and  finitude  are  more  than  appearances ; 
they  are  constitutional  to  the  creature.  The  abso- 
lute will  does  not  finitate  or  limit  itself  in  the  crea- 
tion. The  idea  of  absolute  self-limitation  involves 
that  of  the  annihilation  of  energy  and  is  self-contra- 
dictory. 

The  only  possible  concept  of  a  creature  is  that  of 
a  nature  that  contains  opposite  momenta  of  being 
and  non-being.  Plato  in  the  Timaeus  clothes  a  true 
intuition  in  symbols.  The  Demiurge  compounds 
opposite  ingredients,  the  same  and  the  other,  into 
a  third  existence,  in  which  the  intractable  nature 
of  the  other  is  compressed  into  synthesis  Avith  the 
same.  The  creative  energy  annuls  non- being  by 
generating  a  created  nature  into  which  non-being, 
while  it  enters  as  a  dividual,  separative,  dissolutive 
condition,  is  held  in  subordination  by  the  unitary 
principle  of  being ;  that  is,  the  principle  of  self-con- 
scious spiritual  activity. 

The  dual  nature  of  the  creature  thus  originates,  a 
nature  that  is  ever  in  a  state  of  flux,  as  Plato  says, 
and  that  is  ever  oscillating  between  the  opposite 


296  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

poles  of  being  and  non-being.  And  it  is  this  dual 
nature  of  tlie  creature,  as  we  saw  in  the  first  cha^Dters 
of  this  book,  that  renders  it  open  to  change  and 
evolution.  Being  does  not  limit  itself  in  the  crea- 
tion, but  the  negative  element  is  the  limit  that  re- 
duces spiritual  energy  to  jDotence  and  thus  makes 
development  essential. 

Now,  it  is  in  connection  with  the  evolution  of  the 
creature  that  the  third  movement  in  the  dialectic 
of  spirit  arises.  Evolution  is  to  be  conceived  as 
the  gradual  development  of  the  principle  of  being 
in  the  nature  of  the  creature,  from  potence  to  actual- 
ity, through  a  progressive  suppression  or  transcen- 
dence of  the  negative.  Being  can  grow  only  through 
the  transcendence,  the  annulling  of  non-being.  And 
non-being  can  be  completely  transcended  only  in  the 
unification  of  the  creature  with  the  Creator  through 
an  infinite  approximation.  Spirit's  primal  impulse 
of  self-assertion,  in  view  of  the  negative  char- 
acter of  the  creature,  its  distance  and  alienation 
from  actualized  spirit,  is  to  go  out  in  the  energy  of 
love  as  a  developing  and  mediating  force  of  unifica- 
tion. But  here  again  our  thinking  must  keejD  clear 
of  entanglements.  It  is  not  the  unity  of  being  and 
non-being  that  is  conserved  in  this  developing  proc- 
ess. Non- being  is  annulled  and  suppressed  from 
the  beginning  to  the  end  of  it.  It  is  the  unity  of 
being  and  becoming,  the  creature  and  the  Creator, 
that  is  conserved.  And  the  negative  side  of  this  con- 
serving process  is  the  war  against  and  the  suppres- 
sion of  non-being. 


SPIPJTUAL    ACTIVITY  297 

This  dialectic  of  spirit  which  thu-s  passes  through 
the  moments  of  negation,  creation  and  unification 
is  completely  realized  only  when  we  conceive  it  in 
a  twofold  manner,  (1)  on  its  subjective  side  as  a 
logical  self  -  comi^letion  of  spirit  in  the  unity  of 
thought,  volition,  and  love  ;  (2)  on  its  objective  side 
as  the  progressive  completion  of  the  creature 
through  the  momenta  of  creation  and  evolution, 
culminating  in  the  final  mediation  and  unity  of 
creature  and  Creator. 

Thus  we  conceive  the  movement  of  absolute  spirit 
under  its  own  categories.  Subject  to  the  limita- 
tions of  its  finite  nature  the  dialectic  of  the  human 
spirit  is  to  be  conceived  under  the  same  categories. 
We  have  already  in  the  chapter  on  Knowledge  de- 
veloped the  process  of  the  intellectual  life  in  which  it 
travels  through  the  categories  of  identity  and  dif- 
ference and  sufficient  reason  up  to  that  of  unity, 
under  which  it  realizes  the  rational  ideal  of  knowl- 
edge. We  have  only  to  translate  the  stages  of  this 
progress  into  volitional  terms  in  order  to  see  how 
the  whole  practical  life  of  man  becomes  a  battle 
with  the  negative,  a  struggle  to  overcome  the  world. 
The  life  of  the  spirit  is  a  conflict  waged  x^ositively, 
as  the  spirit's  assertion  of  itself  in  the  progress  of 
its  own  inner  evolution  and  the  development  of  its 
spiritual  potences,  negatively  as  a  battle  against 
negation  and  evil,  and  as  a  refusal  to  be  satisfied 
with  anything  short  of  the  highest  good. 

And  this  ideal  is  realized  only  through  the  unify- 
ing activity  of  love.     In  the  absolute  sphere  unity 


298  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

of  the  Creator  and  his  world  is  effected,  as  we  have 
seen,  only  through  the  activity  of  love  manifesting 
itself  on  the  broad  arena  of  nature  and  humanity 
and  realizing  itself  through  mediation  and  sacrifice. 
This  is  also  the  law  of  the  human  spirit.  In  the 
unifying  activity  of  love  the  spirit  asserts  itself 
negatively  in  the  progressive  annulment  of  the 
negative  forces  that  hinder  spiritual  development ; 
in  its  progressive  triumph  over  sin  and  evil  in  the 
individual  and  common  life  of  humanity ;  in  the 
war  of  extermination  that  it  perpetually  wages 
against  selfishness  and  falsehood.  It  asserts  itself 
positively  in  the  rise  of  the  spirit's  activity,  through 
comprehension,  into  ever  larger  and  larger  spheres 
of  life.  Thus,  for  example,  the  life  of  the  individual 
is  transcended  and  comprehended  in  the  larger  life 
of  the  family.  That  of  the  family  is  transcended 
and  comprehended  in  the  larger  life  of  the  commun- 
ity and  the  institutions  of  church  and  state,  while 
the  supreme  unification  is  reached  in  the  sphere  of 
religion  where  the  larger  life  of  humanity  is  brought 
into  ideal  harmony  with  God. 

Thus  the  larger  life  of  the  human  spirit  realizes 
itself,  but  not  without  renunciation.  The  suppres- 
sion of  the  negative  is  an  inseparable  accompani- 
ment of  positive  growth.  The  spirit,  in  order  to 
enter  into  the  higher  and  broader  life,  must  deny 
its  lower  and  less  developed  self  by  throwing  off 
restrictions  and  hinderances.  In  order  to  enter  into 
the  larger  life  of  the  family,  the  state,  the  church, 
or  the  race,  the  old  man  must  be  put  off  and  the 


SPIRITUAL   ACTIVITY  299 

new  man  must  be  put  on.  And  that  largest  and  su- 
premest  life  of  the  spirit,  which  it  enters  into  in  the 
religious  sphere,  the  life  with  God,  is  conditioned 
on  the  supremest  act  of  self-renunciation.  Here 
the  war  with  the  negative  reaches  its  final  stage, 
where  on  the  one  side  the  demand  for  self-renuncia- 
tion and  annulment  is  most  absolute,  while  on  the 
other  the  comprehension  and  unification  is  most 
comxDlete.  For  through  all  its  renunciations  the 
spirit  carries  its  true  self  with  it ;  only  the  nega- 
tive, the  imperfect,  the  evil  is  progressively  cast 
aside,  while  the  real  self  ever  increases  its  riches 
as  it  merges  into  larger  and  more  comprehensive 
spheres  of  activity. 

We  have  only  to  complete  this  idea  of  the  strug- 
gle of  the  human  spirit  with  the  idea  of  its  depend- 
ence upon  its  absolute  ground,  in  order  to  obtain 
a  key  to  the  whole  life  of  humanity.  The  human 
spirit  cannot  conserve  its  own  development,  but 
in  unity  with  the  absolute  source  of  its  being  it 
may,  through  constant  accessions  of  transcendent 
strength  and  grace,  be  able  to  overcome  all  the 
forces  of  negation  and  evil  and  to  advance  continu- 
ally in  the  progressive  stages  of  an  endless  life. 


CONCLUSION 

Looking  back  over  the  path  we  have  travelled  in 
this  inquiry  several  reflections  suggest  themselves 
in  conclusion.  In  the  first  place,  we  have  found 
in  personality  the  highest  category  of  interpretation 
in  the  spheres  of  both  the  relative  and  the  Absolute. 
Now  personality  is  first  known  as  a  psychological 
fact  in  the  soul's  experience,  and  the  inference  would 
seem  to  follow  that  all  philosophy  rests  on  psychol- 
ogy. This  we  shall  not  attempt  to  deny.  The  spirit 
of  the  knower  must  be  able  to  find  in  itself  the  clews 
to  all  the  mysteries  of  being,  so  far  as  they  may  be 
resolved.  At  the  same  time  the  dependence  of  phil- 
osophy on  psychology  cannot  be  construed  in  any 
narrow  or  exclusive  sense.  Philosophy  is  not  simply 
an  extension  of  psychology.  An  inquiry  such  as  the 
present  one  has  been,  is  fitted  to  open  our  eyes  to  the 
fact  that  our  psychological  categories  only  become 
philosophically  competent  after  they  have,  so  to 
speak,  passed  through  the  historic  medium  and  em- 
bodied themselves  objectively  in  the  experience  of 
humanity.  The  psj^chological  categories  must,  in 
short,  be  translated  from  subjective  to  objective 
universals.  The  fact  that  only  history  is  compe- 
tent to  this  translation  renders  that  insight  which 


CONCLUSION  301 

only  comes  from  a  real  knowledge  of  the  historic 
evolution  of  thought  indispensable  to  philosophy. 
The  true  organ  of  philosophy  is  constituted  by  a  syn- 
thesis of  the  spiritual  insights  of  both  psychology 
and  history. 

The  truth  of  this  is  demonstrated  in  the  instance 
of  personality.  The  riches  of  this  category  never 
would  yield  themselves  to  introspective  and  sub- 
jective analysis  alone.  Far  less  would  they  give  up 
their  secrets  to  the  exclusive  analysis  of  the  individ- 
ual consciousness.  The  full  significance  of  personal- 
ity emerges  only  in  the  objective  thinking  and  the 
spiritual  experience  of  the  race,  and  it  is  only  when 
the  spirit  finds  its  subjective  categories  embodied 
for  it  in  these  objective  forms  that  they  become  ad- 
equate to  the  demands  of  philosophy. 

There  may  be  some  who  will  think  that  in  the 
attempt  to  break  the  agnostic  limitations  we  have 
gone  too  far  toward  the  gnostic  extreme.  But  such 
persons  may  be  reassured.  The  intelligence  of  the 
creature  will  always  find  that  the  Creator  has  been 
beforehand  with  it,  so  that,  penetrate  as  far  as  it  may, 
it  will  find  itself  only  tracing  the  footsteps  of  an 
absolute  intelligence  that  has  preceded  it.  Besides, 
the  aim  of  this  whole  inquiry  has  been  to  penetrate 
the  mysteries  of  the  Absolute  only  so  far  as  may 
be  necessary  in  order  to  discover  how  it  rationally 
grounds  the  relative  order.  The  category  of  per- 
sonality conceived  as  an  immanent  activity  of  being 
gives  us  this  insight,  but  we  know  not,  and  doubt- 
less can  never  know,  what  abysses  of  the  Absolute 


302  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN    PHILOSOPHY 

still  remain  unpenetrated.  The  category  of  person- 
ality does  not  abolish  mystery,  but  simply  lifts  the 
veil  a  little  way  and  reveals  a  glimpse  of  the  cre- 
ative energy  in  its  relation  to  the  world. 

Our  inquiry  has  also  tested  the  value  of  the  dual 
categories  being  and  non-being  in  solving  phil- 
osophic problems  and  in  developing  the  outlines 
of  a  coherent  and  comprehensive  theory.  Whatever 
speculative  difficulties  may  yet  remain,  the  working 
power  of  these  conceptions  can  no  longer  be  ques- 
tioned. It  may  be  maintained  with  Hegel  that  the 
highest  category  is  an  absolute  idea  which  compre- 
hends the  dual  moments,  being  and  non-being, 
within  itself.  To  this  we  may  yield  a  qualified  as- 
sent, provided  this  idea  be  translated  into  spirit  and 
its  dialectic  be  conceived  as  on  its  affirmative  side, 
self-affirmation,  but  on  its  negative  side  the  denial 
of  its  opposite.  The  reform  in  Hegelism,  which  has 
been  urged  throughout  this  inquiry,  may  be  ex- 
pressed in  the  following  statement :  being  must  be 
identified  with  spirit.  The  inner  movement  of  spirit 
is  a  dual  dialectic  in  which  spirit  asserts  itself  and 
denies  its  opposite.  The  dual  movement  is  thus  im- 
manent in  being.  But  the  negative  which  spirit 
denies  is  not  in  being.  It  is  an  oppositive  excluded 
conception,  which  spirit  forever  wars  against  and 
suppresses,  but  which  never  passes  into  its  opposite. 
The  negative  activity  of  spirit  thus  becomes  from 
one  point  of  view  an  outgoing  oppositive  energy,  as 
distinguished  from  the  immanent  activity  of  self-af- 
firmation, while  from  another  point  of  view  it  is  the 


CONCLUSION  303 

volitional  energy  of  creation  and  development.  This 
conceiDtion  of  absolute  spirit  in  its  dual  activity  ren- 
ders  its  whole  relation  to  the  relative  order,  includ- 
ing evil  and  negation,  botli  intelligible  and  rational. 

The  current  thinking  of  our  time  can  find  no 
better  answer  to  the  question  how  it  happens  that 
an  absolute  energy  produces  only  a  relative  and 
imperfect  creature,  than  the  assertion  that  the  Ab- 
solute imposes  a  limit  upon  itself  and  voluntarily 
restrains  its  creative  energies  within  finite  bounds 
when  otherwise  the  result  would  have  been  infinite 
and  perfect.  Now  it  is  clear  that  no  theory  of  ar- 
bitrary self-restraint  can  supplj^  the  ground  of  a 
rational  explanation,  and  if  the  conception  is  to 
be  saved  from  becoming  positively  irreligious  it 
must  be  subsumed  under  the  category  of  the  good. 
The  only  motive,  in  other  words,  that  can  make  such 
self-restraint  reasonable  must  be  derived  from  the 
absolute  goodness.  But  in  view  of  the  actual  evil 
that  has  arisen  out  of  the  finitude  and  imperfection 
of  things  the  goodness  of  the  Absolute  cannot  be 
vindicated,  if,  as  the  theory  in  question  implies,  the 
creative  will  had  before  it  an  option  between  the 
generation  of  an  infinite  and  perfect  world,  and  one 
that  is  finite  and  imperfect.  For  the  fact  remains, 
on  this  supposition,  that  a  world-scheme  which  in- 
volves the  contingency  and  actuality  of  evil  has 
been  preferred  to  one  from  which  these  features  are 
absent. 

A  rational  insight  into  the  negative  cuts  the  knot 
of  the  difficulty  by  helping  us  to  see  that  the  suppo- 


304  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

sition  of  such  an  option  is  irrational  and  that  the 
only  option  conceivably  before  the  absolute  will  is 
a  choice  between  loure  negation  and  a  finite  and  rel- 
ative order  of  being-.  It  is  no  impeachment  of  abso- 
lute power  that  its  outgoing  energy  does  not  gener- 
ate another  absolute  alongside  of  itself,  nor  is  it  any 
impeachment  of  the  absolute  goodness  that  it  pre- 
fers to  non-being  a  relative  and  finite  order  of  being 
which  involves  the  contingency  of  evil.  We  have 
seen  that  the  true  significance  of  the  world-order 
can  be  seen  only  in  the  light  of  the  highest  concep- 
tions of  religion,  and  that  from  the  stand -point  of 
religion  evil  becomes  a  subordinate  though  real  feat- 
ure of  the  world,  while  the  good  stands  supreme  as 
the  end  and  rationale  of  its  whole  history  and  devel- 
opment. 

Furthermore,  our  reflection  enables  us  to  conceive 
a  rational  solution  of  the  issues  between  monism 
and  dualism,  on  the  one  hand,  and  idealism  and 
realism  on  the  other.  A  monistic  theory  of  reality 
which  identifies  it  with  being  must  always  be  in- 
adequate since  the  real  must  include  the  opposite  of 
being,  which  can  never  be  identified  with  being  with- 
out transgressing  basal  principles.  Also  any  mon- 
istic theory  must  be  inadequate  which  ignores  the 
distinction  between  the  Absolute  and  the  relative 
and  seeks  to  apply  a  unitary  principle,  let  it  be 
spiritual  or  material,  without  regard  to  that  distinc- 
tion. For  in  that  case,  if  we  start  from  absolute 
being,  we  will  miss  the  actual  duality  of  the  relative, 
whereas  if  we  take  our  departure  from  the  relative  we 


CONCLUSION  305 

will  never  be  able  to  conceive  any  point  where  a  tran- 
sition of  the  real  from  relative  to  absolute  is  possible. 
And  this  inability  will  carry  with  it  the  impossibility 
of  assurance  as  to  the  existence  of  the  Absolute. 

A  rational  metaphysic  will  admit  the  distinction 
between  being  and  reality,  and  while  asserting-  the 
unitary  character  of  the  one  will  acknowledge  the 
duality  of  the  other.  The  real  includes  the  negative 
of  being.  It  will  also  admit  the  distinction  between 
being  and  becoming,  and  while  asserting  the  unitary 
character  of  being  will  admit  the  duality  of  becoming. 
In  short,  a  rational  metaphysic  is  identical  with  a 
spiritualistic  theory  of  reality,  which,  postulating  an 
absolute  spirit  as  the  self-existent  principle  of  things, 
is  able  to  see  not  only  how  the  necessity  of  non- 
being  springs  from  this  postulate,  but  also  how 
the  negative  supplies  a  necessary  datum  of  the  rel- 
ative, accounting  for  its  modified  and  dualistic  char- 
acter. Monism  is  right  when  it  says  there  is  only 
one  principle  of  being,  but  it  is  mistaken  when  it 
identifies  being  and  reality,  and  on  that  basis  denies 
the  reality  of  the  negative. 

The  issue  between  idealism  and  realism  is  not  so 
stringent.  There  are  several  types  of  theory  which 
a  spiritualistic  metaphysic  will  reject.  One  of  these 
is  a  type  of  ontologic  idealism  which  suppresses 
volition  and  feeling  in  the  interests  of  abstract 
thought.  Another  is  a  si^ecies  of  subjective  psj^- 
chological  idealism  which  ignores  the  ontologic  as- 
pect of  reality  and  completely  identifies  the  object 
of  knowledge  with  the  subjective  psychic  process 

20 


306  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

through  which  it  is  apprehended.  Still  a  third  type 
is  a  species  of  realism  which  assumes  the  distinction 
between  spirit  and  matter  to  be  absolute,  thus,  by 
implication  at  least,  carrying  the  duality  of  sub- 
stances up  into  the  nature  of  the  Absolute. 

The  truth  which  metaphysics  is  chiefly  concerned 
to  assert  is  that  the  real  is  primally  spiritual.  A 
spiritualistic  theory  leads,  as  we  have  seen,  to  the 
recognition  of  a  distinction  between  the  Absolute 
and  the  relative  and  the  inclusion  of  both  in  the 
synthesis  of  reality.  This  makes  it  imj)ossible  to 
reduce  the  relative  to  mere  appearance.  The  rela- 
tive is  real.  It  has  its  roots  in  the  Absolute,  but  it 
is  not  a  mere  schein  of  the  Absolute.  We  have  seen 
that  relativity  has  a  distinctive  constitution  and  type 
which  make  it  analogous  to  a  word  that,  once  ut- 
tered, cannot  be  recalled.  The  word  of  the  Absolute 
endureth  forever.  Moreover,  in  the  relative  sphere 
the  material  is  not  a  mere  schein  of  the  spiritual. 
We  have  seen  that  the  law  of  relativity  is,  first  the 
material,  then  the  spiritual ;  that  the  spiritual  cate- 
gories are  the  highest.  But  this  does  not  mean  the 
supioression  of  the  material  or  its  reduction  to  un- 
reality. In  achieving  the  spiritual,  the  material  and 
mechanical  are  gone  through  but  not  left  behind. 
The  material  stands  there  hard  and  durable,  and 
the  moment  of  mechanism  is  ever  present  in  the 
highest  manifestations  of  spirit.  The  world  is  a 
solid  and  firm -jointed  reality  which  confronts  the 
knower  and  fills  his  categories  with  objective  con- 
tent from  the  beginning  to  the  end  of  the  process  of 


CONCLUSION  307 

experience.*  A  theory  which  thus  asserts  a  system 
of  reality  at  the  heart  of  which  pulsates  the  personal 
energ-y  of  spirit  may  be  idealistic  in  its  conception 
of  the  tnode  of  knowledge,  since  knowledge  and  re- 
ality must  be  distinguished,  but  it  will  be  realistic 
in  its  metaphysic.  Not  the  idea,  but  concrete  spirit 
is  the  primal  unit  of  being.  If,  however,  the  idea 
should  be  identified  with  concrete  spirit  and  en- 
riched with  a  content  of  volition  and  love,  and  then 
its  exponent  should  cling  to  idealism  as  the  best 
designation  of  his  creed,  the  issue  is  not  one  over 
which  philosophy  need  go  to  i)ieces. 

Again,  in  view  of  conclusions  already  established, 
we  think  a  settlement  of  the  issue  between  natural- 
ism and  supernaturalism  becomes  practicable.  Hux- 
ley points  with  some  concern  to  the  victorious  march 
of  naturalism  in  our  modern  thinking.  Everywhere 
the  supernatural  is  falling  into  discredit,  and  even 
religion,  if  it  would  avoid  the  charge  of  superstition, 
must  assume  a  naturalistic  garb.  Now  there  is  a 
scientific  naturalism  which  is  sound  and,  in  fact, 
necessary.  Science  deals  with  causation  and  de- 
velopment, and  we  have  seen  that  these  are  categories 
of  the  natural  series.  Not  only  the  sciences  of  nat- 
ure but  psychology  and  history  are  obliged  to  be 
naturalistic  in  this  sense.  Now  between  such  nat- 
uralism and  spiritualism  there  is  no  issue.  The 
cause  and  the  movement  may  be  both  spiritual  and 
material.     ^Tien,  however,  naturalism  is  carried  over 

*  In  this  we  simply  reassert  the  position  which  McCosh  and  the 
Scottish  thinkers  maintain  against  wliat  may  be  called  phenomenal 
idealism. 


308  BASAL   CONCEPTS   IN   PHILOSOPHY 

into  metaphysics  as  an  exclusive  category  it  becomes 
false.  The  first  presupposition  of  metaphysics  is  the 
Absolute,  which  is  both  transcendent  and  super- 
natural. The  metaphysical  ground  of  an  adequate 
world-theory  is  a  synthesis  of  the  natural  and  i^he- 
nomenal  with  this  supernatural  ground.  MetajDliy- 
sics  must  affirm  a  synthesis  of  natural  and  super- 
natural, and  this  synthesis  must  also  be  found  at  the 
heart  of  every  adequate  philosophy  of  religion.  The 
suppression  of  the  supernatural  carries  with  it  the 
death  of  true  naturalism. 

Lastly,  we  have  in  our  inquiry  been  led  to  see 
how  a  rational  solution  of  the  modern  antinomy  be- 
tween the  ideas  of  immanence  and  transcendence  is 
possible.  We  do  not  any  longer  need  to  work  the 
old  treadmill  of  annulling  one  in  the  supposed  in- 
terest of  the  other,  for  we  have  seen  that  they  are 
not  contradictory,  but  rather  complementary  con- 
ceptions. The  first  presupposition  of  all  being  is  a 
self-existent  Absolute  which  stands  as  the  transcen- 
dent ground  and  principle  of  the  world.  The  world 
is  generated  by  the  outgoing  volitional  energy  of 
this  Absolute.  But  the  creative  energy  itself  enters 
into  the  world  as  the  immanent  spring  of  its  exist- 
ence and  development.  The  Creator  is  in  his  world, 
but  he  is  not  wholly  sv/allowed  up  by  it.  A  synthe- 
sis of  immanence  and  transcendence  is  necessary  in 
order  to  rationalize  the  w^orld.  We  are  not  obliged, 
then,  to  be  either  deists  or  pantheists,  but  true 
philosophic  insight  will  lead  us  to  a  religious  posi- 
tion in  which  the  shortcomings  of  both  are  escaped. 


